On " upadhi "
Hidenori
Kitagawa
The technique " upadhi " in Indian logic is usually translated by " condition, " and seems to be understood, I am afraid, b
y many as follows: The argument "There is fire on the hill, because of the smoke" is valid, while the argument "There is smoke on the hill, because of the fire" is not; for there is surely fire where there is smoke, but there is.
(1)
not always smoke where there is fire. However, the latter argument may turn valid if a condition such as contact with damp feul is added. For there is always smoke where there is fire if the latter is in contact with damp feul. In other words, upadhi is a condition with the help of which
an invalid argument may turn valid.
This understanding, however, is not in accord with the generally
accepted definition of upadhi, namely, " sadhya-vyapakatve sati
sadhanizvy-apakah upadhih (That which is a pervader of what is to be proved and
non-pervader of what proves is the upadhi.)." Examine the argument
" This is a cow, because it is a living being ." This argument is apparently invalid. Here, as the readers will see, the nature of having horns satisfies.
the above-quoted definition of upadhi. But this argument remains invalid
even with the help of the fact that the entity pointed out by the word (3)
" this " has horns, i. e. has the nature of having horns. In other words,
(1) Indian logicians' favorite example for this case is the red-heated iron ball, where there is fire but no smoke.
(2) This definition is attributed to Udayana. cf. Nyayakosa p. 179.
(3) To say that some entity has horns is to say that it has the nature of having horns. Generally speaking, X and the nature of having X are of the
(20) On "upadhi " (H. Kitagawa)
the argument " This is a cow, because it is a living being and has horns" is just as invalid as the original argument " This is a cow, because it is
living being."
Let me explain the situation more in detail. First I must explain
what the definition of upadhi "sadhya-vyapakatve sati sadhanavyapakah
upadhih (That which is a pervader of what is to be proved and
non-pervader of what proves is the upadhi.) "-says. Here the word " sa-dhya, " which is translated by " what is to be proved, " is the abbreviation
of " sadhya-dharma, " and the word "sadhana, " which is translated by what proves, " is the abbreviation of " sadhana-dharma." The word
"dharma " means property, and therefore " sadhy a-dharma " literally means the property to be proved and " sadhana-dharma " the property that proves. Then what are the property to be proved and the property that proves ? When, for example, the argument " There is fire on the hill, because of the smoke " is set forth, the fire is the property to be
proved and the smoke the property that proves. For, the arguer who
has set forth this argument is trying to convince his opponent arguer
that the hill should have the property fire on the ground that it has
the property smoke. Let's put this in a more general way. According to
the terminology of Indian logic, if A possesses B, A is called " dharmin (possessor of dharma or property) " and B " dharma (property)." Contr-asted to the inferential procedure of Aristotelean syllogism, which is based
(4)
on the subsumptive relation between terms, the procedure of the argument of Indian logic may be described as follows: i. e. one points out the fact
same logical effect. The argument, for example, "There is fire on the hill, because of the nature of having smoke (parvato vahniman dhumavattvat) " is just as valid as the argument " There is fire on the hill, because of the smoke (parvato vahniman dhumat)."
(4) Look at the famous example of Aristotelean syllogism. (Major premiss) All human beings are mortal. (Minor premiss) Socrates is a human being. (Conclusion) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
According to the Aristotelean way of thinking the validity of this syllogism
-435-that dharmin A 'possesses dharma B and on the ground of this f act
convinces his opponent arguer of the existence of another dharma C in
the same dharmin A. Here dharma B is the sadhana-dharma (the
pro-perty that proves) and dharma C the sadhya-dharma (the property to be
proved). Then, what are the meanings of the words "vyapaka " and "
avyapaka, " which are translated by "pervader " and " non-pervader "
respectively ? The concept of vyapti or pervasion is one of the most
important concepts of Indian logic. In Indian logic, if everything that
possesses X possesses Y, X is said to be pervaded by Y and Y is said to
pervade X; in other words, Y is a pervader (vyapaka) of X. So, if
everything that possesses X does not necessarily possess Y, Y is a
non-pervader (avyapaka) of X. Thus the meanings of the techniques used in
the definition of upadhi being now explained, let us turn to the meaning zof the definition as a whole . Look at the invalid argument " There is smoke on the hill, because of the fire." Here the contact with damp f eul
satisfies the definition of upadhi. For, everything that possesses smoke
(sadhya-dharma) possesses the contact with damp feul and therefore the
latter is a pervader (vyapaka) of the former; while everything that
possesses fire (sadhana-dharma) does not necessarily possess the contact
with damp f eul and therefore the latter is a non-pervader (avyapaka)
of the former. Thus the contact with damp f eul satisfies the definition tof upadhi .
It is to be noted that in this case the contact with damp f eul actually
helps the sadhana-dharma fire to prove the existence of the
sadhya-dharma smoke on the hill. For, though the argument "There is smoke
on the hill, because of the fire" is invalid, the argument "There is smoke on the hill, because of the fire and because of the contact with damp f eul " is valid. Indeed, there is always smoke where there is fire
if it is in contact with damp feul. However, if we turn to the other
lies in the fact that the extention of the minor term (" Socrates") is sub-sumed by that of the middle term ("human being") and the extention of the latter again by that of the major term ("mortal").
(22) On "upadhi " (H. Kitagawa)
invalid argument " This is a cow, because it is a living being, " the situa-tion is different. Here, living-being-ness or the nature of being a living
being is the sadhana-dharma and cow-ness or the nature of being a cow
is the sadhya-dharma. For in this argument the arguer is trying to
con-vince his opponent arguer that the entity pointed out by the word " this "
possesses the property cow-ness on the ground that it possesses the.
(5)
property living-being-ness. Now, the nature of having horns satisfies
the-definition of upadhi in this case. For, everything that possesses cow-ness-possesses the nature of having horns, but everything that possesses
living-being-ness does not necessarily possess the nature of having horns.
How-ever, as I said at the beginning of this paper, the invalid argument " This is a cow, because it is a living being" remains invalid even when it is, re-stated in the following manner: " This is a cow, because it is a living being and has horns." In other words, the nature of having horns fails
to help the sadhana-dharma living-being-ness to prove the existence of
the sadhya-dharma cow-ness in the entity pointed out by the word " this."
Then what is the function of the upadhi in the Indian system of
logic ? To say briefly, upadhi is not the condition with the help of which
-an invalid argument turns valid; it is rather a symptom through which
we can know the invalidity of the argument. As is already stated,
the-procedure of the argument of Indian logic is to convince one's opponent arguer of the existence of dharma C (the sad hya-dharma, i. e. the property
to be proved) in dharmin A by pointing out the f act that dharmin AA
possesses dharma B (the sadhana-dharma, i. e. the property that proves).
In order to have an argument be conducted under this procedure,
how-ever, it is necessary to have the relation that everything that possesses.
dharma B should also possess dharma C, i. e. dharma C is a pervader,
(vyapaka) of dharma B. But, if dharma C is a pervader of dharma B,
there is no scope for a upadhi to exist, which is defined to be a
pervader-(5) It is to be noted that to say that something possesses cow-ness is to say that it is a cow, and that to say that something possesses living- being-ness is to say that it is a living being.
-433-of what is to be proved (dharma C) and
non-pervader of what proves (dharma B). Why ?
Look at Figure I. It shows the relation that
.dharma C is a pervader of dharma B . The area
encircled by line b (Let's call it " area B.") is the
area where all the entities that possess dharma
B exist, and the area encircled by line c (Let's call it " area C.") is the area where all the entities
that possess dharma C exist. Since no part of area B is outside area C, every entity in area B is bound to be in area C, i. e. every entity that' possesses dharma B' must possess dharma C. Thus the relation that dharma C is a pervader of dharma B is shown by Figure I. Now, to say that upadhi is a pervader of what is to be proved and that it exists is to say
(s)
that there is such a thing D as satisfies Figure II, where the area encircled
by line d (Let's call it "area D.") is the area
where all the entities that possess D as their
dharma exist. Again, to say that upadhi is a non-pervader of what proves and that it exists is to say that we should be able to draw a figure where at least some part of area B is outside area D.
But, is it possible for any part, of area B to be outside area D, if, as is shown by Figures I and II,
no part of area B is allowed to be outside area C and no part of area C is allowed to be outside area D ? So, if dharma C is a pervader of dharma B, there is no scope for such a thing D to exist as is a pervader of dharma C and at the same time a non-prevader of dharma B, i.e. there is no scope f or a upadhi to exist. Look at Figures III and IV. Figure III shows that it is impossible for any part of area B to be outside area D if no part of area B is allowed to be outside area C and no part of area
Figure I
Figure II
(6) The expression " dharma D " is intentionally avoided here. For upadhi is not required to be a dharma of d harmi n A, of which d harmas B and C are
(24) On " upadhi " (H. Kitagawa)
C is allowed to be outside area D. Figure IV shows
that in order to have such a thing D as is a
pervader of dharma C and non-pervader of dharma
B, it is necessary that at least some part of area B should be allowed to be outside area C; which is to say that the relation that dharma C is a
pervader of dharma B should not hold. Now, if
the relation that dharma C is a pervader of
dha-rma B does not hold, the argument of the type
"There is dharm a C in dharmin A, because of
dharma B " is invalid. Thus the existence of D, i. e. the existence of the upadhi, is a symptom
through which we can know the invalidity of
arguments.
This may be confirmed, for example, by the
following statement of the Nyayabodhini: " vahnir
dhuma-vyabhicari, dhuma-vyapakardrendhanasamyoga-vyabhicaritvad,
(7) (8)
tatvadivat ((Assertion:) Fire is not pervaded by smoke, (i. e. the existence of fire cannot be a valid reason for the existence of smoke). (Reason:) Because it is not pervaded by the contact with damp feul which pervades
(9)
smoke. (Example:) Like pot-ness etc." Apparently, this is an argument
Figure III
Figuer N Figure IV
(7) See, for example, Tarkasamgrahah dipika-nyayabodhini-samalamkrtal (Nirnayasagara Press) p. 34.
(8) To avoid unnecessary confusion I have here translated " vyabhicarin " by " is not pervaded by ." The Nyayabodhini defines vyabhicaritvam as vam. Cf. (7).
(9) Some readers may wonder why pot-ness can be an example here. Well, it possesses both the sadhana-dharma caritvam, i. e. the nature of not being pervaded by the contact with damp feul which pervades smoke) and the sadhya-dharma (dhuma-vyabhicaritvam,
i. e. the nature of not being pervaded by smoke). Indeed, that which possesses, pot-ness (i. e. a pot) does not necessarily possess the contact with damp feel which pervades smoke; and also it does not necessarily possess smoke.
-431-that proves the invalidity of the argument " There is smoke on the hill, because of the fire" on the ground that there is such a thing as contact with damp f eul that pervades smoke but does not pervade fire, i. e. that
(10)
satisfies the definition of upadhi. Or, more briefly the first half of Karika.
140 of the Siddhantamuktavali may well be a confirmation. It reads as
follows: " vyabhcarasyanumanam upadhes to prayojanam (Now, the
func-tion of the upadhi is (to make it possible for us) to infer the invalidity [of arguments).)."
* I gratefully acknowledge that this paper is one of the results of my study in India under Muni Jambuvijaya (Deciple of the late Muni Bhuvanavijaya)
in 1963 under the sponsorship of 民 圭 教 育 協 會 (The Institute of Democratic
Education, Tokyo).
(10) Remember that smoke and fire are respectively the sadhya-dharma and the sadhana-dharma of the argument in question " There is smoke on the hill, because of the fire."
