A Compar i s onoft heAmer i canandJapanes eCas es TakuyaSas aki
Ⅰ Introduction
Ⅱ TheLegaciesandLessonsofthePacificWar
Ⅲ TheOutbreakoftheColdWar
Ⅳ TheEvolutionoftheColdWar
Ⅴ TheIssueofNuclearWeapons
Ⅵ Conclusion
Ⅰ I nt r oduct i on
Inaclassicstudyofusesofhistoryforpolicymakers,ErnestR.Maywrote
“framersofforeignpolicyareofteninfluencedbybeliefsaboutwhathistoryteaches orportends. Sometimes,theyperceiveproblemsintermsofanalogiesfrom the past. Sometimes,theyenvisionthefutureeitherasforeshadowed by historical parallelsorasfollowingastraightlinefrom whathasrecentlygone
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before.” Thisarticle,startingfrom Mayʼspremise,assumesthattoanimportantdegree JapanandtheUnitedStatesbasedtheirforeignpolicyintheColdWaryearsontheir understandingoftheSecondWorldWaringeneralandthePacificWarinparticular. Questionstobeexploredare:How andinwhatwayshaveAmericanandJapanese memoriesofthePacificWarinfluencedtheirownforeignpolicyintheseyears?; whatkindoflegaciesandlessonshavethewarbequeathedtotheUnitedStatesand Japan?;how havethetwonationsappliedtheselegaciesandlessonstotheirforeign policyissues?
Primaryemphasisforanalysisisplacedonmemoriesofforeignpolicymakers, althoughanattemptismadetodiscussinteractionbetweenpolicymakersandthe generalpublicoverthewarmemories.
Theargumentinthisarticleunfoldsasfollows. First,discussionofanumberof thewarlegaciesandlessonsforthetwocountries. Followingthatisanexamina- tionofbothnationsʼview oftheSovietthreatandtheColdWar. Afterillustrating aninterrelationshipbetweentheirrespectivewarlegaciesandforeignpolicyformu-
lation,thearticlefocusesontheissueofnuclearforcesandforeignpolicy. In conclusion,somesuggestionsformakinguseofthememoriesofthePacificWar towardaconstructiveJapan-U.S.relationshipareoffered.
Ⅱ TheLegaci esandLes s onsoft hePaci f i cWar
FortheAmericanpeople,thePacificWarwasagoodwarinmanyways. The UnitedStatesentereditbywayofJapanʼs“sneak”attackonPearlHarbor,fought itfordemocraticprinciplesagainstatotalitarianregime,andwonadecisivevictory.
ThewarconfirmedAmericaʼsownself-imagethattheUnitedStateswasontheright sideofhistory. Beingconvertedtointernationalism,theAmericanpeoplegrew fullyconfidentoftakinganactiveforeignpolicyabroadinthepostwarworld.
Also,theybecameconvincedthatsufficientmilitarypreparednesswasthecritical elementindefendingnationalsecurity. WhileintheinterwaryearstheUnited Stateshadmainlyreliedoneconomic,financialandculturalmeasuresratherthan militaryonestopromotethenationalinterestandinternationalstability,thePacific Wardemonstratedtheabsolutevalidityofmilitarypowerinmaintainingworld peace.
Inparticular,PearlHarbor,alongwithMunich,werethedecisiveeventsthat shapedthebasicassumptionofpostwarAmericannationalsecuritypolicy. The Japanesesurpriseattack demonstratednotonlythatisolationism wasnolonger tenablebutalsothatconstantvigilanceagainstahostilepowerandastrongmilitary establishmentinpeacetimewereindispensable. PreventingaPearlHarbortypeof attackbecametheforemosttaskforAmericanpolicymakers.
Ineconomicterms,WorldWarIIhadsuccessfullyexpandedtheAmericanecon- omy. TheGrossNationalProduct（GNP）jumpedfrom $91billionin1939to$220 billionin1945;salariesandwagesofworkersmorethandoubled;andunemploy- mentwasvirtuallyeliminated. Theeconomiclessonfrom thewarwasthatinthe faceofagraveinternationalsituation,theUnitedStatescouldexpendenormous resourcesformilitarypurposeswhilemaintainingahighstandardofliving.
Fourthly,theSecondWorldWarseemedtoconfirm thepolicymakersintheview thatautocraticgovernmentofaforeigncountrywouldinevitablyleadtoaggressive behavioroverseasandpresentaseriousmilitarythreattopeace-lovingdemocratic nations. Accordingly,theybelieved,democratizingthetotalitarianAxisregimes shouldbeamatterofthehighestpriorityoncemilitaryoccupationstarted.
Relatedtothisassumption,American officialsfirmly believed thattheGreat Depressionandthefollowingchaoticeconomicsituationinthe1930ʼsgaveriseto
totalitarianregimesandtheirautarkicpractices,whichinturntriggeredtheout- breakoftheSecondWorldWar. TheUnitedStateswasnow determinedtointe- gratethedefeatednationsincludingJapanintoaworldofliberalcapitalistinterna- tionalism onceitachievedtheobjectivesofoccupationpolicy.
Lastly,thePacificWarplayedanessentialpartinrectifyingracialandethnic discriminationathome. SinceWashingtonhadtorefutetheJapanesechargethat theUnited Stateswasfighting forwhitepeople,itcould notafford to neglect remedyinglegaldiscriminationthatexistedagainstcitizensofChineseethnicback- ground. In 1943,following an announcementofan end ofthe extraterritorial unequaltreatieswithChina,theFranklinD.Rooseveltadministrationabrogatedthe immigration law dating to 1882thathad banned Chineseimmigrantsand their eligibilityfornaturalization. Congressreadilyconcurred（Threeyearslater,Con- gressgranted thesamestatusto Filipinosand Asian Indians). TheRoosevelt administrationtookthesestepsevenwhileitforced120,000Japanese-Americans residingintheWestCoasttoresettlethroughoutthewestern
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states.
Quitenaturally,theJapanesepeoplehadafundamentallydifferentoutlookonthe PacificWar. Forthem,itwastheworstexperienceinhistory. Inspiteoftremen- dousmilitaryspendingandapowerfularmedforces,Japannotonlysufferedan overwhelmingdefeatbutalsowitnessedthetotaldevastationofitshomeland. It alsolostallitscolonies. HiroshimaandNagasakicametosymbolizethesheer destructivenessandinhumanityofwar. MostJapanesegrew profoundlyskeptical oftheusefulnessofmilitarypowerinprotectingtheirwell-being. Thesickening revelationsaboutthenumerousatrocitiescommittedintheoccupiedterritoriesand themistreatmentJapangaveitswarprisonersandcivilianinterneesfurtheraroused thepeopleʼsdisgustatthewarandthemilitary. ThroughtheInternationalMilitary TribunalfortheFarEasttheJapanesepeopleknew forthefirsttime,amongother things,theKwantungArmyʼsplotandextensiveinvolvementintheManchurian IncidentandtheNankingMassacreof1937.
ThewaralsobroughttheJapaneseeconomyintoacompleteshambles;many wereforcedtofacehungerandstarvation. Thericeharvestof1945droppedtoa new low,halfofthe1933level. TheJapanesegovernmentbecamegravelyworried overtheprospectthatabout10millionpeoplemightdieoffamine. Onlythetimely Americanfoodreliefavertedthemassivestarvation. AsaresultofthewarJapan lost30% ofitsnationalwealth. Itwasnotuntilthemid-1950ʼswhen Japanʼs economyfinallyreturnedtotheprewarlevel. InthecaseofJapan,thewarhadnot
paidinanyrespect.
Throughtheseexperiences,theJapanesepeoplegainedastrongsenseofrevulsion againstwarandmilitarypower. ThepublicconsensuswasthatthePacificWar wasaterriblemistakeandthiskindofmistakeshouldneverberepeated. Conve- nientlyforgettingthattheyhadenthusiasticallysupportedthewar,theJapanese peoplefeltsomehow victimizedbyit,blamedthemilitaryforstartingit,andwere determinedtoreestablishJapanʼsinternationalpositionbymeansotherthanmili- tary.
Thispublicperceptionlaidbehindanalmostenthusiasticembraceofthenew constitutioninwhichArticle9renouncedtheuseofarmstoresolveinternational conflict. PrimeMinisterShigeruYoshidainitiallyendorsedtheprovision,byclaim- inghistorydemonstratedthat“recentmajorwarshadbeenfoughtinthenameof self-defenseofthenation. TheManchurianIncidentwassuchacase. Sowasthe PacificWar.”Onanotheroccasion,hedeclaredthatJapanwasaheadoftheworld onrenouncingwar.
ThesheerreluctanceoftheJapanesepeopletotakemilitarymeasuresinany internationaldisputemightbeoneofthemostsignificantlessonsthattheyhad drawnfrom thePacificWar. Suddenly,theUnitedStatesandJapanfoundthem- selveschangingsidesastotheirperceptionoftheeffectivenessofmilitarypowerin protectingnationalsecurity.
Also,instrikingcontrasttothecaseoftheU.S.,whichwastoembarkonanactive, dynamic,andglobalforeignpolicy,Japanbecamecautious,almosttimidintaking anactivepartininternationalaffairsoutsideitsvicinity,andgrew ratherreactive toexternalevents. JapanʼsegregiousfiascoinconstructingtheGreaterEastAsia Co-ProsperitySphereanditsutterdefeatinthePacificWarhadlargelydetermined thispassive
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attitude.
Ⅲ TheOut br eakoft heCol dWar
Sovietforeignactionsin1939-40hadalreadyimpressedAmericanpolicymakers withmanycharacteristicsreminiscentofthemilitaryexpansionbyNaziGermany andImperialJapan. Inparticular,SovietactionsagainstPoland,Finland,andthe Balticnationsinfuriated
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them.
InearlyDecember1939,PresidentRoosevelt,whohadrefrainedfrom publicly attackingSovietconductsinceitsconclusionofthenonaggressiontreatywithNazi Germany,announcedthemoralembargo“ofairplanes,aeronauticalequipmentand materialsessentialtoairplanemanufacture”against“nationsobviouslyguilty”of
the“unprovokedbombingandmachinegunningofcivilianpopulationsfrom theair.” Hehadclearlyinmindthreenations:theSovietUnion,Germany,andJapan. Inthe samemonth,theAmericanChargeinIranapprovinglyreportedbacktheIranian MinisterofFinanceʼsremarksduringtheirconversationwheretheMinisterhad warnedthat“notunlikeJapanintheFarEast,theSovietswerenowplanningaʻnew orderʼfortheMiddleEastbyadroitopportunism andacynicaldefianceofreason and
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justice.”
Thefollowingsummer,StateDepartmentʼsLoyHenderson,whowastobecomea chiefarchitectoftheTrumanDoctrinesomeyearslater,leveledanimplicitcriticism againsttheRooseveltadministrationʼsapparentlyconciliatoryattitudetowardthe SovietUnion. “IstheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatestoapplycertainstandards ofjudgmentandconducttoaggressionbyGermanyandJapanwhichitwillnotapply toaggressionbytheSovietUnion［?］.... IstheUnitedStatestocontinuetorefuse torecognizethefruitsofaggressionregardlessofwhotheaggressormaybe,orfor reasonsofexpediencytocloseitseyestothefactthatcertainnationsarecommitting aggressionupontheirneighbor［?s］”Hiscolleague,EdwardPage,Jr.,sharedthe sameview oftheSovietideologicalthreat. Heobserved in October1940that althoughtheSovietUnionhadconcludedaseriesofnon-aggressionagreementswith neighboring nations such as Finland,Latvia,Estonia,Lithuania,Poland,and Rumania,theSovietarmyhadinvadedPolandandtheBalticnationsandoccupied theBessarabianandBucovinaprovincesofRumania. ThisSovietbehaviordemon- strated,hecharged,thenon-aggressionagreements“werewantonlysweptasideina mannerlegallyandethicallyindistinguishablefrom theaggressiveactscommitted byGermany,Italy,andJapan....”Sovietleaders“haveneverdepartedfrom the ultimate aim to enlarge theirdomain and to include underthe Sovietsystem additionalpeopleand
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territories.”
Whiletheseanti-Sovietperceptionsbecamegraduallysubmergedunderthesur- facewiththeoutbreakofGerman-SoviethostilitiesinJune1941,theyresurfaced towardtheendofWorldWarII. UnderSecretaryofStateJosephGrew,whohad beenanAmericanAmbassadortoJapaninthe1930ʼs,issuedadirewarninginMay 1945:“［A］saʻwartoendwars,ʼthewarwillhavebeenfutile,fortheresultwillbe merelythetransferoftotalitariandictatorshipandpowerfrom GermanyandJapan toSovietRussiawhichwillconstituteinfutureasgraveadangertousasdidthe Axis....”
InaspeechonOctober31,1945,SecretaryofStateJamesF.Byrnesreiteratedthe beliefprevalentamonghissubordinatesthatassumedthecloseinterrelationship
betweeninternalbehaviorofstatesandtheirexternalone. “Wehavelearnedby bitterexperienceinthepasttenyearsthatNaziandFascistplansforexternal aggressionstartedwithtyranniesathomewhichwerefalselydefendedasmattersof purelylocalconcern. Wehavelearnedthattyrannyanywheremustbewatched,for itmaycometothreatenthesecurityofneighboringnationsandsoonbecomethe concernofallnations.”TheseviewswerenolongerrestrictedtotheDepartmentof State. In June 1945,Navy Secretary James V. Forrestalasserted that the dynamicsofphilosophyofHitler,Mussolini,StalinandHirohito“tendedtowardthe concentrationofpowerinthestate.”Threemonthslater,heclaimedaracialaffinity betweentheJapaneseandtheRussianpeopleincontendingthattheSovietswerenot trustworthy. “［T］heRussians,liketheJapanese,areessentiallyOrientalintheir thinking,anduntilwehavealongerrecordofexperiencewiththem onthevalidity ofengagements,...itseemsdoubtfulthatweshouldendeavortobuytheirunder- standingandsympathy.... Therearenoreturnson
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appeasement.”
ThatPresidentHarryS.Trumannaturallyanddramaticallymadeuseofthe ominousimageoftheformerAxisenemiesinexplaininganew courseofAmerican foreignpolicywasnotthereforesurprising. Inhismajoraddresstoajointsession ofCongressonMarch12,1947,heannouncedthat“Thepeoplesofanumberof countriesoftheworldhaverecentlyhadtotalitarianregimesforceduponthem againsttheirwill”anddeclaredthatitmustbe“thepolicyoftheUnitedStatesto supportfreepeopleswhoareresistingattemptedsubjugationbyarmedminoritiesor byoutside
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pressures.”
TrumanshowedexactlythesameresponsewhenheheardthenewsoftheKorean WarinJune1950;hisimmediatereactionwastosearchforaparallelinrecent history. “Inmygeneration,thiswasnotthefirstoccasionwhenthestronghad attackedtheweak. Irecalledsomeearlierinstances:Manchuria,Ethiopia,Austria.
Irememberhow eachtimethatthedemocraciesfailedtoactithadencouragedthe aggressorstokeepgoingahead. Communism wasactinginKoreajustasHitler, Mussolini,andtheJapanesehadactedten,fifteen,andtwentyyearsearlier.”Six monthslater,inaStateoftheUnionmessagetoCongress,Trumanagainexpressed hisstrongconviction:“Ifthedemocracieshadstoodup againsttheinvasion of Manchuriain1931,ortheattackonEthiopiain1935,ortheseizureofAustriain 1938,iftheyhadstoodtogetheragainstaggressiononthoseoccasionsastheUnited NationshasdoneinKorea,thewholestoryofourtimewouldhavebeen
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different.” WiththecomingoftheColdWartoAsiaandtheChinesemilitaryinterventionin theKorean War,thetotalitarian analogy wasnow also applied to China. In
respondingtotheIndochinaCrisis,PresidentDwightD.Eisenhowerwrotealetterto BritishPrimeMinisterWinstonS.ChurchillonApril5,1954,urgentlyaskingfor
“unitedaction”tocountertheChinesemilitarymenaceandinvokingtheircommon memories:“［W］efailedtohaltHirohito,Mussolini,andHitlerbynotactinginunity andintime.... Mayitnotbethatourtwonationshavelearnedsomethingfrom thatlesson?”Thefollowingyear,inthemidstoftheTaiwanStraitCrisis,Eisenh- oweragainwrotetoChurchill,claimingthat“Icomparedtheaggressivenessofthe RedChineseintheFormosaStraitwiththatoftheJapaneseinManchuriaandthe NazisinEuropeinthe1930s. Concessionswereno
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answer.”
Alloftheseviewsillustrated thedominantview ofAmerican foreign policy makersastotheColdWar:TheUnitedStateswasagainwagingafiercestruggle againstapowerfultotalitarianstatesetonworldconquest. Inthatsense,theCold WarwasWorldWarThree.
FormostJapanese,theColdWarwasatotallydifferentstory. Thelastthingthe Japanesepeoplewouldhaveimaginedwasthattheirprewarmilitaryactionshad influencedinsomewaytheAmericanviewsoftheSovietthreat. Neitherwould theyhaveconceivedthatPearlHarborhadformedalastinglessonforAmerican policymakers. Rather,asPrimeMinisterNaruhikoHigashikuniʼsfollowingcom- mentofSeptember1945demonstrated,assoonasthewarwasover,theJapanese started to equate Hiroshima and PearlHarbor,obviously trying to evade the responsibilityforhavingstartedawar. “PeopleofAmerica,wonʼtyouforgetPearl Harbor?.... WepeopleofJapanwillforgetthedevastationwroughtbytheatomic bomb.... Thewarisended. Letusnow bury
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hate.”
Naturally,then,instarkcomparisontotheAmericanpeoplewhoregardedthe ColdWarasanotherworldwar,theJapanesepeoplesaw itsomethingsimplyas imposedbyoutsideforces. Nonetheless,manyconservativeJapanesewelcomedthe outbreakoftheColdWar. TheyexpectedthataU.S.-Sovietstrugglewouldleadto alessharshAlliedcontrolofJapanandpromoteJapanʼsearlyreentryintointerna- tionalsociety. FuturePrimeMinisterNobusukeKishi,whohadbeenarrestedasa ClassA warcriminal,notedinhisdiarydatedAugust11,1946,thathisSugamo PrisoninmatesagreedinseeingthebreakupoftheGrandAlliance“asagoodchance forrevivalofJapan”andbecauseofthisnew internationalsituation,“hisspirits soaredforthefirsttimeinalong
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time.”
AsKishiexpected,theColdWarinAsiachangedtheAmericanpolicytoward Japan. WhenSecretaryoftheArmyKennethRoyallinhisJanuary1948speech
stronglyadvocatedaJapaneseeconomicreconstructioninthefaceoftheCommunist threatinAsia,Yoshidafeltencouraged. Twomonthslater,GeorgeF.Kennan, DirectorofthePolicyPlanningStaffoftheStateDepartment,cametoTokyoto consultwith GeneralDouglasMacArthur,a visitwhich paved theway forthe adoptionofNSC(NationalSecurityCouncil)13/2. Thisdocumentarguedthat
“economicrecoveryshouldbemadetheprimaryobjective”oftheU.S.policyin Japan“forthecomingperiod”andthatSCAP(SupremeCommanderforAllied Powers)shouldbeadvisedtoterminatethereparationsprogram soon,thusshifting thegoalofoccupationalpolicyfrom democratizationtoeconomicrehabilitation. It didnottakelongbeforewarcriminalsincludingKishistartedtobe
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released.
WiththecomingoftheColdWartoAsia,theJapanesegovernmenthaddeter- minedtorelyforitssecurityontheUnitedStates. Asearlyasthesummerof1947, ForeignMinisterHitoshiAshidaproposedtoanAmericanofficialanagreementby whichincaseofcontingency,theU.S.woulddefendJapanbysendingarmedforces. InMay1950,PrimeMinisterYoshidainformedJosephDodgethroughhisspecial representative,HayatoIkeda,aJapanesereadinesstoacceptthepresenceofAmer- icanforcesforthesecurityofJapan. Thisformulabecametheprototypeofthe Japan-U.S.securitypactof1951.
TheKoreanWaracceleratedthisevolutionarytrendinAmericanpolicytoward Japan. ItexpeditedtheJapaneseeconomicrecovery,redoubledtheAmericaneffort toarriveataJapanesepeacesettlementandledtoconcludingasecuritypactwith Japan. TheTrumanadministration,insettingforthprinciplesontheJapanese PeaceTreatyonNovember24,1950,proposedthattheformerAlliedpowersshould renouncereparationsclaimsin principleand should placeno restriction on the Japanese economic recovery and rearmament. These termsformed the basic frameworkoftheSanFranciscoPeaceTreaty.
TothegreatsatisfactionoftheJapanesegovernment,theSanFranciscoTreaty providedforalenientpeace,thanksinlargemeasuretothegoodofficesofthe U.S.government. JohnFosterDullessuccessfullyquelledcomplaintsandprotests from WesternalliessuchastheUnitedKingdom,thePhilippines,AustraliaandNew Zealand. TheTreatydidnotbanJapaneserearmament;nordiditdemandpunitive reparationsfrom Japan. ItonlystipulatedthatJapandidhavetopayreparations totheformerAlliedpowersaccordingtoitslimited
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resources.
Meantime,muchtothedistressofotherAsiancountries,Japanfailedtofaceup squarelytothepartithadplayedinthebitterhistoryofthe1930ʼsand40ʼs. The Japanesepeopleweresatisfied simply to seea numberofformermilitary and
governmentofficialsprosecutedandexecuted. ThattheUnitedStatesdidnotinsist onthematteroncetheColdWarstartedwasessentialinallowingJapantoturna deafeartoitsAsianneighbors. Althoughthesecountriescontinuedtovoicetheir concern,theywerenotpowerfulenoughtoforceJapanandtheUnitedStates. The internationalostracism ofChina,whichhadsufferedthemostfrom theJapanese aggression,wasanadditionalandevencrucialelementintheplayingoutofthis issue.
FollowingtheSanFranciscoconference,Washington,byhelpingJapanʼsapplica- tiontotheWorldBank,theIMF,andtheGATT,furtherhastenedtointegrateJapan into theU.S.-led multilateraleconomicsystem. BecauseoftheCold War,the Japanesepeoplewereabletoreapmajorpoliticalandeconomicbenefitsunderthe militaryumbrellaprovidedbytheUnitedStates,whileremainingcomplacentabout blamingtheirmilitaryforwhathadhappened in thePacificWarand averting sufficientatonementfortheirownwaratrocities. ThisstancereceivedanAmer- icantacitassent,fortheUnitedStateshadanenormousstakeinrebuildingastrong andanticommunistJapanincontainingcommunism in
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Asia.
Still,theAmericantransformationofJapanintoaliberal-democraticandprosper- oussocietyhasstoodasabrilliantsuccess. Thishasbeenthemostenduringlegacy oftheAmericanoccupationofJapan. Commondemocraticvalueshaveformeda firm bond between the two nationsand have constituted the cornerstone for maintaining a stable Asia-Pacific region. Thisachievementwasallthe more remarkableandevenironicbecauseGen. MacArthur,whohadbeenresponsiblefor a seriesofdemocraticreforms,wasan ardentanti-New Dealerand a staunch conservative.
Ⅳ TheEvol ut i onoft heCol dWar
PaulH.Nitze,whowassoontobecometheveryembodimentofthepostwar nationalsecuritypolicy,visitedHiroshimaandNagasakiinthefallof1945asa memberoftheUnitedStatesStrategicBombingSurveyfollowinghisinspectiontrip inEurope. Afterthesurvey,NitzesubmittedasummaryreportonthePacificWar whereheemphasizedtheneedforcivildefensemeasures,scientificresearchand development,effectiveintelligencecapabilities,unificationofthearmedforces,and themaintenanceofstrongmilitarystrength. NitzereferredtothelessonofPearl Harborintheconcludingpartofthereport. “TheJapanesewouldhavenever attackedPearlHarborhadtheynotcorrectlyassessedtheweaknessofourdefenses inthePacificandhadtheynotincorrectlyassessedthefightingdeterminationofthe
UnitedStateswhenattacked.”NitzeʼssummaryreportonthePacificWarwas importantsinceitcouldberegardedastheforerunnerofNSC68andNSC5724 theGaitherReport ,twohighlysignificantNSCdocumentsinColdWarhistory.
NitzeturnedouttobetheprincipalfigurewhodraftedtheseNSC
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papers. InNSC 68ofApril1950,Nitzearguedforanimmediate,large-scalebuildupof conventionaland nuclearforces,thecostofwhich,heestimated,would reach approximately$50billionannually. Thisfigurewasmorethanthreetimesthe defensebudgetforfiscal1950. Interestingly,Nitzeconsideredthatthemilitary expansionproposedinNSC68wasnotonlyarealisticwaytocounterthemounting militarythreatoftheSovietUnionbutalsoanalternativetoasurpriseattack againsttheSovietUnion. Inrejectingapreventivewar,NSC68pointedoutthat suchacoursewouldbemorally“repugnant”and“corrosive”tomanyAmericans. Obviously,PearlHarborcastamoralrestraintontheconductofAmericanforeign relations. InpleadingforadramaticincreaseinmilitaryspendinginNSC68,Nitze citedtheeconomiclessonoftheSecondWorldWar. “InanemergencytheUnited Statescoulddevoteupwardof50percentofitsgrossproducttothesepurposes
［militaryexpenditures,foreignassistanceandmilitaryinvestment］(asitdidduring thelastwar),... OneofthemostsignificantlessonsofourWorldWarIIexperi- encewasthattheAmericaneconomy,whenitoperatesatalevelapproachingfull efficiency,canprovideenormousresourcesforpurposesotherthancivilianconsump- tionwhilesimultaneouslyprovidingahighstandardofliving.”TheKoreanWar pushedthedefensebudgetupto$50billionwithoutseriouslyhurtingtheeconomy, anevolutionthatapparentlyboreouttheanalysisofNSC
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68.
InNovember1957,NitzereiteratedthegistofNSC68inNSC5724whichoffered ahighlycriticalassessmentoftheEisenhoweradministrationʼscontainmentpolicy.
Rejectingtheadministrationʼsfiscalconservatism,theGaitherreportpointedout againtheeconomicexpansionduringWorldWarII. “Thiscountryisnowdevoting 8.5% ofitsproductiontodefense,and10% toallnationalsecurityprograms. The Americanpeoplehavealwaysbeenreadytoshoulderheavycostsfortheirdefense whenconvincedoftheirnecessity. Wedevoted41% ofourGNPtodefenseatthe heightofWorldWarIIand14% duringtheKorean
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War.”
ThosewhoparticipatedinthemakingoftheGaitherReportwereprominent bipartisan figureslikeRobertLovett,John McCloy,William Fosterand Nitze.
Thisdocumentformed theblueprintofnationalsecurity policy forthecoming Democraticadministrationwhichallofthem weretoserveinvariouscapacities.
IntheheydayoftheColdWar,PearlHarboralsoprovidedpolicymakerswitha symbolicandusefulmetaphorforexplainingtothepublicthegraveinternational situation. Inthelate1950ʼswhentheSovietmilitarythreatseemedtorisesharply, themostfrequentcomparisontobeusedwasPearlHarbor. InJuly1955,Senators HenryJacksonandClintonAnderson,predictinginalettertothePresidentthat SovietpossessionofanICBM couldwellleadtoa“nuclearPearlHarbor,”demand- edthatheshouldputtheICBM ona“wartimefooting”withacrashprogram and giveitthehighestnationalpriority.
InthewakeofSputnik,EdwardTeller,the“father”oftheH-bomb,toldthatthe UnitedStateshadlost“abattlemoreimportantandgreaterthanPearlHarbor.” SenatorW.StuartSymingtonoftheSenateArmedServicesCommitteedescribed Sputnik asa“technicalPearlHarbor”and maintained thattheSovietsatellite destroyedtheEisenhoweradministrationʼsclaim thattheUnitedStatesenjoyeda qualitativeifnotquantitativemilitaryleadovertheSovietUnion. LyndonJohnson, SenateMajorityLeader,statedinhisopeningremarksintheSenatehearings:“We meettodayintheatmosphereofanotherPearlHarbor.”JosephW.Alsop,oneofthe mostinfluentialjournalistsinthepostwarperiod,observed in hisJanuary 1960 columnthattheUnitedStateswaslaggingbehindtheSovietsinmissilecapabilities andwarnedthat“somethingmuchworsethanPearlHarborcannow betheresult.” EvenPresidentEisenhower,whoemphaticallyrefutedthePearlHarboranalogy inthemissilegapcontroversy,resortedtothismetaphorindefendingasecretaerial reconnaissanceoverSovietterritory. When theU-2affairaborted hisvisitto Moscow inMay1960,Eisenhowerjustifiedtheflightbysayinginapressconference that“NobodywantsanotherPearl
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Harbor.”
ThePearlHarboranalogywasagainfrequentlyinvokedduringtheCubanMissile Crisis,whichbroughtthetwosuperpowersclosertonuclearwarthananyother crisisintheColdWaryears. AccordingtoErnestR.MayandPhilipD.Zelikow,“In thedebatesrecordedonKennedyʼstapes,PearlHarborhasapresenceaspervasive asMunich.... AbsentPearlHarbor,thewholedebateabouttheSovietmissilesin Cubamighthavebeendifferent,forsupposedlessonsfrom thePearlHarborattack shapedtheintelligencecollectionapparatusthatinformedKennedyofthemissiles andkepthim andhisadvisersabreastofday-to-daydevelopments. Mostimportant ofall,PearlHarborserved asa conclusiveexampleoftheproposition thata secretivegovernmentmightpursueitsambitions,orrelieveitsfrustrations,by adoptingcoursesofactionthatobjectivelyseemedirrationalorevensuicidal. This propositionhauntsdiscussionofSovietmotivesandpossibleSovietreactionsduring
themissilecrisis.”Inotherwords,whattheExComm membersmostfearedwas“a PearlHarborinreverse.”GeorgeBall,forinstance,arguedthatapromptairstrike withoutwarningwasakindofconductthatmightbeexpectedoftheSovietUnion.
SecretaryofStateDeanRusksharedthesamefear. Rusktoldlaterthatwhenhe heardtheFBIreportthatSovietdiplomatsweredestroyingsensitivedocumentsat theirembassyinWashington,itremindedhim thatJapanesediplomatshadburned documentsthenightbeforePearlHarbor.
Atthesametime,anAmericansurpriseattackwasoutofthequestion. Robert Kennedyexplainedthatsuchanattack was“notinourtraditions.”Hisremark infuriatedDeanAchesonwhobelievedtheanalogyasinappropriatebecausethe Presidentrepeatedly warned againstinstallmentofthe nuclearweapon in the Hemisphere. Nonetheless,apparentlytouchingthenervesofotherparticipantsin theExComm,itwasinstrumentalinwinningtheirsupportforthenavalblockade.
LikeNSC68,themoralinhibitionwassignificantinrejectingapreventivewarstrike likePearl
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Harbor.
In formulating Japan policy,theUnited Stateswasdetermined to preventa resurgenceofJapanesemilitarism. ItsdefenserebuildingshouldnotleadJapanto thedominantpositionintheAsia-Pacificregionthatithadoccupiedinthe1930ʼs. Kennan,thekeyarchitectoftheshiftinoccupationpolicy,contendedinJanuary 1948that“Ourprimarygoal”wastoinsurethatAmericansecurity“mustnever againbethreatenedbythemobilizationagainstusofthecompleteindustrialarea［in theFarEast］asitwasduringthesecondworldwar.”ThesecuritypactwithJapan wasconsideredasoneoftheindispensablevehiclesforrestrainingJapan. Asin Europe,UnitedStatesColdWardiplomacyinAsiawastoimplementadualcontain- mentoftheformerenemy Japan and thepresentenemy international
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communism.
TheJointChiefsofStaffʼsmemorandum dated April9,1954to Secretary of DefenseCharlesWilson illustrated thecase. “［I］tbelievesthatso long asthe UnitedStatesfurnishestheprincipaloffensiveairandnavalelementsofthecom- binedmilitaryforcesintheFarEast,adequatesafeguardsagainsttherecrudescence ofJapanesemilitarypowerasanaggressiveforcewouldbeprovided.”Thirtysix yearslater,thefirstBushadministrationstillrecitedthesameview initsreporton thestrategicframeworkfortheAsianPacificRim. “TheU.S.-Japanrelationship remainsthecriticallinchpinofourAsiansecuritystrategy.... AsJapanextendsits regionaleconomicinfluence,latentregionalconcernsmayresurface. Increasesin
JapanesemilitarystrengthundertakentocompensatefordecliningU.S.capabilities intheregioncouldproveworrisometoregionalnations,especiallyiftheyperceive JapanisactingindependentoftheU.S.-Japansecurity
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relationship.”
RichardM.NixonandHenryH.Kissingerwerethemostprominentpublicfigures who expressed thisoutlook bluntly. On theeveofthefirstSino-U.S.summit, KissingeradvisedNixontoexplaintotheChinesethattheUnitedStatesdidnot opposerearmamentofJapan,butdidopposea“nuclearJapan.”Nixonagreedwith him,bysayingthattheUnitedStatespolicywasto“keepJapanfrom buildingits own”nuclearbomb and to “opposeJapan ʻstretching outitshandsʼto Korea, Taiwan,Indonesia.”BothmentionedthedangerthatiftheUnitedStatesdidnot restrainJapan,thelattercouldemergeasthemajormilitarypowerinthe
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area.
Liketherepealoftheanti-Chineseimmigrationact,foreignpolicyconsiderations wereagainevidentintherevisionofthe1924ImmigrationandNaturalizationAct. InordertoneutralizeSovietpropagandaonU.S.racialpolicies,Congressapproved theMcCarran-WalterActof1952whichrepealedthe1924Act,thusremovingracial barsonimmigrationandnaturalizationandallocatingasmallannualimmigration quotatoJapanandothernationsoftheAsia-Pacific
24)
Triangle.
Equally,theforeignpolicyimplicationofAfrican-Americansʼlegalstatuswas grave. AsEleanorRooseveltobserved,civilrights“isnʼtanylongeradomestic question itʼsaninternationalquestion,”onethat“maydecidewhetherdemocracy orcommunism winsoutintheworld.”TheAttorneyGeneralstatedinDecember 1952inabriefforthecasesinvolvingsegregationinpublicschools:“Itisinthe contextofthepresentworldstrugglebetweenfreedom andtyrannythattheproblem ofracialdiscriminationmustbeviewed....Racialdiscriminationfurnishesgristfor theCommunistpropagandamills,anditraisesdoubtevenamongfriendlynationsas totheintensityofourdevotiontothedemocraticfaith.”DeanAchesonconcurred.
“Otherpeoplescannotunderstandhow suchapractice［thesegregationofschool childrenonaracialbasis］canexistinacountrywhichprofessestobeastaunch supporteroffreedom,justice,anddemocracy.”
Oneoftheinvolvedcasesledtothe1954SupremeCourtdecisioninthelandmark caseofBrownvs.Board ofEducationof
25)
Topeka.
Bytakingtheinitialstepstowardeliminatingsystematicdiscriminationagainst minorities,theUnitedStatesdemonstratedtotheworldthatitwasgoingtofulfill, albeitgradually,itspubliccommitmenttothedemocraticprinciples.
Toasignificantextent,theVietnam War,themostcolossalblunderinAmerican history,wasaproductofthePacificWar. MajorforeignpolicymakerslikeJohn Kennedy,LyndonJohnson,DeanRuskandRobertMcNamarabelongedtothesame generationwhosharedfirsthandexperiencesofMunich,PearlHarborandWorld WarII. TheyfirmlybelievedthattheUnited Stateshad to repelthemilitary aggressionofthetotalitarianregimeofNorthVietnam. Ruskwasnevertiredof invokingthelessonoftheSecondWorldWar. InMarch1965,hestatedthat“Can thoseofusinthisroom forgetthelessonthatwehadonthisissueofwarandpeace, whenitwasonly10yearsfrom theseizureofManchuriatoPearlHarbor:abouttwo yearsfrom theseizureofCzechoslovakia to theoutbreak ofWorld WarIIin WesternEurope?... Wecannotforgetthisexperience.”Onanotheroccasionhe repeatedthesametheme. “Onceagainwehearexpressedtheviewswhichcostthe menofmygenerationaterriblepriceinWorldWarII. WearetoldthatSoutheast Asiaistoofaraway butsowereManchuriaandEthiopia.”
Johnson too defended hisVietnam policy by stressing thelessonsofhistory.
“Likemostmenandwomenofmygeneration,IfeltthatWorldWarIImighthave beenavoidediftheUnitedStatesinthe1930ʼshadnotgivensuchanuncertainsignal ofitslikelyresponsetoaggressioninEuropeandAsia.”Johnsonechoedthesame themeinhisspeechonApril7,1965:“Thecentrallessonofourtimeisthatthe appetiteofaggressionisneversatisfied. Towithdraw from onebattlefieldmeans onlytoprepareforthe
26)
next.”
ThesepolicymakersadheredtotheunshakableconvictionthattheUnitedStates couldprovidewhateverresourceswerenecessarytoprevailinVietnam. Inthis respect,theeconomiclessonofthePacificWarwasagainevident. Johnsondeclar- edtothenationin1964that“wehavetheresourcesandwehavethewilltofollow thiscourseaslongasitmaytake.”McNamarainformedhismilitaryadvisersin1965 that“thereisan unlimited appropriation availableforthefinancing ofaid to Vietnam. Undernocircumstancesisalackofmoneytostandinthewayofaidto that
27)
nation.”
Bytheearly1970ʼs,theVietnam WarinsteadoftheSecondWorldWarcameto figureprominentlyinthemindsofAmericanpeople. Thelesseningtensionwiththe SovietUnionandChinaandthearrivalofaneraofdetentefurtheredthetrend. As aresult,thememoriesofthePacificWarrecededsteadilyintothebackgroundand thoseoftheVietnam WarbegantohauntcontinuallysubsequentAmericanforeign andmilitarypolicy.
UnliketheUnitedStates,Japanwasnotconvincedthatitssecuritywasseriously threatened by theSovietUnion orChina. Especially toward China,Japan felt historicalandculturalaffinityinterwovenwithaguiltyconscience. Besides,as YoshidapredictedaneventualbreakupoftheSino-Sovietalliance,theallianceʼs inherentunnaturalnessreinforcedtheview thatChinadidnotposeagravemilitary menace.
Moreover,Article9oftheJapaneseconstitution,adeepsenseofpacifism andthe publicʼsprofoundaversiontorevivalofmilitarism imposedaconstantconstraintin buildingtheSelfDefenseForcesandexplainthecautionoftheJapaneseinhandling thedefenseprogram.
WhenJohnFosterDullespressedtheJapanesegovernmenttostartanall-out rearmamentprogram in 1951,Yoshida resisted therequestby referring to the Japaneseconstitution,thenegativeeffectofhugemilitaryspendinguponeconomic recovery,and Japanʼs Asian neighborsʼsecurity concerns. Although Yoshida promisedalimitedrearmamentplan,heregardeditasapricetosatisfytheUnited StatesratherthanasasteptocountertheCommunistthreat. SuccessiveJapanese administrationsfollowedtheYoshidaFormulawhereJapan,relyingforitsmilitary securityontheUnitedStates,shouldfocusoneconomicdevelopmentandproceed withdefenseprogramscarefully. Inevitably,thepaceoftheJapanesedefenseeffort becameaconstantcontentionwiththeUnited
28)
States.
WhileenjoyingthebenefitsbroughtbytheColdWar,Japandidnotwantto embroilitselfdeeplyinit. TheAmericangovernmentknew thatJapanʼsmoderate effortondefensewasintunewithJapanesepublicfeeling. A studyofthePsycho- logicalStrategyBoardinMay1952statedthat“［f］ormanyJapanese,theprospect ofimmediate involvementin anotherwarisviewed with decided revulsion,a circumstancewhichinjectsanemotionalandirrationalelementintopopularopinion regardingrearmament.”NationalIntelligenceEstimate41-58datedDecember23, 1958notedthat“Popularoppositiontotheideaofrearmamentaswellastoitscost willcontinuetorestrictJapanʼsdefenseeffort.”NIE 41-60datedFebruary9,1960 observed“widespread,butatpresentquiescent,neutralistsentimentin
29)
Japan.” Reflectingthepopularperception,theJapaneseUpperHouseadoptedaresolution in1954againstthedeploymentoverseasoftheSelfDefenseForces. In1976the TakeoMikiadministrationdecidedthatJapanshouldlimitdefensespendingto1%
ofGNP“intheinterim period.”Italsosetstrictguidelinesforarmsexportswhich banarmssaletotheCommunistblocandnationsinvolvedininternationalconflict. Itwasonlyin1976whentheUnitedStatesandJapanbegantoconsultondefense
cooperationincaseof
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contingency.
InmarkeddifferencetotheexamplesetbytheUnitedStates,Japanʼsapproachto itsownracialandethnicaldiscriminationagainstminoritygroupshasbeenluke- warm atbest. InthePacificWarJapanhadsupposedlyfoughtfortheliquidation ofEuropeanandAmericancolonialism inAsiaandhadpromisedintheDeclaration of the Great Asian Conference of 1943 the abolition “of systems of racial
31)
discrimination.”
Nonetheless,afterJapanwasdefeatedin1945,itsubsequentlyfailedtoenactany specificlegislationtodealwiththematter. Muchremainstobedoneinthematter ofwidespreaddiscriminationagainstKoreanandChineseresidents. Inadditionto theJapanesefailuretoconfrontracism,numerousstatementsdeliveredbypromi- nentconservativepoliticianswhoglorifiedthebrutalruleovertheKoreanPeninsula andotherareasofAsiareaffirmedtheprevailingimpressioninAsiathatJapan failedtolearnanimportantlessonfrom thePacificWarandcontinuedtoevadeits warresponsibility. AccordingtoaKoreandiplomatwhoparticipatedinnormaliza- tiontalkswithJapan,Yoshidaonceremarkedthat“TherearethreemenIdetest most.... Oneofthem isDr.SyngmanRheeofSouthKorea.... WhenIwasconsul generalin Shenyang,Manchuria,in theprewaryears...,Ivisited the Korean Peninsula severaltimes.... Iunderstand thatJapan,educating thepeopleand developingtheindustrialinfrastructure,agriculturalandforestryindustries,ruled thePeninsulawellandwise. IcannotcomprehendwhytheKoreanpeople,notto mentionDr.Rhee,bitterlyloathethe
32)
Japanese.”
Thiskind ofremark wasnotunusualin certain conservative quarters. As historianTadashiArugapointsout,thesepeoplehavenotbeenforcedtoacknowl- edgethehorribledeedsofJapaneseimperialism simplybecauseJapanlostallits coloniesafterbeing defeated by theUnited States;theanti-Japaneseresistance forcesinEastAsiawerenotdecisiveinexpellingtheJapanesepower. Owingtothe PacificWar,Japanescapedthepainfulprocessof
33)
decolonization.
Againstthisbackground in the1950ʼsand 60ʼs,Japan normalized diplomatic relationswithotherAsiannationswhichhadnotattendedtheSanFranciscopeace conference,andconductedwarreparationsnegotiationswithSoutheastAsiancoun- tries. Inthelatternegotiations,Japannotonlywhittleddownitswarreparations butalsovirtuallyconvertedthereducedreparationsintoaneconomicaidprogram thatpromotedtheJapaneseeconomicre-penetrationintoAsia. TheU.S.encour- agedthisapproach. AchesonhadexplainedtoYoshidathatthereparationsfor-
mulawould“infactbeofbenefittotheJapaneseeconomyinthatitwouldbeenable Japantoemployitsexcessindustrialcapacity,giveemploymenttothepeopleand reestablishtradechannels.”WhenSenatorMikeMansfieldaskedRaymondMoyer, FarEastern program officeroftheForeign OperationsAdministration,in 1954 whetherreparationswouldfacilitateJapanese“penetration”oftheSoutheastAsian markets,Moyeransweredintheaffirmativethatthey“willimmediatelygetthe Japaneseintobusiness,...andtradewill
34)
follow.”
On thisissuetoo,theUnited Stateswasprepared to step in. The massive AmericanmilitaryandeconomicaidgiventotheSoutheastAsiannationswasina senseanindispensablesupplementtotheirreducedreparationsfrom Japan.
Ⅴ TheI s s ueofNucl earWeapons
Sinceitsinception,thepolicyofcontainmenthadfirmlyintegratednuclearforces intoitsvitalcomponent. PresidentTrumanapprovedNSC30inSeptember1948 thatdefined thattheNationalMilitary Establishmentmustbeready to utilize
“promptly and effectively allappropriate means available,including atomic weapons,”intheeventofhostilities. Still,HiroshimaandNagasakicastalong shadow overAmericanforeign
35)
conduct.
Inthe1950ʼs,threemajorcrisesoccurredwhereanuclearoptionwasdebated insidegovernment:TheKoreanWar,theIndochinaCrisisof1954,andthefirst TaiwanStraitCrisisof1954‑1955. Inallofthesecases,theUnitedStatesdecided nottolaunchanuclearattack. Whilethereasonwasdifferentineachcase,one importantfactoragainsttheusealwayscameintoplay:TheUnitedStatesmust considerthemoraldimensionoftheatomicattack,especiallyifitemployedthe weaponagainagainstAsians.
JustbeforeTrumanʼscasualremarkonuseoftheatomicbombintheKorean conflict,JohnEmmerson,JapanexpertintheStateDepartment,hadwrittentoDean Rusk,AssistantSecretaryforFarEasternAffairs,thatatomicbombardmentwould bedisastroustotheUnitedStatesʼstandingintheinternationalcommunity. Indeed, hearingTrumanʼspressconferenceafewweekslater,severalAsiannationsstressed toadministrationofficialstheracistimplicationofusingnuclearbombsagainst
36)
Asians.
AlthoughTrumanrepeatedlyclaimedthathewasnottroubledbythebombingsof thetwoJapanesecities,hewasclearlyhopefulthathewouldneverbeforcedto makeacomparabledecision. InMay1948,intouchingonHiroshimaandNagasaki, hetoldtheChairmanoftheAtomicEnergyCommissionthat“Igavetheorderfor
theothers,andIdonʼtwanttohavetodothatagain,ever.”InhislastStateofthe Unionmessage,Trumanstated:“Wehaveenteredtheatomicage.... Wartoday betweentheSovietempireandthefreenationsmightdigthegravenotonlyforour Stalinistopponents,butalsoofourownsociety,ourworldaswellastheirs....
Suchawarisnotapossiblepolicyforrational
37)
men.”
TheattitudeofTrumanʼssuccessor,Eisenhower,towardnuclearweaponsisnot easytograsp. Ontheonehand,headoptedastrategyofmassiveretaliationin whichnuclearweaponsoccupiedaprominentrole. NSC 162/2inOctober1953 stated that“In theeventofhostilities,theUnited Stateswillconsidernuclear weaponstobeavailableforuseasothermunitions.”Eisenhowerpubliclyexpressed readinesstoemploytheatomicbombincertaincircumstances. Butontheother hand,Eisenhowerwasdeeplycautiousinactuallyapprovingitsuse. In1945hehad opposedtheuseoftheatomicbombagainsttheJapanese,contendingthat“our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use” ofthe weapon. He reiteratedthemoralelementduringtheIndochinaCrisis. “Youboysmustbecrazy.
WecanʼtusethoseawfulthingsagainstAsiansforthesecondtimeinlessthanten years. My
38)
God.”
Again,themoralfactorplayedakeyroleinshapingtheEisenhoweradministra- tionʼsstancetowardthenucleartestsuspensiontalks. Whentheadministration finallyagreedtotheGenevaconferenceinthefallof1958,internationalopinionwas theessentialfactor. Insupportingsuchnegotiations,JohnFosterDullestoldthe Presidentthat“stepsmustbetakentoputclearlybeforetheworldtheU.S.devotion topeaceandtoreductionofarmsburden. Onlybyconcreteactionscanwecounter- actthefalsepicture,alltooprevalentabroad,oftheUnitedStatesasamilitaristic nation....［T］heslightmilitarygainsappeartobeoutweighedbythepolitical losses,whichmaywellculminateinthemoralisolationoftheUnitedStatesinthe coming
39)
years.”
TheissueofnuclearforcesreappearedintheAmericanpoliticalsceneinthefirst halfofthe1980ʼs. InresponsetotheReaganadministrationʼslargestpeacetime defensebuildupandaseriesofrecklessremarksonnuclearwarmadebyadministra- tion officialsincluding thePresident,antinuclearNGOsorganized the Nuclear FreezeMovement,whichinstantlygainedunprecedented,popularsupport. The firstmassivemovementofthiskindinAmericanhistoryforcedtheReaganadminis- trationtotakeamorepositiveposturetowardsarmscontrolwiththeU.S.S.R.
JonathanSchell,authorofthebest-sellerTheFateoftheEarth,vividlydescribedthe horrorofHiroshimaandNagasakiinspreadinghisantinuclearmessage. Nuclear
physicistLuisAlvarez,whohadbeenaboardascientificplaneovertheHiroshima areaonAugust6,1945andlaterparticipatedindevelopingthethermonuclearbomb, hadbytheearly1980ʼswarnedofthedisastrousecologicaleffectofnuclearwar upontheearth. Thetotaldestructionofthetwocitieswasinstrumentalinproject- ingthehorrificimageofnuclearwarontotheconsciousnessoftheAmerican
40)
people.
TheironyoftheNuclearFreezeMovementwasthatRonaldReaganalsobecame equallyhorrifiedbytheprospectofnuclearwarandheturnedouttobeazealous crusaderagainstnuclearweapons. InhismemoirsReaganrecollectedthesobering experience. “ThePentagonsaidatleast150millionAmericanliveswouldbelost inanuclearwarwiththeSovietUnion evenifweʻwon.ʼForAmericanswho survivedsuchawar,Icouldnʼtimaginewhatlifewouldbelike. Theplanetwould besopoisonedtheʻsurvivorsʼwouldhavenoplacetolive.... Mydream,then, becameaworldfreeofnuclearweapons.... Mydeepesthopewasthatsomeday ourchildrenandourgrandchildrencouldliveinaworldfreeoftheconstantthreat ofnuclearwar.”Inordertorealizehishope,Reaganwasreadytogobeyondnuclear freeze,since,accordingtohim,nuclearfreezecouldnotfurtherthecauseofpeace:
“［A］freezenow wouldmakeusless,notmore,secureandwouldraise,notreduce, therisksofwar.”Reaganʼsproposalwas,ofcourse,theSDIwhichwas,atleastin hisjudgment,theonlywaytoeliminatethedangerofnuclear
41)
war.
WhileitisstillcontroversialwhetherornottheSDImovedtheSovietgovernment tomakeaseriesofdiplomaticconcessionsthatfinallyledtotheendoftheColdWar, severalSovietpolicymakersdidacknowledgethattheSDIforcedthem toadmit thattheycouldnotoutspendonmilitarybuildup. Ifthatwasthecase,then,Reaganʼs moraluneasinessaboutnuclearweapons,undoubtedlyprovokedbythefrightful imageofnuclearwar,contributedtowardbringingtheColdWartoan
42)
end.
InJapan,beingantinuclearwithrespecttotheatomicbombwasthenational consensus. TheLuckyDragonincidentwhichoccurredin1954initiatedanall-out antinuclearmovementinJapan. Thecrew oftheJapanesefishingboatwhowere injuredbythefirstU.S.deliverablehydrogenbombintheBikiniAtollwerereported in Japan asthethird nuclearvictims. TheU.S.knew theintenseanti-nuclear feelingprevalentamongtheJapaneseastheStateDepartmentobservedthat“Deep- seatedpacifist,anti-nuclearinhibitionsstemmingfrom Japanʼspre-warandwartime experiencesare likely to dominate Japanʼsdefense policiesforthe immediate future.”
Still,theU.S.governmentgrew concernedoverthepossibilityofanuclearJapan
followingChinaʼsdetonationofanatomicbombinOctober1964. InJanuary1965, DeanRuskassertedthat“Japanshouldthinknotintermsofanindependentnuclear capabilitybutoflong-term defensecooperationwiththeU.S.andtheU.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty,whichiseffectivewhetheranattackisconventionalor
43)
nuclear.” Inthesamemonth,VicePresident-ElectHubertH. HumphreytoldJapanese ForeignMinisterTakeoMikithathe“hadreceivedsomeimpressionthat,sincethe explosionoftheChineseCommunistnucleardevice,Japanandothercountriessuch asIndiahavebeengivingconsiderationtobecomingnuclearpowersintheirown right.”Hesaidhewouldstronglyopposeanycompetitioninthenucleararmsrace byJapan,IndiaoranyothercountryandassuredMikithat“Americannuclear poweristheonlysafeguardforothernations....”Humphreyconcludedhisremarks by expressing hopethatJapan would notengagein theproduction ofnuclear weapons. Mikitriedtodispeltheapprehension. “Japan,ofcourse,hadthecapac- itytoproducenuclearweaponssinceitcouldproduceplutonium.”However,he continued,nuclearenergyshouldbeusedforpeacefulpurposesinsteadofforarms.
“Japanshouldnotenterintoatomicpower
44)
politics.”
ReflectingtheJapanesepublicʼsconsensusagainsttheatomicbomb,theEisaku SatoadministrationlaiddowninDecember1967threenonnuclearprinciples that Japanwillnotpossess,manufacture,orintroducenuclearweaponsintoJapanese territory. FouryearslatertheLowerHousepassedaresolutiononthenonnuclear principles. OntheinstructionoftheForeignMinistry,JapaneseAmbassadortothe U.S. TakesoShimodaassuredanAmericanaudienceinDecember1967that“the presentconsensusisthatJapanshouldnotdevelopitsownnucleardeterrent,andour governmentiscooperatingwiththeUnitedStatestobringabouttheconclusionof anon-proliferating
45)
treaty.”
TheJapaneseconservativesremainedambivalentaboutthenonnuclearprinciples though. TheAmericanEmbassyinTokyoreportedthatformerPrimeMinister Yoshidainmid-1962publiclystatedthatJapanesenucleararmamentmustnotbe ruledout. FuturePrimeMinisterHayatoIkeda,whoseconstituencywasadistrict oftheHiroshimaprefecture,startledhismosttrustedaidbyremarkingin1958that
“Japanhastogonuclear”forself-protection. PrimeMinisterSato,whowasto receiveaNobelPeaceprizeforhisnonnuclearprinciples,didinfactmakeseveral remarksagainsthispublicstandwhileinoffice. InSeptember1969hedescribedto AmbassadorAlexisJohnsonthenonnuclearprinciplesas“nonsense,”andstressed theimportanceofthenuclearumbrellaprovidedbytheU.S. Onanotheroccasion Satotoldthat“thematteroffactisthatanuclearnationhasasubstantialvoiceover
anon-nuclearnation,”suggestinganecessityofnuclearpossession.
Nonetheless,thespecialcommitteeofexpertsformedbySatotostudyanuclear optionarrivedattheconclusionbyearly1970thatbecauseoftechnological,political, diplomatic and strategic restraints,Japan should notproduce itsown nuclear weapons;insteaditshouldrelyonnuclearprotectionextendedbytheU.S. The DefenseAgencyʼsWhitePaperof1970explainedthatalthoughJapanisableto possessasmall-sizednuclearbomb“jurisprudentially,”itrefusestodosoasamatter ofpolicy. JapandidsigntheNuclearNonproliferationTreatyin1970andratified itin
46)
1976.
ThattheJapanesegovernmentneededsixyearstoratifytheNNT demonstrated anuneasinessprevalentamongtheLDPʼsconservativelegislatorsonitsratification.
Furthermore,theJapanesegovernmenthadnointentionofstrictlyenforcingits nonnuclearprinciples. PrimeMinisterSato,innegotiatingthereturnofOkinawa, allegedlyconcludedasecretagreementwithPresidentNixonin1971wherebytheU.
S.reservesarighttointroducenuclearweaponsintotheislandincaseofemergency.
TheJapanesegovernmentalsohasacquiescedinthetransitofAmericannuclear vesselsintoJapanese
47)
territory.
Inspiteofseveralill-conceived remarksmadeby Japaneseleadersand their evasivenessonapplyingnonnuclearprinciples,themajorityoftheJapanesepeople stronglyopposeJapanʼsownnucleardevelopmentfrom moralandethicalviewpoints andagreetolimitthedefenseprogram tothefieldofconventionalforces. The largeantinuclearmovementintheearly1980ʼsfurtherstrengthenedthiswidespread consensus. Still,thisconsensushasbeendirectedagainstJapanesenuclearposses- sion,notagainstthenucleardeterrenceextendedbytheUnitedStates. Inthis respect,asformerPrimeMinisterKiichiMiyazawaadmittedinaninterview,“The Japan-U.S.securitypactinasensehasprotectedArticle9oftheJapaneseconstitu- tion.”ManyJapanesehaveaccepted,albeitreluctantly,thenuclearumbrellapro- videdbytheUnited
48)
States.
Ⅵ Concl us i on
Notsurprisingly,memoriesofthe Pacific Waraffected both American and Japaneseforeignpolicyinmanyways. Nevertheless,whiletheColdWarwasstill goingon,theUnitedStatesandJapandidnotneedtocometogripswitheachotherʼs memoriesofthePacificwarinawaytopromotemutualunderstanding. A strong andstableJapanasabulwarkagainstcommunism tookprecedenceovereverything else. WashingtonandTokyoregularlyduckedPearlHarbor,Bataan,Hiroshima
andNagasaki,andfailedtoconductfrankdiscussionoftheirdifferencesonthese incidents.
TheirfailurepartlyexplainsthatwiththerecedingSovietmilitarythreatandthe rapidriseofJapaneseeconomicpowerinthelate1980ʼs,theJapan-U.S.relationship tookamarkeddownturn. InrespondingtothecumulativetradedeficitwithJapan, journalistTheodoreWhite,whohadbeenabroadthebattleshipMissourionSeptem- ber2,1945toseetheceremonyofsurrender,declaredin1985thatthePacificWar wasstillgoingonandJapanwaswinning. SomeAmericansbegantoarguefor
“containing”Japan;“bashing”Japan becamepopularin the United States. In responsetothisanti-Japanesetrend,deepresentmentaroseinJapan. ThatThe Japan ThatSaysNowasthebest-sellerin1991reflectedsucha reaction. The overwhelmingmilitaryprowesstheUnitedStatesdisplayedintheGulfWargave birthtoanew wordken-Bei（dislikeoftheU.S.). The50thanniversaryofPearl Harbormighthavebeenanexcellentopportunitytoputthemattertorest,butit settlednothing. TheKiichiMiyazawaadministrationdidnotofferanyexpress apologyfortheattack;PresidentBushsaidinanNBC interview thathehadno intentionofapologizingtotheJapanesefortheatomicbombing. Thefiascoover theEnolaGayexhibitsattheSmithsonianMuseum in1995reinforcedtheimpression inJapanthattheAmericanpeoplewerenotwillingtounderstandJapanesesensitiv- itytoHiroshimaand
49)
Nagasaki.
Developmentshaveacquiredanew momentum inrecentyears. TheCalifornia Statelegislaturepassedalaw sothatformerPOWscouldsueJapanesecompanies fortheirwartimeforcedlabor. TheUnitedStatesCongressenactedtheNaziWar CrimesDisclosureActin1998andtheJapaneseImperialGovernmentDisclosureAct in 2000. Theprimary objectiveofthelatterlaw isto directthePresidentto declassify“allclassifiedJapaneseImperialGovernmentrecordsoftheUnitedStates relatingtotheexperimentationandpersecutionbytheJapaneseGovernmentorits alliesofpersonsbecauseofrace,religion,nationalorigin,orpoliticalopinion.”The Bataanveterans,onthesixtiethanniversaryinJune2002,repeatedarequestforan apologyandcompensationfrom theJapanese
50)
government.
Meantime,in July 2001,JapanʼsEducation Ministry approved a controversial history textbook forjuniorhigh schoolstudents. Thefollowing month,Prime MinisterJunichiroKoizumipaidavisittotheYasukuniShrine,where14ClassA warcriminalsareenshrined. ChinaandSouthKoreaswiftlycondemnedthevisit. KoizumirepeatedthevisitstotheShrineinApril2002andJanuary2003,again drawingsharpcriticismsathomeaswellas
51)
abroad.
Thisseriesofeventsillustratethatwearestilllivinginthemanifoldramifications ofthePacificWar;theyalsosuggestprofoundforeignpolicyimplicationsforJapan andtheUnitedStates:MemoriesofthePacificWar,whilestillcastingapowerful shadow on two nationsʼconductoverseas,aretaking on greatimportanceand affectingbilateralrelationship. Whilethehorrendous9/11attacksandthefollow- ingeventsdominatethecurrentinternationalsituation,thetwonationsstillneed confrontandaddresssomefundamentaldifferencesoverthebittermemoriesofthe PacificWarandfindawaytodealwiththe
52)
matter.
Fortunately,wehavesharedliberaldemocraticvalues,developedinterdependent economic bonds,established solid defense cooperation,fostered open societies, encouragedculturalinteraction,andopenedmultiplecommunicationchannels. In particular,maintenanceoftheliberaldemocracyandtheWilsonianinternational economicsystem,andeffortsdirectedtowardeliminatingracialandethnicaldis- criminationarebasiclessonswecouldshare. Ifwehaveanyreasontobeoptimistic aboutsettlingthecomplicatedquestionslefttousbyourwarmemories,itisdueto thesenew legaciesofthelastfifty
53)
years.
Thispaper,originallypreparedatWorkshoponPublicMemory,Tokyo,June22-24,2002, wassummarizedatthe118thAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanHistoricalAssociation, January8-11,2004,Washington,D.C. TheJapaneseversionofthispaperwassubsequently publishedinChihiroHosoya,AkiraIriye,andRyoOshiba,eds.,KiokutoshitenoParuHaba
（PearlHarborasMemory）(Tokyo:2004),pp.170‑92. Iam deeplygratefultoProfessors Hosoya,Iriye,andOshibaforprovidingopportunitiestodiscussthepaper,andtoMarc Gallicchio,HaruoIguchi,MaXiaohua,andFrankNinkovichforvaluablesuggestions. I am indebtedtoDennisJ.NolanforcheckingtheEnglish.
Notes
1) ErnestR.May,“Lessons”ofthePast:TheUseandMisuseofHistoryinAmerican ForeignPolicy（New York:1973),p.ix.
2) Forageneraldiscussionofhow historicalanalogiesandwarmemoriesinfluence Americanforeignpolicydecisions,seeThomasE.Lifka,TheConcept“Totalitarian- ism” and American Foreign Policy,1933-1949,2 vols.（New York:1988);May,
“Lessons”ofthePast:YuenFoongKhong,AnalogiesatWar:Korea,Munich,Dien Bien Phu,and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965（Princeton:1965);Goran Rystad, PrisonersofthePast?:TheMunichSyndromeandMakersofAmericanForeignPolicy in theCold WarEra（Lund,Sweden:1982).StudsTerkelʼs“TheGood War”:An
OralHistoryofWorld WarTwo（New York:1984）isanexcellentstudyofhow the AmericanpeoplerememberedWorldWarII.OntheracialaspectofthePacificWar andtherevisionoftheanti-Chineseimmigrationact,seeJohnW.Dower,Warwithout Mercy:RaceandPowerinthePacificWar（New York:1986);MaXiaohua,Maboro- shino shin chitsujo to Azia taiheiyo:Dainijisekaitaisenkino Bei-Chu domeino atsureki（Illusionary New Orders and the Asian-Pacific:The Chinese-American AllianceintheWaragainstJapan,1941-1945）(Tokyo:2000).
3) OntheJapanesehistoricalanalogiesandwarmemories,IhavereliedonKiichi Fujiwara,Sensowokiokusuru（RememberingWars）(Tokyo:2001);ChihiroHosoya, AkiraIriye,etal.,eds.,Taiheiyosenso（ThePacificWar）(Tokyo1993);Taiheiyo sensonoshuketsu（TheCloseofthePacificWar）(Tokyo:1997);YutakaYoshida, Nihonjin no sensokan:Sengoshino naka no henyo（TheJapaneseConception of War:The Transformation in Postwar History）(Tokyo:1995);Daizaburo Yui, Nichi-Bei:Sensokan no sokoku（TheFrictionbetweentheJapaneseandAmerican ConceptionofWar）(Tokyo:1995).
4) Onthispoint,highlyinformativeisLifkaʼsTheConcept“Totalitarianism” and AmericanForeignPolicy,esp.,pp.159-211.
5) RooseveltstatementquotedinTravisBealJacobs,AmericaandtheWinter War, 1939-1940（New York:1981),p.98;theChargeinIrantotheSecretaryofState, December1,1939,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates（HereaftercitedasFRUS): 1940,III（Washington,D.C.:1958),625.
6) Hendersonmemorandum,July15,1940,ibid.,I,p.390;Pagememorandum,October 3,1940,ibid.,III,pp.228-29.
7) Grewmemorandum,May19,1945,inJosephC.Grew,TurbulentEra:ADiplomatic Record ofFortyYears,1904-1945,II（Boston:1952),pp.1445-46;Byrnesspeechin Lifka,TheConcept“Totalitarianism” and American Foreign Policy,p.376;Walter Millis,ed.,TheForrestalDiaries（New York:1951),pp.72-73,95-96.
8) PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica:HarryS.Truman, 1947（Washington,D.C.:1963),pp.178-79.
9) HarryS.Truman,Memoirs:Yearsof Trialand Hope（New York:1956),pp.
332-33;PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnited StatesofAmerica:HarryS.
Truman,1951,p.10.
10) EisenhowertoChurchill,April5,1954,inDavidDimblebyandDavidReynolds,An OceanApart:TheRelationshipbetweenBritainandAmericaintheTwentiethCentury
（New York:1988),p.214;DwightD.Eisenhower,TheWhiteHouseYears:Mandate forChange,1953-1956,p.479.GordonChangstressesthatanti-Asianracism formed thepervasivepartintheEisenhoweradministrationʼspolicytowardAsiaingeneral andChinainparticular.SeeGordonH.Chang,Friendsand Enemies:TheUnited States,China,and theSovietUnion,1948-1972（Stanford:1990),pp.170-74.
11) Richard B.Finn,Winners in Peace:MacArthur,Yoshida,and Postwar Japan
（Berkeley,Calif.:1992),p.48.Rightlysensinganattempttoshirkresponsibilityfor
havingattackedPearlHarborinthisremark,UnderSecretaryofStateDeanAcheson angrilyresponded:“nothingcouldshow moreclearlythanthisstatementthefailure oftheJapanesetounderstandthenatureoftheirconductorthemindoftheAmerican people....PearlHarborisnotasymbolofhateforJapanbutasymbolofJapanese perfidy.”Ibid.Itshould,however,benotedthatithadbeenPresidentTrumanwho hadestablishedthelinkagebetweenPearlHarborandHiroshimawhenhejustified theuseoftheatomicbombagainsttheJapanesecitybyarguingthat“Iwasgreatly disturbedovertheunwarrantedattackbytheJapaneseonPearlHarborandtheir murderofourprisonersofwar....Whenyouhavetodealwithabeast,youhaveto treathim asabeast.Itismostregrettablebutneverthelesstrue.”TrumantoSamuel McCreaCavert,August11,1945,in RobertJ.Donovan,Conflictand Crisis:The PresidencyofHarryS.Truman,1945-1948（New York:1977),pp.96-97.
12) KishiʼsdiaryinYoshihisaHara,KishiNobusuke:Kenseino seijika（Nobusuke Kishi:A PoliticianofPowerandInfluence）(Tokyo:1995),p.127.Kishievennoted twoyearslaterthatinordertoprevent“thecommunizationofEastAsia”andthe ChineseCommunistsʼmilitaryvictory,theUnitedStates,insteadofprovidingthe Nationalistgovernmentwith“dollarandarms,”shouldemployitsmilitaryforcesthat wouldinclude“theJapanesevoluntaryarmy.”Ibid.,p.129.
13) Osamu Ishii,Reisen to Nichi-Bei kankei（The Cold War and the Japanese- AmericanRelations）(Tokyo:1989),pp.47-49;NSC 13/2,“Recommendationswith RespecttoUnitedStatesPolicytowardJapan,”October7,1948,FRUS:1948,VI, 858-62.
14) OntheTrumanadministrationʼspolicytowardtheJapanesePeaceSettlement,see ChihiroHosoya,Sanfuranshisukokowaenomichi（TheRoadtotheSanFrancisco PeaceTreaty）(Tokyo:1984).
15) Yui,Nichi-Bei,pp.158-66.
16) United States Strategic Bombing Survey report,“Summary Report（Pacific War),” July 1,1946（Washington,D.C.:1946）(Microfilm version),pp.30-32.On NitzeʼsexperienceinJapan,seePaulH.Nitze,From HiroshimatoGlasnost:A the CenterofDecision-A Memoir（New York:1989),pp.40-44;DavidCallahan,Danger- ousCapabilities:PaulH.Nitzeand theCold War（New York:1990),pp.46-52.An editorialintheArmyand NavyJournaldemonstratedthelastinglessonofPearl HarborinSeptember1945whenitwrotethatPearlHarborwouldnothavehappened, iftheAmericanpeople,“thenrottedtopacifism,”hadallowedCongresstoprovide appropriationsnecessaryforadequatedefense.Rystad,PrisonersofthePast?,p.37.
17) NSC68,“UnitedStatesObjectivesandProgramsforNationalSecurity,”April14, 1950,FRUS:1950,I,237-92.
18) NSC 5724,“Deterrenceand Survivalin theNuclearAge,”November7,1957, FRUS:1955-1957,XIX,639-61.OntheGaitherReportanditsimpactuponcontain- ment,seeDavidL.Snead,TheGaitherCommittee,Eisenhower,and theCold War
（Columbus:1999),esp.,pp.129-81.
19) RobertA.Divine,TheSputnik Challenge:EisenhowerʼsResponseto theSoviet Satellite（New York:1993),pp.23,xvi,67;Snead,TheGaither Committee,Eisenh- ower,andtheCold War,p.80;New YorkHeraldTribune,January28,1960;Michael Beschloss,Mayday:Eisenhower,Khrushchev,and theU-2Affair（New York:1986), p.265.
20) ErnestR.MayandPhilipD.Zelikow,eds.,TheKennedyTapes:InsidetheWhite HouseDuringtheCubanMissileCrisis（Cambridge,Mass.:1997),pp.4,143,189;Rusk interview inRichardNedLebow andJaniceGrossStein,WeAllLosttheCold War
（Princeton:1994),p.303.AmbassadorDobrynin refutesthenewsthattheSoviet diplomatsburnedthefiles.SeeAnatolyDobrynin,InConfidence:MoscowʼsAmbassa- dortoAmericaʼsSixCold WarPresidents（1962-1986）(NewYork:1995),p.80.The mostcomprehensivestudyoftheCubanCrisisisAleksandrFursenkoandTimothy Naftali,“OneHellofaGamble:”Khrushchev,Castro,andKennedy,1958-1964（New York:1997).
21) Kennan statementquoted in Melvyn P.Leffler,A Preponderance of Power: NationalSecurity,theTrumanAdministration,andtheCold War（Stanford:1992),p.
253.Kennanagainshowedin1977hisnagginguneasinessaboutaJapanthatwouldset loosefrom theJapan-USsecuritypact.“Japanʼsindustrialpower,...issotremendous afactorinworldaffairsthatitcanhardlyhelpconstitutingaforceeitherforgreat goodorforgreatbad.Solongaswehaveacloseandsolidrelationshipwiththe Japanese,wecan hopeto preventitfrom becoming thelatter.Ifwe lose that relationship,wecannottell.”GeorgeF.Kennan,The Cloud of Danger:Current RealitiesofAmericanForeignPolicy（Boston:1977),p.108.
22) TheJCStoWilson,April9,1954,FRUS:1952-1954,XII（Part1),417;theBush administrationʼsreportonthestrategicframeworkfortheAsianPacificRim,April 19,1990,inChihiroHosoya,TadashiAruga,OsamuIshii,andTakuyaSasaki,eds., Nichi-Bei kankei siryoshu,1945-97（Collection of Documents on the Japanese- AmericanRelations,1945-97）(Tokyo:1999),p.1176.EvenaformerJapaneseAmbas- sadortotheU.S.admittedthattheAsiannationsunderstoodtheJapan-U.S.security pactasanimportant“brake”againsttherevivalofJapanesemilitarism.Takeshi Yasukawa,Wasureenu OmoidetokorekaranoNichi-Beigaiko（UnforgettableMem- oriesandFutureJapan-U.S.Diplomacy)(Tokoy:1991),p.92.
23) JamesMann,AboutFace:A History of Americaʼs Curious Relationship with China,from NixontoClinton（New York:1998),pp.43-44.SeealsoWalterLaFeber, TheClash:U.S.-JapaneseRelationsthroughoutHistory（New York:1997),pp.355-56.
24) AlexanderDeConde,Ethnicity,Race,and American Foreign Policy:A History
（Boston:1992),pp.140-41.OnAmericanracerelationsandtheirforeignpolicyimpli- cationsintheColdWarperiod,seeThomasBorstelman,TheCold WarandtheColor Line:AmericanRaceRelationsintheGlobalArena（Cambridge,Mass.:2001). 25) MichaelS.Sherry,In theShadow of War:TheUnited Statessincethe1930s
（New Haven:1995),p.146;C.VannWoodward,TheStrangeCareerofJim Crow,
ThirdRevisedEdition（New York:1974),pp.132,146-47.
26) Rystad,PrisonersofthePast?,pp.51-52,48,49.
27) JohnsonandMcNamarainJohnL.Gaddis,StrategiesofContainment:A Critical AppraisalofPostwarAmericanNationalSecurityPolicy（New York:1982),p.262.
28) HarrisonM.Holland,JapanChallengesAmerica:ManaginganAllianceinCrisis
（Boulder,Col.:1992),pp.101-107.OnJapanʼspostwarsecuritypolicy,Ihavealso reliedonAkihikoTanaka,Anzenhosho（NationalSecurity）(Tokyo:1997). 29) RogerBuckley,US-JapanAllianceDiplomacy,1945-1990（NewYork:1992),p.72;
NIE41-58,“ProbableDevelopmentsinJapanʼsInternationalOrientation,”December 23,1958,FRUS:1958-1960,XVIII,114;NIE 41-60,“Probable Developments in Japan,”February9,1960,ibid.,p.288.
30) Tanaka,Anzenhosho,pp.140-41,264,296.
31) AkiraIriye,Powerand Culture:TheJapanese-American War,1941-1945（Cam- bridge,Mass.:1981),pp.118-20.
32) Dongo-JoKim,Kan-Nichinowakai（Korea-JapanReconciliation),translatedby TakehikoHayashi（Tokyo:1993),p.317.JohnFosterDullesknew andwasreadyto capitalizeonJapanesesubtleracism.OnJanuary29,1951,hestressedtothepolitical representativeoftheBritishliaisonmissioninTokyothedesirabilityofinviting Japantojoin“aneliteAnglo-Saxonclub.”FRUS:1951,VI（Part1),825-26.
33) TadashiAruga,“Nichi-Beikankeiniokerutaiheiyosenso”(ThePacificWarin theJapanese-AmericanRelations),inHosoya,Iriye,etal.,Taiheiyosenso,pp.547-48.
34) William S.Borden,ThePacificAlliance:United StatesForeign EconomicPolicy and JapaneseTradeRecovery,1947-1955（Madison:1984),pp.203-4.
35) NSC30,“UnitedStatesPolicyonAtomicWeapons,”September30,1948,FRUS:
1948,I(Part2),624-28.
36) JohnL.Gaddis,TheLongPeace:InquiriesintotheHistoryoftheCold War（New York:1987),p.119.
37) J.SamuelWalker,“TheDecisiontoUsetheBomb:A HistoriographicalUpdate,” in MichaelJ.Hogan,ed.,Hiroshima in History and Memory（Cambridge,Mass.: 1996),pp.24-25;S.DavidBroscious,“LongingforInternationalControl,Bankingon AmericanSuperiority:HarryS.TrumanʼsApproachtoNuclearWeapons,”inJohn Gaddis,etal.,eds.,Cold WarStatesmenConfronttheBomb（NewYork:1999),pp.20, 19.
38) NSC162/2,“BasicNationalSecurityPolicy,”October30,1953,FRUS:1952-1954, II（part1),593;Eisenhower,MandateforChange,pp.312-13;StephenE.Ambrose, Eisenhower:ThePresidency（New York:1984),p.184.
39) DullestoEisenhower,April30,1958,FRUS:1958-1960,III,605.OnDullesʼcon- cern,seealsomemorandum ofconversationwiththePresident,March19,1958,John FosterDullesPapers,WhiteHouseMemorandaSeries,Box6,DwightD.Eisenhower Library.LikeEisenhower,Dullestoohaddemonstratedintensemoralreservations abouttheatomicbombingofJapaninthesummerof1945.SeeNealRosendorf,“John
FosterDullesʼNuclearSchizophrenia,”inGaddis,etal.,Cold WarStatesmenConfront theBomb,pp.64-66.
40) OntheNuclearFreezeMovement,consultDavid Cortright,Peace Works:The CitizenʼsRolein EndingtheCold War（Boulder,Col.:1993);JohnLofland,Polite Protesters:TheAmerican PeaceMovementofthe1980s（Syracuse:1993).OnLuis Alvarez,seeFumihiko Yoshida,Shogen:Kaku yokushino seiki（Testimony:The CenturyofNuclearDeterrence）(Tokyo:2000),pp.49-52,279-84.
41) RonaldReagan,TheAmericanDream（New York:1990),pp.549-50,574.
42) See,forexample,formerForeignMinisterAlexanderBessmertnykhʼsstatementin William C.Wohlworthed.,WitnessestotheEndoftheCold War（Baltimore:1996), pp.32-33.ButseealsoAmbassadorDobryninʼsdisagreementinhisInConfidence,pp.
610-12.
43) StateDepartmentbackgroundpaper,“VisitofPrimeMinisterSato,January11-14, 1965,”January7,1965,LyndonB.JohnsonPapers,NationalSecurityFile:Country File,Japan,Box253,LyndonB.JohnsonLibrary,Austin,Texas;DeanRuskmemo- randum forthePresident,“VisitofPrimeMinisterSato,January11-14,1965”un- dated,ibid.,Box253.
44) Memorandum ofconversationbetweenHumphreyandMiki,January13,1965, ibid.,Box250.
45) Tanaka,Anzenhosho,pp.221-25;ShimodaaddressattheJapan-AmericaSociety ofWashington,December1,1967,JohnsonPapers,NationalSecurityFile:Country File,Japan,Box252.
46) DepartmentofStatePolicyontheFutureofJapan,June26,1964,ibid.,Box250;
MasayaIto,Ikeda Hayato to sono jidai（Hayato Ikeda and HisTimes）(Tokyo:
1985),pp.234-35;SatocommenttoAmbassadorJohnsonreportedinKobeShimbun, June10,2000;theAsahiShimbun,June17,2002;Boeicho（TheDefenseAgency), Nihon no boei Boeihakusho（JapanʼsDefense:TheWhitePaperonDefense） (Tokyo:1970),p.36.
47) KeiWakaizumi,PrimeMinisterSatoʼsconfidentialemissary,confessed in the memoirsthathewasinstrumentalinworkingoutthissecretagreement.SeeKei Wakaizumi,Tasaku nakarishiwo shinzemuto hossu（IWouldLiketoBelieveThat ThereWasNoAlternative）(Tokyo:1994).
48) Miyazawaʼsinterview inYoshida,Shogen,pp.317-18.
49) OntheJapan-U.S.relationshipsincethelate1980ʼs,seeLaFeber,TheClash,pp.
379-95.SeealsoSherry,IntheShadow of War,pp.446-49.
50) http: thomas.loc.govcgi-binbdqueryD?d106:1:./temp bdC9Zq:＠...
d106query.html（accessedonMay8,2002);San Francisco Chronicle,September9, 2001;InternationalHerald Tribune,May28,2002.
51) OnissuesofmemoryandhistoryinAsia,seeGerritW.Gong,ed.,Remembering and Forgetting:TheLegacy of War and Peacein EastAsia（Washington,D.C.: 1996);Memoryand Historyin EastAsiaand SoutheastAsia:IssuesofIdentityin
InternationalRelations（Washington,D.C.:2001).
52) AsYukioMatsuyama,aleadingjournalistfortheAsahiShimbun,notedinhis memoirs,theJapan-U.S.alliancewhichisnotfoundedoncommonsharingofhistori- calmemoriesmightbeunexpectedlyfragilewhenadynamicchangeofinternational politicsoccurs.Yukio Matsuyama,Jiyuu to setsudo（Freedom and Moderation） (Tokyo:2001),p.26.
53) Recenttwopublicationsthathavecommemoratedthe50thanniversaryoftheSan FranciscoPeaceTreatydemonstratethecommonsharingofthepostwarexperiences ofthetwonations.ChihiroHosoyaandA50EditorialCommittee,eds.,Japanandthe UnitedStates:FiftyYearsofPartnership（Tokyo:2001);AkiraIriyeandRobertA.
Wampler,eds.,Partnership:TheUnitedStatesandJapan,1951-2001（Tokyo:2001).
