The US, the UNSC, and the Korean War, (1950-1953)

The Korean War is a good case to understand the US critical influence in the 1950s. This war broke out in June 1950, and ended three years later in 1953, during which the US and the UNSC were both directly involved in this battle. The United Nations, for the first time in dealing with the international conflicts in such a direct position, participated in almost all the important events in the wartime. For instance, in the chronology of the Korean War written by Gordon L. Rottman, “UN authorizes the employment of UN forces north of the 38^th parallel on October 7^th 1950,” “UN forces ordered to cease offensive operations and establish defenses to maintain present positions on November 12^th 1951,” “UN suspends cease-fire talks because of communist refusal to accept voluntary repatriation of prisoners on October 16^th 1952,” “communists accept UN cease-fire proposal on June 4^th 1953.”¹¹⁶ The Korean War was to be the UN’s first commitment of armed forces to conduct and end a war and it is also the largest such UN intervention effort ever taken.¹¹⁷ At the same time, as James Matray concluded by the summer of 1949 that “Korea occupied a central position in Washington’s overall approach to Asia,”¹¹⁸ we could not deny that the US tended to dominate the UN policies and actions and ultimately successfully realized this goal.

Official report of the attack reached Washington in June 24, in a telegram to the Department of State from

American Ambassador Muccio. The US Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest Gross formally requested a meeting of the Security Council, branding the invasion “a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.” At that time, the USSR was boycotting the Security Council because of Nationalist China’s seat on the Council rather than Communist China. The absence of the Soviet Union representative, thus removed, for the time being at least, the possibility of a Soviet veto.¹¹⁹ Thus the hegemon could smoothly have critical impact on this critical issue, which was closely related to the USSR substantial interest.

115 Ibid.

116 Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Batter: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953, Praeger Publishers, 2002, pp. xx-xxiv.

117 Ibid., p. 117.

118 James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985, p.199.

119 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US policy in the United Nation, Council on Foreign Relations, Kraus Reprint CO.

New York, 1972, p. 105.

Because the USSR was not represented on the Security Council, they declared the Council’s actions illegal and that the conflict was internal. ¹²⁰ Even though the Soviet Union delegate soon ceased his boycott and assumed the presidency of the UN Security Council by Yakov Mlik on August 1^st 1950, since the deed had already been done, and Malik could not undo the previous resolutions considering that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China also had the power to veto any such attempt. Thus the Korean War was fought under the auspices and under the flag of the UN.¹²¹

The proposal of the first resolution was submitted by the United States, which received general supp

tive was defeated. It would have limit

entative pres

ort and was adopted at the 473^rd meeting by 9 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia)¹²², with minor changes. It went as followed, “Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”¹²³ It was clear that for the most part members of the Council welcomed and were prepared to follow the leadership of the United States.¹²⁴ And it was a diplomatic victory for the United States for it labeled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the aggressor and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities.¹²⁵

An alternative proposal submitted by the Yugoslavia representa

ed the action of the Council to calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces, and invited the Government of North Korea to state its cases before the Council, but the vote for this one was 1 to 6, with three abstentions (Egypt, India and Norway). The Yugoslav representative argued that not enough information had been presented to justify a finding of guilt, but other members of the Council felt that the available facts were adequate to justify the conclusion drawn by the American draft.¹²⁶

The United Nations Security Council met again on June 27. The United States repres

ented a draft resolution providing for a Council recommendation “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In support of his proposal the US Ambassador referred to the North Korean attack as “an attack upon the United Nations itself.” It was clear, he said, that the North Korean authorities had flouted the decisions of the Council. He announced that the United States was prepared “as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea.”¹²⁷ The Yugoslav representative, warning against the present trends in international relations, proposed that the

120 Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Batter, p.117.

121 Harry G. Summers, JR., Korean War Almanac, Facts on File, 1990, p. 287.

122 The footnote for this voting record in the document is “One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.

123 “Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, 82 (1950),” Resolution of 25 June 1950 [S/1501], at the UN Website: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/95/IMG/NR006495.pdf?OpenElement.

124 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US policy in the United Nation, Council on Foreign Relations, Kraus Reprint CO.

New York, 1972, pp. 104-105.

125 Paul M. Edawards, The Korean War: A historical Dictionary, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford, 2003, p. 204.

126 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US policy in the United Nation, p 106.

127 Ibid., p 112.

Council renewed its call for a cessation of hostilities, initiated a procedure of mediation between the parties and invited the government of the People’s Republic of Korea to send a representative immediately to United Nations headquarters. But these proposals met with little support, and the United States draft resolution was finally adopted by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia).¹²⁸

Within days after the invasion of South Korea, the UN called on all member nations to support the milit

ntries approved of armed forces, 6 sent air force elements, and 5 contributed med

ss undergoing in the UN Security Council, the United States never ceased bein

ary effort in Korea. Resolution 84 was adopted at the 474^th meeting by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia) on July 7. The resolution suggested that “all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America; Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.”¹²⁹ This resolution was adopted at the 476^th meeting by 7 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia).¹³⁰ This resolution acknowledged a unified command for all United Nations forces in Korea with the United States acting as executive agent. The commander, General Douglas MacArthur, was authorized to use the United Nations flag to combine forces from various nations. Since it made few provisions for monitoring the situation, it left the military command in the hands of the United States.¹³¹

In practice, 53 cou

ical support, either military or civilian (Red Cross). The foregoing included the US and British Commonwealth nations. Besides the British Commonwealth, the first countries to offer the commitment of combat units were the Philippines, Turkey, and Thailand. Other countries limited themselves to material support.¹³² Most UN units served under the US command, attached to specific US divisions or regimes for prolonged periods. The UN ground force units were organized using US unit structure or a modified Commonwealth organization.¹³³

With all these smooth progre

g concerned about how to preserve the United Nations peacekeeping role when some nations, primarily the Soviet Union, used the veto. After considerable behind-the-scenes efforts and revamping the original proposal, the United States submitted, and the United Nations passed, the Uniting for Peace resolution.¹³⁴

128 The footnote for this voting record in the document is “Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting; one member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.”

ne member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent”.

ed under the resolution of the UN General Assembly, such as tions Additional Measures Committee (by UN General Assembly resolution 498<v> of 1 Feburary 1951); United

129 The UN: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/97/IMG/NR006497.pdf?OpenElement.

130 The footnote for this voting record in the document is “O

131 Paul M. Edawards, p. 264.

132 Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Batter, p. 118.

133 Ibid.

134 There were some other agencies or committees establish United Na

Nations Cease-Fire Group (by UN General Assembly resolution 384<v> of 14 December 1950); United Nations Collective

There are four major parts in this resolution: one authorized the calling for the UN General Assembly within 48 hours of a conflict; another established a UN Peace Observation Commission to provide independent reports on current threats; the third was that each nation was asked to identify a portion of its military for use by the UN when requested by the Security Council or General Assembly; and fourth, a committee was to be formed on how to organize and use resources made available for the collective action.¹³⁵

By the end of 1950, 15 Members of the United Nations had armed forces on their way to Korea or actually engaged in the fighting.¹³⁶ In the early 1951 the number was brought to 16 by the inclusion of a Luxemburg infantry unit. These, of course, were in addition to the Republic of Korea forces which had been placed under the United Nations Command by President Rhee. The disproportion between the contributions of different members was from beginning to end very great. At the end 1951, to take a date when a measure of stability had been achieved as the result of truce negotiations, close to two-thirds of the total force in Korea under United Nations Command had been contributed by the United States. By services, the United States’ contribution was 50.32 % of the ground forces, 85.59% of the naval forces, and 93.38%

of the air forces.¹³⁷ Without preponderant power to assume the major war tasks, the US would not have rallied such extensive support from its allies during the Korean War.

A special agency bears great noting here is the United Nations Command (UNC), a US-led multinational force, was established in response to UN Security Council resolutions of 25 June and 7 July 1950, which appointed the US as its executive agent to appoint a commander of a unified command under the UN banner to assist the ROK in repelling attack and to restore international peace and security.¹³⁸ The UNC was, for all practical purposes, a US military command. The US government sought UN approval for major political decisions, such as the determination of war aims, response to the Chinese intervention, civilian relief measures, and the armistice, but it maintained a free hand on operational matters. The chain of command ran from the US president through the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to Commander in Chief (CINCUNC) of the UNC. All communications were transmitted through the army chief of staff, the designated executive agent for Far East Command and UNC matters. CINCUNC sent his reports through the JCS to the Defense Department. After interagency coordination, the State Department drafted the final version and presented it to the UN. ¹³⁹ The Far East Conference (FEC) headquarters, with the addition of a Measures Committee (by UN General Assembly resolution 377D<v> of 3 November 1950); United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (by UN General Assembly resolution 376<v> of 7 October 1950; United Nations Good Offices Committee (by UN General Assembly resolution 498<v> of 1 February 1950, ect.

135 Paul M. Edawards, The Korean War: A historical Dictionary, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford, f the United Nations, 1950, New York, 1951, pp. 226-229.

ent to the Congress for the year 1951 (Department /english/un/un_2.htm.

War: A Political, Social, and Military History, Santa Barbara, 2003, p. 265.

136 Yearbook o

137 United States Participation in the United Nations, Report by the Presid of State Publication 4583), p. 288.

138 http://www.panmunjomtour.com

139 Edited by Spencer C. Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Korean California, 2002, Volume II, p. 679.

British deputy chief of staff in July 1952, served as the UNC headquarters. The United States rejected a proposal for a UN committee to assist CINCUNC but accepted the attachment of a representative of the secretary general to the UNC headquarters. Senior military representatives of the participating states had direct access to CINCUNC on “major policy” matters affecting their forces. Otherwise they were to carry out CINCUNC’s orders, with the right to subsequently protest in case of disagreement. The Committee of Sixteen, consisting UN diplomatic representatives of the states providing military forces, met weekly in New York to keep the participating states informed of military operations, but it was not a mechanism for advance coordination of those operations.¹⁴⁰

To the United States, it cannot afford to simply abandon the peninsula to civil war and the potential Communist domination, which would raise serious questions about America’s reliability and complicate the task of building confidence in Asia and elsewhere in the US strategy of containment during that era. The choice to turn to the United Nations as “an avenue of escape” from Korea, a means of acquiring international sanction for an independent government below the 38^th parallel and of persuading Congress to provide funds to insure its survival,¹⁴¹ was proved to be both a rational and productive one relating to the domestic and international concerns. It bears noting that the cease-fire negotiations in 1953 was also conducted between the US General on behalf of the United Nations and the North Korea. This is to say, Americans dominated the UN policy and function in the Korean issue; to some extent it was an America-Korean war rather than Korean civil war.