The Negotiation Process about the Means Adopted to Iraq Invasion

States provided 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget in 2006. The Kosovo War again manifested the US dominance in the multilateral peacekeeping operations. At the very beginning, the European powers were against the participation of the United States, but the following process showed the inability of them. After the hegemon exterted its highly efficient forces and attack the Serbans, the Kosova Crisis was resolved in a very short time. The revival of the US power and the relative decline of other great powers’ status had led to the obvious increase of American influence in the Security Council.

including a series of severe economic sanctions; the other was supported by the United States and Britain, which resorted to war. A number of member states were inclined to the first choice and hoped to avoid direct military conflicts. Indeed, two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, it seemed that war might still be avoided on these terms: Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a US pledge not to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops leave the region; the Security Council indicates a serious commitment to settle other major regional problems. Disputed border issues would be left for later consideration. But the offers were flatly rejected and scarcely entered the media or public awareness. The US and Britain maintained their commitment to force alone.¹⁶⁸ As leader of the two-member coalition, the US moved quickly to ensure that sanctions could not be effective and to bar any diplomatic initiative.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, Washington moved vigorously to block all efforts to resolve the crisis diplomatically, restricting its own contacts with Iraq to the delivery of an ultimatum demanding immediate and total capitulation to the US force¹⁷⁰ Generally speaking, the United States has controlled the negotiating process in the Security Council.

3.3.2.1.1 How the United States Convinced the USSR

The Soviet Union has been keeping close relationship with Iraq, which constituted the greatest obstacle for the US military proposal. As A.M. Rosenthal said, “In its new move to regain political power in the Middle East, the Gorbachev government has one vital goal: the survival of Saddam Hussein.”¹⁷¹ If Saddam Hussein was overthrown by the US-led military actions, the USSR would have to give up its last influence in the Middle East, because Iraq was the only ally and the best customer for the Soviet weapons in this region. It was obvious that the US would again dominate Iraq and greatly increase its influence in this region through the military actions. If the conflicts could be resolved through diplomatic solutions, Saddam Hussein would be more dependent on the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union would be the only intermediary between Saddam Hussein and or the West with his ruling in postwar Baghdad.

Gorbachev would influence the entire Middle East after the war even without contributing a rifle or a ruble during the war.¹⁷² Because of the important geopolitical and business interests, the USSR was naturally negative to a military solution.

Actually, the Soviet military and some parts of the Communist party were strongly against the

“pro-American policy” of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who had stuck to his support of the Security Council Resolution 678. They suggested that the USSR should coordinate with France and linked the

168 Noam Chomsky, “The US in the Gulf Crisis”, edited by Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, The Gulf War and the New World Order, Zed Books Ltd, London and New Jersey, 1991, p.16.

169 Ibid., p.13.

170 Noam Chomsky, “The Use (and Abuse) of the United Nations”, see Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, p.307.

171 A.M. Rosenthal, “Why Moscow Wants to Save Saddam,” see Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader:

History, Documents, Opinions, p.346.

172 Ibid., pp. 346-47.

settlement of the Gulf Crisis with the Palestinian problem. The newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya carried a detailed criticism of resolution 678, affirming that it gave the United States “a good retest to strike a blow at Iraq,” which was “the main bulwark and the base of the struggle against the predominance of the United States and Israel in the region.” Elaborating on the resolution, the newspaper commented that the Security Council had “illegally transmitted its full powers, which are exclusive powers, to a group of states led by the United States.”¹⁷³ The Soviet disappointment was aptly expressed in a Pravda editorial on February 25^th, the day after the ground war began. “This war was launched by the United States in order to impose its world leadership. It is a dirty war, like the one in Vietnam, despite the lofty intentions proclaimed by Washington.”¹⁷⁴

Because of a number of important political and economic interests in Iraq, and the strong oppositions from the inside, the Soviet leaders tended to diplomatic solutions for the crisis, and expressed their opposition to military intervention unless it was decided under the auspices of the United Nations. An official communiqué stated at the end of the first week of the crisis, “We are likewise prepared immediately to undertake consultations within the framework of the Security Council’s Military Committee which, according to UN statutes, can fulfill very important functions.” In his address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September, Mr. Shevardnadze strongly confirmed this willingness to resort to force under UN auspices.¹⁷⁵

Of course, the response from the US was not that favorable to the above-mentioned Soviet Union proposals and it also delivered its ultimatum to the Saddam Hussein regime, “…because the statement promised unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, only to set forth a number of conditions, and needless to say, any conditions would be unacceptable to the international coalition and would not be in compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolution 660’s demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.” ¹⁷⁶ In order to avoid the Soviet veto, the United States has adopted a series of diplomatic and economic instruments. In order to secure the adoption of the November 29, 1990 UNSC Resolution 678¹⁷⁷, which authorized the use of force, the Bush administration used variety of methods, which included “cajoling, extracting, threatening, and buying votes.” The Secretary of State, James Baker, described these methods as politics of diplomacy.¹⁷⁸ Firstly, the US just asked the USSR to condemn the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and then pursued to pass the Resolution 661 to impose sanctions and embargo on Iraq. For the final step, Secretary of State James Baker arranged a $4 billion Saudi loan offer to the Soviets

173 Amnon Kapeliouk, “The USSR and the Gulf Crisis”, p. 75.

174 Ibid., p. 71.

175 Ibid., p. 72.

176 George Bush, “The Ultimatum” (Statement of February 22, 1991), p. 349.

177 UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force in the Gulf in 29 November 1990. This resolution, which does not specifically mention the use of force but authorizes UN members to use “all necessary means” to uphold the earlier resolutions on the Gulf, was passed by a vote of 12 to 2 with one abstention. Cuba and Yemen voted against, and China abstained.

178 James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, New York: George G. Putnam & Sons, 1995, p. 305.

before the UN vote on Resolution 678. Before the economic incentives of the United States, the USSR has chosen a middle road for resolving the crisis. It expressed that the military intervention would be supported.

Finally, for the Resolution 678, the USSR gave a yes vote. In short, the yes vote to American war plan was not coordinated with the Soviet interest, but it had to accept that on account of the large power disparity and internal crises. It was too dependent on the hegemonic power then.

3.3.2.1.2 How the United States Convinced Other Important States

France is another important great power, which has substantial interests in Iraq and might dissuade the Resolution authorizing the use of forces. As a member of NATO and an ally of the United States, it was not surprising that it gave a yes vote for the Resolution 678. But, indeed, France has taken great efforts to realize a diplomatic solution for the crisis, and it even gave an initiative on January 14^th, just one day before the deadline, proposing that the Security Council call for “a rapid and massive withdrawal” from Kuwait along with a statement that Council members would bring their “active contribution” to a settlement of other problems of the region, “in particular, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference” to assure “the security, stability and development of this region of the world.” The US and Britain rejected it. The US Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the proposal was unacceptable because it went beyond previous UN resolutions on the Iraqi invasion.¹⁷⁹

The Arab countries might be the strongest opponents for the Resolution 678. There were a number of pro-Iraqi protests in the Muslim world, and some volunteers went to Baghdad and joined the Iraqi military.

The Parliament of Azerbaidjan adopted a resolution expressing concern about the war, stating that the operations went beyond the United Nations mandate, and that the liberation of Kuwait was a pretext for a large-scale military action aimed at furthering long-term American interests in the region.¹⁸⁰ Americans were ill-informed of the efforts of King Hussein of Jordan, which might have succeeded if Washington had not pressed states in the region into immediate vociferous condemnation as well as military moves.¹⁸¹ The US government drew the conclusion in November 1990 that military actions were necessary to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Thus, it must persuade most of other members in the Security Council to support the Resolution authorizing the use of forces. As mentioned above, the US has adopted all the possible methods to get the favorable outcome. Here let’s review the successful efforts of the United States in negotiating with several countries.

Egypt is an important Arab country, which often plays a leading role in the Arab Leage meeting. It is also a major ally of the US in the Northern Africa. Historically, the Egyptian policy was in support for the

179 Noam Chomsky, “The US in the Gulf Crisis”, pp.16-17.

180 Amnon Kapeliouk, “The USSR and the Gulf Crisis”, p.76.

181 Erskine B. Childers, “The Use and Abuse of the UN in the Gulf Crisis”, Middle East Report, No. 169. (Mar.- Apr., 1991), p. 6.

independence of Kuwait. During the Gulf Crisis, it stood for Kuwait and the US again. In return, President Bush called President Hosni Mubarak on September 1, 1990 to tell him that he was going to recommend to Congress that Egypt’s entire debt of $7.1 billion to the United States be forgiven. The Congress passed the debt forgiveness legislation in the first week of November 1990.¹⁸² Turkey is another important state in the Middle East. Its geopolitical position can greatly facilitate the coalition’s military attack on Iraq through providing military bases and stopping the Iraq oil from being exported to the Mediterranean. In return, the U.S. promised to pay Turkey $1 billion, support Turkey’s application to join the European Common Market, and to extend the World Bank’s loans to Turkey form $400 million to $1.5 billion for the following two years. As a follow-up to that, on January 10, 1991, Secretary Baker presented a bill to Saudi Arabia, in which he asked that Turkey be paid $800 million in economic aid and $1 billion over the following five years for a Turkish special defense fund. Kuwait was also asked to pay Turkey another $800 million in economic aid in compensation for its lost revenues from Iraqi exported oil. Both governments were more than happy to pay.¹⁸³

Malaysia was important because it was a member of the Security Council at that time. As an oil-exporting country, it could not be persuaded by the economic incentives. Thus, the Secretary of State adopted the way of threatening in the negotiations. The Malaysian Foreign Minister started the meeting, on November 8, 1990, by reminding Secretary Baker that Israel did not withdraw from the occupied territories.

However, Secretary Baker did not care about the implied U.S. double-standard policy in handling international relations. He threatened him that a negative vote would “affect relations between the two countries.” At that moment, the Foreign Minister “became dead silent,” and he gave a yes vote.¹⁸⁴ In contrast to Malaysia, it was not so difficult to persuade another Security Council member, Zaire. Zaire claimed that it would give a yes vote if the US restored the foreign assistance to it and the G-7 countries forgave his country’s debt. According to the recalling of Baker, The Romanian vote was the cheapest. It was bought for just $80 million in humanitarian aid during a short meeting between Secretary Baker and the Romanian Foreign Minister, in Paris.¹⁸⁵ Ethiopia’s government was given access to new military aid after a long denial of arms to that civil-war-wracked nation. Unstable Colombia was also offered a new package of military assistance.¹⁸⁶

Two members of the Council opposed to the resolution (Cuba and Yemen) questioned its validity on the ground that the Council had authorized the use of force without determining that the Article 41 sanctions would be inadequate.¹⁸⁷ However, they could not veto the Resolution. This authorization was to be effective on January 16, 1991, if Iraq did not comply by that date. As the final effort of the United

182 James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 291.

183 Ibid., p. 284, 372.

184 Ibid., p. 319.

185 Ibid., pp. 315-316.

186 Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s UN, Arris Books, 2004, p. 37.

187 Oscar Schachter, “United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 85, No.3.

(Jul., 1991), p. 456.

Nations, the Secretary-General went to the Middle East but came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.¹⁸⁸ As President Bush put it, “This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States and many, many other countries.”¹⁸⁹

Phyllis Bennis has precisely reviewed the US dominance in the UNSC decision during the Gulf War:

“Other solutions followed in rapid succession. Every one was drafted by the US delegation, and lobbied for at the highest levels. For every one, nothing short of unanimity would satisfy the tireless Pickering (the US ambassador to the United Nations) and his aides. Resolution 662 (9 August) rejecting Iraq’s claimed annexation of Kuwait, and 664 (18 August) calling for the release of third-country nationals held in Iraq and Kuwait, were both adopted unanimously.

Resolution 665 (25 August), tightening the economic embargo with a naval blockade, passed with Yemen and Cuba again abstaining. Resolution 665 (13 September) tightened the embargo with greater restrictions on food and medical supplies imported to Iraq; Yemen and Cuba opposed. Resolution 667 (16 September) and 669 (24 September), both passed unanimously…Resolution 670 (25 September) expanded the blockade to aircraft; only Cuba vetoed no…Resolution 677 (28 September) condemned Iraq’s effort to change the demographic composition of Kuwait; it passed unanimouly.”¹⁹⁰

To sum it up, the collective action taken under the flag of the United Nations has been hailed as a vindication of international law and of the principle of collective security. At the same time, it has also been perceived by many as still another example of the dominant role of American power and national self-interest in international relations.¹⁹¹ Even though there was some resistance from all over the world, the US ultimately took the upper hand during the negotiating process and unquestionably became the leader in this war. Martin Anderson, of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University exulted in an end-of-war interview that “the Persian Gulf War has shown, clearly and unequivocally, that we’re the number one military power…The United States has achieved moral, economic and military supremacy—probably for the first time in history. It’s the first time since World War II that the leadership of the United States is undisputed.”¹⁹² In the same vein, Charles Krauthammer argued that the Gulf conflict revealed the essential unipolarity of the post-cold war world, “The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.”¹⁹³ Moreover, the ubiquitous use by the English-language

188 George Bush, “The Liberation of Kuwait Has Began” (Speech of January 16, 1991), see Micah L. Sifry, Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, p. 311.

189 Ibid.

190 Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s UN, p. 34.

191 Oscar Schachter, “United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 85, No.3.

(Jul., 1991), p. 452.

192 Toronto Star, 3 March 1991.

193 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (America and the World 1991), p. 23.

media of the adjectival phrase “U.S.-led” to describe the opposition ranged against Iraq reinforced the idea of an American leadership role.¹⁹⁴