Power, Openness, and US Influence on the UN System

create a hypothesis about the Super Power’s influence on three organizations. Simply speaking, the contribution of this dissertation is that it has not only carefully examined the evolution of US influence on the United Nations, but it has also brought forward a concise model to identify this influence. Based on this model, we can continue to examine and predict US influence in other international organizations or even the influence of other great powers in various international organizations.

other great powers were dependent on the hegemon; they could not challenge plans favorable to the hegemon at that time. The preponderance of US power dictated that only the United States could play the decisive role in the creation of a postwar world order.

Second, if the hegemon declines or is surpassed by other great powers, the hegemon’s ideology and institutions will lose their former attraction to international organizations. This point has been indicated very clearly in the empirical studies. In the IMF, the United States established a series of principles and rules aimed at promoting the flow of capital, stabilizing international finance, and advocating liberal economic policy in the 1950s. However, in the 1970s, the emphasis of the IMF was altered to serve other goals such as the reduction of poverty. This led to the establishment of a number of new facilities, especially the SDRs. There is no doubt that these facilities and funds are more favorable to developing countries, through which they can get loans more easily. Since the revival of US power, however, its influence on the IMF has increased again and the principle and policy of the IMF again embody a severe liberal tendency as the case study of the 1997 financial crisis has shown. Similarly, in UNESCO, the liberal principle of information exchange in the 1950s was, to a great extent, coordinated by the US hegemon with the help of the US media. However, in the 1970s, the Third World and the USSR dominated the agenda setting of the organization, and thus the principle changed to some extent and began emphasizing state control of information. After the hegemon returned to UNESCO in 2003, it regained some of its former influence, but it still can not play a critical role in the IMF because of the great extent of openness in this organization. The empirical study of the UNSC has shown this phenomenon. The US-dominated Council of the 1950s explicitly supported the liberal ideology, but things were very different in the 1970s when the USSR and the Third World controlled the issue agenda.

Third, the hegemon is able to affect the function and decision-making process of international organizations by providing indispensable funds, technology, and personnel. Through the empirical studies, we have found that the hegemon has frequently used economic incentives, threats, or even punishment to dominate the organization’s affairs. Sometimes it is able to get what it wants, though many times this has not been the case. These outcomes are dependent on the basic distribution of power. If the incentives, threats, or punishments will bring about severe damage and no other country can counter this damage, it is more likely the US will succeed. For instance, in the 1997 financial crisis, the funds of the IMF were mainly provided by the US, so it was necessary to obtain the approval of the American Congress before those funds could be distributed to any state. Thus, the liberal reform prescription of the IMF reflected the hegemon’s stance. However, the US failed to revive its influence in UNESCO in the 1970s due to the reduction of its financial contribution. One of the major reasons comes from the increasing level of donations from other great powers to the organization. Japan, the USSR, and France have increased their contributions to UNESCO, and so the organization can survive even without the support of the hegemon.

Forth, hegemonic states enjoy the highest “prestige” in international politics, which Robert Gilpin has

described as “monetary” in the world economy. It is not very easy to measure the influence of this prestige, but in fact it exists throughout international politics. We can find evidence for this point. When the hegemon and the great powers negotiated to establish the Bretton Woods System, they chose the dollar-standard system with a fixed ratio between gold and the standard. Of course, this system is based on the “prestige” of US power. All the other powers thought the US would be able to maintain this ratio.

However, US prestige finally collapsed in 1972 when its power declined. Another example is in the empirical study of the US influence on the UNSC. The prestige of US military power in the 1950s and the 1990s has made the US the leader of multilateral military actions. The Security Council actually cannot be the commander of a military action, but it can mandate the hegemon to do it. Thus, the hegemon cannot often be endowed with great prestige in the concrete affairs of international organizations.

Fifth, as the hegemon, the US provides security protection to many allies, and so many states support the US in the establishment and function of international organizations as a kind of exchange or cooperation. This point is very clear in the IMF and the UNSC. The western allies of the hegemon often exchange views with the United States and actually they share many opinions on international political and economic affairs. During the Gulf War, all the allies of the US voted yes to the resolution mandating the use of force. Although in the war on terrorism, the hegemon failed to get support from its allies in its attempt to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. This was not because the US failed to play a critical role, but instead reflected the reality that even the hegemon could not completely manipulate international society.

The United States has gotten most of what it wants after the war; it has been recognized as the “occupying power”.

Thus, we can clearly understand the importance of relative power when it comes to the hegemon’s influence on international organizations. Power can provide a number of basic means for great powers to influence the decision-making procedures of international organizations.

1.2 Organizational Openness and US Influence on the UN System

Openness is another important factor this dissertation has used to analyze the US influence on the United Nations System. The first hypothesis on this issue is that if an international organization is relatively closed and endows some privileges to the hegemon, then the hegemonic state can have a substantial impact on the organization even with relatively declining power. The second hypothesis states that if the international organization is relatively open and the hegemon can only use its power to get what it wants, the hegemonic state cannot play a critical role in controlling the affairs of the organization. The empirical studies that have been examined have proven these hypotheses. The basic organizing principle of the IMF and the UNSC has ensured that the US would have a unilateral veto in important affairs. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the United States revised the decision-making procedures of these organizations, so a number of critical affairs (such as the redistribution of quotas) must pass with more than an 85% majority

since the United States had over 17% of the voting power in the Fund. Thus, this reform gave the US a de facto veto right in the IMF. A de jure veto right in the UN Security Council has enabled the hegemon to prevent unfavorable resolutions from being passed. However, US influence in UNESCO has been greatly weakened due to the great openness of this organization. When the hegemonic power was relatively declining and more and more countries began participating in UNESCO, the US lost its domination of the issue agenda in the organization and was unable to prevent unfavorable resolutions on the issues of Middle Eastern politics and the new world information order.

First, if an international organization is relatively open and every country enjoys equal voting rights in the decision-making process, whether this equal footing comes into being on the basis of a simple majority or a two-thirds majority, the outcome of negotiations will tend to reflect the majority’s interest. This point is very obvious in the empirical studies regarding US influence on UNESCO. Even during the 1950s, when the hegemon dominated the issue agenda of the organization and provided over 30% of the contributions, the US was unable to control the outcome of all the negotiations and get what it wanted without any difficulty. The indifference to the Worldwide Radio Network Plan, which was brought forward by the United States, was a typical instance. Similarly, the United States was only partly successful in getting support during the Korean War, and it failed to prevent the USSR’s allies from becoming members of UNESCO. During the 1970s, the United States found that its contributions to the organization could not decisively influence the decision-making of the organization. In addition, its allies often took positions that were on the fence or even sometimes standing on the side of the Third World and the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the United States has tried to use the threat of reducing its contributions to get a unilateral veto inside UNESCO (or at least compel the organization to reform), but ultimately failed. In 1984, it felt that UNESCO was turning into an anti-American forum and left the organization. Even after its 2003 return, the US was again frustrated by the Convention on Cultural Diversity, which was only partly coordinated with US interests and viewpoints. The openness of UNESCO has denied the hegemon a critical role in the organization.

Second, if an international organization is relatively closed and states enjoy unequal say in the decision-making process, it will be more likely that the hegemon will impose its will on other member states. This point is not at all difficult to understand, and we can find many related examples in the empirical studies. Since the basic organizing principle of the IMF is related to members’ economic scale and not sovereign equality, the IMF is a relatively closed international organization that manages the global economy. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the United States alone decided almost all the critical affairs because it had over 35% of the voting power. When united together with it allies, it controlled more than 50% of the vote. During the 1970s, the liberal principle of the Fund changed to some extent and developing countries could get some funds through authoritative distribution. The requirements for domestic political and economic conditionality also became relatively loose. However, the United States

gained a unilateral veto based on its 17% percent voting power by altering the decision-making rules in the IMF. Similarly, the United States dominated the Council during the 1950s because most of the Council members were its allies, whereas the USSR was basically alone at that time. During the 1970s, the United States could not dominate the issue agenda because of both the increase of developing states in the Council and the independent tendencies of it allies. However, it could still deter the passage of unfavorable resolution drafts. After the Cold War, the US has often used its power for purposes of persuasion relative to the other fourteen members of the Council. The Gulf War was an excellent example of America’s powers of persuasion. The United States, through various economic and diplomatic means, succeeded in winning the support of the other Council members. It cannot be denied that since the end of the Cold War, the US can rally the most support in the United Nations for its foreign policy.

Therefore, the openness of international organizations has great impact on the US influence in postwar organizations. Combining the two factors, relative power and organizational openness, we can develop feasible and effective hypotheses of the US influence on international organizations. The empirical studies have fully demonstrated the hypotheses, and have in turn proved the explanatory clout of power and openness. Hence, we can draw the conclusion that the status of power and the extent of openness combined decide the hegemon’s influence in postwar international organizations.