Chapter 4: The Changing Influence of The United States in UNESCO
1. Assumptions about American Influence in UNESCO
According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter One, the influence of states in international organizations is determined by their power status and the openness of each given organization. Chapter Two has traced the power evolution of the United States throughout the postwar period and the respective openness of several international organizations which would be further probed into in this thesis. Chapter Three has explored the US impact in the IMF and confirmed the assumptions through detailed historical examination. This chapter will then focus on the primary cultural organization in the UN system, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
In order to make the following content better understood, here we should review the openness of the UNESCO first. As far as it is defined in its constitution, the UNESCO is a very open organization: “All member states are represented with equal votes at sessions of the General Conference, which, according to the original constitution, was to meet every year; but, since 1948, it has met only every two years. The members of the Executive Board are elected by the General Conference from among delegates to the conference.”1 “Each Member of the Board shall have one vote. Decisions of the Board shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and voting, except where otherwise specified in these Rules.”2 Besides, “Membership of the United Nations Organization shall carry with it the right to membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization.”3 It means that a state that is already a member state of the United Nations would automatically become a member state in the UNESCO. The impact of openness in UNESCO was undermined, to some extent, by the exclusion of many Socialist countries before 1954, which was resulted from the domination of the United States.4 However, the hegemon could not play a predominant role in the UNESCO even at the summit of its power.
Based on the power evolution and organization openness, three theoretical hypotheses can be put forth:
(1) 1945-1965: power (predominant) + openness (open) = substantial impact in UNESCO; (2) 1965-1984:
power (relative decline) + openness (open) = moderate impact in UNESCO; and (3) 2003-present: power
1 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001337/133729cb.pdf#page=7<br />.
2 In the following cases a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting is required: reconsideration of proposals (Rule 45); consultation by correspondence (Rule 60); amendment of Rules of Procedure (Rule 66); suspension of Rules of Procedure (Rule 67); establishment, before each session of the General Conference, of the list of States not Members of UNESCO which are to be invited to send observers to that session. See http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001390/139080e.pdf.
3 See Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientifi and Cultural Organization, Article II, at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
4 It bears noting here too that in Article II, there is a statement as followed, “…States not Members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.”
(predominant) + openness (open) = substantial impact in UNESCO.5 The US withdrew from the UNESCO in 1984 because it found that the USSR and the Third World had almost dominated the agenda of this organization and the situation of politicization of the UNESCO was increasingly deteriorated.
2. Stage One: 1945-1965 (Substantial Impact)
During this stage, the US had a substantial impact on both the creation and the agenda of the UNESCO; to some extent, the UNESCO was a convenient policy instrument of the US, especially in the Korean War for exporting the liberalism ideology and justifying the dispatch of the UN Force.
2.1 The US Role in the Establishment of UNESCO6
Unlike many other postwar intergovernmental organizations, UNESCO was largely European in origin.7 In 1941, the Britain government proposed to establish an “International Organization for Education,” and this led to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). 8 The US was preoccupied with the struggle on postwar political order and thus paid little attention to such a cultural plan.
Representatives of the US government did eventually join the discussions in CAME, but only played the role of “observer participants.” The British Board of Education and the British Council requested the US State Department officials to upgrade the US participation, but the US officials did not respond immediately. Active US involvement in the planning of UNESCO came relatively late and was to begin only after it had become clear to US observers that an intergovernmental organization in education would likely be established with or without US participation.
In November 1943, the US observer in London, Ralph Turner, cabled the State Department that “we should enter the conference as quickly as possible if we are to affiliate with it at all, because the longer we stay out the less fluid it will become and the more difficult it will be to secure modifications in its organization or objectives.”9 The US delegation brought before the conference a draft constitution, entitled
5 Concretely speaking, Critical Role describes the situation that some state has decisive influence on some decision-making process, and especially when the state could often successfully rally enough support on most of the major issues for its policy.
Substantial Role describes the situation that some state has great influence on some decision-making process, when it cannot often successfully rally enough support on most of the major issues for its policy but is often able to veto the passage of most of the unfavorable resolutions. Moderate Role describes the situation that some state has general influence on some decision-making process, when it cannot both rally enough support for its own policy and veto the unfavorable resolutions but enjoys the legal rights as a formal member.
6 The main resources refer to: H. H. Krill De Capello, “The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,” International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter, 1970, pp. 1-30; James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
7 Roger A. Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: the United States and UNESCO,” in Magaret P. Karns and Karen A.
Mingst (ed.), The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence, London:
Routledge, p. 232.
8 This body, which had been established at the invitation of the chairman of the British Council, was initially comprised of the eight ministers of education of United Nations governments located in London plus British representatives. The main focus of this body was post-war educational reconstruction. Before the end of 1943 representatives in CAME, many of whom were also members of the London International Assembly, expressed the need for creating a permanent international organization for education.
9 James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
“Suggestions for the Development of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education into the United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction.”
Upon this draft constitution, the British Government quickly announced that it would host a conference, which disappointed the French delegates to great extent in that France had been very enthusiastic to spread its great culture and thus active to create a cultural organization under its domination.
On the other hand, the British announcement didn’t receive the warm welcome expected from the US, who had not been consulted about this. Nevertheless, with the solidest ally, England, to preside over the conference, the US draft rather than the French one was used as the basic working document for the CAME constitution. The conference was held on November 1, 1945, with forty-four countries participating the negotiations. There were two major draft constitutions: the US draft and a French version. The US wished the new organization would have a powerful executive leader, while the French authority called for a relatively stronger executive committee elected by General Conference. CAME finally accepted the US viewpoint.
After the London Conference in November 1945, the US delegate William Benton wrote, “the Preparatory Commission is located in London. The Executive Secretary is an Englishman. The headquarters of UNESCO are to be in Paris. It is generally understood that the United States Government can nominate the permanent Secretary-General if it so desires.”10 However, the US candidate, Francis Biddle, ultimately failed to get enough support for the appointment. The first Director General was Julian Huxley from the Britain, while the US delegates were able to negotiate two concessions regarding Huxley’s selection. First, his term of office was to be self-limited to two years. Second, he was to appoint a US citizen as Deputy Director-General who would be responsible for administration, personnel and finance.
With all the negotiations and compromise, this new organization was to contribute to global peace and security by “promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.”11 It was in this light that UNESCO was founded as an organization of ideals. When viewed in the context of bipolar conflicts and ideological struggles, the original principles of UNESCO were clearly penetrated with the US values of individual rights and perceptions of the postwar world order. To be more specific, the preamble of UNESCO constitution declared the following:
“The wide differences of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty within all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern; …a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic 1975, p. 6.
10 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
11 See UNESCO, Constitution, Article 1, paragraph 1, at:
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world…the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”12
Hence, UNESCO has given priority to promoting traditional individual human rights; the notion of peoples’ rights has since walked into the specific program arrangement in the international organization.
The UNESCO programs on international human rights were largely promoted by the US over several years.
It even included a set of planned mechanisms to expose the violations of human rights in the Soviet Union.
According to the Newsletter of the UNESCO Social and Human Sciences sector, “Human Rights are central to the very origins of the UNESCO. They were massively violated in the tragic backdrop to the Organization’s emergence, and universal respect for them is the ultimate goal set for it by Article 1 of its Constitution, which was adopted in London on 16 November 1945.”13 The principles and issue agenda of UNESCO in this period was obviously influence by the hegemon.
2.2 The UNESCO as a Partly Successful Policy Instrument of the US
Since the initial days, UNESCO has become an increasingly significant arena for international political wrestles. Great powers, first the US and then the USSR, seized the agenda of UNESCO and tried to take advantage of it to advance their political interest. As Sagarika Dutt put it, “…the nature of some of the issues that the UNESCO had to deal with made it impossible for UNESCO to completely steer clear of all political conflicts and controversies.”14 In the early years, the major political interest of the US in this organization was to contain Communism and justify the capitalistic ideology. If we take a closer look at the composition of UNESCO, it is not difficult to discover that from 1945 to 1954, Western countries constituted a major part of this organization and only three Socialist states joined in it, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Those three states often opposed to the politicized anticommunist decisions from the General Conference or the Executive Board, but hardly with any positive effect. Ultimately, they withdrew from UNESCO. At that time, most of the Third World members were newly independent countries without any experiences or capability of dealing with multilateral diplomacy. It bears noting too that most of those member states from the Third World in UNESCO are American states, thus were under the great influence of the developed Northern states. They also lacked coordination and cooperation among each other like afterwards in UNESCO or in the other international institutions. Thus most of them unquestioningly accepted the leadership of the Western countries, especially the United States.15 What is more, during this period, the US provided more than 30 percent of the total budget of UNESCO. In the
12 Roger A. Coate, Unilateralism, Ideology, & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of UNESCO, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, p. 38.
13 See the Official Website of UNESCO, at:
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=8736&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
14 Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995, p. 43.
15 Ibid, p. 44.
following parts, three cases will be examined here to identify the US impact during this period.
The first case is the worldwide radio network. In order to spread the liberalist ideology and the US values, America insisted that the task of UNESCO should be expanded to encompass communications.
Thus, Article I, Section 2 of the constitution called on the organization to “collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples through all means of mass communication and to that end, recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word or image.”16 Indeed, since the establishment of UNESCO, communications was a predominant concern of American political leaders. A proposal by Americans for a UNESCO radio network
“capable of laying down strong signals in every inhabited spot on the earth” during the First General Conference in 1946 was received with enthusiasm by few others.17 In 1946, the US representative William Benton launched a program, worldwide radio network, in UNESCO, through which to facilitate the free flow of information and American propaganda. Benton argued that mass communications, as well as mass education, should be the organization’s most important areas of work. However, after 1946 the proposal slowly faded into obscurity partly because the coolness of the member states, and partly because the broke up of the Korean War. Even Julian Huxley, usually excited by challenging schemes, greeted this one with coolness. It has shadowed the future of the US role in this organization, which also proves that the US, even at the summit of its power, has never played a predominant role in the UNESCO.
Nevertheless, the US could still exert substantial influence in the early years in UNESCO, especially when the US conceived that its core interest was at stake. A well-known case was the dismissal of the American employees in this organization. In 1954 the US administration requested UNESCO to dismiss seven American employees because they refused to accept the loyalty investigations. During the
“McCarthy Period,” the US established International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board to check on all Americans employed in the United Nations system. The Board notified the Director-General of its conclusion that there was “reasonable doubt” as to the “loyalty” of each of these seven individuals to the US government, and gave the reasons for this conclusion in each case. The letters implicitly requested the dismissal of all seven.18 The dismissal of the seven Americans was definitely unreasonable since the Constitution of UNESCO explicitly indicates that, “the responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any authority external to the organization. They shall refrain from any action, which might prejudice their positions as international officials. Each State Member of the Organization undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the
16 See UNESCO, Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
17 Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 162.
18 Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995, p. 65; also see Julian Behrstock, The Eighth Case, Troubled Times at the United Nations, University Press of America, Lanham and London, 1987.
Director-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.”19
The contribution of UNESCO to the action of the United Nations following “the aggression against Korea” was another case of UNESCO’s deep involvement in political matters.20 It was actually used as a propaganda instrument for the United States in the Korean War. After the war broke up, the US officials in charge of public affairs set out a “Korean Campaign of Truth,” and UNESCO became a major subject for its mobilization. Especially under the circumstances that both the USSR and its Eastern European allies had been divorced from enjoying the rights to make any resolutions in this organization at that time, it seemed to be the optimal opportunity for the US to stir up any mobilization. But it in fact did not go so smoothly as expected. The US National Commission for UNESCO brought forward an initiative to mobilize the resources of UNESCO, and the resolution of US National Commission for UNESCO in July 1950 recommended “that the Executive Board of UNESCO meet immediately and take appropriate and vigorous action with respect to the impact of the Korean situation on the peace of the world and in regard to other areas where acts of aggression may occur.”21 The US representative in the Executive Board of UNESCO requested the Board to call a special meeting with the support from other nine representatives. Meanwhile, on August 14, 1950, the Economic and Social Council approved a resolution inviting “governments members of the United Nations, the Secretary General and appropriate nongovernmental organizations…to assist in developing among the peoples of the world the fullest possible understanding of and support for the action of the United Nations in Korea”, and requesting the Secretary General “to seek on behalf of the Council the cooperation of the Specialized Agencies as appropriate for this service.”22
However, the special meeting didn’t produce as favorable results as the US representative expected either. Instead of passing the highly politicized proposals brought forward by the US, Jaime Torres-Bodet, the second Director-General from Mexico, moved quickly to have his own four-point proposal accepted. In terms of the specific contents, the Director-General’s proposal “suggest assistance for the civilian populace and in particular the education of refugee children, a program of instruction about the United Nations for use by all peoples, a campaign to educate the public in member states upon United Nations action in Korean, and UNESCO participation in the reconstruction of Korea after the end of hostilities.”23 Mr. Torres Bodet pointed out that “the activities UNESCO could undertake as a result of events in Korea fitted into the framework of its normal programme. They consisted in sharing, to the full measure of its abilities, in the reconstruction of Korea, just as it was already contributing to that of many war-devastated countries.” 24
19 See the UNESCO Constitution, Article VI, Paragraph 5.
Board in September 1950. See Executive Board document 23 eeting of the Executive Committee”, and Social Council, 323(XI), the title of the resolution was “Assistance for the Civil
.
20 See Agenda item 4 of the 23rd session of the Executive
EX/Decisions, p.2, at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001139/113905E.pdf.
21 US National Commission for UNESCO, “Summary Minutes of the Fifteenth M Document XC (50) 54, pp.24-25.
22 See United Nations, Economic
Population of Korea,” at: http://www.un.int/korea/esc.html.
23 James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics, p. 149.
24 See UNESCO Press Release 346, Paris, 28 August 1950
Ten members of the Executive Board expressed their support for the aid, which UNESCO proposed to provide to the Korean civilian population in answer to the appeal of the United Nations.
On the other hand, we cannot deny the fact that the resolution of this special meeting was not fundamentally different from that of the United States. When talking about the cause for the aid to Korea from UNESCO, the resolution declared as followed, “Considering that one of the essential aims of UNESCO is, as stated in Article 1 of its Constitution, ‘to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms for the peoples of the world.’” The Executive Board also said that it was “profoundly moved by the armed attack of which the Republic of Korea has been the victim.”25
Yet, the refusal by the Executive Board members to adopt the exact US plan of action had brought far-reaching impacts. It seemed to many US officials that UNESCO was too plural to be a handy foreign policy instrument of the United States. Many US political elites even perceived UNESCO as an unwilling and undependable instrument through which some important foreign policy initiatives could not be conducted or realized. The organization had failed to act as the political body many of its US supporters had conceived or desired it to be. Furthermore, with the admission of the Soviet Union in 1954, US officials began to prefer UNESCO to be more of a technical agency rather than a political body.
2.3 The Waning of the US Impact from 1954 to 1965
With the booming membership of UNESCO of many Third World and Socialist countries from 1954 to 1965, and the growing independency of the governing bodies in this organization, the US domination undoubtedly encountered increasing uncertainties and challenges. The confrontation between the US and the USSR in the bipolar world politics, at this time being, has also infiltrated into the function of UNESCO, which diminished the US impact to a great extent. The US and its allies, even though united with each other as before, couldn’t make up of the majority so as to decide UNESCO affairs as before. Further, more and more regular budget came from other states rather than the US, and even the extra-budget, mainly from international organizations and particular donors, amounted to about half of the regular one. With all these emerging disadvantages, the US wasn’t ready to abandon the already existing governing bodies to exert its substantial impact, even though it was far from effortless to achieve its goal. Consequently, a number of political debates came into forth, among which the admission of Socialist countries to UNESCO could be counted as the most heated ones.
2.3.1 The Changes of UNESCO Membership Structure
In 1954, the Soviet Union changed its policy to stay away from UNESCO, and this also led to the
25 See Executive Board document 23 EX/Decisions, p.2, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001139/113905E.pdf.
resu
urrounding the membership of the Soviet allies. The US dele
ced most of the UNESCO member states, the 8th Gen
mption of active membership of its followers, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania joined in UNESCO shortly after the USSR reentering. In Cuba, the Castro government came to power and ended the membership of the state in the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) but remained active in UNESCO on the other hand. More importantly, the entry of many Third World countries to this organization, especially from Africa, caused a great many remarkable changes of the membership structure. While membership growth during the 1950s had, in general, been primarily concentrated in the developing regions, a new spurt in growth was even more narrowly concentrated in this regard. In 1960 alone, 17 new African states joined UNESCO. In 1962 seven more states from Africa entered the organization. Decolonization and the influx of new member states into UNESCO from Africa, at the same time, the non-aligned movement, which began in 1956, further enhanced the leverage of the Third World in the United Nations, led to an increase in the power and influence of Third World countries in UNESCO and an increase in ideological conflicts and controversies.
26 By the time the Soviet Union was ready to seek membership, the US government interest and influence in UNESCO had, in general, began to descend.
There were a number of drastic debates s
gates strongly opposed the admission of Romania and Bulgaria into the UNESCO with the reason that these two states severely violated human rights, which constituted a core part of the organization’s Constitution. But the selective morality of US was also questioned in UNESCO when it tried to condemn these two countries. As we know, the Republic of South Africa, in spite of constant violations of human rights, was not denied the membership of the UNESCO ever. At the 8th session of the General Conference in 1954, the USSR and the Czechoslovakian delegation sang high praise for the efforts and achievements of Romania in all the fields of education, science, and culture. The Soviet delegates also pointed out that there was no evidence offered by the United Nations to sustain the US charges on the Romanian violation of human rights and that the allegations against the government of the People’s Republic of Rumania were refuted. Finally, the General Conference was “convinced that the issue was not one which deserved further consideration and because the rights granted to the people and the development of culture and science in Rumania proved that all those allegations were false.”27
While the USSR and its allies successfully convin
eral Conference still postponed the admission of Romania to the next session in 1956 because of the political conflicts, which to some extent could be interpreted as the remaining US substantial impact on the outcomes of the UNESCO. The delegate of Denmark stated that his delegation took the view that “it was desirable that the representatives of all nations should come together irrespective of the different views they
26 The membership of the UNESCO, which was originally 27, rose to 100 in 1960. Between 1958 and 1962, 34 states joined UNESCO, most of which were African states. In 1960 alone, 18 states joined UNESCO, almost all of which were African states.
27 See Proceedings of the General Conference, 8th session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, Montevideo, 1954, p. 48, also at:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114586E.pdf.
hold in political or ideological matters.”28 Ultimately, a resolution proposed by the United Kingdom to
“postpone a decision on the application of the People’s Republic of Rumania until the next session of the Conference, two years hence” was adopted by 28 votes in favor to 12 against, with 15 abstentions and 11 absent.29 The experience of the Bulgaria was quite similar to that of Romania. A resolution proposed by the United Kingdom to “postpone consideration of the application for the admission of Bulgaria” to the UNESCO for a periods of two years was adopted by a vote of 29 in favor to 11 against, with 16 abstentions and 10 absent.30 Both Romania and Bulgaria were admitted into the UNESCO in 1956.
Compared with the condition of Romania and Bulgaria, it took a much longer time for Mainland Chin
.3.2 The Reinterpretation of the UNESCO Agenda
ESCO, the inside division of this organization was
a to replace the Chinese Nationalist Government in the UNESCO. Before the 1954 session of the UNESCO General Conference, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and India were the major member states, which protested the Republic of China (in Tai Wan) to represent China. The Polish delegate pointed this out at the 8th session of the General Conference in 1954: “We are facing an absurd situation and the great Chinese nation of 600 millions is prevented from participating in the work of the UNESCO.”31 In the resolution of this session, “Decides to adjourn any consideration at its eighth session of any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China.”32 After the changes of UNESCO membership structure, there had been more and more members voting against the seat of Republic of China in the UNESCO. However, because the US was worried about the increasing impact of Mainland China in international system, as well as its tight linkage to the USSR at that time, its stance was especially uncompromising and tough in this issue. The controversy over the representatives of China has dragged on over two decades before the normalization of Sino-American relationship.
2
As more and more underdeveloped countries joined UN
increasingly evident by the North-South lines, fueled by the bipolar competitions on the world stage.
The purposes and agenda of the UNESCO came to reflect more concerns of the Third World countries and the Soviet bloc. Since the early 1960s non-western countries tried to reinterpret the purposes and principles of the UNESCO with the ideologies different from the western liberalism. The changes of membership structure and rising power of the non-western states had exerted great influence on the thinking mode, working philosophy and favorable policies of the organization. For instance, the Soviet initiative on disarmament promoted the UNESCO to focus on the security field, and The Third World strived to advocate anti-colonialism in the UNESCO.
28 Ibid., p. 50.
29 Ibid., p. 51, also at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114586E.pdf.
30 Ibid,. p. 53, also at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114586E.pdf.
31 “Proceedings of the General Conference,” 8th Session, 2nd Plenary Meeting, Montevideo, 1954, p. 44.
32 See the Official Website of UNESCO, at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114586E.pdf, p. 8.
In 1960 the USSR launched an initiative to the General Conference, and it became an item on the agen
ebate in 1960 session of the General Conference was originated from the challenges by The Thir
da. The item was based on the 1959 Resolution of United Nations General Assembly on General and Complete Disarmament, and entitled “The action taken by the Director-General for the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Executive Board at its 55th Session concerning the question of general and complete disarmament.” The initiative evoked opposition in the discussions of General Conference, mainly came from the US and its former colony—Liberia. The delegates of Liberia requested to delete this item from the agenda, but the Soviet delegates argued that, “It has been said that we should not concern ourselves with politics. But there are good politics and bad politics. Disarmament is good politics. Let us therefore assist the Director-General and the Organization as a whole to apply the UNESCO’s resources to these matter.”33 Besides, the United States strongly opposed to discuss international political affairs in such a plural and open organization. Mr. Thayer, the US delegates, stated: “As I have said a great many times before, we are not here to discuss political issues, and it is curious that this issue should be raised by those who in the past have walked out of political meetings on this subject. There is no need for us to remind anyone here how to do his duty. We are all in favor of disarmament, but this is not the place to discuss it.”34 Although the US finally succeeded in deleting the disarmament item from the agenda but its victory was not so easy: the Liberian proposal was adopted by a vote of 36 in favor to 26 against, with 20 abstentions and 9 absent.
Another d
d World. The developing countries were eager to condemn colonialism, and draft resolutions had been submitted by the delegation of the USSR and delegations of some other states.35 The final resolution actually adopted many views of the Third World. “That colonialism in all its forms and all its manifestations must be speedily abolished, and that accession to freedom and independence must not be delayed on the false pretext that a particular territory has not reached a sufficiently high standard in economic, social, educational and cultural matters.” “That one of UNESCO’s most urgent tasks is to help the newly independent countries, and those which are preparing for independence, to overcome any harmful after-effects of colonialism, such as economic, social and cultural under-development, illiteracy, and the serious shortage of trained personnel.” The item on the Records of General Conference in 1960 was called “The Role of the UNESCO in contributing to the attainment of independence of colonial countries and peoples.”36 The US delegate Thayer argued again that General Conference should not become a political forum because it would cause tensions and clashes, while he declared that understood the emotions
33 “Proceedings of the General Conference,” 11th Session, Paris, 1960, p. 85.
34 Ibid.
35 Namely, Afghanistan, Burma, Central African Republic, Ceylon, China, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, India, Jordan, Libya, Malagasay Republic, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Republic of Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republi and Vietnam.
36 See the Records of 11th session of General Conference in 1960, at:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114583E.pdf, p. 74; also see the records of Executive Board meeting, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001132/113245E.pdf.
of the newly independent states.37 The delegate of the United Kingdom strongly protested against the reinterpretation of the term “colonialism” but it failed. The increasing number of non-western states made the UNESCO a really open organization and the hegemon was unable to use it as a policy instrument any longer. The agenda and principles of the organization turned to reflect the interests of the Soviet bloc and the Third World. Yet the US still played an important role in affecting the functions of the UNESCO; at least no one could ignore the fact that it provided about one third regular fund to the organization.
3. St e Two: 1965-1984 (Moderate Impact)38
NESCO met with great challenges from almost all the direc
3.1 The Internal Changes of the UNESCO
enting an unfavorable tendency in the 1960s and 1970s to the US
ag
During this period, the US impact on the U
tions, including the internal pressure from the executive leaders in the UNESCO, and the external pressure from the USSR bloc and the Third World. Although the US cut off its assessment to the organization from over 37 percent to 25 percent before its withdrawal, Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union steadily increased their shares in the UNESCO budget. Furthermore, the UNESCO began to be accessible to the extra-budget sources since 1960, which permitted itself a more independent stance from the United States. The US impact shrank to be moderate, and basically it could not substantially change the agenda or tendency of the organization. Thus it finally walked out of this important cultural intergovernmental organization in 1984.
The membership structure kept on repres
and its western allies, which with the time passing by lost their automatic majority in the General Conference. The People’s Republic of China has been the only legitimate representative of China in the UNESCO since 1971. A year later the German Democratic Republic became a member too. The number of the UNESCO members increased to 136 by 1974, most of which came from the Third World and the Soviet bloc. When the US withdrew from the UNESCO in 1984, there were 161 member states participating the General Conference in this organization and made it resemble to the United Nations General Assembly. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly decided “to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognized the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place
37 “Proceedings of the General Conference,” 11th Session, 26th Plenary Meeting, Paris, 1960, pp.411-412; also at:
http://www.culturelink.or.kr/archive/UNESCO/Dec_Rec/UNESCO_D_23.pdf.
38 The main resources refer to: James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; Edward H. Buehrig, “The Tribulations of UNESCO,” International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 4, Autumn, 1976, pp. 679-685; Walter R. Sharp, “The Continuing Dilemmas of UNESCO,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 3, Sep., 1969, pp. 402-412; and T. V. Sathyamurthy, “Twenty Years of UNESCO:
An Interpretation,” International Organization, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 1967, pp. 614-633; Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995.
which they unlawfully occupy at the United nations and in all the organizations related to it.”39 After receiving the message from the UN General Assembly, the Director General of the UNESCO requested the Executive Board to consider the resolution of the United Nations. The Executive Board, which was then in session, decided by 30 votes to 0, with 1 abstention, to add a new item to its agenda entitled “Participation of China in the execution of the program.” After discussions, the Executive board decided, by 25 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions, that from that day onwards the Government of the People’s Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China in the UNESCO. The Director-General was invited to act accordingly.40
There is another comportment bears noting here, which is since 1976, the General Conference has started the practice of creating a Drafting and Negotiating Group at every session, to which all controversial draft resolutions are referred. These groups were born mainly to deal with the dramatically increasing conflicts and discordances in the UNESCO. The Drafting and Negotiating Group, by virtue of the constitution of its membership, gives all contending parties almost equal influence and power in the negotiating process.41 Like in the UN General Assembly and other open intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were also accepted to speak and “undertake specific tasks” in the UNESCO. Even though the US would like to limit the role of NGOs in the organization, the French policy, on the contrary, precipitated the NGOs successful involvement in the UNESCO. With the increasing number and growing effect of the NGOs, the UNESCO was impelled to cooperate with the civil society.
This finally led in 1995 to the definition of an appropriate statutory framework, with the adoption by member states of new directives concerning UNESCO’s relations with non-governmental organizations.42 With the changes of the membership structure and participation of Nongovernmental organizations, the composition of the Executive Board also became to be more multi-layer and open. The Executive Board was very important because it examined the programme of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates. Its task was to ensure the effective and rational execution of the program by the Director-General.43 The Executive Board consisted of 18 members in 1946; after nearly 40 years the number increased to be nearly tripled, 51 as a result. Furthermore, by 1984, the Executive Board had fifty-one members. While board members from Group I (Primarily Western Europe and North America)
39 Yearbook of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, “Questions relating to Asia and the Far East—Representation of China in the United Nations”, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, Vol.25, 1971, p. 126.
40 Ibid., p.134; See Executive Board documents 88 EX, at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001131/113195E.pdf.
41 Ibid., p120.
42 “The purpose of these Directives is to create the necessary conditions for a partnership that will ensure that UNESCO, in the preparation and execution of its programme, benefits from the broadest possible support from NGOs with recognized capacity for reflection and mobilization on the ground. These Directives are also designed to encourage the emergence of non-governmental organizations in areas of the world where they are weak or isolated, with the aim of better taking into account the geographical and cultural diversity of the non-governmental community,” at the Official Website of United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=10623&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
43 Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995, pp.253-254.
still numbered ten, they now comprised only 20 percent of the total membership: African and Middle Eastern members (Group V) alone made up 40 percent of the board.44 This was completely different from the establishment era. Ten members of the Executive Board then came from the western countries; only one third members of the original board from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Another important change of the UNESCO governing bodies was the increasing independency of the Director General. During the mid-1960s, the US not only had to compete with the global challenger, the USSR, but it was also facing increasing anti-Americanism from its old friends in the Europe, especially in France. Since the former capitalistic alliance couldn’t meet the demand of their economic growth or be compatible with it, they thus strived to pursue a new and satisfying political great power status. In 1961 the French politician Rene Maheu was elected as the Director General of UNESCO and his policy was to enhance the authority of organization itself, which would unavoidably further promote the independency of the organization. In 1968 Rene Maheu was overwhelmingly reelected with the affirmative votes of 115 members (with two abstentions). “He has won a large following in the underdeveloped countries,” stated the New York Times.45 Maheu was demonstrated a powerful leader since his first tenure in UNESCO, even though many of his policies evoked strong opposition from the largest contributor. Lawrence Finkelstein has provide an interesting anecdote in this regard: “the point is made dramatically by the puzzled and frustrated reaction of then Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland when, in the early 1960s, he emerged from his first official meeting with the newly appointed DG, Rene Maheu. Maheu had told Cleveland in no uncertain terms that he did not plan to follow the budget guidelines Cleveland had urged on him.”46 Maheu won enough support in the General Conference to approve a budget compromise larger than what the US delegate conceived. In 1962 he succeeded to be elected as the formal Director General though the US strongly opposed that. The authority and influence of the Director General greatly exceeded the original role conceived by the US administration in the American draft constitution for UNESCO when Maheu retired from that position in 1974.
The Director General played a prominent role in the investigation of violation of human rights in occupied Arab territories. One of the resolutions of 17th session of General Conference was entitled
“UNESCO’s contribution to peace and its tasks with respect to the elimination of colonialism and racism.”
It requested the Director-General to use “all available means at his disposal” to assemble information “on the national education and the cultural life of the populations in the occupied Arab territories” for submission to the General Conference at its 18th session in 1974. The resolution of 1974 session invited
44 In 1968 the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference were amended to provide for a system of electoral groups for the purpose of electing members of the board. Five groups were created. While not solely based on geographical criteria, the groups do approximate such a distribution. In 1984 seats on the board were divided as follows: Group I (Western Europe), 10;
Group II (Eastern Europe), 4; Group III (Latin America), 9; Group IV (Asia-Pacific), 8; and Group V (Africa-Middle East), 20.
45 “UNESCO Elects Maheu as Director,” New York Times, 15 November 1962.
46 Lawrence Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director-General of UNESCO,” in Lawrence Finkelstein (ed.), Politics in the United Nations System, London: Duke University Press 1988, p. 32.
“the Director-General to exercise full supervision of the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, and to co-operate with the Arab States concerned and with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to providing the populations the occupied Arab territories with every means of enjoying their rights to education and culture so as to preserve their national identity.”47 Please notice the phrase “all available means at his disposal” and “exercise full supervision” here, which gave the Director General extensive and high authority in the UNESCO actions. The Director General sent a special mission, which consisted of two UNESCO Secretariat officials and was led by Mrs. Herzog, Director of the UNESCO Human Rights Coordination Unit, to observe the state of education and culture in the occupied Arab territories on the spot. The UNESCO mission visited Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and Israel, the Gaza Strip and the occupied Jordanian territories. The mission received high respect from the Middle East countries at all levels everywhere. UNESCO, and its Director General attracted highly disproportional attentions and authority on the world stage as the leaders of a cultural organization.
While compared with the following tendency that UNESCO appeared under the pressure of reform coming from the US, the Director General’s role was greatly weakened. As was stated in a testimony in 1992, “In 1984, decision-making was so concentrated in the hands of the Director General that managers could not make routine decisions. Today, that situation no longer exists. The Director General has delegated authority to managers to make decisions such as amending programs, transferring personnel, and within limits, making funding adjustments. We received 104 such actions and found that managers with delegated authority made 102 of the decisions.”48
3.2 The Struggle for New World Information Order49
The US became the hegemonic state after the Second World War. In comparison to the British hegemony, the US not only enjoyed stronger traditional hard power like the military and economic power, but also had great soft power in the language, value and ideology. Its military occupation troops stationed throughout the world, together with American capital investments, facilitated the spread of communication technology and American television programs, books, magazines, movies, advertising messages, PR (Public Relations) counselors and opinion polls. These latter developments were further assisted by the advent of the communications satellite by which TV programming could be viewed globally by audiences
47 See Report of the Secretary of United Nations, “Assistance to Palestinian People,” at:
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAl.NSF/361eea1cc08301c485256cf600606959/0d64d9e645d99a88052567af007081cd!OpenDoc ument.
48 See UNESCO: Management Reforms Since the United States Withdrawal,Testimony, Befor the Subcommittee on Environment, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, and the Subcommittees o Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division.
49 The main resources refer to: Peter I. Hajnal, Guide to UNESCO, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1983, Chapter 11
“The New World Information and Communication Order and Other,” pp. 241-260; Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge, Hampshire: the Macmillan Press LTD, 1987; and Herbert I. Schiller, “Decolonization of Information:
Efforts toward a New International Order,” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 5, No.1, Winter 1978, pp. 35-48.
numbering in the hundreds of millions.50 The expeditious progress of communication technology further elevated the US advantage in world information order. As mentioned above, the US had thought to establish a worldwide radio network from the initial days soon after UNESCO came into being.
Unfortunately, this plan was abortive due to the coolness of other member states and the breaking up of Korean War. Nevertheless, the US could enjoy great technological and economic advantage in the information order. The four international news agencies, United Press International, Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France Presse, circulated about 85 percent of the international news. The monopolization of the flow of news by the Western commercial media, especially the United States, was under highly skeptical situation of undermining social, economic and political values of developing states in that they apparently have a cultural bias and thus emphasize even magnify the negative news.
The US preponderance and penetration to other countries encountered resistance. Among the opposing parties, France, Canada and a number of the Third World countries became the vanguard. In UNESCO, there was also a movement called for a “responsible media” and a “balanced flow of information”. Since the late 1960s, cultural sovereignty became a focus of international political struggles, and the major objective of this struggle was to eliminate the overwhelming cultural and communication penetration from the hegemon. In 1972, the USSR prepared a “Draft Declaration on the Use of the Mass Media,” which tacitly supported state control of the media. At the Fourth Summit of the non-aligned governments in Algiers in 1973, a Yugoslav initiative established a linkage between economic coordination and international information structures. The seventy-five heads of government in Algiers stated it to be “ ‘an established fact that the activities of imperialism are not confined solely to the political and economic fields, but also cover the cultural and sociological fields, thus imposing an alien ideological domination over the peoples of the developing world.’ To meet ‘the cultural alienation and imported civilization imposed by colonialism and imperialism,’ the non-aligned governments resolved to effect a ‘repersonalization by constant and determined resources to the people’s own social and cultural values which define it as a sovereign people.’ The search for an alternative model had begun.”51
In 1974, the Soviet draft declaration became a divisive issue when a number of Western delegates walked out in protest against anti-Israel language and rejected it as an attempt to destroy press freedom.
The 1974 General Conference concluded that “as the situation of information in the world presents a lack of balance which favors some and ignore others, the non-aligned and the other developing countries have the obligation to modify this situation so as to bring about decolonization in the field of information and express the firm determination to create a new international order in the field of information.”52 In 1976, UNESCO sponsored a meeting on communication policy for Latin America. The meeting accepted
50 Herbert I. Schiller, “Decolonization of Information: Efforts toward a New International Order”, Latin American Perspectives, Vol.5, No.1, Culture in the Age of Mass Media (Winter, 1978), pp. 35-48.
51 Leonard J. Theberge, “The U.N. and Press Freedom,” at the Official Website of Heritage Foundation:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL15.cfm.
52 See “Final Report,” Tunis, March 26-30, Symposium of the Non-Aligned on Information, 1976.
unanimously the following principles: a more just criterion for information exchanges between nations; the desirability of national policies that will permit sovereign determination of needs and priorities with respect to the international flow of information; and the recognition that a genuine free flow of information can exist only when all countries have equal access to all sources of information and participate equally in the control over and use of international transmission channel.53 The Soviet draft resolution adopted by acclamation at 1978 General Conference in Paris was sanitized and received a new title, “Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War.”54
The major practices of New World Information Order included the formation of Non-Aligned New Agencies Pool (NANAP) and the Conference of Ministers of Information of Non-Aligned Countries (COMINAC). NANAP was set up in 1976 to promote greater exchange of news and information among the non-aligned countries. The Conference of Ministers of Information of Non-Aligned Countries (COMINAC) held its first meeting in Jakarta from 26 to 30 January 1984. “This historical event marked the beginning of the South-South Cooperation to consolidate and develop mutual cooperation in the field of information and communication with the ultimate goal to inculcate the New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) and enhance South’s solidarity and shared prosperity.”55
The United States and other western countries strongly opposed the new information order and their critics concentrated on the new order’s limitation for press freedom. A proposal was brought forward by the United States that aimed at improving the news and communications development in the Third Word, but it again received no warmer response compared to the fate of worldwide radio network plan. After retreating from UNESCO, the US and the Britain continued to criticize that “Soviet-inspired” Third World dictators tried to stifle media freedom. The debate died away after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1996, information ministers of at least 27 non-aligned nations were trying to revive the NWICO, declaring developed nations
“were employing their media to disseminate false and distorted information of events in developing countries.”56
3.3 The Regional Membership of Israel and PLO57
The 18th session of General Conference in 1974 was an important turn for the power politics in
53 Herbert I. Schiller, “Decolonization of Information: Efforts toward a New International Order”, Latin American Perspectives, Vol.5, No.1, Culture in the Age of Mass Media (Winter, 1978), pp. 35-48.
54 See the Official Website of the United Nations, at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_media.htm.
55 See the Official Website of COMINAC, at: http://cominac.bernama.com/?type=h.
56 Annalena Oeffner, “The Third World in the Media,” at:
http://www.jmk.su.se/global02/annalena/thirdworld/index.htm#nwico.
57 The main resources refer to: Shams EI-Din EI-Wakil, “Dr. Shams EI-Din EI-Wakil on the UNESCO Controversy,”
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 1975, pp. 3-11; “UNESCO and the Exclusion of Israel,” at http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php?doc_id=317; Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995.
UNESCO. Since this session, the US almost abandoned its leading role in the organization and US participation in UNESCO was mostly to do with damage limitation, which meant protecting its principal, values and interests and trying to limit any damage to them.58 Middle East issue was at the heart of the agenda in this session. Controversial items on the agenda also included the classification of member states to regional programs, granting observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the supervision of human rights protection in occupied Arab territories. The Third World began to dominate the working philosophy, issue agendas and purposes of UNESCO, which led to the tense conflicts in the organization.
The core of the Middle East issue was the Israel-Arabian relationship. As in the UN General Assembly, Arab states, at this time being, received extensive sympathy and support in the UNESCO discussions too especially under the circumstances that Third World states dominated the agenda and negotiations then. The upper hand of the Arab states culminated in 1967 when Israel was expelled from UNESCO. Being the most steadfast ally of Israel, this event rapidly deteriorated the US attitude to this organization. The problem related to Middle East was two-folded, the violation of human rights of Israel in occupied Arab territories and the classification of Israel in regional distribution. The background of the regional distribution originated from the purpose to determine how member states should participate in regional programs, and UNESCO assigned each member to one of the five regions. At the 13th session of the General Conference in 1964, the General Conference adopted a resolution entitled “Definition of regions with a view to the execution of regional activities” which established five regions, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Arab States, Asia and Europe.59
Five members including Israel were not assigned to any region. Since the arrangements were not meant to be comprehensive, nobody felt excluded. While the next General Conference was prepared, the matter of regional groupings was raised again in the committees.60 In 1974, UNESCO voted to exclude Israel from one of its regional working groups, because Israel supposedly altered “the historical features of Jerusalem” during archeological excavations and “brainwashed” Arabs in the occupied territories.61 The resolution of 18th session of General Conference “urgently” appealed to Israel “to refrain from any act that has the effect of hindering the populations of the occupied Arab territories in the exercise of their rights to national education and cultural life”, and invited it “to allow the Director-General of UNESCO to carry out the task referred to in the foregoing paragraph.” This resolution was adopted by 51 votes in favor to 5 against, with 22 abstentions. 62 The US and Israel voted against this resolution. As we mentioned above, the
58 Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, A Case Study of UNESCO, Mellen University Press, 1995, p119.
59 See the Official Website of UNESCO, “Records of 13th session of General Conference,” at:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114581E.pdf.
60 Walter Zander, “Where Does Israel Belong,” Reprinted from New Outlook, September/October 1976, at:
http://www.walterzander.info/acrobat/Where%20does.pdf.
61 Steven Bernstein, “Is UNESCO Reformed?” at:http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=10110.
62 Sagarika Dutt, The Politicization of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, p. 84.
Director General of UNESCO and the special mission played a prominent role in the “supervision of violation of human rights” in the occupied territories. The US delegate insisted that Israel did not violate human rights according to the report of special mission, but its viewpoint didn’t receive the majority agreement in UNESCO.
At the 95th session of the Executive Board in 1974, a draft resolution was introduced by 17 member states which sought to have the Executive Board ask the General Conference to amend the rules of procedure of the General Conference, the regulations for the general classification of the various categories of meetings convened by UNESCO and the rules concerning the UNESCO program of Participation, with a view to allowing the PLO to send observers to sessions of the General Conference and meetings convened by UNESCO and participate in “appropriate fields of the activities of UNESCO.”63 The representative of Israel stated that his government totally rejected the proposal to invite the PLO to participate in UNESCO meetings. In the meeting of Executive Board, the draft resolution was adopted by the board by a vote of 25 in favor to 2 against, with 7 abstentions. Israel and the US were the only member states that voted against the draft resolution.64
In the 1974 session of General Conference, the draft resolution recommended by Commission V concerning item 39 of the agenda, “Definition of regions with a view to the execution by the Organization of regional activities” was considered. Israel proposed an amendment to the draft resolution, aiming at adding Israel to the list of states of the European region in the draft resolution. Supporting Israel’s proposal, the US delegate stated: “We would just like to say that in the spirit of UNESCO, a spirit which is based on equity and fairness, we think that it is a well-established principle that every member state is entitled to be a member of a region, and therefore we would urge very strongly that this principle of equity and fairness be observed in the issues that are before us today. Specifically we would refer to the request by the Government of Israel to associate with the European region.”65 The US delegate in Executive Board also claimed that the PLO could not represent the Palestinian people, and thus opposed to grant observer status to the PLO. In the session of General Conference, those member states that voted against the proposal included all the Arab states, all the Soviet bloc countries and some Asian and African states. On the other hand, most of the western states and Latin American states voted in favor of the proposal. The Israeli amendment to the draft resolution submitted by Commission V was rejected by 48 votes to 33, with 31 abstentions.66 The resolutions of 1974 session were considered as unfair to Israel in western countries, especially in the United States. In this session the other four members were all assigned to different regions.
While its membership with UNESCO was not affected, Israel was isolated as the only member state not
63 Executive Board document 95 EX/DR.11 Rev, also see: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0001/000119/011902E.pdf.
64 Executive Board document 95 EX/SR, p. 132; also see http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0001/000119/011902E.pdf.
65 “Proceedings of the General Conference,” 18th Session, 42nd Plenary Meeting, Paris, 1974, p. 423.
66 Ibid., pp. 426-427.
