Chapter 2: Literature Review
3.3 The Maoist Insurgency
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CPN (M) launched the People’s War in early 1996, and its armed movement became a major problem in 2001, as the Party announced a new political doctrine, the “Prachanda Path”293 from the party’s second national conference. The massacre of the royal family, including then-King Birendra, and the attack on the Holeri police post, created a rift between the parliamentary political parties and the royal palace, especially the Royal NA, as it failed to deploy in the Holeri case.294 The resignation of Girija Prasad Koirala from the premiership and the election of Sher Bahadur Deuba caused a huge political crisis in Nepal.295 The Deuba government spread rays of hope after holding a three-round talk on the table with the Maoists.296 On November 21, 2001, the Maoists claimed
dissatisfaction with the peace talks and, on November 23, the CPN (M) attacked army barracks, including in Dang, and continued its regular attacks in different places.297 The government’s decision at that point to label the party as a terrorist organization clearly divided the whole nation into two opposite blocks.298
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indigenous masses with the purpose of capturing state power or achieving emancipation.300 It uses political organization and irregular military forces to hold power, and aims to
fundamentally weaken the government and ultimately control the legitimacy of the government.301
Political commentators and political thinkers have questioned why the CPN (M) decided to initiate an armed struggle, as there was already a democratic constitution in Nepal,
promulgated in 1990. Even the national and international scenario was not favorable for them to wage a people’s war.302 The beginning of armed conflict in the Himalayan kingdom
surprised the neighboring regional powers, international communities and powerful countries.
They initiated a revolt in a grim situation, and, according to their political document, it was a right time as people wanted to be free from elite political power and enjoy their own political space. The main objective of the rebels was to get complete freedom from capitalistic state power and to establish their own system. As Puspalal states, “[T]he struggle of the Nepali people is to attain civil liberties through a revolutionary struggle.”303 In addition, to
understand this common question, we may consider these lines from Karl Marx, as cited by Dipak Sapkota,
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then there begins an era of social revolution. The changes in economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid., 6.
302 Ibid.
303 Sapkota, Ten Years of Upheaval, 23.
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superstructures.304
The political insurgency used political guidelines developed by the party to mobilize its political activists as an irregular military force to achieve its goals. In this sense, it is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.305
Arjun Karki and David Seddon write that the rise of Maoism in Nepal has a connection with the successful political revolution of Mao Zedong in China and the experience of Charu Mazumdar, the architect of the Naxalite uprising in India. In Nepal in 1971, some youths started violent political activities in Jhapa, in eastern Terai, and formed a Koshi Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Nepal, later known as the All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee (ML). Nepali revolutionary youth got political inspiration from the Indian peasants’ movement that started in 1967 in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal. The All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee’s underground guerrilla war306 was the first political uprising waged by a leftist group in line with concept of “the protracted People’s War.” The Jhapa Uprising was the first attempt by Nepali Communists to undertake armed struggle.307 In a very short time, that extra-political activity came under the control of Nepal’s government. The CPN (Fourth Convention) studied it closely and analyzed the sociopolitical situation of Nepal.308 Later, in 1995, the same CPN (Fourth Convention) became the CPN (Maoist) and undertook effective armed struggle to bring changes in the political power balance.
Studies have found that, in 1990, CPN (UC) opposed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, citing it as an inadequate basis for genuine democracy, and continued to demand
304 Ibid., 33–34.
305 Shrestha, Nepal Coping with Maoist Insurgency; Conflict, 49.
306 Also known as the Jhapa Uprising.
307 Ibid., 10.
308 Karki and Seddon, eds., The People’s War in Nepal, 10-11.
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a CA and the setting up of a People’s Republic in Nepal. However, the CPN (Unity Center) participated in the general election of 1991, under the name United People’s Front of Nepal (UPFN), led by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai as coordinator, and won nine seats out of 205 in the parliament. It stood as the third largest political party in the parliament. In the election, CPN-UML emerged as the second-largest political party in parliament, and the NC got the majority and formed the government. The NC government began to demonstrate its hostility towards the more radical leftist parties, which created a rift between the ruling party and the ultra-leftist political parties.309
The Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) -- CPN (UC) -- held its first Congress in December, 1991, and decided to adopt “Marxism-Leninism-Maoism” as its ideological direction and the Path of Protracted People’s War, through the initiation of open class struggle in rural areas of the country after the Chinese model, rather than a mass uprising.310 In 1992, Nickson pointed out that “the future prospect of Maoism in Nepal will depend largely on the extent to which the newly elected Congress Government addresses the historic neglect and discrimination of the small rural communities which still make up the overwhelming bulk of the population of the country.”311 Until 1996, the Maoist movement in Nepal was in a latent state. In the southern part of Nepal, and especially in the central-eastern Indian state of Bihar, there had been a strong Leftist political movement since the 1930s.312
Until the surge of global democratization in the early 1990s, Nepal was widely regarded a quiet Himalayan Hindu kingdom with a docile citizenry and exotic tourist spots. Bihar, on the other hand, has seen ups and downs in its democratic experience since 1947, including the politics of revolutionary (Marxist-Maoist) violence.313 The comparison of the Maoist
309 Josse, M.R. “History and Genesis of Nepal`s Maoist Insurgency: Tools for Negotiating Conflict.” In Critical Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal, eds., Shrestha, and Uprety, 11.
310 Karki and Seddon, eds., The People’s War in Nepal, 16.
311 Nickson,”Democratization and Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario the Making,” 14.
312 Chaube, Democratic Movement in Nepal and the Indian left, 47-55.
313 Prasad, “Caste, Regionalism, and Political Violence.”2.
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movement in Nepal and India presents very interesting and typical pictures. The movement flourished in a larger country, such as India, and a smaller country, like Nepal, at different times. However, the political parties in Nepal and India adopted the same ideology, that is, Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism or Maoist thought, to capture political power.
Pardip Nepal has argued that the people could not ignore the historical context and background of the country and the Maoist launched violent movements314. The violent struggle did not come into existence only on the basis of Maoism’s theoretical concepts; its development is due to the ideological consciousness of the people. He further mentions that the Nepalese tendency to extend opposition at its highest level, where violence and war are extensions of politics. That is why one cannot find a pure political consciousness even in the struggle launched by the Maoist Party.
Chuda Bahadur Shrestha states that the Maoist People’s War was based on a long-term strategy. As their strategy in the beginning, the CPN (M) had established public awareness programmers in remote areas and trained villagers, who were mainly living below the poverty line, the unemployed, underemployed, and under-privileged youth, to rise against the
multiparty system.315 Nepali people had endured miserable living conditions during the Panchayat regime. In 1989, the World Development Report ranked Nepal 115th out of 120 countries in the world in terms of its per capita income. Nepal`s per capita income was US
$ 220.316 Before 1990, Nepal was ruled by Panchayat system317 where all political parties were constitutionally banned. Political movements, participation, and organization were illegal. In 1990, through the people’s movement, the democratic system was restored and a
314 Karki and Seddon, eds., The People’s War in Nepal, 405.
315 Shrestha, Nepal: Coping with Maoist Insurgency Conflict, 44.
316 The World Bank, World Development Report 1989.
http://ina.bnu.edu.cn/docs/20140606092044230772.pdf. Accessed on June12, 2012.
317 In ancient time, Panchayat means an assembly of five wise and respected elders chosen and accepted by the community. Panchayat System is the political system of Nepal in effect from 1962 until 1990. It was based on the Panchayat system of self-governance historically prevalent in South Asia. It was formulated by King Mahendra after overthrowing the democratically elected government and dissolving the parliament in 1960.
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new interim government was formed under the leadership of NCP leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. The cabinet members of the government, drawn from the NCP, the CPN, royal appointees, and independents, formulated a constitutional form in November, 1990, based on fundamental human rights and parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy.
The middle of 1994 saw the dissolution of the parliament due to disagreements within the political parties of parliament, and the government declared a fresh election of the parliament to be held in November, 1994. The election did not give any party a majority, but it did result in a massive defeat for the NCP, and a hung parliament produced political instability.318 A minority government led by the UML could not last more than nine months, and the
formation of a coalition government failed to address the issues of the populace. The next five years saw five successive unstable coalition governments. The King dissolved the HOR, but later the Supreme Court (SC) decided against it and reinstated the HOR. The SC said that a minority government could not recommend the dissolution of HOR until all alternatives of forming coalition governments had been exhausted. A coalition government was formed under Sher Bahadur Deuba in September, 1995. His government faced a vote of no confidence twice from the opposition, but won with a favorable vote. His government increased the privileges for MPs, pensions, and tax exemptions to import vehicles without any opposition from the political parties, despite strong criticism from the public.319
In this situation, the “People’s War” was declared by the CPN (Maoist) against the Nepalese government, with the goal of establishing a republican state. Nepal then
experienced deadly armed conflict for a decade, from February 13, 1996, to November 21, 2006. The armed conflict started as a small rebellion in the four western Hill districts of Nepal and quickly expanded all over the country, posing a severe threat to human security.320
318 Baral, “Nepal Political Parties and Parliament,” 20-21.
319 Institute for Integrated Development Studies, The Fourth Parliamentary Election: A Study of the Evolving Democratic Process in Nepal, 9.
320 Josse, M.R. “History and Genesis of Nepal`s Maoist Insurgency: Tools for Negotiating Conflict.” In Critical
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Upretiand Pyakuryal maintains that poverty321 was the root cause of this development and of the strength of the Maoist insurgency.322 Otherwise, the Maoists would have been just a political party, instead of armed rebels.
In 2000, the government of Nepal set a high-level committee to solve the political crisis related to the Maoists and on July 25, 2001, the government declared the first cease-fire to hold a dialogue between the rebels and the government.323 The dialogue ended with the attack on army barracks by Maoists in 2001, and immediately the government declared state of emergency and curtailed constitutional rights. In addition, after two years, in 2003, the next political dialogue began, but the reservation remained over holding a round table dialogue, CA election and formation of a new government. Finally, SPA and the Maoists came to agreement on a 12-point agreement and ended the deadlock of political crisis, after the people’s movement 2006.
Causes of the Nepal conflict are a complex web of interacting factors. These include uneven development within the country, and such factors as endemic corruption, the politics of the royal palace, and their relationship with the army, ethnic and caste inequalities, intense politicization human rights abuses, social exclusion and deprivation, and inadequate
infrastructure development.324 Other internal and external factors are also paved the way to conflict.
The studies of the third world countries including Nepal show that the inability to access political, social, ethnic and tribal power leads to conflict among the society.325 Since this leads to denial of rights and identities of minority groups, and since such processes are mostly characterize by mismanagement, it leads to repression of the people. In addition to these
Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal, eds., Shrestha, and Uprety, 6.
321 Upreti, The Price of Neglect; Pyakuryal, Upreti, and Sharma, eds., Nepal: Transition to Transformation.
322 Ibid.
323 Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, 120-21.
324 Ibid., 26-7.
325 Khanal, Committed Insurgents, a Divided State and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,75-94.
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problems, in Nepal, there are issues like inequality in income and regional development and caste differences that allow more privileged people to repress the other unprivileged
people.326 Studies show that the stronger the democratic ideal is, the more effective the state and country can be in protecting its people against social and political repression. Nepal's weak democracy led to the strengthening of insurgency inside the Maoist camp.327
Owing to political and social repression, the Human Rights Organization and it activists have not been treated well in Nepal. During the 1980s, human rights activists, journalists and students were repeatedly arrested, among which were people like Rishikesh Shaha, the chairman of Nepal's Human Rights Organization.328 Violation of human rights in terms of arrest of those who raise their voices against the government in Nepal has thus become an ordeal of repression, which receives no help from international bodies, except few exceptions like the Asia Watch Committee.329 This Committee has helped in monitoring human rights in Nepal by helping Nepali attorneys, activists and others. The human rights violation and abuses in Nepal became more rampant with the onset of the Maoists insurgency. From the initial introduction of the Maoist Movement in Nepal, there has been a rise in human rights violations in the country330. The Maoist government machinery and the Maoist insurgents were equally responsible for the violations and repression of the Nepalese. In 2001, the problem of the human rights violation reaches its height with the royal murder, later followed by the royal coup in 2005.331
As stated, one of the major causes for repression and violence is the ethnic, tribal and caste
326 Ibid.
327 Khanal, Committed Insurgents, a Divided State and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, and Lawoti eds., Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal,75.
328 Asia Watch Committee (U.S.), Human Rights Violations in Nepal. 1989.
https://books.google.com/books?id=CnTFLXce3toC&pgis=1. Accessed on June 12, 2015.
329 Ibid.
330 Dahal Singh, S., K., & Mills, E., “Nepal’s War on Human Rights: A summit higher than Everest.” International Journal for Equity in Health, (2005): 4-9.
http://doi.org/10.1186/1475-9276-4-9. Accessed on June 12, 2012.
331 Ibid.
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conflict in Nepal332. Since the governmental authorities do little to help the discrimination and domination against the minorities, violence continues to rise in Nepal.333 The continued exclusion of the ethnic and tribal minorities, along with the lower caste, has alienated significant populations of the people living in the country. In the beginning, it was the class exclusion and inequality that made the Maoist insurgency arise in Nepal. Among political parties, Mongol National Organisation (MNO) and Khambuwan National Front (KNF), remain as the ethnic minorities that continue to challenge the discrimination issues.334 The KNF went to the extent of initiating ethnic insurgency in Nepal, owing to extreme caste and ethnic discrimination in the country.335 The fact that ethnic minorities and lower caste groups support the Maoists suggests that extreme alienation of these groups attracted them towards using violence to fight against discrimination. The present political discourse largely revolves around these issues.336 The lower Hindu Castes, Dalits, which constitutes 14.99% of the population, continues to face discrimination on a large scale, along with other minor linguistic, religion and ethnic groups like the Madhesi.337
Poverty and corruption are deep-rooted in Nepal, and it is estimated that more than 42%
live below the nutrition-based poverty line in Nepal.338 Such a poverty issue has been traced back to income inequality and disparities rampant in the country. Income inequality ranges across different regions, and political instability in the country continues to add to these issues, instead of solving them.339
Nepal also suffers from regional differences, starting with education, where those in the rural areas are deterred from getting the required education due to distance, early marriage,
332 See the details Table 5, 119 and Table 10-11, 175.
333 Lawoti, Contentious politics in democratizing Nepal, 17-47.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Bhattachan, Krishna B., Indigenous Nationalities & Minorities of Nepal, 49.
338 International Monetary Fund, Nepal - Staff Report for the 1999 Article IV Consultation.12.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr0039.pdf. Accessed on April 20, 2012.
339 Ibid.
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agricultural production, alienation from urban areas and lack of transport facilities.340 In 2001 Crown prince Dipendra murdered the ten members of the royal family, including his father and mother (the King and the Queen). Surendra Bhandari, in his studies, shows how the murders eventually overwhelmed the country with political instability.341 The
murdered King Birendra no doubt was undermining the 1990 Constitution of the country, and his successor became successful in dismantling the rights and principles of the constitution.
Political parties challenged the unconstitutional act, and it was this issue that caused the Nepalese Maoist insurgency from 1996-2006.342 The civil war was mainly staged between the government machineries and the Maoists insurgencies, ending with the abolition of the monarchy, setting up of democratic government, and a peace agreement in 2006.
Within a short time, the factors responsible for the initiation of the People's War in Nepal affected political, economic, cultural and social structures.343 In 1996, they had begun their movement from four major districts like Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha and Sindhuli. By 2000, they attacked the district headquarters of Dolpa and proved their political existence for the first time with their own military force. The political insurgence turned to a military insurgency when they attacked in Dang, Syangja and Solu – three district headquarters – and challenged Nepalese security forces. For this, as Man Mohan Bhattarai opines in his interview, they had military training and armaments from India. The government of Nepal aimed to control it in time, and from the inception of this violent conflict, the Nepal police force was used to dismantle the plans of Maoists. Finally, the government deployed the NA along with Nepal Police and Armed Police force collectively. The government endorsed the ‘Terrorist
Ordinance’ in 1998,344 providing management of Unified Command of security forces in
340 Grover, V. ed., Nepal: Government and Politics.
341 Bhandari, S. Self-Determination & Constitution Making in Nepal: Constituent Assembly, Inclusion, & Ethnic Federalism.11.
342 Ibid., 2-3.
343 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 53-55.
344 Sapkota, Ten Years Upheavel, 125.
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2001, the cordon and search operation, and aerial attacks against the Maoist movement.
Nepali political parties and the government of Nepal failed to address the structural cause of conflict and assure the common populace on the developmental policy of government.
CPN (Maoist) had opposed some constitutional provisions and demanded the election of CA, but political parties and the palace were not ready to address such a demand.345 Maoists had different professional organizations like students’ union, trade union, women’s union,
peasants’ association, teachers’ organization, cultural organization, intellectuals’ organization, and youth organization346 that were active after 1996. Also, the party had opened twelve national liberation organizations – Dalit, Magar, Tharu, Newar, Tamang, Tamu, Madeshi, Limbuan, Kirat, Majhi, Thami and Rai-Danuwar National Liberation Fronts.347
Maoists' political strategy moved from strategic defense, and as Sapkota notes, their
“armed movement was on the defensive stage and the armed force was weaker than government’s security force.”348 They reached strategic equilibrium after their second national conference in 2001 and their attack on a military post. In 2004, they declared they were in strategic offence. During this time, they developed the people’s army and formed seven divisions of People`s Liberation Army (PLA),349 declared a people’s court, district government and central government.350 By 2006, Maoist had proposed eleven different states and practiced federalism within party politics. Among them, Sapkota writes, Limbuwan, Kochila, Kirat, Madeshi, Tamsilang, Newa, Tamuwan, Magarat, Tharuwan were proposed on the ground of nationality, and two other states, Bheri-Karnali and Seti-Mahakali were formed on the ground of geographical identity.351
Coming to the end of 2015, the course of Nepali politics was changing day by day.
345 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 191.
346 Ibid., 147-151.
347 Ibid., 141-143.
348 Ibid., 72.
349 Ibid., 82-83.
350 Ibid., 106-113.
351 Ibid., 144-145.