Armed Conflict and the Peace Process in Nepal

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Shrestha, Ananda. P., and Hari Uprety, eds. Critical Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal.

2004. p.82-83.

Some commentators propose that Maoist insurgency was an expression of frustration against the Nepal democratic government’s activities. Birendra Prasad Mishra points out that the decade-old Maoist conflict caused the militarization of the nation. Further, he mentions that the CPA, signed by the Maoists and the government, was an end of a political deadlock and formally paved a new way for solving the political crisis. It mainly covers the period from November 22, 2005, to January 14, 2009, and elaborates on and discusses the peace initiatives taken during this period. He also mentions that the political actors during that period, such as the two major political forces – the SPA and the CPN (M) – played major roles in solving the crisis. The traditional political power – the feudal king – that had ruled Nepal for centuries was already politically sidelined after the signing of the 12-point understanding with India in 2005.

B.P. Mishra categorizes the armed conflict in different forms. According to him, armed conflict can have different forms such as political, social, cultural, ethnic, and religious.

According to him, the peace process is the only mechanism for resolving this conflict. In connection with this, he quotes ideas from Galtung to explain the procedure of Nepal’s peace process. He says,

This is a ceasefire process, not a peace process. A casual chain from unresolved conflicts – polarization/dehumanization to violence – trauma calls for a peace process with four components: mediation for conflict resolution, peace building, violence control, and conciliation for healing and closure.⁴⁰³

The peace process of Nepal can be divided according to the stages of the peace process.

Mishra states that the first stage of the peace process commenced with the constitution of an Interim Legislature. The second stage commenced with the adoption of an Interim

403 Mishra,B.P.,The Nepalese Peace Process, 1–3.

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Constitution. The third stage began with the formation of the Interim Constitution.⁴⁰⁴ The Nepali peace process substantially changed the political equation between the political parties and former rebel forces as they joined mainstream politics. It ultimately ended the

monarchical system that had ruled the country for a long time, and it declared the country a federal republic in the Interim Constitution in 2007. The peace process, despite some

weaknesses such as the failure to address the issues of women, accepted the identity politics of the Dalits, Madeshis, indigenous community, minority people, and backward groups;

ultimately, it addressed the issues of nationality and national security (the issue of national security was part of the agenda of peace process of CPA 2006).

Mishra emphasizes the point of view that the progress of the peace process during 2008 was due to the understanding reached between political parties to strengthen the peace process and to facilitate the process of amending the constitution based on a simple majority with respect to the election of the president, vice president, prime minister, chairperson, and vice chairperson. Further, the Nepal peace process is ongoing and conflicting issues are yet to be solved. The integration of the Maoist army and the issue of arms are major ongoing issues.

Surendra Pandey opines, in connection with this, that “the government of Nepal would decide to establish one Special Directorate under NA which would comprise 35 percent from

existing NA, 35 percent from Maoist Combatants, 15 percent from Nepal police and 15 percent from Armed Police.”⁴⁰⁵

Writing the new constitution is the main agenda of the peace process. The entire peace process focuses on the monitoring of weapons, combatants, and the NA. The entire political situation around the peace process had some positive as well as negative aspects. The positive aspect is that the political parties have a positive intent. According to leaders interviewed, “[I]

t sounds a note of caution to stakeholders to be prompt in taking suitable action for building a

404 Ibid., 45–8.

405 See Appendix 5,305-6.

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new Nepal in accordance with their vision and in line with the public spirit and demands of the time.”⁴⁰⁶ The negative part of the peace process is that some of the issues remain unmonitored, like the issues of justice, human rights’ abuse, and involvement of women in peace talks.

Further, the role of the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) in the peace process has been vital. The government and the Maoist party requested help from the Secretary General of the UN on August 9, 2006, by writing separate letters. The Security Council responded positively to the request for assistance from Nepali parties and approved the advance deployment of 35 arms monitors and 25 electoral advisers.⁴⁰⁷ In January, 2007, in Resolution 1740, the Security Council unanimously supported the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Nepal. UNMIN was to have an initial mandate of 12 months. Ian Martin, who was then Chief of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal, was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIN. This was the first UN involvement in Nepal’s peace process.

The involvement of UNMIN in Nepalese peace process was to engage in shaping a new political process and monitoring human rights. It had certain limitations in monitoring human rights and was to monitor both security forces of Nepal and Maoist, work for holding peace dialogue to bring the warring parties into consensus, and provide election observation for the election of CA.

UNMIN’s mandate provides that it shall monitor the compliance of the NA and the Maoist army with the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies and the provisions of the CPA. Regarding arms monitoring, UNMIN formed a team of 71 arms monitors from 18 contributing countries. UNMIN is based around-the-clock at seven Maoist

406 See Appendix 5,305-8.

407 United Nations, Security Council Established United Nations Political Mission in Nepal, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1740(2007).

http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8942.doc.htm. Accessed on April 20, 2012.

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army sites where weapons were stored, as well as at the Chhauni barracks, the NA’s weapons storage site. Arms monitors also pay regular visits to the Maoist army satellite camps.

However, the overall monitoring of the peace process and arms and armies is illustrated by the following remarks on Nepal peace process and role of UNMIN.

Martin writes, “UNMIN’s main focus was now to maintain its arms monitoring, while encouraging the progress regarding the future of the combatants through providing assistance to the technical committee that the special committee had appointed to advise it.”⁴⁰⁸ The government of Nepal had requested to Security Council to extend the tenure of UNMIN in July, 2009, January, 2010 and May, 2010, and finally the Security Council decided to withdraw UNMIN from Nepal in January, 2011. The UN’s political and technical support to Nepal’s peace process was a positive force in building trust among the political parties and it mainly focused on the issues of peace, which is still the goal of the Nepali peace process.

According to Feyzi Ismail, Nepal’s CPA – signed in November 2006 between the

government and other major political parties and the UCP (Maoist) – formally declared the end of the decade-long civil war. According to Ismail, this peace accord was the response to mass movements that were held in April of that year (Jana andolan). In his view, the peace accord made significant promises by the political parties to the people for a political and social economic transformation that would minimize inequality and exclusion, and which would aid in the progress of the country. He emphasizes that during the peace process, there were several groups of people demanding representation and there was much talk on

inclusion and the reform of the state. He points out the need to continue to emphasize economic equity and the end of poverty.

During the qualitative stakeholder interviews with prominent Nepali leaders and scholars, Manmohan Bhattarai indicated that he saw the invisible hand of India and the Royal palace in

408 Martin, “The United Nations and Support to Nepal’s Peace Process”, 228.

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the creation of conflict in Nepal. He says that the entire peace process will not end easily and would take a long time to reach a logical end. Surendra Pandey also believes that the entire peace process is connected to the integration of Maoist combatants. The immaturity of political leaders will not remain in the long run and they will be influenced by the procedures of the entire peace process.

The Prime Minister and President of CPN (UML), Jhala Nath Khanal, opines that Nepal had already drafted a federal interim constitution in 2007 and the country cannot go back from this historical reality. Going through with the decision made by the first meeting of the CA is mandatory, but he believes his party cannot accept the federal division on the grounds of ethnicity. In his view, Nepal is the country of ethnic groups; therefore, the federal

component should address the needs of everyone living in Nepal. People living in a

multiethnic country will not be comfortable in a mono-ethnic state. According to Khanal, We ought to move ahead accepting this principle and the federal states will be

declared on this historical decision. It is not possible to declare states on an ethnic base. It is a country of diverse peoples and ethnic groups. Therefore, the federal unit should fulfill the needs of everyone rather than some handful of castes and groups.

Even at present, the administrative divisions of Nepal into zones and districts are pluralistic. The entire country is multiethnic and so are all the village units. Therefore, all federal units will be multiethnic; otherwise, it will lead the country towards

territorial breakup. Truly speaking, no one needs such type of federal division. In order to build a New Nepal we should develop a new structure, which truly settles the demands of people of different ethnic groups, genders, and backward regions.⁴⁰⁹ The views of Vice Chairman of the Maoist Party Baburam Bhattarai are different from others. He says that Nepal’s peace process differs from those of other countries. The outcome

409 Appendix 5, 307-8.

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of an armed struggle against feudal autocracy, monarchy, and foreign domination became the political agenda of the dialogue table that supported the socially backward groups, women, Madeshi, Dalits, and the poor classes. He believes that unless there is a complete

transformation of the society, durable peace is not possible. An abstract form of peace would not solve the problems of the country. His views on nationality and ethnicity are different from those of others and are quite debatable among the political parties. According to Bhattarai,

We want to do away with the existing unitary state and restructure the state into a federal set up which is the general principle of federalism… Our proposal is on the national basis of federalism but not on ethnic basis of federalism. We should not have any confusion on this issue. People have wrong concepts of nationality and ethnicity.

We Marxists believe in nationality-based federalism. Here, nationality means a group of people who have common territory, common language, common economic base, and psychological make-up, who come together to form a nationality or they are the basic understanding of nationalism. We want to restructure the country on these certain grounds but not on the grounds of ethnicity. If you go by ethnic federalism, they will have fissiparous tendency and separatist tendency. However, we want to strengthen the unity of the country. We want to devolve much power to the federal units so they become fully able to run and develop the federal territory. In this regard, in a real sense, we want the unity of the country, which will be based on nationality and nationalism – common territory, language, economic principle, and psychological makeup but not on the principle of ethnicity.⁴¹⁰

The leader of the Maoist Party, Ram Karki, sees the democratization of politics and parties as the solution to the entire peace process. Kul Acharya categorically opposes the prospects

410 Appendix 5, 320.

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of ethnic federalism. Indra Gurung opines that strong political determination helps to minimize conflict in a country; the way leaders use conflict to gain power is a hindrance in the solution of political crises. Dolendra Khadka sees the problem in the vested interests of political parties and leaders; he sees ethnically based federalism as the seed of the ethnic conflict in Nepal.

Remarks

Pragmatically, the peace process in Nepal officially began with signing of a 12 point understanding between SPA and the rebel group and moved ahead with the signing of CPA and promulgation of Interim Constitution 2007. The political leaders agreed to sending the Maoist combatants into cantonments, holding the election of CA in 2008, integrating the combatants in security forces, rehabilitating them in societies, and building political consensus among the political parties for drafting the new constitution in the first CA.

However, some issues of the peace process are incomplete, as it failed to promulgate the constitution in time.

From the monitoring perspective, Birendra Prasad Mishra remarks that “it can be said that the peace process, especially after the signing of the CPA, has hardly been monitored.”⁴¹¹ When the handling of the peace process in Nepal is examinedthree negative characteristics of the process stand out, specifically, only unfulfilled agreements and understandings were reached; no significant facilitation was provided; and no specific monitoring team was established. The peace process of Nepal has covered up several issues. However, to date, neither the political parties nor the international community has addressed human rights issues. During the decade of armed conflict, state and Maoist forces committed crimes and violated human rights (rapes, mass killings, and kidnappings, for example). There is also a

411 Mishra, B.P., The Nepalese Peace Process, 77–9.

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culture of impunity in the current discourse. Manmohan Bhattarai states,

[H]uman rights abuse issues have been lopsidedly sidelined by the political parties. Gross violation of human rights abuse has been committed by Maoists, in fact, rather than by the government. The state has a certain responsibility when the insurgency was on, but most of the blame has been put upon the state. The disappearance of the people, killing of civilians etc. was initially committed by the Maoist as the teachers and civilians were their targets.

Only after the ceasefire, there was acute fighting between Maoist force, police, and army.

But before that time almost for seven years the war was against the civilians.⁴¹² The Maoist party, government, and political parties granted blanket amnesty to those responsible for human rights violations and for disrespecting the rule of law. In returning to the causes of current armed conflict and its dynamics, it arises from repression, human rights violations, ethnicity, social exclusion, and deprivation. In such conditions, Nepali

stakeholders should think towards a more inclusive vision for a New Nepal in the future, and not only mere peace under the current situation.