Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.3 Root Causes of the Conflict
From the literature, it can be seen that the main factors behind the Maoist violence was dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the democratization process during the 1990s and people’s growing anger with the monarchy that had ruled Nepal since 1768. Much of what
81 Ibid., 12.
82 The International Crisis Group is an independent organization working to prevent wars and shape policies that will build a more peaceful world. It was founded in 1995 as an international non-governmental organization by a group of prominent statesmen who despaired at the international community’s failure to anticipate and respond effectively to the tragedies of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia Source; https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are/history. Accessed on April 12, 2013.
83 International Crisis Group, “Beyond Victimhood,”1-25.
84 Dahal, D.R., National Security; Sector Reforms and Civil-Security Relations in Nepal, 5.
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has been discussed so far in the literature is a broad analysis of the development of the Maoist movements and their strategy to capture state power. While informative, such analysis has lacked in-depth examination of social and political factors. Earl Conteh-Morgan has observed that in conflicts and disputes around the world, their intensity, and the level of participation by groups or states can be explained in terms of how the identities, ideas, and goals of the actors are affected.85 The socially constructed understanding, perception, or interpretations of the actors shape how both conflict and cooperation unfold.
Rebecca N. Mbuh states that conflict and wars result from causes and can spread from a small part of a nation to neighboring regions and countries, as has been the case in African conflicts.86 Upreti87 points out that the influences of the international community – either regionally or globally – should play a constructive role in the Nepali conflict. Upreti says that the failure of successive governments to address structural problems of poverty, inequality, political oppression, and social discrimination against certain groups such as Kamaiya,88 women, and Dalits89 is also the root cause of the conflict in Nepal.
There are different schools of thought contributed by human rights workers, researchers, and journalists about the Maoist movement in Nepal, with regard to its beginnings, its history, and the uprising. With regard to democratization and the growth of communism in Nepal, R.
Andrew Nickson has highlighted the fact that Nepal presents a rare exception in the
85 Conteh-Morgan, “Peace Building and Human Security,” 72–3.
86 For example, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has involved eight countries. Africa is a vast and heterogeneous continent that renders the causes of conflicts equally complex. Some of these include poverty, decline in community ethics, lack of appropriate education, governments’ inability to settle conflicts quickly, disintegration of societies, lack of trust, individualism, self-interest, and politics and power. See Juma 2005;
Shawa 2003; and Kang, McDonald, and Mbuh, eds., Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, 119–201.
87 Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, 42-7.
88 Landless people working the fields of landlords for very nominal wages.
89 Dalits have been called by several names. Some terms, such as paninachalne (“water polluting”), acchoot (“untouchables”), doom, pariganit, and tallo jat (“low caste”), used in Nepali society are derogatory, while others, such as uppechhit (“ignored”), utpidit (“oppressed”), sosit (“exploited”), pacchadipareka (“lagging behind”), bipanna (“downtrodden”), garib (“poor”), nimukha (“helpless”), simantakrit (“marginalized”), subidhabata banchit (“disadvantaged”), alpasankhyak (“minorities”), banchitikaranma pareka (“excluded”), and Harijan (“god’s people”), are not, though some may be considered condescending. After initial hesitation and controversy among Dalits and non-Dalits alike, the use of the term “Dalit” has gained general acceptance, and has been widely used at national and international levels. See Bhattachan, A Resource on Situation of Dalits.
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contemporary world, in which the decline of communism generally leads to the ascendance of neo-liberalism. Maoism, virtually extinct in the rest of the world except Peru, is a potent political force in Nepal,90 and while the CPN (M) Nepal has had political and training support from the Indian Communist Party of India (Maoist), Indian rebels have not had a significant influence on Nepal CPN (M).
Nickson presents the intra-party division during the monarchy and democracy movement as the main cause of the escalation of the Maoist uprising. He compares Peru’s Sendero Luminoso and the CPN (Masal), noting that both parties appear in both countries in similar situations, and are similar in structure. He analyzes the situations in Peru and Nepal and argues that the future prospect of the Nepalese Maoists will depend largely on the extent to which Nepali political parties, such as NC and the government, address the historic neglect and discrimination suffered by the rural communities.
Furthermore, Nickson91discusses some issues that have contributed to the growth of the Maoist movement in Nepal, such as the conservative nature of the public administration, the armed forces, and the monarchy, as well the inability to effect structural reform through the parliamentary system and the continued deterioration of the economic activities that
contributed to the well-being of the youth and the rural poor. Bishnu Raj Upreti92 asserts that the causes and consequences of the Maoist armed conflicts in Nepal were failure of
governance, the slow pace of developmental activities, and the failure of the royal takeover and constitutional limitation to address the people’s demands. In addition to these factors, the catalysts of the conflict were the royal massacre of June 1, 2001, the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 –– which led to international efforts against terrorists, with the government taking strong action against Maoists as part of this initiative ––as well as the role of the media and the unlawful activities of the election commission for holding local
90 Nickson, Democratization and Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making? 358.
91 Ibid., 372.
92 Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, 19.
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elections after the coup by King Gyanendra.93
Anne de Sales94 highlights the core of Maoist identity politics as resting with ethnic minorities. When the Maoists started their insurgency, they vowed to bring autonomy to the marginalized ethnic and caste groups and assured the youth of some positive changes in order to recruit them to the movement. The Maoist party established itself in the ethnic
communities, such as in the Kham-Magar95 in the countryside of Rolpa. There, the Maoists became somewhat popular due to their reciprocal relation with the rural people and local populations (mostly Magars), who endured very poor economic conditions. The Maoists were successful in inculcating a sense of nation state and autonomy in these communities.
To understand the root causes of the Maoist uprising, one must therefore look to the party’s political and institutional strength in these ethnic communities.
An in-depth analysis of the literature and evidence shows that factors in the Nepali political situation, and the unexpected royal massacre, also played a vital role in the success of the Maoist movement in Nepal. In the book Critical Barriers to Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal,96 Ananda P. Shrestha and Hari Uprety propose two factors: one to do with the history and origin of the Maoist insurgency, and the other with the possible tools for negotiating the ongoing conflict.
Josse offers a linear account of the CPN in general and highlights the establishment and structure of the party in particular. He notes that September 15, 1949, marked the publication of a Nepali translation of the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.97 This coincided with Mao Zedong’s proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing.
The CPN (M) derived the name of their party from the success of the Chinese leader and
93 Ibid., 41-7.
94 De Sales, “The Kham Magar Country,”65.
95 The group of ethnic people in Nepal those Speak the Kham language. Kham-Magar is one of the indigenous ethnic nationalities of Nepal.
96 Shrestha and Uprety (eds.), Critical Barriers to Negotiation, 51-64.
97 Josse, M.R. “History and Genesis of Nepal`s Maoist Insurgency: Tools for Negotiating Conflict.” In Critical Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal, eds., Shrestha, and Uprety, 2-17.
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practiced his theories in the Nepali context as a means to grasp power.98
Josse focuses on what are generally considered the key factors for the growth and escalation of the Maoist insurgency. They are as follows:
Mohan Bikram Singh99
Slow government reaction
Caste and ethnicity
The Magars100
The Tharus101
Exclusion from civil service
Abuse of electoral practices
Post-election persecution
SIJA Campaign102
Operation Romeo103
Disillusionment with multi-party democracy
Failure to extend the tenure of local officials
Furthermore, an evaluation of the existing literature shows that Nepal’s Maoist conflict was heightened through the empathy of political actors. There are factors behind the Maoist problem, including political, geographic, economic, and ethical issues. For a long time, Nepal was subject to the undemocratic Panchayat system, based on a feudal economy and culture,
98 Ibid., 2.
99 A communist politician. From the very beginning, he vowed to hold a CA election and led a democratic uprising. For more details, see:
http://cailmail.free.fr/Documents/Mohan%20Bikram%20Singh%20and%20the%20History%20of%20Nepale se%20Maoism.pdf. Accessed on April 21, 2013.
100 The Magar is one of the indigenous ethnic nationalities of Nepal.
101 The Tharus are an ethnic group indigenous to the Terai, the Southern foothills of the Nepal.
102 SIJA is an acronym of Sisne (name of a peak) and Jaljala (Shrine), familiar Kham-Magar symbols.
103 In November 1995, the government of Nepal, a coalition of Congress and royalists, launched a police invasion of Rolpa, code-named “Operation Romeo,” to control Maoist activities. Atrocities committed by the police in “Operation Romeo” brought the villages of Rolpa to a fever pitch. See
http://monthlyreview.org/commentary/the-nepali-revolution-and-international-relations. Accessed on April 21, 2013.
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under which people could not enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms.
The rule of law, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary were not recognized institutionally in Nepal, and people became the victims of lapses that were ignored by the political system. People were in favor of making the necessary changes to the political system and socioeconomic sectors needed to improve their quality of life and enjoy complete social security. The common and marginal people felt insecurity in education, health service, employment, involvement in decision-making level, feeling that societal justice and the political leaders were far behind the aspirations of the public and that the political superstructure was meaningless.
The Mid-western Development Region, which was most affected by the Maoist insurgency, had no basic infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, schools and hospitals. The average living standard was low104 and the majority of the people living in Nepal did not have even the basic facilities. In this regard, according to Bhattarai, “[The Maoists] fought against feudal autocracy, and foreign domination for supporting the socially backward groups, women, Madeshi, Dalit, and the poor classes.”105
Nepalese governments had ignored the locals living there rather than bringing them into the national mainstream.106 There was little representation at the policy-making level, and, even in political parties, their presence was quite nominal. The Maoists addressed their problems politically and promised to build a multi-ethnic society, a policy that earned them great popularity among minority communities in the country. Manmohan Bhattarai agrees that, only after 2006, “due to the direct proportional electoral system, different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups had the opportunity in the legislature parliament…”107
Uncompleted laws, a lack of law enforcement, and a perceived bias of law enforcement
104 Irini Maltsoglous, and Kiyoshi Taniguchi, Poverty, livestock and Household typologies in Nepal, 18-19.
105 See Appendix 5, 316.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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agencies also added to the People’s War.108 The laws were not sufficient to address problems such as women’s rights to property, to eradicate the problems of the Dalits, and to ensure equal treatment of all ethnicities.109 The Constitution of 1990 ensured freedom of
expression and thought and the right to assembly, but its practical implementation was very weak.110 From 1994 to 1996, when people close to the Maoists tried to exercise their political freedoms, the police suppressed them and they were ultimately forced to join the
underground activities of the Maoists.111 The government ignored the Maoists’ 40-point demands and launched operations against them, leading to the deaths of civilians before the party initiated an armed insurgency in 1996. The police disrupted peaceful demonstrations, arrested political activists and local people, raped women, and killed with impunity.112 The police banned their organizations and even intervened by arresting and killing people
engaged in cultural programs carried under SIJA auspices.113 These actions undermined faith in law enforcement agencies, especially the police, and drove the locals into the arms of the Maoist movement. Several scholars114 have identified the causes of the conflict as monolithic, feudalistic, autocratic, authoritarian, and centralized government.
In an empirical study, Shrestha finds that the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was caused by the ideological base, international circumstances, and the political development of the country, and lists the following factors as being responsible for the insurgency:115
Political and ideological influences from both the right and the left
Lack of popular participation in political parties under the Panchayat system
Imitation of international political systems, such as the communist and democratic
108 Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, 26-27.
109 Ibid., 27.
110 Ibid., 39.
111 Ibid.,42.
112 Josse, M.R. “History and Genesis of Nepal`s Maoist Insurgency: Tools for Negotiating Conflict.” In Critical Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal, eds., Shrestha, and Uprety,12.
113 Ibid., 11-12.
114 Thapa, Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal; Karki and Seddon, eds., The People’s War in Nepal;
Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, Misra 2004.
115 Shrestha, Chuda, B., Nepal: Coping with Maoist Insurgency Conflict, 89–91.
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systems
Lack of good governance
Ethnicity, caste and cultural factors
Lack of equal opportunities
Chronic corruption at all levels and sectors
Lack of freedom and fear of investigation, persecution and trial
Shrestha presents similar causes of the Nepali Maoist insurgency to those identified by the Centre of Human Rights and Global Justice in the Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Caste
Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal. This study, carried out in 2005, highlights issues such as caste-based discrimination, economic marginalization, impediments to education, lack of access to food, water, and health care, and lack of political representation. The study states that, with regard to the Maoist insurgency, the civil war in Nepal was marked by
widespread insecurity, overt forms of violence and repression, and a systematic curtailment of fundamental liberties. The Centre of Human Rights and Global Justice Report mentions that global causes of conflicts, such as the global war on terror declared in 2001, also contributed to the escalation of conflict in Nepal, and that the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of the Royal NA on November 26, 2001, by the government, escalated the conflict, which rapidly affected the entire country.
Studies have found that the 9/11 terrorist attack on the USA affected global security, which had an effect on the Maoist insurgency of Nepal.116 The army was deployed throughout the country and had begun to characterize its intensified struggle against the Maoist insurgency as part of the “global war on terror.” Neighboring countries provided assistance to Nepal’s army and supported it with sophisticated weapons acquired through military aid from India, the USA, the UK, and other European countries. Equipped with new antiterrorism legislation
116 Harjeet Singh, South Asian Defense and Strategic Year book- 2013, 37.
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that gave them extraordinary powers of arrest and detention, security forces began operating under an unofficial policy of killing all individuals suspected of taking part in the Maoist insurgency.117 According to Nepal’s National Human Rights Commission, government security forces have engineered more than 2,000 extra-judicial killings since 2001. Similarly, according to the UN, Nepal had the highest number of reported new “disappearances” in the world in both 2003 and 2004.118
Anjana Shakya and Centre of Human Rights and Global Justice writers Rajeev Goyal, Puja Dhawan, and Smita Narula have said that the “militarization of the conflict has exacerbated caste dynamics and the resulting abuses against Dalits in Nepal.119” This resulted in the involvement of the Dalit community in the insurgency, and there was growing resentment against the security forces deployed by the government.
There is some literature that seems to share the view of Burton’s human needs theory,120 which is based on the norms, customs and beliefs associated with particular social
communities and interests. In the context of Nepal, Maoists had taken part in parliamentary general and local elections held in 1991 and 1992 under their open political forum UPF led by Baburam Bhattarai. During that time they demanded that the government fulfill their 40-point political agenda and concluded that there was no way for the further involvement of the party within the parliamentary political system. In a very short period, they convinced the people that the existing political system would not fulfill their needs. In short, the
expectations of the Nepali people were the same even after 1990 and the failed promises of the political system. The conversation of Maoist leaders to common people emphasized the
117 Centre of Human Rights and Global Justice, Missing Piece of the Puzzle, 4.
118 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth session, Item 11 (b) of the provisional agenda: Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions, Question of enforced or involuntary disappearances, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, January 21, 2004,43.
119 Centre of Human Rights and Global Justice, Missing Piece of the Puzzle, 4.
120 Conflict stems from unsatisfied human needs. In conflict, people represent their interests, but not their underlying needs; however, they will use power and coercion to meet those needs.
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political differences between the government of Nepal and Maoist ideology.
Quite the contrary, Manmohan Bhattarai categorically disagrees with the conflict of ideological differences and states that the reason behind the conflict in Nepal was the
“politics of resources and they [Indians] were all behind to grab the resources whatever was within the country.”121 He clearly indicates his views that the rich natural resource of Nepal like water resources, medicinal herbs in Himalayan ranges, fertile land, good climate for living in Nepal are the pushing factors for conflict. For this, India and other international stakeholders have an interest in power politics in Nepal, as Nepal lies between India and China and its strategic location is important for power politics. In his opinion, it was a part of power conflict, as the Royal Palace of Nepal and Delhi were not satisfied with the
Constitution of 1990. The political change of 1991 was reflected in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, and a faction of Royal palace was not ready to be a constitutional royal entity and wanted to plot against it.122
If we analyze the political document of CPN (M), the conflict had a political goal to get power and change the socio-economic structure of Nepal through political transformation.
Manmohan Bhattarai denies all these issues and holds the view that it had a link with the political ambition of Maoists and the power interest of royal palace and India, which had an interest in grasping resources of Nepal for India.123 This suggests that the seed of Nepalese conflict was sown in the hilly area of Nepal and gradually affected the whole country. There was the involvement of larger institutions in the conflict, and India wanted to convert a unitary political system into a federal system. Some people suggest that India has the interest of using Nepal’s water resources,124 but there were other factors too.125 Bihar is now
building 10,000-km six-lane roads and 10,000-km railway tracks to build up the
121 See Appendix 5, 316-17.
122 Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, 54.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.