トップPDF PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ...
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PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ...
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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Eco 601E: Advanced Microeconomics II (Fall, 2nd, 2013) Final Exam: January 28 1. Dynamic Game (24 points) Consider the following two-person dynamic game. In the first period, game A is played; after observing ...
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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Any finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 2. Expected Utility (16 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert effort or not. Her initial wealth is $100 and the cost ...
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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (e) The social welfare function introduced by Arrow is to derive social UTILITY by adding up individual utilities. 2. Externalities (25 points) Consider a one-consumer, one-firm economy (or equiv- alently an ...
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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... U and v ′ i > v i for i = 1, ...SYM and PAR restrict the behavior of the solution on single bargaining problems, while INV and IIA require the solution to exhibit some consistency across ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...
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Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ...
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PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each ...
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PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate ...
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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 2. Duopoly (15 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , ...
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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Derive each partner’s payo¤ function. (b) Derive each partner’s best reply function and graphically draw them in a …gure. (Taking m in the horizontal axis and n in the vertical axis.) (c) ...
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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Suppose a government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neutral mobile phone companies, i = 1; 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with higher bid receives a spectrum ...
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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 1; 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the ...b+b 2 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s ...
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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) Now suppose that the …rms interact inde…nitely through time. They discount future pro…ts at a discount factor . For what value of is there an equilibrium where …rms follow the “trigger strategies”, i.e., they produce ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 合理的な豚：分析 子豚には最適戦略（支配戦略）が存在する！ 大豚の行動によらず「 待つ 」のが常に最適 子豚が合理的ならば絶対にスイッチを押さない 子豚の「 スイッチを押す 」は可能性から消去される ...
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Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Dual Problem - Theory | 双対問題 - 理論 (1) Applying the duality idea to the consumer problem, we can establish the close relationship between the indirect utility and expenditure functions, and between the ...
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PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Set 3: Due on July 17 Advanced Microeconomics II (Spring, 2nd, 2013) ...1 and type 2 worker has a marginal value product of ...z and for type 2 is C 2 (z) = (1 − ...
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PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ...
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