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... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Eco 601E: Advanced Microeconomics II (Fall, 2nd, 2013) Final Exam: January 28 1. Dynamic Game (24 points) Consider the following two-person dynamic game. In the first period, game A is played; after observing ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Any finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 2. Expected Utility (16 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert effort or not. Her initial wealth is $100 and the cost ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (e) The social welfare function introduced by Arrow is to derive social UTILITY by adding up individual utilities. 2. Externalities (25 points) Consider a one-consumer, one-firm economy (or equiv- alently an ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... U and v ′ i > v i for i = 1, ...SYM and PAR restrict the behavior of the solution on single bargaining problems, while INV and IIA require the solution to exhibit some consistency across ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Duopoly (15 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Derive each partner’s payo¤ function. (b) Derive each partner’s best reply function and graphically draw them in a …gure. (Taking m in the horizontal axis and n in the vertical axis.) (c) ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Suppose a government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neutral mobile phone companies, i = 1; 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with higher bid receives a spectrum ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 1; 2. The buyers submit bids simultaneously, and the buyer with higher bid receives the ...b+b 2 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) Now suppose that the …rms interact inde…nitely through time. They discount future pro…ts at a discount factor . For what value of is there an equilibrium where …rms follow the “trigger strategies”, i.e., they produce ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 合理的な豚：分析
子豚には最適戦略（支配戦略）が存在する！
大豚の行動によらず「 待つ 」のが常に最適
子豚が合理的ならば絶対にスイッチを押さない
子豚の「 スイッチを押す 」は可能性から消去される ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Dual Problem - Theory | 双対問題 - 理論 (1) Applying the duality idea to the consumer problem, we can establish the close relationship between the indirect utility and expenditure functions, and between the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Set 3: Due on July 17 Advanced Microeconomics II (Spring, 2nd, 2013) ...1 and type 2 worker has a marginal value product of ...z and for type 2 is C 2 (z) = (1 − ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (proposer) and 2 (receiver) are bargaining over how to split the ice-cream of size ...player 2 where x ∈ [0, 1] is player 1’s own share. Player 2 can decide whether accept the offer or ... 完全なドキュメントを参照