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... (c) Any finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 2. Expected Utility (16 points) Suppose that an individual can either exert effort or not. Her initial wealth is $100 and the cost of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Mechanism Design This lecture is mostly based on Chapter 14 “Mechanism Design” of Tadelis (2013). There are many economic and political situations in which some central authority wishes to implement a decision ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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政府（官僚組織、政治家）はどのように行動するのか？
政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学 政治の経済学
私企業の中でなにが起こっているのか？
組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） 組織の経済学、企業統治（コーポレート・ガバナンス） ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) Let p be a probability that player 2 would choose Rock, and q be a probability that she chooses Paper. Note that her probability of choosing Scissors is written as 1 p q. Under mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... student s prefers an empty slot at school c to her own assignment, and (nw2) and (nw3) mean that legal constraints are not violated when s is assigned the empty slot without changing other students’ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Using this minimax theorem, answer the following questions. (b) Show that Nash equilibria are interchangeable; if and are two Nash equilibria, then and are also Nash equilibria. (c) Show that each player’s payo¤ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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すべてのプレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある
「支配される戦略の逐次消去」（後述）
（お互いの行動に関する）「正しい予想の共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (d) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Hint: Your answers in (a) – (c) may change depending on the value of θ. 4. Duopoly (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2, simul- taneously and independently select ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Connection between UMP and EMP | UMP と EMP の関係 There is a strong link between the utility maximization problem (UMP, 効用最 大化問題 ) and the expenditure minimization problem (EMP, 支出最小化問題 ). Let us first consider the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies in which each player i accepts an exchange if and only if the value v i does not exceed some threshold θ i (b) How would your answer to (a) change if ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3. when it is available (its date) 4. under what condition it is deliverable (the state of the world) Def A contingent commodity x kts is a promise of delivery of a particular good or service k at a particular date t if ... 完全なドキュメントを参照