# トップPDF Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...

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### Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**theorem assures that the first mover has a winning strategy in ANY perfect information game with strictly opposite interests. (e) The weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs ...

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### Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A ...

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### Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ...

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### Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**actions, they play game B in the second period. Assume that the payo¤

**s**are simply the sum ...

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### Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ...

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### Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...

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### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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### Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**information set is reached, choosing A is clearly optimal irrespective of her belief over nodes. → Choosing F looks non-credible. SPNE cannot eliminate this since there is no ...

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### Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**knowledge of her own type p i (t −i |t i ). When nature reveals t i to player i, she can ...

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### Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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### Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**): Existence of Pivotal Voter Lemma 3 (Existence of Pivotal Voter) There is a voter n ∗ = n(b) who is extremely pivotal in the sense that by changing his vote at some profile he can move b from the ...

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### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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### Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**bid, b 0 is the loser’

**s**bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ...

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### Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**s**preference is continuous, monotone and strictly convex. Then, we have the following relations between the Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions ...

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**2**, w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...

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### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

**の**プレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある 「支配される戦略

**の**逐次消去」（後述） （お互い

**の**行動に関する）「正しい予想

**の**共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ...

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### PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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