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トップPDF Micro5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Micro5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... The next theorem guarantees the existence of equilibrium ( 均衡存在 ). Thm Consider a production economy (u i , e i , θ ij , Y j ) i∈I,j∈J . Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied: ◮ Utility function u i ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor L . ...

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syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... This is an advanced course in microeconomics, succeeding to Advanced Microeconomics I (ECO600E) in which we study individual economic decisions and their aggregate [r] ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (5) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period ...

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 5. Focal Point (5 points, bonus!) Choose one course offered in GRIPS in the winter term, and write down the name (do NOT write more than one names!). If the course you choose becomes the most popular ...

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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Similarly, player 2 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing X and Y , which implies 4q + 6(1 q) = 7(1 q) , 5q = 1 , q = 1=5. Thus, the mixed-strategy equilibirum is that player 1 takes A with probability ...

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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 安田予想で未受賞候補者たち Robert Barro (1944-, マクロ、成長理論) → イチオシ! Elhanan Helpman (1946-, 国際貿易、成長) → 誰ともらうか? Paul Milgrom (1948-, 組織経済学、オークション) → 今年は厳しい… Ariel Rubinstein (1951-, ゲーム理論) → 今年は厳しそう… ...

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最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... student s prefers an empty slot at school c to her own assignment, and (nw2) and (nw3) mean that legal constraints are not violated when s is assigned the empty slot without changing other students’ ...

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...

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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... You and your n − 1 roommates (n ≧ 2) each have five hours of free time that could be used to clean your apartment. You all dislike cleaning, but you all like having a clean apartment: each person i’s payoff is the ...

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis   ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ...

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Review of Lecture 5  Indifference property in mixed strategy NE.  If a player chooses more than one strategy with positive probability, she must be indifferent among such pure strategies: choosing any of them ...

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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