[PDF] Top 20 Lec1 8 note 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... The choice function C does not need to be observable.. 3.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... [0, 1] such that v(s) ◦ M ⊕ (1 − v(s)) ◦ m ∼ [s] where [s] is a certain lottery with prize s, ...= 1 ◦ s. In particular, v(M ) = 1 and v(m) = ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... To understand how to work with the concept of subgame perfection, con­ sider the game pictured in Figure 15.4. Note irst that this game has one proper subgame, which starts at the node reached when player 1 plays ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)
 (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Preferences To construct a model of individual choice, the notion of preferences plays a central role in economic theory, which specifies the form of consistency or inconsistency in the person’s choices. We view ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 囚人のジレンマ：注意点
このゲームでは個々のプレーヤーが最適戦略を持つ
【最適戦略（支配戦略）】 他のプレーヤーたちがどのような行 動を選択しても、自分がある特定の行動Aを選ぶことによって 利得が最大化されるとき、行動Aを「支配戦略」と呼ぶ。 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Cournot Game with Unknown Cost | コストが不明のクールノーゲーム (2) Assuming a linear (inverse) demand, p = a − (q 1 + q 2 ), the profit function becomes π i (q 1 , q 2 ) = [a − (q 1 + q 2 ) − c i ]q i for ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. if ω ′ = p ′ x(p, ω), then either x(p ′ , ω ′ ) = x(p, ω) or (p ′ − p)(x(p ′ , ω ′ ) − x(p, ω)) < 0. Proof The proof for 1 is left for the assignment. Assume that x(p ′ , ω ′ ) 6= x(p, ω). By Walras’s ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at2. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Zermelo’s Theorem Thm For any finite perfect information games, there exist at least one backward induction solution in pure strategies. Furthermore, if payoffs differ between any two different strategy profiles, ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... as 1 p q. Under mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, player 1 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing Rock, Paper and Scissors, which implies that these three actions must give him the same expected ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (c) Formulate the cost minimization problem (you may denote a target output level by y). Then, solve it and derive the (minimum) cost function, c(w 1 , w 2 , y). 5. Risk Aversion (15 points) Suppose that a ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... where x is a vector of choice variables, and a := (a 1 , ..., a m ) is a vector of parameters ( パラメータ ) that may enter the objective function and constraint. Suppose that for each vector a, the solution is unique ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (5) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period payoff. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (b) Does this production function display increasing, constant, or decreasing re- turns to scale? Explain why. (c) Formulate the cost minimization problem (you may denote a target output level by y). Then, solve it and ... 完全なドキュメントを参照