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# トップPDF Lec1 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Lec1 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... R n + := {(x 1 , ..., x n )|x i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} ⊂ R n . For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y. Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives. A budget set is a set of ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 + x 2 with ; > 0, then % satis…es the above three ...is 1) Additive and Strictly monotone but not Continuous, and 2) Strictly monotone and Continuous but not ...

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### Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ...

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### en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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### Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ...

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### Lec2 4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... , s − i ) > u i (s i , s − i ) for all s − i ∈ S − i ...strategy s ′ i is a weakly dominant strategy if playing s ′ i is optimal for any combination of other players’ ...

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### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  【戦略】 個々プレイヤーがとることできる行動  【利得】 起こり得る行動組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲーム解（予測）はどうやって与えられる？ A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ...

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### Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロア恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...

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### Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (b) Does this production function display increasing, constant, or decreasing re- turns to scale? Explain why. (c) Formulate the cost minimization problem (you may denote a target output level by y). Then, solve it and ...

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### Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 4. Exchange Economy (12 points) Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, 1 and 2, have the ...

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### Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...

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### Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... problem with equality constraints. 2. Consumer Theory (30 points) A consumer gets utility from 2 sources: drinking (measured in liters x) and time spent on the phone (measured in hours y). Each liter of drink costs ...

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### Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...

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### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

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### PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...

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### PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

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