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トップPDF Lec1 5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lec1 5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2 Assume that both x and y (where x 6= y) are solutions to the consumer problem B(p, ω). By the convexity of the budget set B(p, ω) we have αx + (1 − α)y ∈ B(p, ω) and, by the strict convexity of %, αx + (1 ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (1) Write the payoff functions π 1 and π 2 (as a function of p 1 and p 2 ). (2) Derive the best response function for each player. (3) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. (4) Derive ...

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 5. Focal Point (5 points, bonus!) Choose one course offered in GRIPS in the winter term, and write down the name (do NOT write more than one names!). If the course you choose becomes the most popular ...

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  【戦略】 個々プレイヤーがとることできる行動  【利得】 起こり得る行動組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲーム解(予測)はどうやって与えられる? A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ...

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Micro1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロア恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A function f (x) is homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g is a strictly increasing function and h is a function which is homogeneous of degree 1. Suppose preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility ...

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (b) Does this production function display increasing, constant, or decreasing re- turns to scale? Explain why. (c) Formulate the cost minimization problem (you may denote a target output level by y). Then, solve it and ...

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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ...

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 6. General Equilibrium (30 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann (A) and Bob (B), and two goods, leisure x 1 and a consumption good x 2 . Ann and Bob have equal en- dowments of time (= ω ...

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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... not have any Nash equilibrium, including mixed strategy equilibrium. 5. Question 5 (6 points, Review) A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but prefers ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ...

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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