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# トップPDF Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### Lec1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... for i = 1, · · · , n. We now have to show that p ∗ is a competitive equilibrium. Using Warlas’ law, we can show that z i (p ∗ ) = 0 for all i. It is common to show the existence of equilibrium by applying a ...

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### Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... いよいよゲーム理論中身を見ていこう！  まずは1時点（静学的な）ゲームを分析  各プレイヤーは独立かつ同時に戦略を決定  相手決定を知らずに自分戦略を決めるような状況  決定タイミングは文字通り“同時”である必要は無い！ ...

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### Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... homeowners, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose how many hours to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn (denoted by l 1 and l 2 ...that 1s payoff is expressed ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...

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### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...

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### Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロア恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

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### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

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### Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ...

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### en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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### Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 2 α ◦ x ⊕ (1 − α) ◦ y ∼ (1 − α) ◦ y ⊕ α ◦ x: The consumer does not care about the order in which the lottery is described. 3 β ◦ (α ◦ x ⊕ (1 − α) ◦ y) ⊕ (1 − β) ◦ y ∼ (βα) ◦ x ⊕ (1 − ...

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### Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 6. General Equilibrium (30 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann (A) and Bob (B), and two goods, leisure x 1 and a consumption good x 2 . Ann and Bob have equal en- dowments of time (= ω ...

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### Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...

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### Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ...

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... [0, 1] such that v(s) ◦ M ⊕ (1 − v(s)) ◦ m ∼ [s] where [s] is a certain lottery with prize s, ...= 1s. In particular, v(M ) = 1 and v(m) = ...

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