トップPDF Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

In contrast, classic producer theory assigns the producer a highly structured target function (profit function) but fewer constraints on the choice sets (technology or production functio[r]

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r]

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

for each player i the action a s i belongs to A i . ◮ In the finitely repeated game G(T ) or the infinitely repeated game G(∞, δ), a player’s strategy specifies the action the player will take in each stage, for every possible history of play.

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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash equilibrium. (c) If there are two Nash equilibria in pure-strategy, they can ALWAYS be Pareto

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MarketDesign en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.   Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r]

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r]

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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).   Ber[r]

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.   Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .   After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ) as a unique outcome.

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!   Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis    ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though    Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!    Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up realizing!!

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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

   If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r]

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at2. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r]

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PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r]

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Nobel2015 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

  Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？   Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたのは好材料？   Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？   清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い

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Midterm14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r]

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Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference can be expressed in the form of U (x, y, z) = V (x, y) + z. Derive V (x, y).

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トップPDF Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

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