トップPDF EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Final2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) Zermelo’s theorem assures that the first mover has a winning strategy in ANY perfect information game with strictly opposite interests. (e) The weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts NO restriction on beliefs ...
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Midterm2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? 4. Mixed Strategy (15 points) Three …rms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A ...
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Final2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 5. Bayesian Game (20 points) There are 10 envelopes and each of them contains a number 1 through 10. That is, one envelope contains 1, another envelope contains 2, and so on; these numbers cannot be observable ...
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Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Confirm that by choosing the tax t appropriately, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced. (d) Add a second firm with a different production function. Now the consumers observe a pollution level b = b 1 ...
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Final2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider the following two-person dynamic game. In the …rst period, game A is played; after observing each player’s actions, they play game B in the second period. Assume that the payo¤s are simply the sum ...
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Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Auctions (30 points) Suppose that the government auctions one block of radio spectrum to two risk neu- tral mobile phone companies, i = 1, 2. The companies submit bids simultaneously, and the company with ...
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Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the ...
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Lec2 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... That is, given that the incumbent’s information set is reached, choosing A is clearly optimal irrespective of her belief over nodes. → Choosing F looks non-credible. SPNE cannot eliminate this since there is no ...
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Lec2 10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A belief about other players’ types is a conditional probability distribution of other players’ types given the player’s knowledge of her own type p i (t −i |t i ). When nature reveals t i to player i, she can ...
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Lec2 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... First-Price: General Model (1) Consider a first-price auction with n bidders in which all the conditions in the previous theorem are satisfied. Assume that bidders play a symmetric equilibrium, β(x). Given some bidding ...
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Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Axiomatic Approach (2) PAR (Pareto Efficiency) Suppose hU, di is a bargaining problem with v, v ′ ∈ U and v ′ i > v i for i = 1, 2. Then f (U, d) 6= v. The axioms SYM and PAR restrict the behavior of ...
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Lec2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Proof Sketch (2): Existence of Pivotal Voter Lemma 3 (Existence of Pivotal Voter) There is a voter n ∗ = n(b) who is extremely pivotal in the sense that by changing his vote at some profile he can move b from the ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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Final2 08 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... b + (1 )b 0 where b is the winner’s bid, b 0 is the loser’s bid, and is some constant satisfying 0 1. (In case of ties, each company wins with equal probability.) Assume the valuation of the spectrum block ...
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Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Dual Problem - Theory | 双対問題 - 理論 (3) Thm Suppose the consumer’s preference is continuous, monotone and strictly convex. Then, we have the following relations between the Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... すべてのプレーヤーに支配戦略が無いゲームでも解け る場合がある 「支配される戦略の逐次消去」（後述） （お互いの行動に関する）「正しい予想の共有＋合理性」 によってナッシュ均衡は実現する！ ...
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