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プロフについて考えよう！！ 1 年　　　組　　　番　名前　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 　　　　　　　　　番　名前　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 以下の質問について２人１組で話し合い、出た意見を全部書いてください

個人で携帯電話や PC でのインターネットの 使い方について、列で与えられたテーマで良 い点・悪い点を考えて付箋に書く。 一人４枚（良い点悪い点２枚ずつ） 一つの意見に１枚の付箋を使う

性格 口癖 好きなタイプ 好きな人 好きな TV 番組 好きなアーティスト 今一番欲しいもの 今一番したいこと 朝起きて最初にすること 無人島に持っていくもの 自分を動物に例えるなら？ 生まれ変わったら何になりたい？ 最近ハマっていること

St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in the 18th century when he examined the famous St. Pertersburg paradox.

4. Question 4 (5 points) Consider a game of election with asymmetric information among voters. Whether candidate A or candidate B is elected depends on the votes of two citizens (denoted by 1 and 2). The economy may be in one of two states, α and β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α and candidate B is best if the state is β. The payoff for each citizen is symmetric and given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other candidate wins, and 1/2 if the candidates tie. Suppose that citizen 1 is informed of the true state, whereas citizen 2 believes it is α with probability 0.9 and β with probability 0.1. Each citizen may either vote for candidate A, vote for candidate B, or not vote.

6. Question 6 (6 points) Consider the following labor market signaling game. There are two types of worker. Type 1 worker has a marginal value product of 1 and type 2 worker has a marginal value product of 2. The cost of signal z for type 1 is C 1 (z) = z and for type 2 is

ユーザが行う唯一の貢献は、いくつかのコネクタを溶接すること、トロイドを作るこ と、いくつかのリードをはんだ付けすること、 レギュレータと最終トランジスタのペア、巻線トランス... うわー、あなたはもはや 私は 2 枚のプリント基板が付属している最初の 2 枚を持っていました。

27 Jane wants to be a famous star some day.. 28 I was very busy and couldn’t write to you.[r]

（１）実現しようとする順序回路の機能の仕様を記述する      具体的には、状態図（state diagram）で記述する （２）状態図から状態遷移表（state transition table）を作成し、      フリップフロップを用いて状態割当（state assignment）を行なう

～２年生のめあて～ 「１年間を振り返り、自分の成長に関わってきた人たちに 感謝の気持ちを言葉や態度で表そう」 「ありがとう」「ごめんなさい」「どういたしまして」「いいよ」など、自分 から進んで、自分を支えてくれる周りの人に、感謝の気持ちや自分の気持ちを 言葉やあいさつ、態度で伝えられるよう指導していきたいと思います。

(2) She has some homework to do.[r]

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

◮ with probability p, a consumer with wealth x will receive a times of her current wealth x ◮ with probability 1 − p she will receive b times of x. Thm Assume that the assumptions of Pratt’s Theorem holds. Then, for any proportional risk, the decision maker 1 is more risk

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

5. Mixed Strategy (20 points) Consider a patent race game in which a “weak” firm is given an endowment of 4 and a “strong” firm is given an endowment of 5, and any integral amount of the endowment could be invested in a project. That is, the weak firm has five pure strategies (invest 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) and the strong firm has six (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5). The winner of the patent race receives the return of 10. Both players are instructed that whichever player invests the most will win the race and if there is a tie, both lose: neither gets the return of 10.

simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination of strategies determines a payoff for each player..    Each chooses her own action without knowing others’ choices.[r]