# トップPDF 2Ajm2 1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 1

### 2Ajm2 1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 1

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### 2Ajm2 ws2 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 ws2

プロフについて考えよう！！ 1 年　　　組　　　番　名前　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 　　　　　　　　　番　名前　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 以下質問について２人１組で話し合い、出た意見を全部書いてください

### Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in the 18th century when he examined the famous St. Pertersburg paradox.

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### PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

4. Question 4 (5 points) Consider a game of election with asymmetric information among voters. Whether candidate A or candidate B is elected depends on the votes of two citizens (denoted by 1 and 2). The economy may be in one of two states, α and β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α and candidate B is best if the state is β. The payoff for each citizen is symmetric and given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other candidate wins, and 1/2 if the candidates tie. Suppose that citizen 1 is informed of the true state, whereas citizen 2 believes it is α with probability 0.9 and β with probability 0.1. Each citizen may either vote for candidate A, vote for candidate B, or not vote.
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### PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

6. Question 6 (6 points) Consider the following labor market signaling game. There are two types of worker. Type 1 worker has a marginal value product of 1 and type 2 worker has a marginal value product of 2. The cost of signal z for type 1 is C 1 (z) = z and for type 2 is

ユーザが行う唯一貢献は、いくつかコネクタを溶接すること、トロイドを作るこ と、いくつかリードをはんだ付けすること、 レギュレータと最終トランジスタペア、巻線トランス... うわー、あなたはもはや 私は 2プリント基板が付属している最初 2 枚を持っていました。

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### 復習 最近の更新履歴 M2 English

27 Jane wants to be a famous star some day.. 28 I was very busy and couldn’t write to you.[r]

### chapter 2 最近の更新履歴 Hideo Fujiwara

（１）実現しようとする順序回路機能仕様を記述する      具体的には、状態図（state diagram）で記述する （２）状態図から状態遷移表（state transition table）を作成し、      フリップフロップを用いて状態割当（state assignment）を行なう

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### 2nen1gatu 最近の更新履歴 湖西市立新居小学校 city.kosai szo

～２年生めあて～ 「１年間を振り返り、自分成長に関わってきた人たちに 感謝気持ちを言葉や態度で表そう」 「ありがとう」「ごめんなさい」「どういたしまして」「いいよ」など、自分 から進んで、自分を支えてくれる周り人に、感謝気持ちや自分気持ちを 言葉やあいさつ、態度で伝えられるよう指導していきたいと思います。

### 不定詞問題2こたえ 最近の更新履歴 M2 English

(2) She has some homework to do.[r]

### Slide2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

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### EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

◮ with probability p, a consumer with wealth x will receive a times of her current wealth x ◮ with probability 1 − p she will receive b times of x. Thm Assume that the assumptions of Pratt’s Theorem holds. Then, for any proportional risk, the decision maker 1 is more risk

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### EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

### Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

5. Mixed Strategy (20 points) Consider a patent race game in which a “weak” firm is given an endowment of 4 and a “strong” firm is given an endowment of 5, and any integral amount of the endowment could be invested in a project. That is, the weak firm has five pure strategies (invest 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) and the strong firm has six (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5). The winner of the patent race receives the return of 10. Both players are instructed that whichever player invests the most will win the race and if there is a tie, both lose: neither gets the return of 10.

### Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination of strategies determines a payoff for each player..    Each chooses her own action without knowing others’ choices.[r]

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