トップPDF 2Ajm2 1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 1

2Ajm2 1 最近の更新履歴  ProA 2Ajm2 1

2Ajm2 1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 1

イイイイイイイイイイイイイイ.. イイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイ イイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイ イイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイイ イイイイイイイイイイ ププププププ. ex) プププププププププププププププププププ プププププププププププププププププ et c[r]

6 さらに読み込む

2Ajm2 ws2 最近の更新履歴  ProA 2Ajm2 ws2

2Ajm2 ws2 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 ws2

プロフについて考えよう!! 1 年   組   番 名前                         番 名前                  以下質問について2人1組で話し合い、出た意見を全部書いてください

1 さらに読み込む

09proA2A jm1 最近の更新履歴  ProA 09proA2A jm1

09proA2A jm1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 09proA2A jm1

個人で携帯電話や PC でインターネット 使い方について、列で与えられたテーマで良 い点・悪い点を考えて付箋に書く。 一人4枚(良い点悪い点2枚ずつ) 一つ意見に1枚付箋を使う

1 さらに読み込む

2Ajm2 ws1 最近の更新履歴  ProA 2Ajm2 ws1

2Ajm2 ws1 最近の更新履歴 ProA 2Ajm2 ws1

性格 口癖 好きなタイプ 好きな人 好きな TV 番組 好きなアーティスト 今一番欲しいもの 今一番したいこと 朝起きて最初にすること 無人島に持っていくもの 自分を動物に例えるなら? 生まれ変わったら何になりたい? 最近ハマっていること

2 さらに読み込む

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in the 18th century when he examined the famous St. Pertersburg paradox.

15 さらに読み込む

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

4. Question 4 (5 points) Consider a game of election with asymmetric information among voters. Whether candidate A or candidate B is elected depends on the votes of two citizens (denoted by 1 and 2). The economy may be in one of two states, α and β. The citizens agree that candidate A is best if the state is α and candidate B is best if the state is β. The payoff for each citizen is symmetric and given as follows: 1 if the best candidate wins, 0 if the other candidate wins, and 1/2 if the candidates tie. Suppose that citizen 1 is informed of the true state, whereas citizen 2 believes it is α with probability 0.9 and β with probability 0.1. Each citizen may either vote for candidate A, vote for candidate B, or not vote.
さらに見せる

3 さらに読み込む

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2and3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

6. Question 6 (6 points) Consider the following labor market signaling game. There are two types of worker. Type 1 worker has a marginal value product of 1 and type 2 worker has a marginal value product of 2. The cost of signal z for type 1 is C 1 (z) = z and for type 2 is

3 さらに読み込む

part1 jp 最近の更新履歴  JA2GQP' s Download site part1 jp

part1 jp 最近の更新履歴 JA2GQP' s Download site part1 jp

ユーザが行う唯一貢献は、いくつかコネクタを溶接すること、トロイドを作るこ と、いくつかリードをはんだ付けすること、 レギュレータと最終トランジスタペア、巻線トランス... うわー、あなたはもはや 私は 2プリント基板が付属している最初 2 枚を持っていました。

19 さらに読み込む

復習 最近の更新履歴  M2 English

復習 最近の更新履歴 M2 English

27 Jane wants to be a famous star some day.. 28 I was very busy and couldn’t write to you.[r]

3 さらに読み込む

chapter 2 最近の更新履歴  Hideo Fujiwara

chapter 2 最近の更新履歴 Hideo Fujiwara

(1)実現しようとする順序回路機能仕様を記述する      具体的には、状態図(state diagram)で記述する (2)状態図から状態遷移表(state transition table)を作成し、      フリップフロップを用いて状態割当(state assignment)を行なう

28 さらに読み込む

2nen1gatu 最近の更新履歴  湖西市立新居小学校 city.kosai szo

2nen1gatu 最近の更新履歴 湖西市立新居小学校 city.kosai szo

~2年生めあて~ 「1年間を振り返り、自分成長に関わってきた人たちに 感謝気持ちを言葉や態度で表そう」 「ありがとう」「ごめんなさい」「どういたしまして」「いいよ」など、自分 から進んで、自分を支えてくれる周り人に、感謝気持ちや自分気持ちを 言葉やあいさつ、態度で伝えられるよう指導していきたいと思います。

2 さらに読み込む

Slide2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Slide2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r]

16 さらに読み込む

EX2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 18 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

1 さらに読み込む

Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

◮ with probability p, a consumer with wealth x will receive a times of her current wealth x ◮ with probability 1 − p she will receive b times of x. Thm Assume that the assumptions of Pratt’s Theorem holds. Then, for any proportional risk, the decision maker 1 is more risk

13 さらに読み込む

EX2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

PS2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing function and h is a real-valued function which is homo- geneous of degree 1. Suppose that preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility function. Then, prove the following statements.

1 さらに読み込む

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

5. Mixed Strategy (20 points) Consider a patent race game in which a “weak” firm is given an endowment of 4 and a “strong” firm is given an endowment of 5, and any integral amount of the endowment could be invested in a project. That is, the weak firm has five pure strategies (invest 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) and the strong firm has six (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5). The winner of the patent race receives the return of 10. Both players are instructed that whichever player invests the most will win the race and if there is a tie, both lose: neither gets the return of 10.

3 さらに読み込む

Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination of strategies determines a payoff for each player..    Each chooses her own action without knowing others’ choices.[r]

27 さらに読み込む

Show all 10000 documents...