パーリ学仏教文化学 (2) - 001Warder Anthony K「THE BUDDHA AS A PHILOSOPHER」

(1)

Society for the Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

NII-Electronic Library Service

Society for theStudy of Pali and Buddhist Culture

THE

BUDDHA

AS

A

PMLOSOPHER

Anthony

K. Warder

,introduction.

In

considering anyone as a `philosopher' we

have

first

to

define

`philosopher'.

This

is

notoriously

difficult,

the

simplest solution

be-.ing

to

take

_people

who

hold

chairs

in

`philesophy' at rnodern

uni-versities as examples, with `philosophy' as what

they

do

in

their

lectures

and

in

_{publications.}

We

might

thus

be

able

to

_pick

out some

of

the

main

_questions

they

ask and attempt

to

ans"rer; we might

also

be

able

to

extend

the

idea

of a `philosopher'

back

to

their

predecessors

and even

to

teachers

outside universities, or

before

anything resembling a modern university _existed.

Our

problem

is

still not completely solved,

for

_even _within

uni-versities

there

are

trends

so various

that

_professors

may

ignore

each

other's work as

lrrelevant.

For

example

there

is

British

empiricism

on

the

ene

hand

and

German

speculation on _another,

_to

_taketwo

striking _examples.

We

need

_go

into

no

details

here

about

_philosophy

in

Europe,

but

the

is

that

such a

_position

or attitude _as-･

sumed

from

one's own

training

affects one's view of

India,

one's use

of

European

concepts

(writing

in

a

European

language)

when

ex-ploring

a non-European scene.

Thus

scholars with a speculative

background

have

denied

that

the

Buddha

was a

_philosopher

be-cause

he

rejected speculation.

A

British

empiricist may

be

allowed

(2)

2

-g-V

*ts#:!

tle.\

to

claim

the

Buddha

as a

phllosopher

for

precisely

the

same reason.

He

appealed only

to

experience as a sDurce of

knoNKrledge.

This

question

of

what

constitutes

knowledge

is

surely

the

most

important

in

_philosophy.

Why

should

xEre

accept any claims

to

knowti

This

develops

into

an analysis of statements and concepts

put

for--ward

by

others.

Then

there

will

be

an attempt

to

describe

ex-perience

and eventually some

hypothesis

about `reality' may em-erge.

The

Buddha

took

up all

these

questions

in

numerous

texts

as-cribed

to

him.

Befere

looking

at some examples we ought

briefly

to

define

the

`Buddha'

as

their

supposed author.

These

are

the

cQrnmon core of

texts

ascribed

to

the

Buddha

by

all available

tra-ditions

of `Buddhism'

(Bauddha,

etc.).

They

have

been

reviewed

by

the

_present

writer

in

`A

Strategy

for

Buddhist

Research'

and

in

k2dian

BMddhism.

Here

we refer

to

the

Pali

of

the

Sthaviravada,

the

Chinese

Taish6

editions of some

texts

of

the

Sarva'stivada,

Dharmaguptaka

and other schools,

the

Maha-vastzc

of

the

Lokot-taravada,

various extant

Sanskrit

texts

ef

the

Sarvastivada

and a

Tibetan

version of a

Sarvastivadin

sntra,

As

a rule we

take

only

texts

found

without significant variants

in

at

least

two

of

these

schools, which should

therefore

have

existed

in

the

3rd.

century

B.C.

or earHer,

before

the

schools separated.

The

Buddha

is

the

perscn

held

by

these

schoels

to

be

the

author of

these

texts:

new

evidence might modify

the

details,

only an earlier

document

could

greatly

improve

our view of

him.

Meanwhile

we may call

the

speaker of

these

texts

(Gotama,

Sarvarthasiddha,

etc.)

the

Buddha.

r

I{is

associates named

in

the

texts,

such as

Sariputra

and

Katyayana,

(3)

dis-Society for the Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSOPHER

3

cussion must

have

added some new ones,

but

we may

hope

to

dis-cern

the

original attitude

imprinted

on

these

texts,

the

individual

language

of a _creative

_philosopher.

We

take

the

Pali

forms

as

the

most archaic available,

the

Pali

texts,

in

so

far

as

they

are

support-ed

by

others, appearing as

the

most _authentic _as _well as most

com-plete

recension.

The

translation

is

necessarily

tentative,

since no

two

languages

match exactly,

least

of ali

in

abstractions.

One

reads

and

judges

the

fields

of reference and

tries

to

find

_equivalents _which

fit

all

contexts and cohere as a systern.

The

overall _argument may

be

reasonably clear even when some

cletails

remain uncertain.

Empiricism

and

trvleeoru

ef

Knowledge.

'

_Beginning

then

with experience as

the

only source of

knowledge,

the

rejection of all authority,

let

us see

how

the

Buddha

_presents

his

empiriclsm.

For

example

in

A

I

189ff.

(cf.

Taish6

26 No.

16

of

the

_{Sarvastivada)}

the

Kalamas

tell

the

Buddha

that

various

philo-sophers and

_priests

come

to

their

town

(Kesaputta)

and each one

praises

his

own statements and

disparages

those

of

the

others.

Who

is

speaking

the

truth

and who

falsehood:

how

are such

doubts

to

be

settled?

The

Buddha

replies:

Not

through

tradition

(anussava),

nor a succession

(of

teachers,

ParaxePara-),

nor

history

(itileira),

_nor _a

tradition

_of

_texts

(Pi.taka-sampada-na),･ nor a reason

from

logic

(takfeahetu),

nor a reason

from

`schemes'

(of

interpretation,

formal

schemes

for

simplify-ing

sets o'f

terms,

fitting

them

into

a

glven

framework

or

pat--tern,

nayahetu), nor

from

reflection on `features'

(difedira

means

(4)

Society forthe Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

4 {S.

.:.

.Y..V.

pa.

et.

.YllttiY

surface

_{peculiarities,}

mere appearances), nor approving after

sidering an opinion

(dit.

_{.thinitiha-nakkhanti),}

nor

because

`he seems

to

be

a capable

_person'

(bhavyartiPata-),

nor

because

`the

philosopher

is

our

teacher'

(samapto

no

_gaM

ti).

Only

when

_you

yeurselves

can

know

(nNi7a'):

these

_principles

are

bad

(e.g.

_greed

and anger)

･･･

tend

to

unhappiness

(unhappy

_experience),

then

you

should abandon

them･,･or

if

they

are

_good

(e.g.

non-greed,

etc.)a･･tend

to

happiness,

_you

may adopt

them.

Compare

S

II

l15ff.

(T.

99

section

14 No.

9

of

the

Sarvastivada).

The

Buddha

does

not appear

here

but

a

_group

of rnonks

develop

the

same

idea:

Savittha

asks

Muslla

whether without confidence

t-(saddhaM,

trust,

belief

in

someone), without

liking,

viritheut

tra-dition,

without reflection on

features,

without approving after

consi--dering

an opinion, one

has

only

personal

(Paccatta)

knowledge

(nNaHna)

that

old age and

dying

has

birth

as

condition

(etc.).

Musila

responds

that

xKrithout

these

one

does

know

and see･･･

'

In

D

I

93

and other

_places

(Maha-vastzt

III

200)

we read

that

the

doctrine

_(in

a non-dogmatic sense,

dhanzma)

taught

by

the

Buddha,

which

is

to

_guide

the

monks,

together

with

their

own

ef-forts,

the

Buddha

himself

diselaiming

any authority,

is

visible,

time-less,

verifiable

(elziPassika),

fruittul,

to

be

experienced

(veda)+it'ab-ba)

_personally

by

discerning

_persons.

In

M

-t

.M84ff.

(T.

99

section

34 No.

24)

the

Buddha

says

that

he

does

not

hold

any opinions

(di.gthis,

e..ff.

that

the

universe

is

eternal

or non-eternal),

that

he

has

_got

rid ef all opinions and

instead

has

(actually)

seen

(di#ha)

matter, experience,

_perception,

forces

(5)

Society for theStudy of Pali and Buddhist

of

which are

ones) and

their

exhaustion, of an

ego

thus-gone

is

freed

where regarded as concepts and

criticlsed

if

not

'

Criticism

tions

about

them.

Certain

concepts

and statements

any entity which

'

synonyms) or a

the

five

groups

ples

will

be

13-14

(Maha"vastu

Matter,

monks, soul

it

would

ference

to

it

But

since

it

is

find....

--In

the

consclousness are

sick and cannot

er

impermanent?

permanent

Culture

THE

BUDDHA

AS

A

PHILOSOPHER

particularly

elusive

to

us,

but

they

origination and cessation.

Therefore

abandoning, etc. of all

tendencies

towards

(aharpTkara)

or

of

`making

,mine'

(the

concept of an ego or `soul',

the

basis

of all `epinions').

statements

_put

forward

by

others,

visible, verifiable, etc.

of

Metophysics,

of

Speculative

Cbncopts

do

not correspond

to

anything

using

them

are meaningless.

We

is

_permanent,

such as a `soul'

`world'

(loka,

universe).

Ob$ervation

(kinds)

of

principles

(mentioned

discussed

as a

hypothesis

below).

III

335fL):

is

not a soul

(attan,

or `self').

not

become

sick,

it

would

be

found

one could say:

Let

my matter

not a soul

it

does

become

sick

same way expenence,

_perceptlon

none

of

them

a

soul

because

be

changed as wished.

---Is

---Impermanent

(they

reply).

unhappy or

happy?

---Unhappy.

---Is

5 link

the

outer

through

the

conceit

(mamaijzka-ra)

the

attan,

is

else-This

brings

us

to

which

the

and

observable

(real)

cannot

observe

(attan

and various

gives

us only

above;

the

princi-We

read

in

VinI

If

it

were a

that

with

re-be

thus,

not

thus,

and

one

does

not

'

,

forces

and

they

all

become

matter

_permanent

--Is

_what

_is

it

sound

(lealla)

(6)

6

,< -- V\tsKM(･

b\

to

envisage what

is

impermanent,

unhappy and

having

the

ciple of change as `This

is

mine', `I am

this'

or `This

is

my

soul'?

---No.

---In

the

same way experiences,

perceptions,

forces

(volitions)

and consciousness are

impermanent,

unhappy... not

`mine', `I' or `my souY.

Understanding

this,

one

becomes

rent

to

these

five

(groups)

and

is

freed.

In

the

Maha-nida-na

(D

II

64ff.,

T.

14

of an unknown schoo!,

T.

1 Ne.

13 _probably

of

the

Dharmaguptakas,

T.

26 No.

97)

the

Buddha

reviews various

theories

of a soul

(atta;a).

It

is

conceived as

rna-terial

(rabPin)

or as

immaterial,

limited

or unlimited

(infinite),

as

either now

having

these

properties

or as

going

to

have

them

in

the

iuture,

or as

being

thcught

capable of

having

them

if

their

subject makes'it so

though

at

present

it

lacks'them.

Again,

the

soul

is

envisaged as experience

(vedana):

one who says

this

should

be

asked:

There

are

these

three

(klnds

of) experiences, sir,

happy,

unhappy and neither

(neutral).

Which

of

these

do

you

envisage

your

sou! as?

When

one experiences a

happy

experience, at

that

time

one

does

not experience an unhappy or neutral experlence.

Similarly

when one experiences

the

others....

A

happy

experience

is

impermanent,

`synthesised',

originated

through

conditions,

having

the

_principles

of

being

exhausted, cf

being

lost,

of

fading

away

(becoming

dispassionate),

of cessation.

So

are

the

other

two....

When

one experiences a

happy

experience one

thinks:

`This

is

my soul'.

But

through

the

cessatioR of

that

happy

experience one will

think:

`My

soul

has

_gone'

(vi-gam,

does

not exist,

is

zero or nothing).

The

same with

the

other

two,...

Thus

he

wlto says

his

_soul

is

(7)

THE BUDDHA

AS

APHILOSOPHER

7

which

is

impermanent,

a mixture of

h'appy

and unhappy, which

has

the

_principles

of occurring and

being

lost.

Therefore

it

is

not

ac-ceptable

(fekam)

to

envisage

that

`Experience

is

my soul'.

On

the

other

hand,

one who says: `My soul

is

not experience, my soul

is

non-experiencing

(aPPa.tisampvedana),

should

be

asked:

Where,

sir,

there

is

complete absence of experiencing

(vedayita);

could

there

be

the

thought

`I

am'?

---No.

---Therefore

this

also

is

not acceptable,

'to

envisage:

My

soul

is

not experience, my

soul

is

non-experiencing.

Thus

we

_get

a

dilemma:

if

the

soul

is

experience

it

is

imper-'manent;

if

it

is

hot

experience

there

is

no experience of

it,

tliere-N

fore

the

concept of

a

soul(of an etetnal soul)

is

uritenable and any

proposition

about

it

is

meaningless.

This

text

continues

that

it

is

just

the

same

if

the

formu!ation

is:

My

sou'1 experiences,

because

my soul

has

the

_principle

of experience

(vedana-dhamma).

One

who

says

this

should

be

asked:

If,

sir, experience completely,

in

all ways,

all without remainder, should cease;

in

the

cemplete absence of

ex-perience

through

the

cessation of exPerience cou!d

there

be

the

thought,

'I

am

this'?

(ayam

aham asmi;

the

Bangkok

edition

omits

･a>,am)

--No.

---Therefore

this

too

is

not acceptable....

Since,

Ananda,

a rnonk

does

not

envisage

a

soul

as

experience,

nor a soul

non-experiencing; nor a soul which experiences and which

has

the

principle

of experience,

he

is

not attached

to

anything

in

the

world.

Not

being

attached

he

does

not

long

for

anything

and

so

he

'

Sonally

attains extinction....

If

anyone should say,

Ananda,

with reference

to

a monk _whose

thoughts

are

thus

freed:

`The

thus-gone

exists

after

death''is

his

opinion,

that

would

be

unsound.

If

instead:

`The

thus-gone

(8)

Society forthe Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

8

?£

-V\MXkticil},gtr.

does

not _exlst _after

death',

_that

_would

be

_unsound.

If

instead:

`The

thus-gone

both

exists and

does

not exist after

death'

that

would

be

unsound.

If

instead:

`The

_thus-gone

neither exists nor

does

not exist after

death',

that

would

be

unsound.

Why?

As

far

as

there

is

desiagnatlon,

as

far

as

there

is

a way

for

designations;

as

far

as

there

is

language,

as

far

as

there

is

a way

for

language;

as

far

as

there

is

concept, as

far

as

there

is

a way

for

concepts;

as

far

as

there

is

understanding, _as

far

_as

there

is

scope

for

understandlng; as

far

as

there

is

the

_cycle

(of

transmigration),

as

far

as

the

cycle revolves:

having

ascertained

that,

a monk

is

freed.

If

anyone shouid say: `A monk

having

_ascereained

_that

and

being

freed

does

not

know,

does

not see',

that

is

his

opinion,

it

would

be

unsound.

In

S

III

46-7

(T.

99 section

2 No.

13)

we read:

Those

sophers and

_priests

who

in

many _ways _envisage _a _soul _all

do

_so

by

envisaging

the

five

attachment

_groups

or one of

them.

Which

five?

In

this

connection, monks, an

uneducated

ordinary

_person...

envisages

matter as a soul, or a soul as

_possessing

matter, or

matter

in

a soul, or a soul

in

matter.

Or

he

envisages experience,

perception,

forces

or consciousness as a soul,

_possessed

by

a

soul,

in

a

soul,

or

a

soul

in

them.

(The

following

sentence

is

only

in

the

Pali

version:)

Envisaging

this

he

_gets

the

thought

`I

am'

and

being

ignorant

he

thinks

this

or `I am

this'

or `I shall

be'

or `I shall not

be'

or 'I

shall

be

_material'

_or

`I

shall

be

hav-ing

perception'

or `I shall

be

without

_perception'

or `I shall

(9)

edu-Society for the Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

THE BUDDHA ASAPHILOSOPHER

9

cated abandons

ignorance

_and

_gets

knowledge...and

does

_not

have

any

of

these

thoughts.

Potthapada

asks

the

Buddha

whether

_perception

(sanNnPaH)

is

a

man's

soul

(D

I

185f

£,

T.

1 No.

28).

The

Buddha

replies

that

on

any

theory

of a soul

(an

eternal soul) a man's

_perceptions

would

occur as one

thing

(the

eternal

_percipient

soul)

but

would cease

as another

thing

(non-perception

and non-eternal).

The

argument

appears

to

be

the

same as

that

about experience above.

As

for

consciousness, we

find

in

the

IVida-na

Sa7?zyutta

(S

II

94f.,

Sarvastivtidin

Sanskrlt

version

ed.

Tripathin

_pp.

115ff.):

An

uneducated ordinary

_person

may

become

indifferent,

passionate,

freed

with reference

to

the

body

consisting of

the

four

great

elements

(or

realities,

bhtitas),

because

it

is

seen

to

grow

and

decay,

to

be

taken

up and

_put

down.

But

_as

to

_what

is

called `thought'

(citta),

`mind'

(manas),

`consciousness'

(vin--n"a-na;

these

three

are

treated

as synonymous or as aspects _of

the

same

_principle

by

most schools of

Buddhism),

with reference

te

that

an uneducated ordinary

_person

is

not able

to

become

indif-ferent,

dispassionate,

freed.

Why?

Because

for

a

long

time

it

has

been

coveted,

_possessed

(mamdyita),

held

on

to:

`This

is

mine',

`I

am

this',

`This

is

my soul'

(attan,

or self)....

It

would

be

better

if

he

were

to

accept

the

body

consisting of

the

four

great

elements as a soul,

but

not

thought.

Why?

The

body

is

seen enduring

fer

_years...

but

thought,

rnind, _{consciousness,}

day

and night occurs as one

thing

but

ceases as another

(changes

(10)

le

7R-VeetskJS(Iicee

one

tree

to

another

(takes

one support,

lets

it

_go

and

takes

another).

The

A{Zaha'niddna

in

a

_passage

just

_preceding

that

_quoted

earlier

(D

II

63,

etc.) explains

the

depeiidence

of consciousness on a

sen-tient

body

_(with

the

`groups'

experience,

_perceptlon

and

those

forces

most closely associated with

these,

i.e.

volition, contact and

attention, on which rnore

below)

as

follows:

'

_If

_{consciousness}

_did

_not _obtain _a _resting

place

(Pati#ha-)

in

a

sentient

body

(na-martiPa),

would

the

_possibility

of

the

origination

of

birth,

etc.,

be

known

in

the

future?

--No.

--Therefore

a

sentient

body

is

the

cause, source,

origination,

conditlon

of

sciousness.

To

this

extent one may

be

born,

grow

old,

die,

pass

away,

be

tebDrn;

to

this

extenLL

there

is

a･way

for

designation,

a way

for

language,

a way

for

concepts;

to

this

extent

there

is

scope

for

understanding;

to

this

extent

the

cycle revolves

ier

the

discernment

of

this

world

(itthatta);

namely

(to

the

extent of)

theJ

sentient

body

with conscioushess.

Thus

consciousness should not

be

imagined

to

be

an

independent

`souV;

it

cannot occur without a

body.

In

fact

it

is

comprehended

in

the

six consciousnesses of

the

six _senses, `mind'

itself

being

the

sixth `sense' with

its

own

_proper

objects

(`supportsi)

as well

as

being

aware of

the

other

five

senses;

mind

is

an organ of

the

body.

Thus

we

have

the

eighteen `bases'

(dha'tus)

from

which _all

experience arises: six senses, six

kinds

of object, six

klnds

of

(11)

Society for _{the Study} of Pali and Buddhist Culture

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSePHER

11 In

the

Sa.ldyatana

Saf?tyutta

on

the

six senses, naturally a

con-spicuous

topic

in

an empiricist

_philosophy,

we

find

the

corollary

of

there

being

no `soul', which

is

that

all

_principles

are `empty'

(sufin-a)

(Szt27nNa

Sutta,

S

IV

54,

T.

99

section

9 No.

4):

Ananda

asked

the

Buddha:

It

is

said

that

the

universe

is

empty.

To

what extent, sir,

is

the

universe said

to

be

empty?

---Since.

Ananda,

it

is

empty

of

a

soul

or of anything

belonging

to

a soul,

therefore

the･

universe

is

said

to

be

`empty'.

And

what

is

it

'that

is

empty of a soul or of anything

belonging

to

a soul?

Sight,

Ananda,

is

empty of a soul or of anything

belonging

to

a soul.

Visible

objects are empty....

Consciousness

of sight

is'

empty,...

Contact

(samPhassa)

of'sight

is

empty....

(contact.is

the

meetlng or combination of a sense,

its

object and

the

consciousness

of

this;

thus

of any

of

the

six sets of

three

forming

the

een

bases;

cf.

the

Dha-tu

Sa)?zypttta

S

II

140,

etc., and

the

hupin.

4ika

Sutta

M

I

l12,

etc.).

And

whatever experiencin.cr

(vedayita)

occurs

through

the

dition

of contact of sight

(i.e.

an `experience', vedanaH), whether

happy,

unhappy

or

neutral,

that

too

is

empty....

Similarly

for

all

the

other sets, up

to....

And

_whatever experiencing _occurs

through

the

condition of contact of mind

(with

its

object and

the

sclousness of

that

in

the

next moment),

happy,

unhappy

or

ral,

that

too

is

empty....

And

since

it

is

empty of a soul or of

anything

belonging

to

a soul,

therefore

the

universe

is

said

to

be

empty.

'

Thus.the

concept

of

the

`universe',

which

might

be

considered

(12)

12

ig-P\Mfa

_Jk

(ic\

by

some

as an entity and which

then

would

be

regarded

by

the

Buddha

as meaningless,

is

replaced

by

what

is

actually _experienced.

This

depersonification

of

discourse,

this

elimination

of

_ghosts,

is

to

be

thoroughly

carried ollt

in

formulating

ultimately `true'

(i.e.

scientific or

_{philosophical)}

staterrients.

Thus

in

S

II

13

(T.

99 sec-tion

15 No.

10)

it

is

asked:

Who

contacts?

--That

is

unsound,

it

should

be:

Through

what condition

is

there

contact?

The

six

(sense)

spheres

(i.e.

the

senses with

their

objects,

then

when

there

is

con-tact

of consciousness

there

is

experience, as above).

Similarly

such

expressions as 'who

desires',

`who

is

conscious', `who

dies'

and

so en are

to

be

reformulated

to

eliminate

the

concept of a

person

or soul or `agent'.

Im

the

Mda-na

Samytttta

(S

II

75f.,

Tripathin

pp.

165-7)

when

asked: `Is

he

who _acts

the

_same _as

he

_who _experiences

_the

re-sult?

Or

does

one

act and another experience

the

result?,

the

Buddha

rep!ies

that

these

two

conceptions represent

two

(false)

extremes,

for

which

the

(true)

intermediate

explanation

is

to

be

substituted, namely

the

sequence of conditioned origination

(see

below).

The

other concepts of speculative

_philosophy

are of

the

same

kind

as `soul'

in

that

they

cannot

be

observed or `instantiated'

(vil"J'ama'na),

they

are

imaginary

entities.

Consequently

_proposltions

about

them

have

no meanin.cr.

In

the

th#haPa"da

_(D

No.

9,

I

187-8,

T.

1 No.

28)

and

Brah7na7'a"la

(D

No.

1,

T.

1 No.

21,

Sarvastivadin

version

in

Tibetan

ed.

Weller

Asia

Matior

IX,

₁₉₃₃₎

some

_people

held

or asked

the

Buddha

about

the

`universe'

as eternal or

non-eternal or

finite

or

infinite.

These

_questions

_are _sometimes

brack-eted vtTith

_questions

about

the

`soul'

(13)

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSOPHER

13 have

_just

seen

the

Buddha

_substitute

the

_analysis _of _sense

experi-ence

for

a statement _about

the

_universe, _as

if

that

_were

the

reality

lying

behind

such a conception.

But

there

are

further

implications:

the

Sthavirav5da

commentary

(DA

II

_p.

377)

says

that

when

Pot-Vhapada

after

the

discussion

about a soul switched

to

the

_questions

whether

the

universe

is

eternal and so _on,

he

dld

so `in

connec-tion

with a soul'.

In

other words

Potthap5da

had

in

mind

the

pos-sibility of an eternal soul, as

if

it

were

his

own subjective universe.

One

rnight

a!se

suppose

that

the

brahman,

the

`world soul', was

in

_question.

But

the

real, ultimate answer

is

that

all

these

opinions

reduce

to

the

alternative extremes of eternal existence versus utter

annihilation

(going

to

non-existence).

There

is

no

entity

which

could

be

eternal or

be

annihilated,

but

only

the

sequences of

con-ditions,

all

impermanent

but

real

during

the

moments of

their

oc.

currence.

Iitductive

Reasoning:

CZiuses

or

Conaitions

are

aiseovered

bu

Empirical

_{investigations.}

Continuing

this

discussion

on

impermanence

and origination

from

conditions,

the

Buddha

says

(S

II

17,

Tripathin

167ff.):

The

majority _of

_people

have

depended

_on

_the

_pair,

it-is-ness

(existence)

and

it-is-not-ness

(non-existence,

annihilation).

One

who

sees

the

origination _of

the

_universe

in

its

true

nature

(as

above),

through

right understanding,

is

not aware of

it-is-not-ness

(non-existence,

i.e.

cessation) with reference

to

the

universe.

One

who

sees

the

cessation

(nirodha)

_of

_the

_universe

in

its

_true

_nature,

(14)

origi-Society for the Study of Pali and Buddhist Culture

14

7s-p\thmprS(dk,ee

nation, _as _effects _of

_that

_which

_ceased)

_with

_reference

to

the

universe.

The

majority o'f

_people

have

been

bound

by

means

<t{Pa-yas),

by

attachments

(ttPa-da-7tas)

and

by

involvements

ki"nivesas;

so

the

Pali,

the

Sanskrlt

has

instead

by

a

basis,

aalhi, and

by

_attachments, _omitting

involvements).

NovLr

he

who

･does

not

_plan

for,

_get

_attached

to,

fix

his

_attention on, means

and attachments, on

fixing

the

attention of

,thought,

on

the

tendency

to

involvements,

thinking

`I

have

a soul'

(reading

as

-does

the

commentary _atia- _nze);

he

does

not

doubt,

he

is

not

uncertain,

that

only unhappiness occurs when

there

is

occurring;

that

only unhappiness ceases when

there

is

ceasing.

In

this

case

he

real!y

has

knowledge;

he

does

not

have

it

throu.crh

the

¢

tion

of another's

(knowledge).

To

this

extent

there

is

right

theory.

`Jt

exists'

(Pali:

all exists)

is

ene extreme. `It

(all)

does

not

exist'

is

the

second extreme.

Not

_going

to

either of

these

tremes,

the

thus-gone

(Buddha)

teaches

a

doctrlne

by

the

mean:

The

forces

exist

through

the

cendition of

ignorance...

(and

so

on, conditioned originatlon).

Thus

we

have

the

originatlon of

this

entire mass of unhappiness...and

its

cessation.

In

general

(S

II

25'ff.,

Tripathin

148f.)

when a

particular

base

<dhntu,

any oi

the

coRditions)

is

established,

there

is

a station

<.tleiti)

for

_principles

(dhammas),

there

is

regularity of

principles

(dha77amani",a-mata"),

there

is

specific conditionality

(idaznPaccayata").

This

a

thus-gone

attains enlightenment about.

The

tTLlahanida-na

begins

the

Buddha's

exposition

(D

No.

15,

etc.,

there

are also some

Sanskrit

fragments

from

Turfan,

Waldschmidt

(15)

Society for _{the Study} of Pali and Buddhist Culture

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSOPHER

15 If

asked _whether _old _age _and

dying

_exist

through

a _specific

-

condition, one would say

that

old age and

dying

exist

through

the

condition of

birth...

(this

_starts _at

the

_other _end and

con--tinues

with

the

successive conditions) _existence

(bhava,

explainecl as

transmigration,

not of a

soul

of ceurse

but

of

effects)...

tachment...desire...experience...contact

(cf.

above,

the

Sa7?2yeetta

contexts

insert

the

six sense _spheres

here)H.a

_sentient

body...con-seiousness...sentient

body

(again,

the

sentient

body

and

ness are

found

to

be

conditions

for

each other, neither can

nate without

the

other;

the

Samyutta

versions

however

add

the

forces

as condition

for

consciousness,

these

being

the

forces

in

a

_previous

existence,

it

is

inferred,

which cause a consciousness

to

appear under

the

right conditions

in

a new

one,

so we see

the

sequence

is

not simply a

linear

one

but

is

more complex;

the

Sarptyutta

a}so adds a

further

condition

for

the

forces,

namely

ignorance,

see

belew).

In

_what _way

is

it

to

be

_ascertained

that

old age and

dying

_exist

through

the

_condition _of

birth?

If

_there

were no

birth

at all,

in

any way, of anything,

anywhere...,

in

the

complete _absence _of

birth,

through

the

_cessation of

birth,

would old age and

dying

be

discerned?

--No.

---Therefore

in

this

case

_precisely

this

is

the

cause

(hettt),

the

source

(nidamna),

the

origination

(sam"daya),

the

condition

(Paccaya),

of old age

and

dying,

namely

birth...

(same

for

the

_others, _with _appropriate

variations,

but

for

the

sentient

body

as condition

for

contact

the

explanation

is

more complex).

By

whatever

features,

tics

(lin'gas),

signs

(nimittas,

_grasped

by

_perception)

or

ed

descriptions

(uddesas)

there

ls

a concept

(PanN7iatti)

of

the

body

ef sentience

(na'mafea-ya),

in

the

absence of

these...there

(16)

16

isc--Vl}eiAXIS(It\

would

be

no contact of

the

designation

(adhivacana)

with

the

body

of matter

(n7･pafedya).

By

whatever

features,

tics,

signs and summarised

descriptions

there

is

a concept of

the

body

of matter,

in

the

absence of

these

there

would

be

no

tact

of resistance

(Pa.tigha)

with

the

body

of sentience.

In

the

absence of

these

features,

characteristics, etc.

by

which

there

is

a

concept

both

_of

the

body

_of _sentience _and

_of

_the

body

_ef

_matter

there

would

be

neither centact of

the

designation

nor contact of

resistance.

In

the

absence of

those

features,

characteristics, etc.

by

which

there

is

a concept _of _a _sentient

body

(matter

_with

sentience)

there

would,

therefore,

be

no contact.

The

Avaa-･;za

Sarpzyzttta

(S

II

4,

Tripathin

158f.)

explains

that

the

sentient

body

is

matter, namely

the

four

_great

elements and matter

which exists

in

dependence

on

them

(including

the

sense organs),

and sentience, namely

in

the

Pali

experience,

_perception,

volition

(cetana-),

contact and attention

(7nanasika-ra)

but

in

the

San･skrit

version experience,

_perception,

forces

and consciousness.

The

forces

as condition

for

_{consciousness} _are _specified _as

_those

_of

_the

body

(haHya),

of speech and of

thought.

Ignorance

is

lack

of

knowledge

of

the

four

`truths'

(the

f'act

of unhappiness,

its

origination,

its

cessation and

the

way

to

accomplish

this).

It

adcls

(S

II

65,

TrlpEthin

145)

a

_general

form

of statement of a condition:

This

being,

this

is;

from

the

occurrence _of

this,

this

_occurs

(where

the

_alternate

thises

refer

to

a condition and

that

which

is

condltioned).

Thus

we

find

that

from

observation

the

Buddha

saw

that

there

was

nothing

_permanent

and everything ceased

to

exist.

But

this

(17)

LT-lj.

E..

BUDDHA

AS

A

PHILOSOPHER

17 principles.

In

this

succession, regularities are observed and specific

cenditions or causes can

be

identified.

This

succession _of

_passing

.existences,

or,

better,

occurrences,

_gives

rise

to

the

appearance of

the

`universe'

continuing, or on

the

other

hand

of a `person'

making

his

way

threugh

it.

What

is

`Real'?

A

ffupothesis

about

Reality

anaerlying what

is

Emperienced:

the

`Prineiples'.

The

regularities

described

_above

_lead

_to

_the

_hypothesis

_that

_there

are `principles' which are real

(bhnta)

because

they

_preduce

ef-fects

in

a regular _manner.

These

_principles

(dhammas)

_are

in-cluded

in

the

five

_groups

mentioned above,

they

are without `soul',

are conditioned

by

bases

(dha'tus,

_a

_term

_borrowed

_from,

_or _at

least

shared with, chemistry _and _used also

in

linguistics

for

_a

`root'),

which are

in

fact

other

_principles.

They

occur regularly

depending

on

their

conditions _and

_they

_are

_themselves

_conditions

for

further

occurrences of

_principles.

They

are,

like

everything,

.impermanent

but

none

the

Iess

real

for

belng

repetitions, always

with

the

same characteristics.

We

read

in

the

Mahdmalmbhya

Sutta

(M

No.

64,

Vol.

I

_p.

435;

T.

26 No.

205):

Abandoning

bad

_(akusala)

principles,

a monk enters and remains

in

the

first

meditation.

Whatever

_principles

there

are

there,

in

(the

_groups

of) matter,

experience,

_perception,

forces

and cons ¢

iousness,

he

observes

_as

impermanent,

unhappy,

diseased,

as a

boil,

a splinter, a

hurt,

as

ill,

as alien, as

decaying,

as empty, as without soul.

He

withdraws

his

thought

from

_these

_principles,

_and

_having

withdrawn

his

thought

from

them

he

visualises

his

thought

as

the

`deathless

(18)

18

i£

L-P\MXptKic.#

of all

forces,

the

rejection of all

bases'(uPadhis,

for

attachment),

the

exhaustion of

desire,

dispassion,

cessation, extinction

(nibbaHna).

This

is

repeated about

the

second and

higher

rneditations and

the

`attainments'.

The

main

_points

here

are not

the

metaphors

for

`unhappy'

but

that

the

_principles

are

included

in

the

five

groups

and are

irnperrnanent,

empty and without soul.

The

_groups

are

classes

of

_principles.

The

Anattan

Sutta

_(A

IV

I4,

but

no other version

has

_yet

been

traced)

_goes

one step

further

by

saying

that

all

_princlples

are

without soul, which

is

_perhaps

implied

above

though

not stated.

We

have

seen earlier

that

when a

base

(any

of

the

conditions)

is

established

there

is

a station

for

principles

and

there

is

regularity

of

principles.

In

other werds

principles

occur regularly when

their

conditions occur,

they

are regular ef'fects or results.

The

A]ida"na

Samyutta

_(S

II

56ff.,

T.

99

section

14 No.

3)

uses

the

compound

expression `base

for

a

_principle'

dhammadhaHtec

with reference

te

eonditioned

origination of

_principles

and vLre see

that

any of

the

twelve

conditions

in

the

sequence may

be

considered a

_principle

and any of

them

equally as a

base.

In

the

A･?igztttara

_(A

V

2-4;

but

in

the

.Wadhyama of

the

Sarvas-tivada,

T.

26 No.

43)

the

relation

between

two

principles,

which

is

causal or conditioning,

is

called `principleness'

(dhammata').

The

fact

of

being

_principles

means

that

they

enter

into

conditional

relations with one another and

the

term

dhamma

apparently carries

this

sense of causal

interdependence.

After

the

discussion

rejecting a soul or an eternal universe, etc.

above,

the

PotihaPaHda

continues

(p.

190

of

the

Pali)

that

the

Samana

Gotama

(the

Buddha)

rnakes

known

a

practice

which

is

(19)

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSOPHER

19

real,

true,

thus,

statiened

in

the

_principles,

a regularity of

princi-ples.

Thus

the

_principles

are what

is

real

and

a

practice

or way

based

on

them

is

a

real

_practice,

an effective

_practice.

The

Dasuttara

Sbetta

(D

No.

34,

T.

1 No.

10,

Sanskrit

ed.

Mit-tal

and

Schlingloff)

lists

550 _principles

_and _says

_that

_they

_are _all

real

(bhata).

These

are

classified

as

to

be

abandoned, or

developed,

or

fully

_understood, etc.

They

are also

_grouped

by

numbers

in

ones,

twos,

threes,

etc. and

there

is

a

_good

deal

of

duplication.

Most

are mental

forces,

few

_physical.

The

Sathgiti

Sutta

(D

No.

33,

T.

1 No.

_9,

Sanskrit

ed.

Mittal

and

Stache-Rosen)

similarly

lists

1,Oll

_principles

(with

_minor

varia-tions).

Some

of

these

are miscellaneous

items

of

knowledge

and

hardly

distinct

_principles.

They

include

the

majority of

those

in

the

Dasuttara.

The

schools afterwards systematised

these

and

other

lists,

ellminating

duplicates

and synonyms,

in

their

Abhidhamma

texts,

reducing

them

to

about one

hundred.

The

shorter sets

in

other

texts

may

_give

a clearer

impression

of

what

these

_principles

are.

The

AmtPada

Stttta

(M

III

_25-6,

but

not

_yet

traced

elsewhere'except

that

it

is

_confirmed

in

_the

Abhi-dhamma)

lists

those

occurring

in

meditation.

In

the

first

medita-tion

there

are sixteen: reasoning, reflection,

joy,

happiness,

focus-sing ef

thought,

contact, experience,

_perception,

volition,

thought,

will,

intentness,

energy, self-possession, equanirnity and attention.

In

the

second,

third

and

fourth

meditations

the

first

four

of

these

principles

cease.

Very

frequently

principles

are classified as

_good

or

bad

and

lists

of

these

are

_g!ven.

The

factor

_of _{enlightenment} _called

(20)

2o

ig-vsttsvaIc(tee

(with

reference

to

_progress

towards

enlightenmeRt).

Thus

there

are seven sets of

_principles

(thirty-seven

items)

on

the

side of

enlightenment and on

the

other

hand

five

obstacles opposing

it

<the

will

to

_pleasure,

malevolence, ete.)

(SatiPa.t'.tha-na

Sutia,

D

No.

22

ancl

M

No.

10,

T.

26 No.

98).

Here

again we see

the

causal

force

of

the

_principles:

they

are real

because

they

_produce

effects.

Thus

principles

are not

just

sense-data, rnere appearances.

They

produce

effects,

they

are conditions.

Moreover

they

do

so regularly,

as might

be

suggested

by

the

etymology

from

the

root

dhar,

`main-tain'.

On

the

other

hand

they

are not substances enduring

through

time,

being

without `soul' or `self' or any other eternal essence.

This

dhamma

hypothesis

seems not

to

have

been

fully

worked out

by

the

Buddha.

The

schools elaborated

it

Iater,

reducing

the

long

lists

but

also attempting

to

enumerate all

_possible

_principles,

clas-sify

them

and

describe

their

relationships.

They

drew

rlgorous

Hnes

between

prlnciples

and

superficial

appearances.

Though

all

this

might

seem

to

be

implied

by

what

the

Buddha

says,

he

did

not attempt

a complete survey of what

there

is.

He

indicates

that

only

these

conditioned conditions are real,

though

impermanent,

just

because

they

_produce

effects.

Everything

else,

the

surface

appearances,

is

unimportant, whether

in

any sense `real' or net.

An

empiricist after all

is

not expected

to

_produce

a system

but

only

to

work out methods

of

analysis _and

_get

some

_practical

results.

Cbnclusion.

The

above sketches

the

main outlines of

the

Buddha's

(21)

THE

BUDDHA

ASAPHILOSOPHER

21 to

a

_practice,

which we

have

not

_pursued,

to

attain

happiness

as

the

_generally

agreed aim of

life

(variously

defined,

_of course).

It

is

clearly empiricist and one could

_pick

out methods

of

scientific

enquiry,

the

study of regularities, causality and `bases'

(dha-ttts),

for

example.

Various

methods of argument appear and

there

are

several others.

A

conspicuous

further

topic

discussed

is

free

will.

Non-soul

is

the

Buddha's

original critique of all

_philosophy,

of all

concepts of supposed entities which

in

fact

are not _entities, _of _all

propositions

about such entities.

This

leaves

the

impermanent

_ancl

`empty'

principles

as

the

only reality

to

be

investigated.

Bibliogrophg.

The

Pali

Text

Society's

editions are referred

to

with

the

usual

abbreviations and

the

Taisho-

JfssaifevO as

T.

v

MahaLvastu

ed.

Senart,

Soci6t6

asiatique,

Paris,

1882-97.

Mittal

and

Schlingloff:

Das'zattara

Sutra

ed.

in

Sanskrit,

Deutsche

Akaclemie

der

Wissenschaften

zu

Berlin,

1957,

1962.

Mittal

and

Stache-Rosen:

Sarkgiti

_Satra

_ed.

_in

_Sanskrit,

_Deutsche

Akademie

der

Wissenschaften

zu

Berlin,

1968.

Tripathin:

IVidanasa7?2yukta

Sanskrit

fragments

ed.

Deutsche

demie

der

Wissenschaften

zu

Berlin,

_1962.

Waldschmidt,

Claviter

and

Sander-Holzmann:

Sanskrithandschriften

aus

den

Turftinfrtnden,

Steiner,

Wiesbaden,

_1965-79.

A.K.Warder:

bzdian

Buddhisnz,

second edition

Motilal

Banarsidass,

Delhi,

1980･

---:

`A

Strategy

for

Buddhist

Research',

Essa},s

on

thli

and

Bztddhist

Civilization,

Sankibo-Busshorin,

Tokyo,

_1982.

(22)

Sooiety _{for 　the 　Study} of _Pali and _Buddhist _Culture

22 Wener

： β紹勿％

の

δ」α

S

励

’

α

　　

and

381ff

．

，

1933

．

パ

ー

り学仏教文化学 ed

．

｛n　

Tibetan

，　

AsiaIVajo7

’

_IX

PP

・

195ff

．

N工工

一

Eleotronio