The Korean Model and the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment

The Korean Model and the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment

著者 ESHO Hideki

出版者 Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

journal or

publication title

Journal of International Economic Studies

volume 6

page range 1‑11

year 1992‑03

URL http://doi.org/10.15002/00002090

JournaloflntemationalEconomicStudies(1992),No.６，１－１１

．l992ThelnstituteofComparativeEconomicStudies,HoseiUniversity

"TheKoreanModel,,andthePoliticalEconomyofStructuralAdjustment

HidekiEsho

Pm/bss“F1zzc"/11〕ﾉｑ/Ｅ、"ｏ加jcS,ＨｂｓｅｊＵｊｏｉｚﾉe沼jlbﾉ,ＴｂＡｊﾉ０

Korea'sremarkablesuccessineconomicdevelopmentisoneofthemostwidelyacknowledgedfacts amongdevelopmenteconomistsShesteppedveryquicklyuptheladderofeconomicdeveIopment fromapoorruralsocietytoaNewlyIndustrializingEconomy、Ｉｎｏｎｌｙ３５ｙｅａｒｓ，Korea'sGNP increasedmorethansevenfold、ButevenKorea'sdevelopmentwasnotfreefromeconomiccrisis Duringthetwooilcrisesofthel970saccompaniedbyrecessionandinterestrateincreasesin developedcountries,mostoftheoil-importingdevelopingcountriesexperiencedanadversebalance ofpayments,increasedinflation,slowingdownofeconomicgrowth,anddebtcrisisKoreatoodidnot escapefromthesewidespreaddisastersParticuIarlysincethelatel97０，s,Koreahasbeenlargely affectedby“externalshocksU'andhasexperiencedthefuelingofinflation,mountingcurrentaccount deficit,andaccumulationofforeigndebt・Inl980,Koreaexperiencedaminus48percentgrowthrate andinl981KoreabecamethefourthlargestdebtorcountrvintheworldfollowedbyBrazi],Mexico，

andAIHentina

However,theKorea，sperformanceinstructuraladjustmenttothiseconomiccrisiswasalsoquite remarkablelncontrastwiththeheavilyindebtedcountriesofLatinAmericaandstagnanteconomies inmanycountriesofSouthAsiaandAfrica,Koreawasabletorestraininflationandimprovecurrent accountdeficitsinaveryshortperiodwithoutsignificantsacrificeofgrowthByl986,Korea，-ｓ ｂａｌａｎｃｅｏｆｔｒａｄｅｗｅｎｔｉｎｔｈｅｂｌａｃｋａｎｄｈｅｒｄｅｂｔｂｕｒｄｅｎｗassubstantiallyreducedKoreawasable toquicklyovercometheeconomiccrisiswithasetofstructuraladjustmentprograms・Today,her successfUlstructuraladjustmentexperiencehasbeenrecognizedａｓｔｈｅｍｏｄｅｌｃａｓｅｆｏｒｇｒｏｗｔｈ‐

orientedstructuraladjustmentprogramswhichareknownastheBakerlnitiative

Thispaperistomakeasurveyofthepoliticaleconomyofstructuraladjustmentlnthelighｔｏｆ Ｋｏｒｅａ，sexperience

１．Korea,sexperienceastheexport-orientedindustrializationmodel

Koreaexperiencednotablyrapidgrowthbypromotinglabour､intensivemanufac turingforexporｔｓｗｈｉｃｈｗａｓｉｎｌｉｎｅｗｉｔｈｈｅｒｃｏｍｐａｒａtiveadvantagefroml960to l973Expｏｒｔｓｇｒｅｗ４０ｔｏ５０ｐｅｒｃｅｎｔｐｅｒａｎｎｕｍａndproductionincreasedmorethanlO percentannuallyduringthisperiodInaddition,ｉｔｈａｓｂｅｅｎsaidthatKorea,sgrowth

hadnotsufferedadverseincomedistributioneffects

Thesefactsvalidatetheexport-orienteddevelopmentstategytobeacceptedby developingcountriesingeneralandoustedtheoldfashionedimport-substituting developmentstrategywhichdependedonanexportpessimism、Theexport､oriented developmentstrategybecametheneworthodoxyindevelopmenteconomicsinl970s Korea'spolicyreformstowardsanexport-orienteddevelopmentstrategyinmid-l960s

１

ＨｉｄｅｋｉＥｓｈｏ

formedthebasicprototypeofthe“KoreallModel"、

However,althoughmostdevelopmentec()nomistsrecognizedthesuperiorityofthe

export-orientedstrategyovertheimport-substitutingstrategy,ｉｔｗａｓａＩｓｏｃｌｅａｒｔｈａｔ，

ｉｎKorea,theexport-orientationwasnottheonlyfactorwhichhadcontributedtothe rapidgrowthwithoutdeterioraljngincomedistributiolLl、(〕therwords,thequestion

ofexactlywhatfactorsmadepossiblethepolicyshifttothesuccessfulexport‐

orientedstrategywasraised（Findlay,1988)．Manystudieshavepointedoutmany factorswhichmighthavecontributedt()theKol-eanlniracle・Amongthemainfactors whichmoststudiesnoteare:first,theexistenceofamplecheapandhighlyquali[ied labour；second，theexistenceofastronggovernmentwhichhasfirmresolveand commitｍｅｎｔｔｏｐursueeconomicdevelopmentsupportedbyexcellentbureaucratic leadership；third，afavourabIeinternationalenvironment・Twofavourableinitial conditionsａｒｅａｄｄｅｄｔｏｔｈｅｌｉｓｔ、Thesearethelandl-eform，whichissaidtohave

contributedtorelativelyegalitarianassetdistribution,ａｎｄｔｈemassiveUSaidduring

thel950sRecently,manystudiesstressthecriticaIroleofthestateandmethodsof stateinterventionineconomicdevelopｍｅｎｔ(DattaChaudhuri,198］；sen､1981；Ｂrad、

ford,1987)．

ThesecondbigissueintheKoreanM[odelisrelatedtothecontentsandexplana‐

tionsoftheexport-orienteddevelopmentstrategyitselfWorldwiderecessionand risingtrendsofprotectionisminthedevelopedcountriesaftertheoilcrisiscasted doubtsontheeffectivenessofexport-orienteddevelopmentstrategyandanewexport pessimismappearedTheNobelLectuｒｅｂｙＬｅｗｉｓ(]980)wasapioneerworkforthis newexportpessimism､Insuchasituation,Streeten(1982)assertedthatthefaultsof import-substitutionpoliciesresultednotfromLhemisallocationofresourcesbetween export-orientationandimport-substitutionorinefficienciesarisingfromsuchanoca‐

tion,butratherfrominefficientuseoftheresourcesallocatedtothegivenobjective ofimportsubstitution・Thedichotomybetweenoutward-lookingandinward-looking strategiesmightfocusattentiononalessimportantsetofdecisionsre]atingtothe qualityofmanagement，scale，technology，product-mix，productdesign，typesof education,recruitmentandtraining,administration,ａｎｄｓｏｏｎＳｏ,Streetensaid,the ultimatetestoftherespectivemeritsoftheoutward-lookingandinward-1ooking strategieswasnottheirabilitytoallocateresourcesbetweensectors,buttheirpower tomobilizedomesticresourcesandskillsandtocreateandactivateincentives，

attitudesandinstitutionsfordevelopmcntStreetenalsoargued,followingthestudy ofCline(1982),thatifalldevelopingcountriesweretobeassuccessfulasTaiwanand SouthKoreainincreasingexports,tradebarrierswouldquicklybeerectedorterms oftradewoulddeteriorateandthedemandconstraintwouldbecomeoperative､Cline calledthis“afallacyofcomposition"、

AgainstClineandStreeten,Balassa(l983a)ａｎｄＲａｎｉｓ（1985)defendedtheposition ofexport-orientedstrategy・BalassarejoinedthatSLreeten，scharacterizationthatthe proponentsofoutward-orienteddevelopmentstrategiesadvocateddiscriminationin favourofexportsandagainstimportsubstitutionweresimplyattackingastrawman、

Balassaelaboratedthatoutward-orientedstrategymeanttheequaltreatmentofsales indomesticandforeignmarketsandthedistinctionwasbaseｄｏｎｗｈｅｔｈｅｒｓａｌｅｓｉｎ ｄｏｍｅｓｔｉｃａｎｄｅｘportmarketsreceivedsimilarincentives,orwhetherimportsubstitu‐

tionwasfavouredoverexportation・Balassawrote，“SouthKoreaandTaiwan，ａｓ ｗｅｌｌａｓＳｉｎ貝aporehaveprovidedsimilarincentivestoexportsandtoimportsubstitu‐

２

"TheKoreanModel'，andthePoliticalEconomyofStructuralA〔ljustmenl

tion，ｏｎｔｈｅａｖｅｒａｇｅＷｈａｔｉｓｍｏｒｅ，ifappropriatedomesticpoliciesareapplied，

exportexpansionandefficientimportsubstitutionwillgohandinhandThusadopt‐

inganoutwardorientedstrategywouldalsoinvolvereducingthebiasoftheincentive systemagainstprimaryactivities､Suchachangeinincentiveswouldpromoteexports aswellasimportsubstitutioninprimaryproducts，'・AgainstClineandStreeten，ｓ

"fallacyofcomposition”hypothesis，Ranis(1985)arguedthatClineunderst()odthe EastAsianModelasthatof“exportingasmuchaspossible",butthatCline'sanalysis wasflawedRather，ｔｈｅＥａｓｔＡｓｉａｎＭｏｄｅｌｗａｓｏｎｅｏｆ“movinginthedirectionof marketliberalizationasquicklyaspossible，,、ｓｏ，Raniscontinued，“differentLDCs

[would］arriveatasubstantialmanufacturedgoodsexportcapacityatdifferent pointsintime,producinggoodswithdifferentattributes,eveniftheyshouldstartin thisdirectｉｏｎａｓｏｆｎｏｗ,，､Wemaycharacterizethisdebateasoneoverthedcfinition oftheoutward-orientedstrategy，buttheappropriatenessofsuchdefinitionsby BalassaandRanisalsomustdependonthehistoricalrea1itiesoftheKoreanexport‐

orientedstrategysincethemid-1960sWhethertheKoreanstrategysincethemid‐

ｌ９６０ｓｗａｓｔｈａｔｏｆ“exportingasmuchaspossible”ｏｒｔｈａｔｏｆ“movinginthedirection ofmarketliberalization，，isanotherquestion，

Critisizngthedichotomyofexport-orientationversusimport-substitution，Sachs (1985)argueditwasimportanttoworkwithinaframewarkofatleastthreesectors，

ｉ､e,,importables,exportables,andnon-tradables,toassesstheallocationofresources Thisisbecauseinthetwo-sectormodelDallpoliciesthatprotecttheimport-competing sectornecessarilyhurttheexportingsector・Hereprotectionismisnothingm(〕rethan anti-exportbiased,sinceresourcespulledintoimportablesmustcomefromexporta‐

blesOntheotherhand,inthethree-sectorframework,itispossibleforprotectionist policiestogohandinhandwithexport-promotingpoliciesifresourcesaredrawn fromnon-tradablesintoboththetradablesectorsAccordingtoSachs，ｔｈｅｅｘｐort‐

promotionpoliciesofKoreahadthischaracterBhagwati(1987)elaboratedBalassa'一s definitionofexport-orientedstrategy(EP).AccordingtoBhagwati,ＥＰｉｓ“amatterof settingpriceincentiveｓｉｎｓｕｃｈａｆａｓｈｉｏｎａｓｔｏｅｎｓｕｒｅｔｈａｔｔｈｅｈｏｍｅｍａｒｋｅｔｄｏｅｓｎｏｔ ｂｅｃｏｍｅｍｏｒｅｌucrativethantheforeignmarket，'・Inotherwords，EPisthatthe effectiveexchangerateforthecountry'sexports(EERx）islessthanforitsimports (EERm).ＩｆＥＥＲｘくＥＥＲｍ，thisimpliesthatsaleinthehomemarketproducesmore revenuesthansaleabroadsothatthepriceincentivesaresetsuchthatthereisabias againstexportsOntheotherhand,EPensuresEERx＝ＥＥＲｍ，andissynonym〔)uswith

neutralityofrelativeincentivesforhomeandexportsales・ＡｎｄｉfEERxsignificantly

exceedsEERm，itiscalledasultra-EPstrategy、AndBhagwatiattachedfivecom‐

mentsonthesedefinitions.(1)Thedefinitionsrelatetoaverageincentives・Thepursuit ofeitherEPorultra､EPstrategydoesnotprecludeimportsubstitutinginselected

sectors.（２）ＯｎｅshouldｎｏｔｅｑｕａｔｅｔｈｅＥＰｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｗｉｔｈｔｈｅａbsenceofgovernment intervention.(3)Theincentive-definedEPstrategyhastobedistinguishedfromthe traditionalconceptofexport-ledgrowth．（４）ＴｈｅconceptofEPrelatestotrade incenｔｉｖｅｓｂｕｔｄｏｅｓｎｏｔｉｍｐｌｙｔｈａｔｔｈｅＥＰｓtrategycountriesmustbeequallyoutward

orientedinregardtotheirforeigninvestmentpolicies.(5)Thepatternofincentivesis

aresultofnotjustoftradebutalsoexchangeratepolicies

Bhagwati，ｓａｒｇｕｍｅｎｔｉｓｉｎＵｎｅｗｉｔｈｔｈａｔｏｆＳａｃｈs・Herecognisesthepossibilityof

pursuingtheimportsubstitutingstrategyinsomeselectedindustriesinEPc()untries，

andalsoherecognisestheimportanceofstateinterventioninsuccessfulEPcountries

３

HidekiEsho

2．Export-orienteddevelopmentstrategyandtheexternalshocks

ＴｈｅｔｈｉｒｄｂｉｇｉｓｓｕｅｏｎｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＭｏｄelofexport-orienteddevelopmentstrategy iswhetherornottheoutward-lookingeconomyismorevulnerabletoexternalshocks thantheinward-lookingeconomy､Manycritics,includingthedependentschool,have longassertedthatoncetheworldeconomicsituationgotworsethesuperiorityofthe export-orientedstrategyshoulderodeaway､Oilcrisisandsubsequentworldrecession duringl970sandl980sputthisassertionandthevalidityoftheKoreanModeltoa severetest,Ifthefavorableinternationalenvironmentswerelost,wouldtheKorean

Modelstillbeviable？

Againstthiscriticalquestion，theWorldBankledbyBalassarespondedmost vigorouslyAnumberofstudiesontheperformanceofstructuraladjustmentin developingcountriｅｓｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｖｉｅｗｐｏｉｎｔｏｆ“thepolicyresponsetotheexternal shocks，'werepublished(Balassa,1981,1982,1983b,1984；Balassa＆Williamson,1987)．

Inthesestudies,thefollowingpointsarestressedagainandagain．

(1)TherewereconsiderabledifferencesbetweentheNICsandtherestasregardsthe policiesfollowedinresponsetoexternalshocksbetweenl973andl978TheNICs offSetthree-fourthsoftheadversebalanceofpaymentseffectsofexternalshocks throughdomesticadjustmentpoliciesofexportpromotion,importsubstitution,and deflationarymeasures，withadditionalnetexternalfinancingaccountingforthe remainder､Theremaininggroupshadbeendependentonexternalfinancingtomeet thecombinedadversebalanceofpaymentseffectsofexternalshocks,lossesinexport marketshares,andincreasedimportshares．

(2)AmongtheNICs,thethreeFarEasterneconomies-Korea,Singapore,andTaiwan -adoptedanoutward-orienteddevelopmentstrategyintheearlyl960sandcontinued withthisstrategyafterl973､Facedwiththeexternalshocks,thesecountriesdevalued theirexchangeratetoaconsiderableextent,eliminatedquantitativeimportrestric‐

tions,loweredindustrialtariffs,andabolishedpricecontrol．

(3)AmongtheLDCsand,ｉｎparticular,amongtheNICs,outward-orientedeconomies sufferedsubstantiallysmallerterms-of-tradelossesinrelationtotheaveragevalueof theirexportsandimportsthaninward-orientedeconomies・Furthermore，outward orientedeconomiesexperiencedasmallerexportshortfallthaninward-oriented economiesdid

(4)WithintheNICs,however,theratiooftheexportshortfalltoGNPwashigherin outward-orientedeconomiesthaninward-orientedeconomies，ｂｅｃａｕｓｅｔｈｅｓｈａｒｅｏｆ ｅｘｐｏｒｔｓｉｎＧＮＰｗassubstantiallylargerintheformerthaninthelatter．

(5)Outward-orientedeconomiesreliedtoamuchgreaterextentondomesticadjust‐

mentthaninward-orientedeconomies・Thedifferenceisparticularlymarkedamong theNICsOutward-orientedeconomiesnotonlygainedexportmarketsharesbutalso didbetterinimportsubstitutionthaninward-orientedeconomies・Outward-oriented developingeconomieshadamorefavorablegrowthperformanceafterl973，even thoughtheyexperiencedsubstantiallylargerexternalshocksthanoutward-oriented developingcountries．

(6)Outward-orientedeconomieswerewillingtoacceptlowerratesofeconｏｍｉｃ ｇｒｏｗｔｈｉｎｔｈｅｗａｋｅｏｆｔｈｅｑｕａｄｒｕplingofoilpricesandtheworldrecessioninorder

４

"TheKoreanModel”alldthePolitica]EconomvofStructura]Adjustment

tostabilizetheireconomiesandtoavoidlargeforeignindebtednesslnturn,inward‐

orientedeconomies,foreignborrowingwereinpartusedtoincreaseconsumptionand theefficiencyofinvestmentdeterioratedunderthepoliciesfollowed

Balassastressedthatfromtheviewpointｏｆｔｈｅｐｏｌｉｃｙｒｅsponsestotheexternal shocks,outward-lookingeconomiessufferedmuchmorethaninwardlookingecon．

omies,buttheformercouldrespondfarbetterthanthelatter・Thisviewpointclarified

therelationshipsbetweenlong-termdevelopmentstrategyaltemativesandtheshort‐

aswellasmedium-termstructuraladjustmentmeasures

Butifwelookathisargumentcarefully,theKoreanadjustmentmeasuresaftｅｒｔｈｅ ｆｉｒｓｔｏｉｌｃｒｉｓｉｓｄｏｎｏｔｆｉｔｉｎｈisanalyticalframework，albeitBalassacharacterizes Koreaasarepresentativecaseforexport-orientedNIEsHisassertionthat“byand

large，outward-orientedeconomieswerewillinｇｔｏａｃｃｅｐｔｌｏｗｅｒｒａｔｅｓｏｆｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｃ

ｇrowthinthewakeofthequadruplingofoilpricesandtheworldrecessioninorder tostabilizetheireconomiesandtoavoidlargeforeignindebtedness”couldnotapply totheKoreancase・Ａｔｏｎｅｐｌａｃｅ,ｈｅｓａｉｄｔｈａｔ“onthewhole，ｉｎｗａrd-orientedecon‐

omiesbiasedthesystemofincentivesagainstlabor-intensiveactivities;suchabiasdid notexist,oritwaslesspronounced,underoutwardorientation",butinanotherplace hestatedthatKoreaduringthelatel970swas“anexception,,becauseofthereal

appreciationoftheWonexchangerateAlthoughhecontrastedinward-oriented

economieswithoutward-orientedeconomiesbysayingthattheformerusedsuch measuresascreditrationingandtaxpreferencestopromoteimport-substituting industries,ａｎｄｔｈａｔｔｈｉｓｗａｓｎｏｔｔｈｅｃａｓｅｆｏｒｔｈｅlatter・Heconfessesinfootnoteinthe samepaperthat"Koreaprovidesanexceptiontowardtheendoftheperiod，，(Balassa，

l983b）IftheKoreanstructuraladjustmentisanexceptiontoNIEsandatthesame timetheKoreandevelopmentstrategyisarepresentativecaseofNIEs,ｗｅａｒｅｆａｃｅｄ ｗｉｔｈｎｏｔｈｉｎｇｌｅｓｓｔｈａｎａlogicalcontradiction．

3.TheExperienceofKorea,sstructuraladjustmentandtheBakerlnitiative Theoilcrisisinl973andsubsequentworldrecessionseverelydamagedｔｈｅｏｉｌ‐

importingdevelopingcountriesanｄｂｒｏｕｇｈｔｔｏｔｈｅｍａｓｌｏｗｉｎｇｄｏｗｎｏｆｅｃonomic growthandexternaldebtcrisisKoreawasnoexception、

Korea，scrisismanagementduringthistimｅｈａｓｎｏｔｈｉｎｇｉｎｃｏｍｍｏｎｗｉｔｈｔｈｅ ｏｒｔｈodoxmonetariststabilizationpolicyadvocatedbytheIMFwhichconsistedof restrictivedemandmanagementanddevaluation・Notonlythatltwasalsosubstan‐

tiallydifferentfromthetypicalstructuraladjustmentprogramoftheAsianNIEs accordingtoBalassa，sframeworkRatheritwasanaggressiveadjustmentsimilarto thatofLatinAmericancountrieslnthissenseKorea,sadjustmentwasveryunique andwas“anexception,，totheexport-orientedAsianNIEsAccordingtoBalassa,the contentsofKorea，sadjustmentsmethodsareasfoUows

First,Koreangovernmentshiftedherdevelopmentstrategyfromlabour-intensive lightmanufacturingindustrializationforexportstothebig-pushforheavyand chemicalindustrializationThispolicyshifthasoccuredbecausethepolicy-makers haverecognizedthattheKorea、comparativeadvantagesinlightmanufacturing exportshavebeenlost・Second，asaresultoftheabovepolicyshift，government interventionhasincreased・Third,theexchangerateoftheWonagainsttheUSdollar

５

HidekiEHho

wasfixedduringtheperiodbetweenl975andl979Sotherealexchangerateinterms ofpurchasingpowerappreciatedl4percentinthisperiodAsaresultofthis,inflation

accelerated,andexportssloweddown，ICORincreased，andtheincomedistribution deterioratedFourth,importrestrictionsandcreditallocationsincreased

Bala：saexplainedthesephenomenaas“policyreversals，，ｉｎKorea，sdevelopment history(Balassa,1985).Ｆｏｒｈｉｍ,thepolicyshifttoheavyandchemicalindustrializa‐

tionwaHnothingmorethanabadpolicychoice,whichwouldabandonthecompara

tiveadvantagesKoreainherentlyhad，ｉ・ａ,adeviationfromthe“KoreanModel，'.He

pointedthatthecapitalproductivityinmanufacturingindustryhasdeclinedbecause oftherealappreciationoftheWonandexcessiveinvestmentallocationtotheheavy andchemicalindustries，andthereappearedexcesscapacityｉｎｔｈｏｓｅｓｅｃｔｏｒｓｉｎｔｈｅ ｆａｃｅｏｆｔｈｅｓｍalldomesticmarkets，whiletheexpansionandupgradingoflabour‐

intensiveexportshavebeenhampered・

Ｈaggard＆Ｍｏｏｎ（1983）suggestedthreefactorswhichwouldconstrainthe

outward-lookinggrｏｗｔｈｏｆａ“smalltradingnation，,suchasKorea：first，“dyadic dependence''０ntheeconomicperformanceoftheUSandJapan;second,“sensitivity,，，

meaninRdomesticeconomicperformancedeterminedbytheperformanceofand

trendsintheinternationaleconomy；third，“reliance，,，whichreferstotheneedfOr

externalinputs-capital,technology,rawmaterials,andenergy-topursueagiven developmentstrategy、Theyalsopayedattentiontoanumberofseriousproblems

producedbyheavyandchemicalmdustrializationstrategy，andsaidthatthese

problemsdemonstrated“thedifficultiesofanaggressiveadjustmentstrategyfora

smalltrade-orientedeconomy，'andtheyindicatedthe“inherentlimitations''ofsuch

apolicy、Thereasonstheypointedoutare：first,mostofthetechnologydemanded

wasｔｏｂｅｉｍported，andhighroyaltypaymentsraisedproductivitycostswithout

improvillgthetechnologica］capabilitiesoftheparticipatingfirms；second,thereli‐

anceoI1debt,bothdomesticandforeign,hadresultedinaweakeningofthefinancial structul-eofmanyfirms・

Contrastingwiththeseviewpoints，Dornbush＆Ｐａｒｋ（1987）presentedanother evaluationonthｅｐｏｌｉｃｙｓｈｉｆｔｔｏｔｈｅｈｅａｖｙａｎｄｃｈｅｍｉcalindustrializationinKorea、

Theywrotethat“Ｋｏｒｅａｎｏｗｓｅｒｖｅｓａｓａｍｏｄｅｌｆｏｒｔｈｅｅｘport-orientedstrategyof

developmentthatmultilateralinstitutionsareurgingoncountriesofAfricaandLatin

America,，,andforthatreasontheystressedthatKoreanｓ“haveadjustedsuccessfully tobothｔｈｅｏｉｌｓｈｏｃｋｓｏｆｔｈｅｌ９７０ｓａｎｄｔｈｅｄｅbtshockoftheearlyl980s"・Theyalso

statedthatKoreawas"theonlymajordebtorthathasovercomethedebtproblemand hasdonesowithavengeance，，ｉｎｔｈｅｌａｔｔｅｒｈａｌｆｏｆｔｈｅｌ９８０ｓ・Theycasteddoubtson theideathat“widespreadagreementthattheheavyandchemicalindustryinvestment ｃａｍｐａｉｌｍｏｆｔｈｅｌ９７０ｓｉｎｖｏｌｖｅｄａmisallocationofresources，,、Ｔｈｅｙｓａｉｄｔｈａｔ“there isnohardevidencethatKorea，sinvestmentswereinfactpoor"，andfollowedthat

"todａｙｉｔｉｓａｐｐａｒｅｎｔｔｈａｔｍａｎｙｏｆｔｈｅｓｅindustrieshavegainedinexportshareThe autom()bileindustryisacaseinpoint"・Theypraisedhighlytheheavyandchemical industrializationpolicysayingthat“improvedtechnologyhascomewithhighinvest‐

mentlevel"・Collins＆Ｐａｒｋ（1989)toopointedoutthattheinvestmentsinheavyand chemic2llindustrieswerebeginningtopayofftoday、

BalaHsa'ｓａｒｇｕｍｅｎｔｓａｒｅｔｏｏｓｔａｔｉｃａｎｄｔｏｏｍｕchadheredtotheprototypeofthe KoreanModeLBecausehestressedtheimportanceofselectingtraderegimestoo much，heironicallyenoughseemedtomissthedynamicadvantageswhicｈｔｈｅｔｒａｄｅ

"TheKoreanModel，，andthePoliticalEconomvofStructuralAdjustment ^￣

wouldproduce

lnl98qKoreawasinthemidstoftheworstpoliticalandeconomiccrisissinceits

independenceAddedtotheexternalshocks,thereappearedaseriesofunfavourable

events；theappearanceofdistortionsofexcessivecapacityinheavyandchemical industries,thepoliticalinstabnityfollowingtheassassinationofPresidentParkin

Octoberl979,pooragriculturalperformanceinl980,andthedecisionbytheCarter

administrationtocutUStroopsinKorea,Theexternaldebtaccumulatedbeginning inl979,andtheexternaldebtstocksroseupｔｏ５２３ｐｅｒｃｅｎｔｏｆＧＮＰｉｎｌ９８２・

NevertheleｓＳａｓｅａｒｌｙａｓｌ９８３～84,Ｋｏｒｅａｗａｓａｂｌｅｔｏｒｅｃｏｖｅｒｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｃｒisis followedbytherevivalofworlｄｄｅｍａｎｄａｎｄｔｈｅｉｍｐｒｏｖｅｍｅｎｔｓｉｎｔｅｒｍｓｏｆｔｒａｄｅｌｎ ｌ９８６，Koreanotonlyexperiencedaresumptionofinflationbutalsoaccumulateda

tradesurplusShemetherdebtservice,ａｎｄｈｅｒｄｅｂｔｓｔｏｃｋｗａｓｒｅｄｕｃｅｄｔｏＵＳ＄２．２

billionThisuniqueexperienceattractedtheattentionofdevelopmenteconomistson thepolicyresponseofKoreangovernment・

Facedwithacrisis,Koreangovernmentintroducedacomprehensivestabilization policyinl979andl983

Aghevli＆Marquez-Ruarte（1987）ofthelMFobservedwithsatisfactiｏｎｔｈａｔ

"Korea,sexperiencefollowingthesecondwaveofoilpriceincreasesisanexcellent exampleofhoworthodoxstabilizationpolicies,effectivelyimplemented,canhelpa countryadjusttodomesticandexternalshocks，,､Accordingtothem,tｈｅａｉｍｏｆthe Korea，sorthodoxstabilizationpolicyis“toreviveeconomicgrowth,whilereducing domesticinflationandthecurrentaccountimbalance，，，andthatpolicyconsistedof

strictfinancialdiscipline，whichsharplyreducedthepublicsectordeficit，tight

monetarypolicy，substantialdevaluａｔｉｏｎｏｆｔｈｅＷｏｎａｎｄｔｈｅａｄｏｐｔｉｏｎｏｆｆlexible exchangerate,acomprehensiveenergypolicywhicｈａｉｍｅｄｔｏｒｅｄｕｃｅｔｈｅｄｅｐｅｎｄｅｎｃｅ ｏｎｔheimportedoil,theliberalizationbothofthetradeandfinancialsystems,ａｎｄｓｏ ｏｎＴｈｉｓｓｅｔｏｆｐｏｌｉｃｙｒｅｆｏｒｍｓｗassupportedbyaseriesofIMFstand－ｂｙｃｒｅｄｉｔｓａｓ ｗｅｌｌａｓｂｙＳＡＬｆｒｏｍｔｈｅＷｏｒｌｄＢａｎｋ・Aghevli＆Marquez-Ruarteevaluatedthese programsasrepresenting“asignificantdeparturefromKorea，straditionaldevelop‐

ｍｅｎｔstrategy,whichhadaimedatmaximizinggrowththroughsubstantialrecource toinflationaryfinanceandexternalborrowing，'、

Comparingthefirststructuraladjustmentpeｒｉｏｄｆｒｏｍｌ９７３ｔｏｌ９７７ｔｏｔｈａｔｏｆｔｈｅ ｐeriodfroml979tol983，Ｐａｒｋ（1985）madenearlythesameevaluationasthatof Aghevli＆Marquez-Ruarte、Ｈｅｓａｉｄｔｈａｔｉｎｔｈｅｆｉｒｓｔａｄｊｕｓｔｍｅｎｔperiod，Korea adoptedan“expansionarypolicyresponse'，ｏｒ“growth-firstpolicy'，，whichwasto promoteexportsbydepreciationoftheWonandexportsubsidiesaswellasby acceptingheavydependenceonforeignborrowingAsaresult，whilegrowthand employmentwereguaranteed，economicstabilizationwerelostandinflationary trendsbecameinstitutionalized,Contrastingwiththesepolicyresponses,ｈｅsaid,in thesecondadjustmentperiod,Koreangovernmentadoptedtightdemandmanagement policy,devaluationoftheWon,ａｎupwardadjustmentofbankmterests,andincreases inenergypricestoimprovethecurrentaccount・

FortheeconomistsoftheIMFandtheWorldBank,thepolicyresponsetothecrisis afｔｅｒｌ９７９ｉｎＫｏｒｅａｉｓｏｎｅｏｆｔｈｅｂｅｓｔｅｘamplestoprovethecorrectnessofthe new-orthodoxstructuraladjustmentprogramsinlinewiththeBakerInitiative､Ｔｈｅ ｐｒｏｃｅｓｓｗａｓｔｏｗｏｒｋａｓｆｏｌｌｏｗｓ・Firstwouldcomeastabilizationprogramsuchas demandmanagementanddevaluationoftheexchangeratetocombattheinflation，

７

HidekiEsho

andwithitorfollowingit,wouldcomeaperiodofstructuraladjustmentsuchasthe

liberalizatioｎｏｆｔｈｅｓｕｐｐｌｙｓｉｄｅ，“tocombineshort-termstabilizationandlong-term structuralchangestoimprovetheeconomy'sefficiency,'(WorldBank,1988,ｐ､１７）．

Ｆｏｒthem,Korea'sfirstadjustmentexperienceduringl973tol978shouldbeconsid eredanexceptiontothetypicaloutwardorientedNIEsbecauseitproducedmisalloca‐

tionsofresources,andthatitwasKorea'ssecondadjustmentexperience,whichwas

basedonthestabilizationprogram,thatshoulｄｂｅｔｈｅｍｏｄｅｌｔｏｂｅｓｔｕｄｉｅｄｂｙｏｔｈｅｒ

ｄebtriddendevelopingcountries

4.Politicaleconomyofstructuraladjustment

Todayithasbeenwidelyacceptedthatthenatureofthestructuraladjustmentsis inessencepolitical-economy・InthissituationStreeten（1987）advocatedthatthe Radical/ReformistAdjustmentLoans(RAL)whichsupportedthepoliticalleadersof reformistbeliefswasmoreimportantthantheStructuralAdjutmentLoans(SAL).His assertionisthatitisnecessarｙｔｏｇｏ“beyondadjustment,,tomakeanyadjustment、

Ｐａｒｋ(1987)questionediftheIMF＆WorldBanktypeofliberalizationpolicywould facilitateadjustmentwithreasonablegrowth,"whyhaven，tmanycountriesembarked oneconomicliberalization？'，Thereasonshesuggestedwere：first,thatinternational environmentwasnotsuitable；ａｎｄsecond，economicliberalizationcouldcause considerablemacroeconomicinstability・Healsostatedthatalthough“theKorean experiencehasbeenheraｌｄｅｄｉｎｍａｎｙｐｌａｃｅｓａｓｔｈｅｐｒｉｍｅｅｘａｍpleofasuccessful caseofadjustmentthroughliberalization,itisnotclearwhetherliberalizationisthe resultofgoodeconomicperformanceorviceversa"、Hestressedthegapbetween economictheoryandactualpolicymaking、Anactualpolicymakerhimself，he suggestedontheissueofthesequencingofliberalizationthat“thebestpolicyisto choosethe[target]thatismostconvenientandpracticaltoliberalizefirst"・Alsohe stressedthattheWorldBank'soperationshouldnothaveforcedthepolicy-makersof receivingcountriestoaccepttheWorldBankpoliciesasapackage，butshould encouragegovernmentsｔｏｄｅｖｅlopprogramsthemselves、Hecriticizedtheexcessive beliefineconomictheorywhichtheeconomistsoftheIMFandtheWordBanktendｅｄ

ｔｏｅｍｂｒａｃｅ

Ｎａｍ(1987)notedthatnotonlydemandmanagementpolicybutalsoincomepolicy wereusedinthestabilizationeffortsｉｎｌ９８０ｓｉｎＫｏｒｅａ・Ｔｈａｔｉｓ,ｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎｇover､‐

mentadoptedlow-wagepolicytomaintaintheinternationalcompetitivenessofher manufacturedexports・

Haggard＆Ｍｏｏｎ（1983)focusedattentiononthepoliticalprerequisitesofexport‐

ledgrowth,andquestionedwhatthedomesticpoliticalbasiswhichmadepossiblethe policyshifttoexport-ledgrowtｈｉｎＫｏｒｅａｗｅｒｅ・Accordingtothem，thedomestic politicalprerequisitesignoredbyliberaleconomistswere：first，thestronggovern‐

mentwhichwasabletoimposestabilizationandtoresistpressuresfromdomestic businessandothergroupsfavoredbyclosure;second,theabilityofthegovernmentto havechannelledadequateresourceswhichitpossessedselectivelytoeasｅｔｈｅｒｅｏｒ‐

ientationoftheeconomyinanoutwarddirection；third,theexistenceofareformist leadershipwhichsaweconomicreforminitslong-termpoliticalinterest・They concludedthatthesepoliticalprerequisitescou1dnotbeeasilytransferabletoother

８

"TheKoreanModel”andthePoliticalEcollomyofStructuralAdjustment

ｃａｓｅｓ･

Collins(1990)dividedtheKorea，sadjustmentexperiencesintotwoperiods:1980～８２ andl983～84．ＡｎｄｓｈｅｆｏｕｎｄｔｈａｔＫｏｒｅａｈａｓｈａｄｔｈｅｂreathingperiodoflarge continuedcapitalinflowsbeforeundertakingrestrictivemonetaryandfiscalpolicy，

ShestressedKoreadidnotdoeverythｉｎｇａｔｏｎcebutdidaphasedpolicyresponse Sachs（1985）proposedthepoliticaleconomyofexchangeratemanagemenLHe comparedmacroeconomicmanagementandeconomicperformanceindeveloping countriesofLatinAmericaandEastAｓｉａＩｎｄｏｉｎｇｓｏ,hecomparedeconomicpolicy inbothregions,andfoundthat,incontrastwithLatinAmerica,wherebothimporta‐

blesandnon-tradableshavebenefitedattheexpenseofexportables,inEastAsia,both exportablesandimportableshavebenefitedattheexpenseofnon-tradables,Againhe comparedexchangeratemanagementinbothregionsfromtheviewpointofresource distributionandincomedistribution､Ａｎｄｈｅａｓｓｅｒｔｅｄｔｈａｔｉｔｗａｓｔｈｅｒｕｒａｌpolitical powerthatmadepossiblethedevaluationofexchangerateinEastAsia，whilein LatinAmerica,itwastheurbanindustriesandurbanworkerswhogotbenefitsfrom theovervaluedexchangeratesandimpededthedevaluationofexchangerate・ｓｏ，

accordingtoSachs,“thedifferenceinlabourmarketorganizationcertainlyplaysan importantroleinthepoliticalcalculus".Hisargumentsuggeststheimportanceofthe analysisofclassstructurｅｗｈｉｃｈｍｉｇｈｔｌｉｍｉｔｔｈｅｃｈｏｉｃｅｏｆｅｃｏnomicpolicyofthe developingcountries．

5．ConcluSion

ｌｔｗａｓｔｈｅｄｅｃｉｓｉｖｅｒｏｌｅｏｆａｃｔｉｖｅｓｔateandclassstructurewhichmadeexport‐

orientedstrategyfeasibleinKoreaTheKoreangovernmenthasalwaysbeenableto devaluatetherealexchaｎｇｅｒａｔｅｏｆｔｈｅＷｏｎａｎｄｔｏｒｅｓｔｒａｉｎｔｈerealwagesto maintaininternatio､alcompetitivenessofherproducts,Korea，smiraculouseconomic

developmentandhersuccessfulstructuraladjustmntwaspossibleonlymapolitico‐

economicsystembywhichthestatesuppressedthelabormovementsandthehuman rightsofthelaborerstocreateandmaintainfreelabourmarketsThesearethe characteristicsofaLeviathantoday,anewmerchantiliststate、

ＩｆｔｈｅｓｅａｒｅｔｈｅｌｅｓｓｏｎｓｗｈｉｃｈｃａｎｂｅdrawnfromKorea，sexperienceofstructural adjustment,ｔｈｅｆｕｔｕｒｅｏｆｔｈｅｃｏｍｍｏｎｐｅｏｐｌｅｍｔｈｅdevelopingworldlooksdim indeed・Anauthoritarianregimemightbegoodforeconomicdevelopment,butthis patternofeconomicdevelopmentbelongstotheoldworldThedrivinｇｆｏｒｃｅｔｏ，，A

NewGlobalOrder,'ｃａｎｎｏｔｅｍｅｒｇｅｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｓｏｉｌｏｆｏｌｄmeasures．

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e"Ce,PolicyandResearchSeriesl．

１１