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(1)The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees: Understanding the Linkages and Potential for Collaboration Francela Davila Montero. INTRODUCTION The 2016 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Annual Report on Forced Displacement revealed stark figures about forcible displacement: 65.6 million people have been uprooted from their countries because of war, violence, human rights violations, poverty or environmental degradation. The world has witnessed increasing numbers of people on the move; in the pursuit of safety, they risk their lives many of them failing to reach safe haven. Some others have managed to cross international borders, risking everything on the journey only to realize that the protection of their rights has become enmeshed into political debates.. The protection of refugees relies on two instruments: the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (from now on the Convention)―and its following 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees―and the UNHCR Statute. Building on the platform of those instruments, regions have also drafted. their protection frameworks in the form of regional instruments for the protection of these populations1） Although the availability of legal instruments, states have interpreted them at their discretion, rendering a narrow definition of the protection responsibilities towards refugees.. The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged as a milestone in the international relations discourse, challenging a long-standing tradition that regarded sovereignty as sacrosanct. It was introduced into the international jargon in 2005 as a concept premised on the idea that states owe their populations security and . 1）Building on the language of the 1951 Convention, regions have built complementary instruments to provide a more focused and contextualized approach to protection through a broader conceptualization of refugee. In that spirit, the Organization for the African Union (OAU) adopted in 1969 the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems. This instrument considered that the increasing numbers of refugees required an approach that responded to the continent’s context and that was in synch with the mandate of the OAU. This Convention borrowed the definition of refugee included in the 1951 Convention; however, Article (2) expanded that definition to accord protection to other groups at risk, including those persons displaced “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. See the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The 1969 OAU Convention set a precedent for other regions, and in 1984 Latin America follow suit with the adoption of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Amid the turmoil in Central America’s civil wars, this regional instrument expanded the definition of refugees to include also “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” See the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees..

(2) 108 （368）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. protection; and that the fulfillment of these duties legitimises sovereignty.. This article aims at presenting the areas of convergence between the Responsibility to Protect concept and the Refugee Protection Regime and the potential of collaboration; to that aim, the article will first shed light on the current refugee protection scheme and its implementation. It will touch on the extent to which the protection regime has served its purpose, identify its shortcomings and consider the complementarity with the Responsibility to Protect as a possible avenue to improve responses to refugees. THE REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME Refugees have always been present. Their emergence and continued existence is linked to the reality of the international society and has become a constant in the international context. Their presence in the international system has witnessed wars, changes in the structures of power, ideological conflict, economic systems and others (Betts & Loescher, 2011).. Migration is one of the most distinctive features of our globalized world, facilitated by the development of communications and transportation means. The UNHCR defines the term migrant as a ‘person that has changed his or her residence, with a distinction made between short-term or permanent migration’ so it includes a broad range of categories of migrants (UNHCR, 2016d).. The reasons for migrating are varied; some are a rationale based on a voluntary choice, for instance, better economic opportunities, education, among others. For millions of people, however, leaving their country of origin is the only chance for survival; this last category of migrants depicts the reality of millions of refugees. Alex J. Bellamy (2016) reflects on the need to flee during humanitarian crises when he argues that “one of the things that determine whether civilians caught between barrel bombs and beheadings live or die is their capacity to flee from immediate harm.” Although still migrants, refugees are different to others included in this category, in that they have compelling reasons to leave their countries due to violence, war, and human rights violations; they cross international borders―usually exposing to another type of dangers―in the pursuit of security and safety in other states. Refugees, therefore, require special protection or protection from the international community (UNHCR, 2016c).. The acknowledgment of refugee movements goes back to before the establishment of the current state system. In their account of the development of the current refugee protection regime, Betts and Loescher (2011) note that following the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and concurring with the state consolidation processes of European states, there was an intensification of refugees from specific religious groups that didn’t fit into some European governments’ state-building processes, pushing these groups to search asylum in neighboring states.. During the XIX century, Europe continued to witness massive movements of refugees fleeing from persecution and violence, while neighboring countries, as well as the United States, became haven for the persecuted and repressed2）. The first attempt to create an international protection system for refugees was ─────────. 2) This was the case of approximately 200,000 French Calvinists, members of the Protestant minorities, who faced Catholic persecution through a series of repressive measures leading to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by Louis XIV―which gave recognition to the Calvinist minorities within France and granted them certain conditions for the exercise their faith―leading to the first massive exodus in Europe. This group is known as the Huguenots and.

(3) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （369） 109. the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for the Refugees by the League of Nations in 1921. The Office’s mandate was temporary and explicitly set to address the recently displaced people in Europe; however, the scope of this framework was later extended to bring into its protection scheme, specific nationalities of refugees from the former Ottoman Empire (Betts, Loescher, & Milner, 2012).. From the onset, the High Commissioner for the Refugees was granted limited capacities. This attempt to create a framework of cooperation on refugee protection issues was designed in such a way as to hinder any challenge to states’ sovereignty and independence. Considering the unpredictability nature of refugee flows, Western countries―large recipients of refugee flows during the IWW―decided to set a narrow scope for the organization and allocate a limited budget for its operation (Loescher, 1994). The conceptual narrowness of the definition of refugee, the reduced budget to operate and fulfill its mandate and the reduction of the rights entitled to the groups eligible for protection impinged negatively on its work, falling short in providing the protection needed by refugees.. Economic crises during the interwar era translated into greater restrictions to immigrants and to the humanitarian efforts to address refugees’ need for protection. The need for a global response to the massive movement of people became conspicuous during and after World War II. In 1950, this concern was institutionalized in the form of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and complemented by the Convention on the Status of Refugees later in 1951. The path to the creation of the UNHCR revealed the conflicting interests of western countries on the agenda, purview, and scope of this organization, and the intended extent of the protection of refugees, ultimately favoring the interests of few countries (Betts and Loescher, 2011).. With the adoption of Resolution 319 (IV) of 1949, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established with the aim of coordinating a more global response to the situation of refugees. Under the authority of the General Assembly, the UNHCR would protect individuals falling into the definition of refugees and displaced populations and seek for durable solutions ranging from repatriation, local integration or resettlement. The creation of the UNHCR was in a sense, the institutionalization of the interest of large western countries, in that it was given limited autonomy to operate, was financially dependent on member states’ voluntary contributions and it was envisioned to have a short life (Betts et al., 2012).. The establishment of the UNHCR was followed by negotiations for an international treaty that would bring clarity and guidance to UNHCR’s actions; in 1951, twenty-six countries agreed on the Convention on the Status of Refugees. The negotiations leading to this agreement attested to the different interests on the desired. ─────────. are referred to as the first modern day refugees, who relocated to primarily protestant countries such as Switzerland, England and Germany. The Huguenots found themselves on shifting boundary between the early modern refugee and the modern refugee. Unlike modern refugees, the Huguenots were displaced because of their faith, and in the absence of any policy to accommodate these populations, their faith opened doors for safe haven in neighboring countries that showed religious affinity. See John Hintermaier’s The First Modern Refugees? Charity, Entitlement, and Persuasion in the Huguenot Immigration of the 1680s..

(4) 110 （370）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. purview of the Convention3）. The unpredictability of refugee flows convinced states to limit the scope of the Convention to focus on the provision of protection and permanent solutions to the inherited challenge of the refugees displaced by World War II.. Article I of the Convention provides a definition of refugee and specifies who is entitled to this protection; therefore it applies to (i) individuals recognized as refugees by previous arrangements prior to the entry into force of the convention; (ii) persons outside of their country of origin or habitual residence that can’t return based on a well-founded fear of persecution for ethnicity, religious reasons or different political opinions; (iii) stateless people that cannot return to their countries of residence due to fear of being persecuted (UNHCR, 1951). There are other two components of this definition: (a) it has a geographic and temporal delimitation; applied to those forcibly displaced by the events before January 1, 1951, in Europe. And (b) contracting states could, at their discretion, extend the definition to cover other nationalities.. In the absence of legal protection in their own countries, refugees became a group of particular concern to the international community. Schuck (1997) reflects on the vulnerability of these groups when he argues that, They were compelled to abandon the only protections and solaces that can render the harsh vicissitudes of life endurable: the assistance (however minimal) of their own governments and the social supports of their customary communities. In that spirit, the Convention stipulated the right of refugees of having their basic needs met, including access to courts, to employment opportunities, housing and education (articles 16, 17, 21 and 22 respectively) (Betts et al., 2012). However, Article 33 stipulates the groundbreaking protection clause on ‘prohibition of the expulsion or return,’ which refers to the duty of contracting states not to return refugees to their countries of origin if the risk of persecution persists. This norm represents the core component of the refugee law regime, and its observance has become a matter of customary law; its noncompliance thus, accounts for a breach of the law (UNHCR, 2001).. The narrow definition of the status of refugees did not live up to the reality of displacement, exacerbated by the proliferation of new independent states and the concomitant process of definition of national borders. In the decades following the adoption of the Convention, the triggers of massive displacement diversified; ranging from persecution―the condition required to acquire the status of a refugee according to the Convention― to massive violence, political instability, poverty, environmental threats and others, making clear the need to redefine the status of refugee.. In synch with the new displacement realities, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was negotiated and adopted in 1967; it expanded the definition of refugees to other groups in refugee-like ─────────. 3) In their account on the process that led to the adoption of the Convention, Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher and James Milner (2012) explain the conflicting expectations about the Convention among powerful western states: on the one hand, Britain strived for a broader definition of refugees that would―regardless of nationality―include all refugees even in future emergencies or crises; on the other, the United States along with France, pursued a narrow definition of refugee so as to withhold some prerogative on the entitlement of rights of refugees and the groups upon which protection would be granted..

(5) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （371） 111. situations, removing the previous geographic and time limitation and joining the Convention as a paramount component of the refugee protection regime.. These two instruments, along with the UNHCR, have set the guidelines for the treatment of refugees for over 60 years, proving resilient to changes in the international system. The UNCHR, in particular, has been forced to evolve to accommodate to a changing political and institutional environment and broadening its mandate (Loescher, 2014).. State’s observance of the rules included in the Convention and the Protocol has fallen short. There have been questions about the effectiveness of the international protection of refugees, including the suitability of the available legal instruments to deal with the magnitude of the problem of forcible displacement and the need of protection. There seems to exist agreement, however, that the main hindrance to the effectiveness of the current refugee protection scheme has more to do with the real interest of countries to observe the rules (Schuck, 1997). Other arguments also identify the structure of the regime itself as the primary problem considering that it was devised in such a way as to protect state’s sovereignty and give opportunities to states to circumvent the obligations contained in the Convention and the Protocol.. The less than universal accession to these instruments is one of the gaps in the regime, as is the variation in its implementation in different regions; this is particularly interesting considering that most of the non-party states are from the global south and are recipients of a considerable number of displaced populations. There are concerns about the quality and extent of the protection provided by those countries to refugees, considering that that protection is not informed or guided neither by the Convention nor the Protocol (Türk & Dowd, 2014).. Another important feature of the instruments is their ambiguity regarding the protection responsibilities of states. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, enshrines the right of asylum4）; however, the Convention nor the Protocol include language imposing a duty upon state parties to grant asylum, institutionalizing a gap between the ever-increasing demand for protection and the short supply of asylum.. Attitudes towards asylum have changed both in the North and the South; in the former, changes in international politics have fueled reluctance to granting asylum to refugees after the Cold War, and instead have adopted a policy of containment. In that regard, Newman and Selm (2003) explain this as a “shift from the protection of asylum seekers to protection from them.” Countries in the South, once characterized by their solidarity, have been strained with massive flows of refugees, and ultimately have started to pursue not only more restrictive measures against refugees but also changes in the quality of the protection provided (Loescher, 2014).. States’ narratives about refugees have been aligned to their security agenda. The securitization of these populations has fueled the fear of refugees. At the same time, the propaganda against refugees has served well the populist rhetoric of national politicians who blame national problems on these populations Refugees have toppled other more traditional threats to national security; and so, resources and policies are now directed ─────────. 4) Article 14 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights..

(6) 112 （372）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. towards countering this new ‘threat’ (Hammerstad, 2014).. Ignorance about the status of refugees and what this condition entails has promoted negative attitudes against refugees, who are mistakenly seen as migrants that opportunistically profit from the limited resources of domestic economies instead of groups in need of protection. The definition of the identity of refugees is for the most part constructed through the process of othering5）of , this group; put it differently, the construction of the identity of refugees is through differentiation from the self . Refugees represent the “other,” they are outsiders, and as such they are suspicious. This representation influences behavior and leads to the creation of a hierarchy that privileges a superior group, and alienates the other; in the case of refugees, this ‘othering’ was wittily captured by Zygmunt Bauman (2016) when he comments, Refugees from the bestiality of wars and despotisms or the savagery of famished and prospectless existence have knocked on other people’s doors since the beginning of modern times. For people behind those doors, they were always―as they are now―strangers. Strangers tend to cause anxiety precisely because of being ‘strange’―and so, fearsomely unpredictable, unlike the people whom we believe we interact daily and from we believe we know what to expect; for all we know, the massive influx of strangers might have destroyed the things we cherished―and intend to maim or wipe out our consolingly familiar way of life. States have started to walk away from their commitments under the Convention and have created governance instruments or institutions6）that allow them to turn the debate about refugees from a humanitarian issue to migration or security discussion. This political maneuvering permits states to exert more control over migration movements, devise means to deter the arrival of refugees and avoid the obligations that come along with them (Betts, 2009). There is an ongoing debate about the adequacy of the regime to deal with the current reality of displacement; some critics have argued that the Convention and the Protocol are Cold War documents and do not accommodate well other groups that are as well in need of protection (Newman & Selm, 2003). The new causes of displacement do not fit into the traditional context of persecution stipulated in the legal instruments, although the UNHCR (1991) acknowledged the new dynamics of displacement in its Note on International ─────────. 5) The construction of social identities through differentiation between the “self ” and the “other” was introduced in the postcolonial period by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her 1985 work “The Rani of Sirmur”, when explaining the British colonial rule over India and the definition of identities and power relations. The colonial ruler was defined as the “self ” and locus of power, while the colony was degraded as the “other” establishing a master/subordinate formulation. This construction served to legitimize the superiority of the British and the degradation of the Indians. See Jensen (2011). 6) Examples of these parallel institutions are provided by Betts and Loescher (2011) and include among others the European Union’s Common Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC), the Global Commission on International Migration and Development (GCIM). In their analysis, these institutions are tasked with making decisions on refugee protection and asylum granting without the participation of the UN system competent agency. The preference of states to resort to these institutions is what Betts calls “regime change” from one that imposes obligations upon states to one that permits states implement measures to discourage asylum seekers into coming close to their territories..

(7) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （373） 113. Protection of 1991 when it argues, The reality is that population movements are compelled by persecution, other forms of human rights violation and conflict, but are also caused by natural or ecological disaster, extreme poverty, or by a mix of these reasons. The protection of refugees is beset today more than in the past by major difficulties attributable in part to the complexity of population movements and a resulting lack of clarity about the protection responsibilities of States, the proper role for UNHCR and the appropriate solutions to pursue. There are arguments also claiming that not even the most flexible interpretation of the Convention and the Protocol would be able to accommodate all the cases of human suffering that merit protection. Nonetheless recent crises have come to pose new challenges for the approach to refugees; for instance, large influxes of refugees stranded at sea (Türk & Dowd, 2014).. This debate acquired greater relevance in 2015 when the refugee regime reached an unfortunate milestone. On its 2015 annual report on forced displacement, the UNHCR revealed that 65.3 million persons had been forcibly displaced during that year, reaching record numbers not seen since the Second World War. There has been a 75% increase in the number of forcibly displaced populations in the past two decades, an increase from 37.3 million in 1996 to 65.3 million in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). The tendency is to continue increasing given the prolonged nature of the crises that are generating refugee flows. This statement was validated in the UNHCR’s 2016 annual report, which reported an increase of 300,000 persons displaced in that year, unfortunately keeping the numbers at a record high. Also worryingly is that even though Syria remains as one of the primary sources of displacement, other crises have worsened in the reported year (UNHCR, 2017).. In such scenario, there is an inexorable need to reconsider any possible alternative to manage the current refugee crisis and make the much-needed protection available to millions of people. It is then the Responsibility to Protect that might provide some opportunities for action. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NORM The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept emerged in 2001 when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) proposed a new understanding of sovereignty7）. This concept was ─────────. 7) Although the official emergence of the concept of R2P was credited to the ICISS Report in 2001, it heavily borrowed from the work of Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen. A seasoned Sudanese Diplomat, Deng served as the United Nations Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons. He advocated the idea of responsible sovereignty by suggesting a new definition of sovereignty, one that was defined in terms of responsibility and accountability. He argued that states’ primary responsibility is to provide its people with protection, the rule of law and basic services. Whereas state cannot perform that responsibility, the wider international community should then provide assistance to states in fulfilling that mandate. However, in the event of massive human suffering, the international community has the obligation―based on the principle of humanitarianism―to respond and discharge that responsibility. This conceptualization was defined primarily as a framework for conflict management, prevention and resolution in the Post-Cold War African Context. Similarly, the work of Roberta Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, influenced the ICISS construction.

(8) 114 （374）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. developed as an attempt by the ICISS to address questions about violence against civilian populations in the midst of civil war and internal violence in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and other scenarios. The ICISS led global consultations around the world to understand different attitudes of international actors about intervention as a possible means to stop and prevent further cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other violations of human rights.. The Commission presented a new definition of sovereignty, one that directly challenged Article 2.7 of the United Nations Charter and that made sovereignty contingent upon states fulfilling responsibilities towards their populations. In its report “Responsibility to Protect ” the Commission presented the idea that the primary duty of states is to protect their citizens. The argument for this groundbreaking change is that sovereignty now carries responsibilities not only towards other countries but also towards the state’s people. As the report highlights, there are additional demands and expectations of responsibilities when it incorporates the concept of human security into the relationship between a state and its people, and it requires states to provide order, protection and sustaining living standards to all (ICISS, 2001).. The work of the ICISS and its report represented a response to the plight of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to prevent conscious-shocking events involving the loss of life and gross violations of human rights. It also challenged the international community to seriously address the failure of the security system by taking decisive action to protect populations at risk (UN, 2000).. The concept of R2P included three different components with three specific responsibilities:. ⅰ. ‌the responsibility to prevent: addresses the causes of conflict through noncoercive measures to prevent it from escalating; ⅰⅰ. ‌the responsibility to act: the capacity to react to address compelling need for protection and might involve the use of more coercive measures; and ⅰⅰⅰ. ‌the responsibility to rebuild―assisting in the recovery of critical areas in the event of a United Nations Security Council mandated military intervention (ICISS, 2001).. The concept was, therefore, a comprehensive approach to humanitarian crises, encompassing a collection of diplomatic, economic and lastly military actions to halt massive violations of human rights and to humanitarian international law. The doctrine of R2P was aimed at bringing coherence to the institutional practices of the United Nations to respond to humanitarian crises and systematizing them into one framework (Orford, 2011).. The concept of R2P generated debate within the United Nations. In 2004, the Secretary-General appointed a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (HLP) to analyze the current threats to peace and international security and to determine the organization’s capacity to confront those threats. The report refers to the concept of responsibility to protect as an ‘emerging norm’ and acknowledges that responsibility, falls first upon states and if they cannot fulfill that responsibility it falls back to the international community. The use of ─────────. on R2P. Her work, along Deng, focused on the development of a system for the protection of Internationally Displaced People (IDPs), who, until the last decade of the twentieth century, had been marginalized from the international agenda. Deng’s concept of responsible sovereignty served well this endeavor, because it reconciled national responsibility with international humanitarian action on behalf of IDPs. It also paved the way for the emergence of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement..

(9) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （375） 115. force is also considered in the report, as a last resort if all other less coercive means have been used and failed; and contingent upon authorization by the Security Council (UN, 2004).. Building on the recommendations of the 2004 Report, the Secretary-General presented his report ‘In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ to the General Assembly in preparation for the 2005 World Summit later that year. His report was a collection of priorities in three crucial areas: development, security, and UN reform. The Secretary-General endorsed the analysis made by the HLP and repeatedly urged states to embrace the new emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect as the basis of the collective security framework (UN, 2005a). The months preceding the Summit involved intense negotiations among states over the still existent concerns about R2P, including normative aspects―specifically the unlawful use of force for intervention―as well as linguistic changes (Badescu, 2011).. The concept was refined from its original conception by the ICISS, and finally was included in the language of the UN, in a section of the 2005 World Summit Document. The document framed the collective responsibility to protect in paragraphs 138 and 139 when it stipulates that, 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (UN, 2005b). Paragraph 138 reiterates that there is a responsibility to protect populations at risk in the event of four specific international crimes―namely genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity― and reflects the narrow scope given to the R2P norm. This definition distances to the one envisaged by the ICISS’s definition that used a broader scope―paragraph 4.20 of the ICISS Report also includes state collapse.

(10) 116 （376）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. and environmental disasters―as grounds for international intervention (ICISS, 2001). The refinement of the R2P formulation in the World Summit Outcome document was the result of an intense negotiation process that required some political compromises to push the resolution through; those compromises focused primarily on the amplitude of the norm and the threshold for the use of force (Evans, 2015).. The World Summit Outcome Document was accepted―at least rhetorically―by member states; however, there was little intention at that point to turn words into reality. After the initial endorsement of the R2P concept, Alex Bellamy (2009) described the political environment as tense due to states’ ‘buyer’s remorse’, as some states felt that they had just endorsed a new form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in disguise. This concern was exacerbated by the military intervention in Iraq in 2003.. The journey of R2P continued within the Security Council, which later ‘reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (UN, 2006). That reaffirmation was a milestone for the R2P as a norm, because, for the first time, the Security Council included the language of R2P into a resolution, giving legal force to R2P (Badescu, 2011). The general environment and expectations about the norm, however, didn’t mitigate the concerns of some countries about the conditioning of sovereignty, requiring a better conceptualization of the norm.. As Serrano (2011) argues, the Secretary-General undertook R2P as a priority during his tenure and used his prestige to harness support for this endeavor. In 2009, the Secretary-General released the first of its yearly reports on R2P, which dealt precisely with its implementation. To advance the implementation of the norm; he proposed a three-pillar strategy, including the following: ⅰ. ‌pillar one outlined the responsibilities of states to protect their populations from the four crimes and their incitement; ⅰⅰ. ‌pillar two refers to international assistance and capacity building―calls out to the different actors ranging from regional organizations to private sector to assist states in fulfilling their commitments to protection; ⅰⅰⅰ. ‌p illar three refers to the responsibility of the international community to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner through various means when a state fails or is incapable of protecting its population. The three-pronged architecture defined by the United Nations Secretary-General in its 2009 Report, aimed at decoupling R2P from humanitarian intervention; and instead, sought to capitalize support for the other pillars (pillar I and II) which are considered less controversial and enjoy primacy within the R2P framework. The General Assembly opened its first debate on R2P, to vote on the Report which was approved―although with changes―and endorsed by member states. One of the agreements of the General Assembly, included in resolution 63/308, was to continue the discussions on R2P; this commitment translated into the SecretaryGeneral yearly reports on R2P.. The itinerary of R2P at the General Assembly demonstrated that although there was some skepticism from few states, the political consensus around the concept had grown and there was greater acceptance of R2P within UN membership (Burke-White, 2012). R2P was put to the test shortly after its adoption in 2005 when it was invoked to respond to different humanitarian crises. Within its first five years, R2P was invoked 13 times, resulting in action only on three occasions, although the existence of mass atrocity crimes in Somalia (2006),.

(11) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （377） 117. Sudan (2008) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bellamy, 2010). The inconsistent implementation of R2P can be attributed to the ambiguity of a recently emerged norm, however as Serrano (2011) rightly notes, it is important to highlight that R2P proved to be relevant for ‘real time politics’.. Ensuing crises merited the invocation of R2P, and in 2011 the Security Council adopted resolution 1970, the first resolution authorizing the use of force for the protection of civilians in Libya in response to the violence and brutality of the Gadhafi regime against the civilian population. Similarly, resolution 1975 was adopted by the Council to address the violence in Cote d’Ivoire, unleashed by an electoral process and the negative of the outgoing president to step down. The unanimous support of the Council reflected the empathy of states towards R2P and the international community’s responsibility to act on R2P grounds (Bellamy & Dunne, 2015).. The short-lived enthusiasm over the implementation of R2P in Libya was replaced by criticism about how the intervention had overstretched the mandate set by the Security Council that resulted in a regime change. As Weiss (2011) cautioned, If the Libyan intervention goes well, it will put teeth in the fledgling RtoP doctrine. If it goes badly, critics will redouble their opposition, and future decisions will be more difficult. 8） The controversy over Libya ignited old arguments against R2P especially from the BRICS , who saw R2P as being nothing more than Western intervention and fueled greater distrust against the norm. This. wariness has impinged on the Security Council’s response to other crises; the Syrian crisis, for instance, which has reached unimaginable levels of violence and crimes against civilians populations, not even seen in the Libyan case, and has kept the Security Council at a deadlock (Bellamy & Dunne, 2015).. Notwithstanding the paralysis of the Security Council, there is agreement that the norm has become common language when referring to mass atrocities, featuring in various resolutions from the Security Council, the UN Human Rights Commission, and the General Assembly. As Bellamy and Dunne (2015) comment, citing former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, “the international debate about R2P has moved from a focus on the merits of the principle itself to matters of implementation” when referring to the support of the international community for the principle.. The Secretary-General has continued to contribute to the deepening of the understanding of the norm through the debate of his reports on R2P. The topics of these Reports include Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect (2010), the Role of Regional and Sub Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2011), Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (2012), State Responsibility and Prevention (2013), International Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect (2014), Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2015) and Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the responsibility to protect (2016).. The debate about the implementation of R2P has been focused on pillar three, and more specifically on the use of military measures in detriment of other non-coercive and less controversial measures that could help . 8）Acronym used to refer to a group of emerging economies namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa..

(12) 118 （378）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. bring protection to vulnerable populations despite repeated iterations by the Secretary-General that the heart of R2P lies in prevention. As Thakur (2016) citing Bellamy pint points, “pillar three is not exclusively about the use of force, even in pillar three, the first option are other peaceful means, not the use of force”. R2P AND REFUGEE PROTECTION: WHERE DO THEY MEET? In his 2008 article, the then High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres (2008), concerned about the politicization of refugee protection, expressed the need to overcome the gaps in the protection of refugees and internally displaced people through a “new legal and policy framework based on cooperation and humanitarian principles”. In 2016, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon echoed that concern and in his report “In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugee and migrants” he calls out on member states to address the increasing numbers of people displaced and act through a framework of shared values, nondiscrimination, and respect for human rights (UNHCR, 2016b).. The need for complementary forms of protection is urgent considering the increasing numbers of people uprooted, the protracted nature of humanitarian crises and the new triggers of displacement; and calls for considering new avenues for dealing with forcible displacement. The Responsibility to Protect framework presents potential to becoming an ally in such endeavor. This section will present the areas of convergence between R2P and refugee protection. It will discuss the views about the complementarity between both regimes.. The complementary nature of the Responsibility to Protect with other international instruments, and more precisely with refugee law, was asserted by the Secretary-General in his 2009 report, in paragraph 3 when it states that “R2P does not detract states from complying with their obligations under other international humanitarian instruments already agreed on, on the contrary, it encourages states to honor those commitments” (UN, 2009). Similarly, William Maley (2015) argues that R2P’s main foundations rely on international humanitarian law principles and therefore acceptance and support to R2P are not detrimental to other protection schemes within international humanitarian law.. R2P and refugee norms are part of the international humanitarian regime which aims the alleviation of unnecessary suffering and provides protection to the most vulnerable populations; the bedrock of this regime, as Barnett (2014) explains, is the “discourse of compassion, responsibility, and care which in turn are attached to claims that the ‘international community’ has an obligation to its weakest members”. Both R2P and the refugee regime share this mandate, of protecting those that have been put in peril and danger, alleviate suffering and assisting at-risk groups. The populations of concern for both norms, therefore converge, as one of the most common reasons for displacement is the fear of the commission of any of the four crimes condemned by R2P.. This complementarity also goes to the very origin of R2P. The “sovereignty as a responsibility” concept was developed by former Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Frances Deng, who proposed a different understanding of sovereignty. This new construction responded to the renewed interest on security in the post-Cold War era. It has been argued earlier in this paper, that the security concerns after the Cold War diversified and included other non-traditional threats to security, refugee flows were an addition to this list. The concern extended over IDPs as well, who were also seen as a potential threat to regional instability after their states had failed to provide protection and basic services for these populations..

(13) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （379） 119. The debate about how to assist these populations along with the breakdown of traditional understandings of sovereignty led to the origin of R2P (Cohen, 2010).. From its 2001 conception, R2P has evolved from a concept crafted by the ICISS, to a three-pillar response to mass atrocity crimes. It has been argued that R2P is linked to the protection of refugees, mainly through pillar two and pillar three. In elaborating on each pillar, the UN (2009) report of the Secretary-General refers particularly to pillar two and cites the forms through which, this second responsibility can be undertaken when it states that, These provisions suggest that this assistance could take one of four forms: (a) encouraging States to meet their responsibilities under pillar one (…); (b) helping them to exercise this responsibility (…); (c) helping build their capacity to protect ( … ); (d) assisting States “ under stress before crises and conflicts break out ”. To prevent further escalation of violence and the potential commission of the four crimes anathematized by R2P, refugees and forcibly displaced populations are of crucial importance in raising red flags about the possibility of conflict spiraling within a state. Forcibly displacement of people serves as a warning of the potential for a conflict to spiral into a context of mass atrocities; Susan Rimmer (2010) citing UNHCR explains that refugees and IDPs perform as a ‘barometer’ as they can provide information, through their stories and experiences, about the conditions of conflict. R2P’s third pillar provides ground for international action when a state has failed or when it is purposefully committing those crimes. As the Secretary-General explained in this 2009 report, this pillar encompasses a variety of measures to act in the event of mass atrocities, When a state refuses to accept international prevention and protection assistance, commits egregious crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect and fails to respond to less coercive measures, it is, in effect, challenging the international community to live up to its own responsibilities under paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome (UN, 2009). The use of force under R2P has taken center stage during the R2P norm development process. It has been accepted that R2P needs to have some enforcement capacities. The use of coercive measures is required whenever the other less coercive available tools have been exhausted. The use of military measures is not a silver bullet, but as Weiss (2011) comments, it needs to be considered when “diplomacy and moral outrage have reached their limit.” Although the debate around R2P is ongoing, there still is a conceptual misunderstanding of pillar three and more specifically about the use of force for the protection of people against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The overwhelming attention over the coercive component of pillar three has been detrimental to the use of other less controversial―and less coercive―diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful measures available. The language about the use of force in core R2P documents has also left little room for the inclusion of language about the protection of refugee and internally displaced populations; instead, these groups have been referred to as a threat to security, and therefore asylum has not been mentioned until later R2P reports. Integrating refugee protection language into the R2P framework could encourage cooperation and prevention.

(14) 120 （380）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. of humanitarian crises. The challenges of operationalizing R2P are contentious. Notwithstanding, Barbour and Gorlick (2008) note that granting asylum to refugee might be the most practical way in which states can comply with their R2P commitments and reduce the death toll. It has been agreed that this option should be appealing to states when compared to the financial and political costs of multilateral action in the event of R2P crimes. Similarly, granting asylum and protection to these groups reduces their vulnerability. Bellamy (2016) in making a case for granting asylum for refugees fleeing atrocity crimes recalls the painful experiences of the past when he comments, That is the lesson that should have been learned in Europe and North America in the 1930s. Back then, instead of facilitating the flight of Jews from Nazi Germany they prohibited. Tens if not hundreds of thousands of people who might have escaped the Holocaust did not because they were denied asylum in third countries. Although not explicitly included in R2P documents, asylum represents an important way in which states can meet their obligations of collective responsibility. Instead, refugees have been referred to in the initial R2P documents as a burden, and refugee flows as a ‘destabilizing force’ to regional peace (Rimmer, 2010). The derogatory language has thus, provided ground for states to try to avoid these ‘spillovers’ by implementing greater restrictions to asylum seekers. Even countries that had previous experiences resettling refugees have changed attitudes towards them. Other nations, while having the capacity to accept refugees into their territories, have opted for preventing them from reaching their borders and have used other mechanisms to deter their arrival9）.. Gradually the tone has been changing in subsequent UN documents; action has been called for to overcome the security-oriented approach to refugees and instead, address the issue from a humanitarian and moral perspective. In his 2016 report, the Secretary-General reminded the international community of its responsibility to fulfill its obligation to act in a timely and decisive manner when mass atrocities occur, and that this responsibility is individual (UNHCR, 2016b).. The notion of sharing responsibility―previously considered as burden sharing―on the protection of refugees has acquired greater salience over the past year, especially with the protracted nature of displacement. The current distribution of refugees is unbalanced and has affected low and middle-income countries who have shouldered for the most part the responsibility to accommodate uprooted populations. Data from the UNCHR . 9）The ambiguities in the language of asylum has lead countries to act under their own interpretations. Although refugee protection has been regarded as a public good, the incentives for countries to engage in cooperation are low. Instead, countries have resorted to different mechanisms to discourage refugee flows from pouring into their borders and circumventing legal obligations; among those measures are the deal entered by the European Union and Turkey to relocate refugees who entered Europe via Italy and Greece in exchange of a 6 billion euro deal for the encampment of those asylum seekers. Another harshly condemned deal is the one entered by Australia and Nauru which operates as the former’s offshore asylum request processing center, although resettlement rarely occurs. Human rights NGOs have denounced the egregious violations of asylum seekers in Nauru, and Australia’s policy of banning entry into Australian waters..

(15) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （381） 121. confirms that statement by reporting that 86% of the world’s refugees―approximately 13.9 million people― are hosted in developing countries (UNHCR, 2016a).. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not stipulate any principle that obliges states to assist other nations in meeting the protection needs of refugees. Due to regional proximity, similarities in cultural, religious or social values, or low-guarded borders, southern nations have become the largest hosts for the displaced. These host countries, for the most part, have been left alone in addressing the need of refugees, while northern industrialized nations have opted for free-riding, preventing any institutionalized commitment when it comes to protecting refugees (Schuck, 1997).. This unbalanced distribution of responsibilities responds to the ambiguity of the language of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol; there is no clarity as to where does the protection start and who is to bear the legal obligation to provide this protection. Countries geographically closer to the source of displacement take on greater responsibility, while developed or more affluent countries have more bandwidth to decide the extent of their contribution; in that regard, Betts and Collier (2017) explain, The cooperation problem in the refugee regime can be thought of as what game theorists would describe as ‘suasion game’: one in which weaker players are left with little choice but to cooperate and stronger players are left with little incentive to cooperate. This explains in part why fewer than I percent of the world’s refugees get access to resettlement in third countries beyond their region of origin. Although proposals for responsibility sharing in the area of refugee protection are not new, the context of displacement calls for a more balanced distribution of refugees and makes it more urgent than ever. Refugee protection needs to be understood as a public good, in that it reduces inequalities among regions, contribute to greater security and fulfills state’s moral and humanitarian obligation under international law (Surhke, 1998).. Skepticism about the extent to which R2P can contribute to refugee protection still exists. The main arguments refer to the ‘narrow, but deep scope’ of R2P and its strength as a norm. Regarding the first concern, critics have argued that R2P applies to specific situations of mass atrocities situations and that it does not cover all forms of violence, human rights violations and other contexts that drive people away from their countries.. R2P’s ‘narrow but deep scope’ was premised on the idea that to prevent or halt the commission of international crimes, R2P should focus on a limited number of them; especially if it requires the invocation of coercive measures under pillar three. The delimitation of R2P’s scope was a result of the political negotiation; the use of force was agreed upon the establishment of a strict threshold: the commission of four crimes. The debates about the implementation of R2P showed states’ concerns about the possibility of strong states high jacking the norm to pursue other concealed interests; thus international agreement about the invocation of R2P was built on four specific crimes10）. R2P’s scope is deep, inasmuch that there is a collection of tools at the . 10）This position was defended by ASEAN member countries during the discussion of the 2009 Report of the Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect ”. During the debate of the report, the representatives of the Southeast Asian region expressly manifested their support to the substance of R2P however they also voiced their rejection to the inclusion of other non-human security, human rights or developmental.

(16) 122 （382）. Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Nos. 4‒5‒6. international and regional level that states can resort to protect vulnerable populations from those crimes.. The nature of R2P’s ‘narrow but deep’ scope was thought of as a means to prevent it from becoming an all-inclusive umbrella for other situations; as Thakur (2016) notes, “R2P does not resolve all the dilemmas of how outsiders can provide timely, decisive, and effective assistance to all groups in need of protection. It may be deep but remains so narrow that so many areas beyond the four atrocity crimes fall outside of its scope”.. The limited scope of the R2P was set to prevent the abuse of force. This “narrow but deep” threshold holds that the international community will only engage militarily under four scenarios stipulated: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This has sparked questions about the moral underpinning of R2P, prioritizing some humanitarian concerns over others; however, widening the scope might endanger the support that R2P has harnessed, might feed mistrust among states that are critical of the norm and further complicate its operationalization (Bellamy, 2014).. The narrow but deep limitation to the scope of R2P merits a careful reading. This limitation was set to prevent a distortion of the concept that might result in arbitrary military action, but it does not limit the other peaceful and non-coercive measures that the international community can resort to fulfill its protection responsibilities.. Concerning the second argument about R2P’s normative status, there is an emphasis on the institutionalization in the form of legally binding instruments as criteria in determining the relevance of a norm. In the context of R2P, its normative status remains a divisive issue; on the one hand, it has been argued that R2P is nothing more than rhetoric because it imposes no obligations upon states. Susan Rimmer (2010) is of that view and asserts that R2P as a soft law has developed very quickly and has earned acceptance―at least rhetorically―from states; however, remains marginal to international law because what is still lacking is the actual will of states to act upon it. The situation in Syria and the deadlock of the Security Council has further supported the claim that R2P amounts to nothing more than political rhetoric.. On the other hand, Gareth Evans (2009) accepts that R2P cannot be considered an international customary law yet but he weighs in the general support for the norm when the comments that R2P “can already be properly described as a new international norm: a new standard of behaviour, and a new guide to behaviour, for every state”. Notwithstanding its status, R2P has come to influence state behavior in that the majority of states do not commit the crimes that R2P condemns and have instead subscribed to international legal instruments that proscribe those crimes. Using that influence, R2P provides ground for new leadership to emerge, and set the example for other countries to follow suit in protecting refugees; such is the case of Jordan11）, one country that can claim has fulfilled its R2P responsibilities by becoming an asylum country for Syrian refugees (Welsh, 2014).. . issues into the scope of R2P in detriment of the norm’s implementation. This regional concern resulted from the attempt to invoke R2P to deliver humanitarian aid to Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. See Bellamy and Drummond (2012). 11）Jordan is the seventh-largest refugee-hosting country in the world. By the end of 2016, it provided protection to 685,200 people, the majority of whom are Syrians, followed by Iraqi and Sudanese. See UNHCR’s 2016 Global Trends Forced Displacement Report..

(17) The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Refugees（Francela Davila Montero）. （383） 123. CONCLUSIONS This paper has explained the links between the refugee protection regime and the Responsibility to Protect. It has been argued that the refugee system, constructed to address the dynamics of displacement of previous times, has fallen short to meet the current protection needs of millions of people displaced by conflict, violence and massive violations of their human rights. Prospects for political solutions to the ongoing ―refugee producing―conflicts are not bright, and therefore might uproot more people in the following years. The number of refugees displaced in 2016 has defied known statistics; however, the response from the international community has been slow and highly politicized. Albeit the need for protection from the international community, the figure of asylum has come under much debate due to states’ security agendas, populist politics at the domestic and international level, the criminalization of refugees, xenophobia and lack of solidarity. R2P provides opportunities to support the protection of refugees; as it places the responsibility of protection first and foremost upon states, with a fall back responsibility on the international community. With the general support of the R2P norm in 2005, the international community accepted the idea of collective responsibility to protect those populations in need, and although implementation has been contentious, it should be acknowledged as a significant move towards a better protection scheme for populations at risk. Both regimes share a common intellectual heritage, as they are part of the international humanitarian regime; both aim at protecting populations at risk. R2P underpins other international humanitarian instruments and magnifies the protection responsibilities of countries. The structure of R2P as a three-pillar principle, gives primacy to the prevention and assisting components of the norm and presents a repository of peaceful measures that are often overlooked and underutilized. Granting asylum, securing passage of refugees and assisting other countries that host displaced populations are, therefore, part of the tools available for states to fulfill their R2P responsibilities. R2P also enables the emergence of new leaderships, founded on the principles of shared humanity and compassion. In the context of the current displacement crises, these leaders are in short supply, however, countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, despite their limitations, have become leaders in protecting refugees. Hopefully, these examples will spark collaboration with other nations towards the establishment of a collective responsibility scheme. Refugee protection facilitates the fulfillment of R2P responsibilities. Therefore, the discussions about the operationalization of R2P need to continue. At the same time, it is necessary to make the links between R2P and refugee protection self-evident in R2P documents. A better understanding of this relationship might help states overcome the misconstrued notion of R2P as merely a militaristic doctrine and take advantage of the whole gamut of peaceful tools available. References Badescu, C. G. (2011). Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. Security and Human Rights. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Barbour, B., & Gorlick, B. (2008). Embracing the ‘Responsibility to protect’: A repertoire of measures including asylum for potential victims. International Journal of Refugee Law, 20(4), 533‒566..

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