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(1)Consensus and Regional InstitUtion Building： Is there any prospect of a丘ee trade area in the Asia−Paci血c1）. Hiromi Ka『bashima 1. 1． lntroduction One of the mysteries of regionaHsm in the Asi壮Pac姐c is why multilateral free. trade agreements have not been established．2｝There has been a great dea正of interest in enhancing regional economic cooperation in Asia since the financial crisis of 1997． However， almost all of the cooperation frameworks are bilateral. free trade agreements（FTAs）or economic partnership agreements（EPAs）， not multilateral FlrAs．ヨ｝Though multilateral FTAs have been proposed several times in the Asia−Pac茄c since the 1990s， they have not been enacted． Tlle most recent. multilateral FTA challenge is a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pac述c（FTAAP）， which was advocated in 2004 and is currently under examination． Is there any prospect that the FlrrAAP will be established？ The． purpose of this paper is to. examine the reasons why multilateral FTAs have not formed by concentrating on variables in the past case studies， in order to assess the possibility ofthe N［AAP. Many factors have motivated regionalism in the Asia−Pacific． First is tlle 35.

(2) 横浜国際経済法学第17巻第2号（2008年12月） ongoing concern about the Doha Round of the World Trade Orgapization（WTO）， which is at a critical junc亡ure． The negotiations have gone into hilbernation．・｝） Alternative ideas to promote market liberalization in the Asia．Pacf］c are required．. Second are external developments in regionalism． In particular， there is some. concern that the deepe皿ing and expanding of the European Union（EU）may interfbre with potential mafkets fOr Asia． Third are the Asian financial crisis of. 1997and the perceived inadeqtlate response to it、 The Asian crisis has been the catalyst for undermining existing regional coop’ ?窒≠狽奄盾氏@in the Asia−Pacific over trade五beralization issues． Four仕I has been廿ustration about past failure to. overcome internationa工economic barriers in the multilateral regional frarnework． This paper poin’ts out that the consensus form of decision−maldng， whidl was. a building block for achieving，Asian regionalism in the beginniIlg of the 1990s， has operated as a stUmbling blocl〈 With regard to multilateral F［As． Consensus. decision・making was responsible for the success of’Asia’ 氏@regionalism as a collective action held by uneven members． However， they do not completely. accept common value， which’should be internalized and sllared by all the members as a basis i｛）r consensu曲ased decision−maldng．’IThe slack in collective decisions has influenced the results of regionalism． I. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows． Section 2 takes stock of. recent ongoing events regarding the FTAAP Section 3！discusses consensus decision−making in．Asian．regionalism at the beginning of the 1990s， fbcusing on regional integration in Asia−Paci日c EcoIIomic Co operatiori（APEC）． Section 4 discusses the challenge to a multilateral FTA in APEC， paying spec述c attention. to consensus decision−maldng． The且nal section ex註mines margins of consensus and the．next step that might be taken to develop mtiltilateral regionalism．. 36.

(3) Consensu§and Regional Institution Building. 2．Free Trade Agreement of the Asia・Pacific. 21 The situation of the FTAAP A仕er APEC economic leaders agreed to Iaunch the FTAAP at the 2004 APEC I￡aders’Meeting on the basis of a proposal from the APEC Business Advisory Coullcil（ABAC）， tlle economic leaders were instr．ucted to undertake feasible stUdies on the scope， ways and means of the FTAAP as a IOng−term prospect， and to report in廿ie fbllowing year’ s APEC meeting in 2005．“r） The report finalized an d. submitted to the 2007 Leaders’ Meeting’ includes a wide range of practical actions. that APEC member− econoiAies can tal｛e to promote and reinfbrce integration． It. was declared that廿iey would examine the options and prospects fbr the FTAAP wi亡h incre1皿ental steps．6）. Wliy has the FTAAP been advocated？There are three internal and externaI factors． First， the Bogor goa工s to achieve t1“ade and investment liberalization. under the APEC initiative by 2010／2020 have been nearly dornlant． Some chaUenges to promote and reinfbrce the Bogor goals were undertaken， although. no significant progress has been made towards completing the libei・alization by 2010／2020． SecondIy， the current negotiation under the WTO has hardly advanced． The November 2001 declaratiori of the fourth ministerial meeting in Doha not only provides the mandate ffor negotiations on lorigstariding issues sllch. as agriculture and anti−dumping as a WTO rule but also includes Ilew agenda items on tlie enVironment， electronic Commerce， least−developed counn・ies and so. on． OriginallY， the ministers expected to conclude the Doha Development Agenda ①DA）by 2004， yet the sticcessfUI conclusion of the DDA has been postponed・ In particular，廿1e iitformal mee血g of the Trade Negotiatiens Comnlittee in July. 2004elucidated that the gaps am皿g members remained too wide．7） The fact that. the DDA was deadlocked might boost the imP1’ession that member countries 37.

(4) 横i兵ll司際経済法学第17巻第2号（2008ゴF 12月）. intended to pursue alternate strategies．］Lastiy， regional groupings have gained. lncreaslng momelltum worldwide． Regional trade agreements have operated as Iegally permitted exceptions to GATr∬WTO， and reporting to GATT／WTO has been required， whether the agreements are reciprocal exchanges of trade. preferences or non−reciprocal exchanges of preferences． Approximately 300 regional trade agreements were reported to GATr／WTO by December 2006． It is es．pecially remarkable that Asian countries that were nOt involved in regional. agreements have figured as positive actors fbr F王A and EPAL Additionally， the. emergence and consolidation of ASEAN＋3 and the East Asia Sumrnit’ iEAS）， which made a sign誼cant impact on some countries that were excluded． from the regional groups，s｝were expected ’to be the main vehicles fbr t］ユe b’uilding of an. East Asian co㎜晦. 2．2 Emergence of the FTAAP The MAAP was propo’sed at tihe ABAC meeting in Taipei in May 2004．帥The. 2004ABAC meeting approved the proposal as an alternative strategy to，the stagnated negotiations under the WTO and agreed to propose it at仕1e APEC economic leaders’meeting．｝o｝The proposal regarding the possibilities of the FlrAAP was taken and discussed at the APEC Senior Official Meeting elucidating that all the members did Ilot agree to the proposal， and that廿le’ concrete featUres. of the F工AAP should be gradually constructed with communication among the members． The APEC economic leaders welcomed the sugges目on， although some of them三nsisted that it should be handled cautiously． ’lhe 2004 declatation of the. Ieaders’meeting re且ected their an垣ety and showed their moderate and tentative attitude．1」〕. The turning point fbr the F工AAP occurred in the later haHi of 2006． The ABAC. Mee加g・in Cebu was concerned・ that the failtire of the・Doha negotiations would 38 ，.

(5) Consensus and Regional Inst三tution工3uilding. hurt ec6nomic growth and urged mer品ers to resume nego ti ations to complete. 也eDoha Round．t帥The failure of the nego廿ations at血e WTO encouraged the U皿ited States， Chile， Singapore and New Zealand to promote the rTAAP at. the APEC Ministerial Meeting in November 2006， yet China and some ASEAN countries insisted that it was too early to launch the FTAAP and were worried. that the region瓠ffarnework would impede the successf田conclusion of the Doha Round at the WTO．i3’ The 2006 j oint statement of the−APEC Ministerial Meeting. resulted in the agreement that APEC meInbers would coriduct feasible studies. on the FTAAP among memb er governments．u｝ APEC economic leaders realized that officials should conduct fUrther stti dies on the FlrAAP and report to the 2007. APEC Econo血ic Leaders’Meeting on the regiona1 economic ／integration from the IoIlg・term prospect． At the same time， they recognized the sign正clmce that business communities took diverse FTAs in the Asia．Pacdic．i5｝. 2．3 Assumption for the FTAAP ．− The growth in the number of regional trade arrangements has been apparent in the Asia−Paci丘c since the mid−1990s， and has become a driving fbrce in the. FIAAP initiative． Some business leaders and economists have been concerned about the proliferation of regional trade arrangements． They polnt to trade d三version effbct：excluding industrieS．and sectors with high protection； increasing. the opPortunity cOSt with their proliferation of unwieldy rules of origins， including a spaghetti b owl effect．1田Not only the United States but also Au str・alia. and New Zealand llave eagerly、 pointed out’ that increasing bilateral economic. arrangements’ have caused economic三n’ ???奄モ奄?獅モ凵C discrimination and a crack am皿g the Asia・Pacific economies since the autumn of 2006． In particular， the. United States has endorsed regional economic integra廿on， inciuding the FTAAP， frem the perspective that the networl〈 of trade would become mor℃rational詑ed 39.

(6) 横浜匡1際経済法学第17i崔…第2骨（2008年ユ2月）. through integration， in addi廿on to lookillg ahead at the failure of the WTO、 Doha Round．17〕. While the United States and some other countries are in favour of the rTAAP，. the ABAC stUdy shows costs and benefits．As its proponents insist，出e㎜ could promote a higher level of convergence ahd consolidation of the eme1’ging. bilateral F“17As in a comnprehensive and WTO−plus manner． In this context，. the FTAAP could co血tribute to regional economic development and assist to ウ. resume the Doha trade negotiations． On the other hand， it is also agreed that. an obvious shortage of unified will with concrete policies for the FTAAP is a. key obstacle，、 and the FTAAP might be incompatible with the WTO standards and goals．1s｝This concludes the modest suggestion on tlle rTAAP．19）From the perspedive of scepticisM and the ineffectiveness of liberalization of APEC， the. United States， Canada， Singapore and Chile have preferred comprehensive agreements， yet Japan and Peru， have preferred piecemeal agreements with selective li］〕eralization． The controversy over the APEC initiative might tone. down advocacy of the FTAAP as well． Dr． Fred Bergsten explains that the increasing proliferation of bilateral trade agreements could create blocs and draW aline down the Asia−Pacific regioI1， and that the different stances on a region」 wide agreement might spoil the convergence of the Asia−Pacific．2°］In other words，. a fUtUre netWork to improve divergence among the growing bilateral agreements. could impede the convergence among APEC economies． Moreover， they have not yet agreed to membership and tffe concrete means for it， and have not exactly. estimated whether the rTAAP could fbζtrade diversion and the spaghehi bowl effect．’lhat is， though all of the Asia・Pacific economies are ini目ally expected to. participate in the FTAAP to solve the spaghetti effect， fundamental issues have. not yet been discussed． Most important of all， the onset of the㎜without deliberation may cause an all−or−nothing decision on the way to accomplishing 40.

(7) Cons巴nsus and Reglollal lns伽目on Building. 廿le FTAAP， as they have basically adopted a consensus decisbn−making style in dle Asia−Pacific Region． Do they teach a consensus on the FTnV itselft Is也ere any potential risk that the liif7AAP will destroy their decision−making style？21）. 3．Consensus Befbre we examine the possibility and potential risk of rtiultilateral regional. liberalization， it will be useful to discuss in rnore detail the cdnsensus on. decision−making that has been adopted in the Asia−Paci且c． Consensus means group solidarity in sentiment and belief in addition to merely general agreement . among’members of a par ticular sOciety， and is in contrast with’coercion as a. basis of social order． In this context， consensus does not always imply complete. agreement among all members but denotes apProximate agreement among them． Under consensus decision−maldng， it is assumed that there皿ay be dissent in the details of the agendas to some extent， but rough agreement on the crucial. points． Persuasion and communication are recognized as important means to gradually丘x the dissent． Consensus is realized as a way to avoid divisions among memb ers and to maintain soc▲al convergence and solidarity．za）. The Asia−Pacific economies have preferred consensus decision−making． In order to identify the Iong−standing decision−making style in tlle Asia・Pacific region， consider fi1’st， as a case stUdy， the regional background and consensus. with regard to APEC．. 3．1 Agreements・. APEC Ine皿bers have made decisions through consensus since it was establlshed ln 1989． After Australian Prime Minister Bob Howke proposed an Asia−Pacific inter−governmental organizatiolユin January 1989， the initial 41.

(8) 枇浜国際経清法学第17巻第2号（2008年12月〕. reaction from the region was positive but cautioUs， especially丘om the Asian economies that were expected as original members who were basica工ly accepted. but suspeCted． SeVeral ASEAN economies had reservations about including the United States． They were， furthermore， afraid that the implications of. ASEAN might fade and the inter−governmental fraInework might be fbrm…U and defensive．es｝ Australia dispatched a mission to potential participahts in APEC to introduce their views and to seek their approval． In Japan， the Ministry of. International Trade and Industry， which also explored economic cooperation at the governmental level， was eager to have consulta廿ons with Asian governments．. They insisted that inter−gov』rnmental cooperation should be outward−looking alld not seek to fbrm a trading bloc． As a result of their care血l consultations， all. the potential Members−Japan，1（orea， the United States， Canada， Australia， New. Zealand and s三x members of ASEAN−agreed to have a meeting on a ministerial level to discuss the poten廿al objectives and nature of ’ceoperation．210. The importaIlt point to note is that all six members of ASEAN as well as. other countr▲es reached consensus． Those proponents of APEC reiterated that the initiative would dea．l with the growing intra−regional interdependence and. Iaunch an inter−governmental open forum to exchange information fbr worldwide prosperity． Further， it was emphasized that the meeting that Prime Minister. Hawke planned in Canberra in November could be an exploratory assembly and leave all optio皿s open for continuing inter−governmental cooperation． In this context， the siX members of ASEAN finally accepted the idea and reached consensus， which yielded the first inteFgovernmental meeting in the Asia−Pac術c．. Consensus−based decision−making was critical to winning support for APEC in its early stages． In addition to the agenda regarding the participation of. ASEAN， the involvement of the three Chinas（PRC， T包iwan and Hong Kong）， the establishment and operation of the APEC permanent secretariat；periodical 42.

(9) Consensus and Regional InstitUtion Building. niinisterial meetings and the scope of their work are typical examples of. maintaining and expanding the fUnction of APEC through consensus． Those examples share certain similarities in the fact that conflicts a皿d coercion were avoided alld members roughly agreed at first． For installce， PRC， which insisted. that the regional initiative was not binding， was nevertheless concerned by international treatment of廿le three Chinas at APEC．zl｝As perceptions of those. Chinas threatened the’ 高≠奄獅狽?獅≠獅モ?@and expansion of the potential APEC market， original APEC members repeatedly persuaded PRC with the feature of APEC and suggested that the three Chinas would participate in APEC as T. an independent economy／government． Thus， dogged persuasion realized the initial fUndamental framework：not only the participation of the three Chinas. but also the establishment of the APEC secretariat and the APEC annual Ministerial Meeting．2s） Through patient persuasion and discussion， the APEC also strengthened its廿1ree pillars；trade and investm、ent liberalization， business. facmatation and economic a皿d technical cooperation． Even though each member did not agree to all the agenda details， they avoided terrible frictiori and advanced. their coopera廿on to reserve final decisions and seek a point of consensus・. 3．2 Arbitrary Actions and Predictability Another featUre of consensus is that it could wo】rk as a motivation ・to join and. contribute to the group． As mentioned in the previous section， members can reserve deciding on the details while they apProve the outlines of ludgments in. advance under consensus decision−makdng． It means tllat each皿ember could make rational choices within tihe cortsensus that all the me皿bers arrived at．. An APEC Leaders’Meeting was proposed in the middle of 1993 and had a significant impact on the APEC member economies． Japan， Korea， Australia， New Zealand， Canada， Singapore and the Philippines agreed to the proposal 43.

(10) ’封「C ij毛厘…1際濯i…i肖F法学第17巻第2−Pi ｛2008ゴ｛三．12月）. and were eager to participate in the first Leaders”meeting in Seattle，27）bUt Malaysia opposed the proposal and was also afraid to be controlled by the United. States．：H）Indonesia and Thailand were hesitant to accept the proposal initiated. by the White House and indicated that their support would depend on unanimity. among the ASEAN members and the intenti皿s， which the United States and. the proponents had for the．Leaders’Meeting．鋤The United States conveyed the rationale；meanwhile， s’enior officials of Japan were dispatched to ASEAN countries to discuss tlle proposal．30｝As．a result of their persuasion and a series. of discussions among ASEAN members， the ASEAN economies realized that thl ’. APEC I￡aders’．Meeting would not undermine the− common vieWs on the roles of APEC and ASEAN， yet they were suspicious about the inStitUtionalization of. APEC at the ASEAN annual Ministerial，Meeting．：si），All the ASEAN economies. approved the inauguration of the APEC Leaders‘Meeting with the condition that it Inaintains its fUnction as a forum． The agreements among the ASEAN. economies promoted consensus to establish the工疋aders’Meeting in November 1993．Although Malaysia refused to attend the meeting even after the ASEAN Mee値ng， the consensus was not weakened and fixed diplon］a廿c schedules． For example， Mr． Young・sam Kim， President of the Republic of Korea， intended to. hold his first meeting with Mr． Morihiro Hosokawa， who took of丘ce as Prime. Minister of Japan in July 1993 when they both visited N卵Ybrk to attend the. United Nations General Assembly Meeting at the end of September 1993． President］Kim suddenly could not make the visit to the United States and cancelled the meeting with Pr三me Minister Ho sokawa as well． However， this did. not mean that the meeting was retracted．［1 hey agreed to hold a constructive meeting when Visiting Sea亡tle as・APEC economic leaders．3t｝ Although none of the. members knew th杜details of the APEC Leaders’Meeting， certain consensus among al】the leaders tllat a summit conference would be held in the United 44.

(11) Consensus and Regional Institution・Building. States in November 1993 ensured their diplomatic prospects and rational choices tO SOme eXtent．. 4FTA and the Asia−Pacific in the 1990s 4、1 New Pacific Community The President of the United States， William J． Clinton， proposed to create. a new pacific community in July 1993． Although the Cold・War．had passed 丘om the world stage， regional and domestic conflicts persisted． Additionally， nuclear suspicion and nuclear inspection三n North Korea， friction in the I（orean peninsula， territorial issues， the possibility ． of Taiwan becoming an independent. nation and armaments also provoked regional tensions．：”1）When Iooking at the economy， the negotiation at the GAflT Uruguay Round was nearly i 1 a deadlock，. which meant that the world t1・ade regime could be destroyed and tremendous bldck economies could be established． Particularly in Europe， the European Common Marl〈et provided a step−by−step reduction of trade ba1・riers and harmonization of a whole range of economlc policies that finally culminated in the EU as a kind of polity inユ992． The United States feared that the hibernation. of GAT］’ and the creation of the EU might exclude tile United States and draw fault lines all over the world． The United States economy， moreover， faced trade. imbalances with Asian economies． The United States was gradua工ly coming to rely on the Asia−Pac血c in contrast to the ambunt ef trade and invest1皿ent in the. Asia−Pacific economies a decade ago， but simultaneously the United States had. ahuge deficit with Asian economies・3n］The Clinton administration also required new strategies on security and economy after the Cold War． He expected that tle. new Pac近c community could maintain good partnerships for security， promote. open economies and supPort democracy， and he proposed the new Pacific 45.

(12) 横浜国際経済法学第17巻第2号（2008年ユ2月） community as a catalyst to gain regional and world advantages fOr the United States． As a consequence， it was envisaged that removing trade barriers and ・e・・hi・g・・egi・nal・free・tr・d・・agreem・nt噸mul61・t・・al・eg・・ity・y・t・m・in the の. new Pacific community．. The idea fbr the new Pacific community was substantially followed by the. APEC Eminent Persons Group（APEC・EPG）．The APEC−EPG was a group that consisted of economists， governmental officials and business leaders， and. attempted to assess・the current position and outlook of the APEC region and develop a long’ term Vision fbr APEC． in particular， it was expected to examine. tariff barriers and non−tariff barriers in、the region and to report at the APEC Mini・t・・i・1 and Leaders’Meeting・＄・h・dul・d f・・N・v・mb・・1993・a’ 5’ Th・. strong leadership of the American representative of the APEC−EPG， pr． Fred Bergstei且， initiated several EPG meetings to consult on economic liberalization. aEd prepared a report、 According to the report submitted to the 1993 APEC Meeting， APEC must move forward by taking the first steps towards￠reating an Asia−Pac姐c Economic Communityi．With the Vision of eventUal free trade and. 麺vestment in the region． The EPG was unanimolls in its recommendations of ac柱ons needed to achieve丘ee trade and investment in the region・：6）. 4．2 C「isis of Consensus. The approximate agreement on the EPG report誕the 1993 APEC Meeting ∬｝arked furthest move by APEC towards free trade in the region， but various. 三nterests among member ec白nomies ciashed、 FuTther trade liberalization invelved the foilewing tWo controversial issues・. The量rst was飾e dual target datεs and tirnetables for the achievement of free. trade ln the region． The APEじEPG originally dMded the timetable into出ree parts， fecommending蓋beralizati白n by 2010 fbr advan｛二ed coun廿ies：by 2015 fOr. 46.

(13) Con§ensus and Regional lnstitUtion Building. Newly lndustrializing Economjes（NIEs）and by 202e for developing counhies． The timetable was adjusted into two parts−by 2010 and 2020 f（〕r developed and. developing economies， respectively， although splitting the直metable raised more controversy．37）Although trade liberalization on the basi呂of the EPG draft was. favourable to the United States， the succeeding compromise and the consensus among APEC members were different丘om the US expecta廿on． One of the points that Ame百can officials argued was th註t China should not receive the statUs of a. developing country and economic concessions． Singapore and other members also opposed China beiIIg categorized in the 2020 group， whiIe China insisted that it shou工d be included among developing courltries．ss）In the end， no explicit. decision was made about its status， but a consensus was fbrmed at the APEC senior official meeting that China belonged to the 2020 group， and ASEAN F］VE excluded Singapore．：9）. The second was mutual favoured nations（MFN）， which was a more controversial issue． The United States feared freeriding caused by unconditional. liberalization to n皿一rnembers， and insisted that non−APEC member states could access the APEC market’only through reciprocal liberalization．4D〕While there were some proponents of conditional MFN status， such as Australia， the. oPPosition was strong． China particularly emphasized access to the market on a non・discrimination basis． As a result，‘concerted unilateral action’was. introduced， alth6ugh the UIlited States was the most hesitant to depend on concerted un丑ateral action．41）Many member states basically realiZed that APEC. was a loose consultative body rather than a compulsory organization， and Malaysia and Indonesia particularly opPosed formal negotiations・Nonetheless， not only the United States but also Australia， New Zealand and Thailand 1’ealized. that they would need negotiations on proportionality to remove free−riding by me皿bers on the slower track． The conce1’ted unilateral’ action that was 47.

(14) 横i兵1到際売…］…i斉宇去学第17巻第2’号’ （2GO81．F−12月）. unanimously accepted among memもers guaranteed Collective harmonization and voluntary liberalization， while it could aUow free−riding to some extent，. which meant that there were growing gaps among members on the path to trade liberalization． They faced difficulty in advancing the consensus that they had. reached on previously・The consensus on concerted unilateral action poten廿ally. included fault lines among members and connotations where each member envisaged their owll views．−12）. 4．3 Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization Some frustration on concerted unilateral action resulted in the introduction. of the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization（EVSL）initiative to accelerate the IiberaliZation of APEC through the adoption of a呂ectoral approach． Fifteen sectors were targeted fbr fast−track liberalization by the目me of the 1997 APEC. Leaders’Meeting， and nine of them were selected for三mmediate action to start in 1999．‘1帥APEC mernbers’were required to participate in all the sectors and. implement trade liberalization， facilitation and economic technology cooperation in each sector as a pagkage project・Jg）However・ Japan refused implementatien in the fishery and forestry sectors， as that would have raised unacceptable levels of political friction in the domestic context． Japan recognized that any. experlment would be implemented on the basis of voluntarism and agreed to fifteen sectors， including］丘shery and forestry， which was the rationale for the refUsal．樹In addltion， there were sorne criticisms on the EVSL initia廿ve． Some. member econornies accused that the EVSL was an lntrusion of the reciprocity・ based WTO style of nego目ation， while the initi al consensus on APEC was that it was an open fbrurh basecl on voluntarism．“ifi） By the time the APEC Kuala Lumpur meetings were held in 1998， it was clear that tbe EVSL was teetering on the bi’inlc. and had failed to play an important role to advance trade liberalization．47）The 4S.

(15) Consensus and Regienal Institution Building. EVSL concept had been expected to be a 1tind of critical mass to form a free trade area， yet a lack of detailed discussion on the basis of consensus not only delayed. certain implementation of liberalization but also caused some tension among. members．. 5 Limitation of Consensus decision・making 5．1 0pen Decision APEC and other regional frameworks in the Asia−Pac近c have relied on open. decision， which is one of the features of consensus． Each member state can. postpone血rther agreements that the consensus implies，∼vhile being expected to accomplish decision and implementation sooner or la．ter Within the consensus. that has formed． APEC， in particular， is a stable intergovernmental foru’m. characterized by ongoing communication among worldng−level officials， which. ’assumes that information exchanged among officials will develop regional coherence and，contribute to arriVing at廿1e final stage of the cooperation agreed. upon． In fact， a growing number of APEC sectoral ministerial meetings and specia正task groups has developed a range of channels of communication．ns） According to a fbrmer governmental officlal who attended an APEC task fbl’ce. meeting on infrastructUre management， those meetings proceeded caln〕1y and slnoothly皿the basis of consensus， and・the members formulated public policies after returning back to their countries・He says that tllei「initial goals we「e acconlplished by repeating the process．刷This fact irnplies that it could make. networks of govemmental officials and norms of reciprocity to llave meetings. regularly among same members． Those networks and norlns are namely two elements of’social capital’that facilitate coordinated actions．5U）. However， there are lirnitations to consensus in terms of the pe1’formance of 49.

(16) 枇浜国際経清法学第17巻第2号（2008年12月） what they agreed upon． As I outlined the matter regarding EVSL in the last chapte’r， APEC member econornies struggled to implement trade liberalization， though they had initia王ly agreed to have a丘ee trade area． Rent−seeling groups. in country−specific and sector・specific economic韮beralization often obstruct plans and intervene in domestic decision−mal｛ing processes．s” To the extent that regional initiatives consiSt of simultaneous nego目ations at the internationaI and domestic levels， it is a fa’モ煤@that negotiatibns at the international level. have overlapped with those on domestic leve1． Robert Putnam explained that executives tend to take the concern of societal actors into account， and pay attention to dornes目c supPorts and evalua｛ion on the ac丘on of executives．°”m The. 至inkage betWeen the international and domestic dimensions often makes it more dl［自］cult to arrive at unanimous agreernents on、 the basis of rnultilateral ini口atives．. ’llius， under consensus decision−making， postponement of血ユal goals to resolve dissent could get lmplementation as unstable co］lective actions， while it avoids. fata1 fault÷lines amoBg members． Accemplishing agreements would take a lot of. time and hardly develop the perfbrmance even if the agreements were carried out， since execu8ves tend t｛｝under毎ke those po王icies that they can easily obtain e］［王d￡｝Tse王nent in．. 5．2 0011ective Action Probbms 鋸董斑￡磁ioned befbre， consensus・based deeision・making implies ensttring pred至c揺封斑寧］Member states can make rational ehoices and make their own P臼葺醒≦……s⑰盤thF．． b盆芭拍of consensus．’As they also can predict actions of other. 譲er麟ers frsl21 gfifisens肛s to some extent， they can be released from a kind 誕￡｛旙緬i毒1鎌重i窃痒毎鋤口st聞麟重heif strategie呂and plans． However， when there 銀i岳董s｛｝斑｛三董｝sgs蓑｝ll＃fes±封at unexpeCted internal and external factor｛きcould …轟語r賠王匡套匡醒喜｛｝H｛1ξ＃ivg葺ζt三杜狂まthg穿g▲s Ag guaranteg that th￡initial consen＄u＄. 斑.

(17) Consensus and Regional lns出u値on Building. Wi11 be fUhilled． That is， even though there is a consensus among member states，. unexpected factors may destroy it． There could occur a free rider problem． Afree rider problem that pays attention to an unfair share of the transaction cost is a typical issue with regard to collective actioII in the intergovemmental. environment． Sorne members intend to receive their rewards without paying the price of collective action． Given that each government is recogn泣ed as one of the agents of regional polityi moral hazard may b e pointed out． Moral hazard. results especially from inf（）rmation asymmetry， in which Qne government in a. censensus−based decision−making process has more infbrmation than another． Free−riding and moral hazard are the most significant problems undermining consensus when collective action is taken， even江all members ofthe group arrive at an agreement in advance． A free rider refers exclusively to any individual who ignores an obligation yet benefits from its action， whi玉e a moral hazard under血nes a situation in which one party in a transaction has more iniiormation. than another． Moral hazard indicates that asymmetric information between states inf阯ences the results of decisi曲一making． Both free riding and moral hazard are betraya1 behaViours that eXPIoit asymmetエ’ic situations of payment and infOrmation am皿g melゴbers， which spoils predictability as a factor of consensus decision−maldng． As a result， itis natural廿lat the desi1°e to remeve the disloyalty. should emerge among members． Those who want to thorough工y accomplish the goals that members have agreed upon require some institUtienal cooperation to bind nlembers exclusively， whereas others insist on the advantages relying on consensus． As for the case study on APEC， the United States needs some institutionalization including legalization and sanctions to avoid free・riding，. while Japan and some Asian members claim the principles of consensus where the decision of each membel・is respected、 Those who focus皿the pl’inciples of consensus have fbund that voluntarism is embedded in collsensus decisioll−. maldng． 51.

(18) 横浜国際経済法学第17巻第2号（2008年12月｝. 6．’ Conclusion. αearly， consensus−based decision：making has played an important role in multilatei’al regionalism like APEC， and will be needed’to establish mul偵1ateral. f1℃e tl・認e agreements ln’the future as wel1． The argument here， however，. is that consensus decision−nユ註king cou王d contribute not on1｝T to building multilateral regionalisms but also undermine regional initiatives． Tb be sure，. the case study of APEC shews that consensus can avo三d fragmentation and keep sceial convergence with their own discretion at the first stage， which. ef免ctively gives Asian regionalismsjnclud三ng APEC， some sort of dynalnism．. Nonetheless， consensus cou｛d諏pede Fぽbuilding sooner．or la戯if you look. at past experiences． Among the potential members of the㎜R there are d三vergent opinions on the forms of trade葺beralizat三〇n；whether they s加uld 翻dertake comprehensive liberaUzation or selec口ve王ibera且zation；whe廿1er they sliould implement vo］untary，玉iberalizationIor legalized liberalization；whe由e1・. ㌫eregio丘a玉fr且mework 8hou玉d keep intergovernrnental bodies or establish a s蓮pr錨a蓑onal commun三ty． The meInbers of the FTAAP w三11 face the limltation ξ｝fthe亡o葺呂ensus through those issues． In addition， even though they might 琵議・tl｝e coRse丑sus・ofi｛he fbrm， further collecti▽e aetion issues will show the 三三斑封葺曇｛斑｛迂c｛｝fisensus｛iecisign−maklng， as far as the〕aSAAP．ig es｛2blished at伍e. 鐡顯臼輸i頭響ve瓢e・t・P・rStte・natienal・i・t・r醜a・面t・・est gr。・p・have −m｛｝r彗｛｝rlggs P｛｝w￡r5三fiterfiati｛｝na夏夏y an｛l dom｛∋Stically． Con§ensus that sl．ould. 露a董｝蓋iz￡婁至9拓n毒9竃｝v皇汀…a註ζe葺杜｝1e｛｝eginnilコg may be a stumblilコ』『block once血e. 麺溺皇酎顕醸． Ofie｛｝fi重he iτ蓑董穎亘s董葺套ζ匡ξjestiCfiS三s請1he轟登cg頚ヨ￡…1コ｛s斑∋重hat bgost…うthe Fヨ「AAP. 耀融鱈已麗鏑至ξ．質｝at三豊，癒瓠d鰯嚥鐡sus壷顯g興akin喜￡hange 一鉋一顯磁§麺鞍鍬缶磁鎧鍾瀕撫誌r鑑卿憩賠撞蜘9 P・int is whert 5．2.

(19) Consensus and Regional lnsti tu ti ofl Building. members identify the concrete policies as regional advocacy and launch their. action． Consensus will impede the FI7AAP−building when the FTAAP evolves from the Ievel of planning into a concrete course， or from matter−of−fact agendas into controversial agendas． Additionally， the introduction of legalization is a工so. an important point in time． As Iong as the FTAAP is handled on a consensus. basis， regional oversight responsibilities are small，・because consensus rests. on voluntarism． Inevitably， some members will be eager to legalize and institutionalize the agreement． That is， they will expect to build a more Solid system to patrol and check for violations， rather than wait fbr peer pressure． At. that point， the E［AAP conducted through consensus weuld come to． a deadlock．. Should the consensus−based deliberate process be changed to otlle1・ways of decision−making？ lt would be premature to remove the consensus−based decision. method in the development of tlle rTAAP， because the advantage of consensus must not be underestimated． We are now at the crucial stage in the development. of Asia−Pacfic regionalism and must examine the best practices in multilateral regional initiatives．. 1）. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 20081nterna瞳onal Studies Association Annual ConΨention， SaII Francisco．. 2）. Included in the Asia−Pac近c region are not only Soudheast and North￠ast Asi≡m States but al50 EasterII Pacil］c states，. 3）. See RJ， Lloyd， New」R㎎緬昭「is’〃a」r∂」∼「e’tv B「iateraiis，n i嶽」tl∼e、4sia Pbc済c， ISEAS 1、「orking P叩er. Visiting Researcher SeHes， No．3， Singapore：InsUtute of So1曲East Asi乱S杣dies，2002． 4）. No consensus ha5 been achieΨed as of the 2008、、「rO sumlllit、 Ecenomist， Vbl．3871sstle 8591，. 5）. Bridgin已the」Pactnc：α）ヵ「オ，g甜∫r’t titeα」ロ’∫ロ∫tges Of Globalizaガolt， R叩ort to APEC Econolnic. 2August 2008， PP．71−72．. Leaders Voluinel ExecutiΨe Sulllmary， APEC Busine§s Advisory Council，2004， Th帆lgh ABAC I℃ported to est乱blish a tas】｛force te exanline Ule∫easibnity of a FTAAP to Ule 2005 Leaders’ r】1eeting、 tlle 2GO5 Leaders’Declaratioii doeg． Ilot collsist ofit． 6）. 2007Leaclers’DeclaratieパStrengthening Our Colllmuni｛y， Buildisig a Sustai”able Fut田’e’，↓51h 53.

(20) 繊浜国際経済法学第17巻第2号㈱腿年12月〕 ’］三conomic LeaderぎDeclarati服， Sy｛1ney： Aust王alia，9Septen±er 2007． 7）】Talks SUSI〕￠ade〔垂．】To｛重ay th｛）re are｛矯ly Ios｛…rf…．■苦，「LSTTO封「EWS・王）1｝A juneノ∫u匡y 2006， Sumi珊ary 24 July．. 8）」…雄ic｝宜Sugawar丑，“The FTAAP an｛1 ECOfiom…c Iポegration in East Asia：Japan’sapproaeh主o ・regi醐alis珊i and US engagement in． Ea邑tAsiガ溺］却o Rese註reh Paper 12， Eebruary 2ee7・. 部Acc⑰rd畑缶歯e APEC secretariat Mr． P｛erre IArtie who was tke Canadian represefitative of. AB蛭垣20｛▲4 adv凸cated竜e FF繊. 1D）1蝦C M却ers駄鎚ine l即act・f控A。fA・i・・P・c宙c二疏醐五・・滅・・1醐・剛肱 1s｝Santiag・Dec㌔目。・‘O爬￡聞抽磁甑Our F蹴e’，・12・・ Ec脚snlc Leaders「Meeting，2a21 Novembet 2ee4， 12）AIPEC Busiaess Advisery C｛班ikcil，’BttsinesS Le垂ders call wny？O NegofiatioriS Fai缶re a D董…笥｝. C蹴erゴ，15．Augtisl 20eG． 13）麺∫Rぷξ，ibun， 16 Nove紬巳r 2ee6． 14）18th APE｛こ］睡匡nister…a！夏壺≧｛1｛ing， Ran｛｝…：Vietnam，’. P51｛｝Nevemtier 20〔｝6，ノaPan Ti，nes l6. November 2e酪． i5｝・裂…即｝Ded眠1函忌中・E￡o問mie Leaders’ Meeting 1＆19 Nevember 2ee5．. 16｝誕eS趣w鎚耽磁翫ited・N蜘ns・Eeon噸c雌Soci㎡c。tam1ssi・n・虹頗a and H・e Pad巨c ・｛VNESむAP｝，“］適戚蓬lateraミ詑ing Regl｛｝斑斑！sm：Tbwar【鍵茸a凸integrate［ミ塾nd eutWard・ori｛inted. Asia？acifsc ecefie訂註c ar｛三a戸，匡旙e輩ver▲fig on the“rTO ftoune：AMgh一匡evei Gevernment一歪lu∈｝iΩess王＞ialogue丘｝r P芒vel｛）1ヨf王匡e且t，4巷Oclobet 20（抵． For the｛王｛scussfon en也e effe Cts of mttlti韮ateraiis盈ti｛｝n t｛｝pr｛≧窓｝r｛intial regl｛｝na匡廿且｛1吾agreem｛lnt｛㍉see董目亡liarrf Bia甚｛lwifi， Slm｛｝n ：Evene｛t， aft｛匡？a廿曇k］Low，】葺eyonζi「E頭悲藪重u招言酷｛三百s言再‡De｛三［）er R E’IA Cemmitrnents’ ， httplノ／. nf−｛wwte．erg畑glish／tratep＿鵠曙拓狂＿君／ccn＿sepe7＿e／掘翻n．．．eve珊戯＿lo“t＿即df， accessed. ・頒12、A運20盤灘i謡暮臼趣r融臨e韮1deminct「effect， cat磁鴻叩w臨reg桓na貰sm・all剛r血e wor量d、 as撫声盛蹴指登si噸討撫hra醐ge車n｛hose regi㈱韮§！n，. 三7］臨C。幽言ee端鑑e， the U．S． seegetary｛if State， sh…惚d疏磁ゴ謡si国拓r APEq蜥ch trafiS￠ends simple ce叩eぷefi， aRrl』ks憩融e聴τge瑠琶of認魁…i・Pac；fi仁Eco”omic. Cemrnu晦at題醍駕O鍵s翻m紘鯉E￡Le轟d臨踊伽鵠R蛭幟I B睡賠s喜王nteres｛s’， ’靖郷僻ば」Verfia， i9 st’evemijer 2ee6， iAPEC te Censlijer the FeaSibraty of a Free ［rrade・ttrea in. the Asia 9acific’，燗c繊鵡劔童毘鞠言．ま三，翻融鰐2縮．. E9旙ぷ躍融g梧融τep・rtS・teneE￡蛭m墓麓睡轟亡萢醗。n。m］c c・叩磁。fi・c・Elficit J ふ. 鋤Seg註鋤婁耀Ferward・a・Fデ蹄脚紅＃塀籔撫嬬葺舗．A、FEe Ce獅1＃ll＃itV： i∼ePert ta ！IFEC. Econefnic heffders． neEC Business A翻sory c雌fiell．箆06；PEcc s｛丑重e鯉皿t；挽e埴璽1g of APEC 藩簑lsfefS ftesp賠slble f・r Tradie・蓑o￡1｝i M漣City：∵iein4m・」搬2蘭庄・. 麟勘経，翫聯繊透鑑eTτa龍Area e抽eAsi丑P壼c掘c翻’巴癌意臼f lh e Fal lertllg ・揺鎗鶏郷af：・Tt裁缶轟匡i聾躍培磁…ves fo［ AVEC；／！n APEC TiFarfg f｛g”nda．7 The．」㌔鍾ca9. 蔀鏑轡㎡喜持擁告遼▲遵桝ψ垂ぱ斑Prtcifie、∫歯t蜘日y毎tl把馳磁c．Eemian；lc ・鞠騨壕雑鋸賠￡i≧f董9fe A？EC 9us｛tiess Adivi§鰐￡臼鰐iL ．瑳・.