Vol.64 , No.3(2016)210志賀 浄邦「Hetubinduに見られるジャイナ教徒に帰せられる見解」

An

Objection

in

the

Hetubindu

Ascribed

to

theJainas

SHIGA

Kiyokuni

1.

Introduction

Arcata

(ca.

710-77o)

_provides

a

long

criticism of

the

Jaina

view

in

his

Hetubindutika

(HBT)

98,14--107,23.

This

section appears

just

after

his

direct

commentary on a certain opponenVs objection

in

the

Hetubindu

(HB)

9',13-14

and

Dharmakirti's

answer

to

it

(HB

9',15-10*,4).

The

aim of

this

_paper

is

to:

(1)

examine

the

argument

in

HB

9*,13-10'4

that

_provides

the

starting

_point

ofthe

_polemic

between

the

Buddhists

and

the

Jainas

in

the

HBT,

(2)

clarify

the

context

in

the

HB,

that

is,

the

relationship

between

that

argument and

Dharmakirti's

theory

of momentariness

and

causal

relation ofthings,

(3)

confirm whether

theJainas

hold

that

view

in

HB

9*,13-14

in

their

own

treatises,

and

(4)

compare

the

statements

in

the

HB

with

those

of

Dharmakirti's

other works, such as

the

Pramarpavdirttikctsvav.rtti

(PVSV).

2.

The

View

Ascribed

to

theJainas

and

Mimarpsakas

2.1.

The

Context

in

the

HB

The

objection

in

_question

is

fbund

in

the

arguments

in

the

section

that

includes

the

proof

of

momentariness

(HB

7',17-19*,13).

The

opponent criticizes

Dharmakirti's

fbllowing

proposition:

that

which arises

by

itself

and

has

the

_property

of

instability

does

not need another cause

fbr

having

the

[property

of

instability]

as an

intrinsic

nature,

because

that

which

has

such an

intrinsic

nature

[to

produce

an effbct

necessarily]

_produces

[the

effect]

(tatsvabhavasyajanana-t).i)

The

logical

reason

in

this

passage:

tatsvabhavayajananat

(HB

8',ls-19)

is

the

additional

_ground

fbr

establishing

the

validity of

the

reason "[a

thing's]

not

depending

[on

other

causes

than

the

thing

itselfl

fbr

its

disappearance"

in

the

_proofi

`All

the

_produced

things

disappear

mornentarilM

because

all

[those

things]

are established as

those

which

do

not

depend

-(214)

An

Objection

in

the

Hetubindu

Ascribed

to

theJainas

(SHiGA)

[on

other causes]

fbr

their

disappearances."2)

According

to

Arcata,

the

opponent

indirectly

criticizes

the

additional

_ground,

tatsvabhjvasyajananat,

in

the

objection

in

question

and regards

it

as an

inconclusive

reason.

2.2.

The

Analysis

of

the

Objection

in

the

HB

The

opponent's view

is

as

fbllows:

[Objection:]

Ifa

single efTbct

[such

as visual cognition]

is

_produced

by

cooperating

[causes]

such

as eyes, etc. that

have

[respectively]

their

intrinsic

natures

that

are

djfferent

[frorn

each other],

there

would

be

no

difference

in

the

effect,even

though

the

causes are

different

[from

_each

other].3)

Arcata

analyzes

this

objection

as

fbllows,

ascribing

it

to

the

_Jainas

and

Mimarpsakas

(k;;apa4akojaiminCya

HBT

92,14):`)

It

should not

be

accepted

that

_plural

_{causes, such as} eyes, etc.,

_produce

_{a single efTect}

(i.e.,

visual cognition)

due

to

their

intrinsic

natures

being

diffbrent

from

each othen

Different

causes

must

_produce

different

effbcts, and a

single effect must arise

from

a single cause.

Therefore,

causes such as

eyes,

etc.,

share

a non-diffbrentiated

_property;

which

is

a common nature

(sa-martya),

and will

_produce

a single

effect.

while

this

common nature

_produces

an effect _when

the

_{causes are}

in

_a

complete _state,

they

do

_not

_produce

_an

_effect

_when

_they

_are

_in

_an

_incomplete

_state.

Howeveg

even

if

any one of

the

causes

is

lacking,

a common nature

can

exist on account ofthe

incompatibility

with

its

non-existence.

Therefbre,

the

nature common

to

all

the

causes

does

not

always

_produce

an effbct, even

though

it

is

existent.

Thus,

the

logical

reason

_presented

by

Dharmakirti,

tatsvabhavasya

jananat

(HB

8",18-19),

is

inconclusive,

because

there

can

be

a certain cause

that

does

not

_produce

an effect, even

though

it

has

the

nature of

_producing

an effect.

(HBT

92,18-27)

2.3.

Dharmaki'rti's

Position

As

Katsura

1983

_points

out,

Dharmakirti

formulates

two

kinds

of causal models:

(1)

the

relationship

between

cause and effect

(e.g.,

a seed, etc,,and a sprout)

that

is

analyzed

in

terms

of

continuity

(sarptana),

and

(2)

the

relationship

between

cause _{and effect}

(e.g.,

eyes and visual cognition)

that

is

analyzed

in

temis

of momentariness

(ksapa).5)

_The

first

model can

be

reduced

to

the

second one

from

the

viewpoint of

the

_ultimate

truth.

6)

_The

case

mentioned

in

Dharrnakirti's

answer

(HB

9*,ls-10',4)

to

the

objection stated above

is

the

relationship

between

cooperating

causes, such as a

lump

of clay;a

second model.

Dharmakirti

also maintains elsewhere

in

the

HB

that

being

cooperating causes

(sahakarirva)

is

characterized

by

fu1fi11ing

one and

the

same

_purpose,

or

producing

one and

the

same efuct

(ekjrthakriya).

7)

Even

in

the

case where one and

the

same effect

(e.g.,

a

_pot)

arises

from

the

assemblage of causes

(e.g,,

a

lump

of clay,

a

potter's

wheel, a

_potter,

etc.), each capacity of

the

causes

that

constitute

their

assemblage exerts

influence

on

its

corresponding

_particular

_properties

of

the

effbct

(e.g.,

being

made

from

clqyi

having

a

_particular

shape, etc.).

Since

there

are

differences

of object

domains

among capacities of causes

(i.e.,

a

lump

of clay, a

_potteg

etc.),

particular

properties

of

the

effect

become

various

in

accordance with

the

capacities of

causes.

Nevertheless,

those

_properties

are one and

the

same

as a real entity.

Dharmakirti

basically

attempts

to

justify

the

causal mechanism of a single effect arising

from

_plural

causes, whereas

he

explains

that

various

_particular

_properties

of

the

effect

arise

from

the

corresponding

_particular

capacities of

the

causes.8]

Therefore,

we

can

even say

that

he

indirectly

accepts

that

_plural

effects arise

from

_plural

causes

if

one

takes

account of

those

_plural

_properties

of

the

single effect.')

3,

Descriptions

inJaina

Treatises

A

_Jaina

_philosopheg

Haribhadrasttri

(ca.

740-81o),

criticizes

the

causal model

that

a single effect arises

from

_plural

and

diffbrent

causes. 'O)

_His

_{way ofcriticism}

_is,

however,

different

from

that

of

the

objection

in

_question.

Indeed,

he

does

not accept

that

a single

effect

arises

from

_plural

causes

that

are

different

from

each otheg while

he,

in

addition, assumes and enumerates

_possible

cases:

(1)

_plural

causes might

_produce

a single effect,

(2)

plural

causes might

_produce

_plural

effects,

(3)

a single cause might

_produce

a single effect, and

(4)

a single cause

might

_produce

_plural

effects.

Then

he

regards all of

these

as

flawed.

From

this

description,

one can safely state

that

Haribhadrasari

does

not

consider

that

proper

causal relationships would

be

either

the

combination of a single cause and effect

or

that

of

_plural

causes and effects,

but

that

there

could

be

more

possibilities

than

these

two.

On

the

other

hand,

he

seems

to

accept

those

two

causal models elsewhere

in

his

Anekantag'ayapataka

(iYP),

as

fbllows:

And

even

if

causes

[such

as a

fbrm-and-colog

etc.] are

_plural,

[they]

do

not

_produce

an effect

that

has

a single

intrinsic

nature

[such

as visual cognition].

If

so,

then

the

differences

of causes

would not

differentiate

[their

effect]when a

[single]

effect

is

_produced

by

cooperating causes

-(216)

An

Objection

in

the

Hetubindu

Ascribed

to

theJainas

(SHiGA)

whose

intrinsic

natures are

different

[from

each other]. And therefbre, neither would

it

fbllow

that

non-difference

[of

causes]

does

not

differentiate

[their

effect] . , . If

there

iscertainly a

difference

_[in

effect]

for

the

reason that there

is

a

difference

[in

cause],

in

the

same way,

it

[would]

be

right

that

there

is

no

difference

[in

effect]

for

the

reason

that

there

is

no

difference

[in

cause] on

the

basis

ofthe restricted

[re]ation]

ofnon-deviation

[between

_{cause and effect].}ii)

In

this

_passage,

Haribhadrasitri

admits

that

a

difference

in

effect

is

based

on

that

in

cause, and that non-difference

in

effect

is

based

on

that

in

cause.

Hewever,

he

does

not

present

the

Jainas'

own

_position

in

a

_positive

manneg while

he

criticizes

his

opponent's

(i.e.,

the

Buddhists)

view

of

causal

relationship.

i2)

4.

Relationship

with

Dharmakirti's

Other

Works

The

alleged

_Jaina

view

in

the

HB

is

totally

different

from

an opponent's view

in

PV

1.181-184,

which

is,

according

to

Dharmakirti

himselC

raised

by

the

Jainas

(ahrrka).

In

the

HB,

Dharmakirti

deals

mainly with

the

issue

of causal relatienship, whereas

in

the

PV

1

and

PVSY

he

criticizes

the

Jaina

ontology

that

one entity

has

two

contradictory

properties

at

the

same

time.

Indeed,

the

objection

in

the

HB

is

ascribed

by

Arcata

to

the

Jainas

and

Mirnarpsakas,

and relevant

_passages

are

in

fact

found

in

the

Jaina

and

MimAmsaka

works, as seen above,

but

we cannot say

that

there

is

an exact accordance

between

those

texts

and

the

objection

in

_question

seen

in

the

HB

and

HBT.

Rathe4

the

arguments

that

are

_parallel

with

the

opponent's view

in

HB

g*,13-14

appear

in

the

_polemic

with

the

Sarpkhyas

in

the

PV

1

and

PVSV

i3)

We

can assume

that

Dharmakirti

might

have

borne

those

arguments

in

mind when

he

wrote

the

HB.

The

Sarnlchyas

attempt

to

explain

the

causal model

that

a single effect arises

from

_plural

causes

by

introducing

the

_concept "having _{one and}

the

_same

intrinsic

nature"

(eka-tmata

PV

1.164a,

ekasvabhavatva

PVSV

s3,g)

or "the non-differentiated

intrinsic

nature"

(abhinnah

svabha'vah

PVSV

83,9-10).

This

idea

is

analogous

to

that

of

the

opponent ofthe

HB

and

HBT,

and

_quite

similar statements are also

found

in

the

TS

and

TSPL

The

word ekatmata

in

PV

1.164a

or ekanugatatva

in

TS

1767ab

is

_paraphrased

as anvaya

in

PV

1.163b

and

TS

1761d,

which

is

the

unique

term

to

the

Sarnlchya

system of

philosophy

It

means `･[everything's]

being

accompanied

[by

the

characteristic of

consisting of

three

_qualities

(traiguttya)]"

or "[truiguaya's] occurring successively

[in

everything]." i4)

Furthermore,

the

first

half

of

the

fbllowing

commentary

by

Kamalagila

on

TS

1767

resembles closely

the

objection

in

the

HB

and

HBT

in

that

both

opponents

justify

the

causal model

that

a single effect arises

from

the

common nature among

plural

causes. is)

On

the

other

hand,

if,

[as

the 5arpkhyas claim,

_plural

causes]

_produce

[a

single effect]

due

to

being

accompanied

by

one and

the

same

intrinsic

nature even

though

[plural

causes] such as

eyes, etc, are

different

[from

each other],

[it

would

fo11ow

that]

one and

the

same

intrinsic

nature

[consisting]

in

those

[causes]

is

present

[also]

injust

one cause

[out

ofall].i6)

This

_passage

suggests

that

Dharmakirti

might

be

aware of

the

view of

the

Sarpkhyas

as

well as

those

oftheJainas

and

Mimarpsakas

when

he

introduced

the

opponent's view

in

HB

9',13-14.

This

assumption

is

also supported

by

the

fact

that

the

criticism of

the

Sarpkhya

view concerning

the

existence of samairya

(PV

1.163-lso)

is

fo11owed

by

the

criticism

of

the

Jainas'

anekantava-'da

(PV

1.181-184).

As

Wakahara

1996

_points

out,

the

arguments

parallel

with

PV

1.163-180

are

found

in

the

20th

chapter

(Eiyadva-dapan-ks.

a-)of

the

TS

and

TSP,

to

be

more

_precise,

TS

1759-1775,

which

fo11ow

after

the

view of aJaina

thinker

called

Sumati

(TS

17s4-175s).

Although

Santaraksita

and

KamalaSila

do

not mention

the

specific names of

_persons

or sects, one can

identify

the

opponent

in

TS

17s9-1775

as someone

belonging

to

the

Sarpkhya

school.

After

that

_polemic,

the

view of

Kumarila

is

introduced

and criticized

in

TS

1776-17s4.

This

reveals

that,

at

least

in

the

TS

and

TSE

the

theory

ofsamartya as a real entity asserted

by

the

Sarpkhyas

is

included

in

the

so-called

_syadvada,

i7)which

is

often regarded as

the

distinctive

thought

of

the

Jainas.

s.

Conclusion

In

the

ohjection

introduced

in

HB

9',13-14,

the

opponent considers

the

causal model

that

_plural

effects arise

from

_plural

causes or a single effect

from

a single cause

to

be

legitimate,

and criticizes

the

model maintained

by

the

Buddhists

that

a single effect can

arise

from

plural

causes.

According

to

Arcata,

the

opponent constructs

the

model

by

assuming one and

the

same

property

that

lies

commonly

in

all

the

causes.

Dharmakirti,

on

the

other

hand,

establishes

that

plural

causes

can

_produce

a single effect,

based

on

the

characteristic of "fu1fi11ing one and

the

same

purpose

or

_producing

one and

the

same efTbct"

(ekarthakrtya)

ofcooperating causes.

He

further

states

that

each capacity of

the

causes

has

its

own object

domain,

and

the

effect,

though

it

is

single as areal entitM

-(218)

An

Objection

in

the

Hetubindu

Ascribed

to

theJainas

(SHiGA)

comes

to

bear

specific

_properties

_generated

by

the

corresponding capacities.

Therefbre,

it

might

be

_possible

to

assume

that

Dharmakini

indirectly

accepts

the

causal model

that

_plural

effects arise

from

_plural

causes.

while

the

opponent's view

in

_question

is

ascribed

to

theJainas

and

Mimarpsakas

by

Arcata,

we could not

find

the

_passages

that

precisely

accord with

those

in

the

works of

these

schools,

though

Haribhadrasari

directly

cites _{and criticizes}

the

_relevant

_part

of

the

HB

in

his

AJP.

By

comparing

this

opponent's view ofthe

HB

and

Arcata's

_commentary

thereon

_with

the

descriptions

in

the

PV

1

and

PVSY

on

the

other

hand,

it

has

been

revealed

that

this

opponent's view conforms with

the

Samkhya

_{view rather}

than

the

Jaina

_one.

_It

is

also

confirmed

by

the

fact

that

there

are several

_parallel

_passages

in

the

HBT,

PV

1,

PVSY

TS,

and

TSR

iS)

And,

at

Ieast

in

the

_2oth

_{chapter of}

_the

_TS

_and

_TSP;

_{not only}

_the

Jaina

view

but

also

the

Mimarpsaka

and

samkhya

ones

are

introduced

under

the

chapter named

Syadvadapariks,di.

Although

it

is

the

Buddhists

at

that

time

that

classify

the

philosophical

thoughts

in

this

waM

it

is

like]y

that

those

three

schools

hold

or share

similar views regarding

the

ontology

(especially

regarding

the

issue

ofsa-marrya and

vis'esa) or _causal

theory

NaturallM

further

investigation

of

the

related

literature

of each

school

is

necessary

to

_prove

this

hypothesis.

Notes1)

See

HB

8",14-19

and

Steinkellner

1967:

43-44.

For

detail

of

Vasubandhu's

_proof

of momentariness, see

Katsura

2002:

264-265

with nn.

19-20;

270-271

with n. 34. 2) TS

353:

_tatru

ye

kltakd

bha-vds

te sarve

ksa"abhanginah

/

vinas'arp

_prati

sarvesa'm anapeksataya-sthiteh

ll

(See

also

Mimaki 1984: 224-225.)

3)

HB

9',13-14:

bhinnasvabhdivebltyaS

caksuradibiryah sahakarib}rya ekaka-ryotpattauna

ka'raptabheda-t

ka'ryabhedah

_syaJd

iti

cet.

(Quoted

in

_AJP,

vol.

2,

174,7-8

and

Utp

42,13.

See

also

Steinkellner

1967:

45;

121-125,

n. 27 and Katsura

1983:

104J 4)

See

also

Steinkellner

1967:

121-122.

5)

See

Katsura

1983:100-102.

6)

See

Katsura

1983:

103;

110-111.

7)

HB

15',4-5:

idam

eka-rthakriydlaksa4ai!i _{sahaka-ritvam}

ksanikanam

eva

bha-va'nam;

15",18-19:

tatruiharthakriyaiva sahakaritvarn. s) Cf HB 11',3-5.

9)

A

_Jaina

_philosopheg

CandrasenasUri,

likewise

understands Dharmakirti's

_position:

tatra

dharmakirtis

tavad

dhetubindau

bhedabhedam

svavaca- sarnarthayate sma

(Utp

42,12).

See

also iUE vol. 2, 174,3-6 and n. 12. Io)

For

the

_possibility

that

the

opponent

is

a

Mimarpsaka,

_see

Steinkellner

_1967:

_122-124.

Steinkellner

cites

the

Sdstradipika-

224,4-11

(Sastra

Dipika

ofPartha

Sarathi

Misra with theComrnentary

Called

Yttktisneha

Pranirani

by

Pandit

Rarna

Krishna

Misra,

ed. Laxman

Shastri

Dravid,

The

Chowkhamba

Sanskrit

Series,

no.

43

[Benares:

Chowkhamba

Sanskrit

Series

Ofice,

1916])

as a relevant

text

of

the

Bhatt,a-tradition.

11)

AJR

_vol.

2,

_150,8-12:

_na ca

kjru4am

alry anekam

ekasvabhavasya

karyasyajanakam.

_yadi

_syat,

nedanim.

bhinnasvabha-veb}Diab

sahakaribPryah

kaJryotpattau

kctrupabhedo

bhedakalp

_syat,

tatas'cabhedo

'pi

nabhedako

bhavet,

kara4abhede

'Ry abhedat.

_yadi

bhedad

bheda

eva

_syat,

evam abhedad abhedo

_yuktah,

aryabhica'rantyamat.

(See

also

Steinkellner

1967:

124-125.)

Cf

Aptamfmarrtsa

58

(Ghoshal

2002: 117-118). 12)

Elsewhere

in

the

_AJP,

we encounter a staternent

by

Haribhadrasari

himselC

where

he

$eems toagree with

Dharmakirti's

answer: "The

particular

properties

ofa

[single]

effectare not contradictory tothe

distinctive

natures of

[plural]

causes,

because

effect

[in

_general]

has

singularity and

_plurality

[at

the

same

time]

as

its

own

natures,

because

[effect]

is

cognized as such."

(AJP,

vol. 2,174,4-6). 13)

See

especialty

PV

1.164

and

PVSV

83,9-11.

14)

See

SaTnk}ryakan'ka

(Yttktidfpika:

The

Most

Signiflcant

CommentaTy

on

the

samklryakarika,

ed.

Albrecht

Wezler

and

Shojun

Motegi,

Alt-

und

Neu-Indische

Studien,

no.

44

[Stuttgart:

Franz

Steiner

Verlag,

1998]) 14;15ab and YUktidfpiku 144,2.

CE

PVSVT

325,28-30.

Is)

Although

the

Sarnlchyas'

explicit assertion on

the

causal mQdel that

_plural

effects arise

frorn

plural

causes cannot

be

found

in

the

PV

1 or

PvSy

it

is

likely

that they accept

this

model a$

well,

See

PVSV

86,1-2,

PV

1.170ab.

CE

TS

1761.

16)

TSP

608,2Z-23:

_yadi

tu

punar

ekasvabhava-nugatatvena

bhinna

api caZsurddayo

janakiib

_syuh,

tadaikas tesarrisvabha-vo

janaka

ekctsminn api

karape

lsti...,

17) Forthe term

_syadva"da

in

theJaina

_philosophy,

see

Uno

Atsushi

fii:

wy`V,

`)ainaky6

no suyadovada:

Syadvadamaajari

g23-2s"

V'

"

l

}-

ig

op

X

"['

-

F

of

7

-

tY':

Syadvadamafljari

g23-2s,

Indogaku

shironsha

t

)i

F\ststfi

617

(1965):

105-109.

18)

For

instance,

HBT

94,14-15,

PV

1.164,

PVSV

83,9-11,

TS

1767,and

TSP

608,22-23.

Abbreviations

NP

Utp

TS

T5PPV

1

pvsvPVSVT

HB

Anekantojayapata-ka-.

Aneka-ntojayapataka

lry

Haribhadra

Sari

with

His

Own

Commentary

and

Municandra

Sari's

Supercommentary.

Ed,

H,

R.

Kapadia,

2

vols,

Gaekwad's

Oriental

Series,

nos,

88,

105.

Baroda:

Oriental

Institute,

1940,

1947.

Utpadadisiddhi,

Anava-clyanupamavedacaastayavidhanavedhatigrihemacandragurubhratrgnL

pradyumnasnricara"acarncan-kagrt-candrasenasarisatrita

svopcy'nrra s'n'-Utpjdadisiddhih,.

Ed.

Cunilal.

Surat:

Sr-lj'ainanandapustakalaya

Gopipura,

1936.

Tlittvasatrgraha.

Ticittvasangraha

ofSa-ntaruksita

with the

Commentary

ofKamalcts'ila

Ed.

Embar

Krishnamacharya.

2

vols.

Gaekwad's

Oriental

Series,

nos.

3o,

31.

Baroda:

Central

Librar[y;

1926,Tlzttvasarpgrahapailj'ika.

See

TS.

Pramapavarttika, lstchapten The

Prumapctvarttikam

ofDharmakirti:

The First

Chapter

with the Autocornrnentary Ed. Raniero

Gnoli.

Roma: Istituto

italiano

_per

il

Medio ed

Estremo

Oriente,

1960.

Prama-navarttikasvavrtti.

5ee

PV

1.

t

a

Pramdnavarttikasvav.rtti;ikd,

Kar4akagomin's

CommentaTy

on

the

Pramapavdrttikav.rtti

of

Dharmakirti.

Ed.

Rahula

Sarpkrtyayana.

Kyoto:

Rinsen

Book,

1982.

Hetubindu.

Dharmakirti's

Hetubinduh,

Teil

I,

Tibettscher

fext

und raconstruierter

Sanskrit-Text,

Ed.Ernst

Steinkellner.

Wien:

bsterreichische

Akademie

der

Wissenschaften, lg67.

-（

220

）

An

　

Objection

　

in

　

the

　

Hetubindu

　

As

（：

ribed

　

to

the

Jainas

　

（

SHIGA ）

HBTHe

亡ubfη

d

_嘩抜δ

．

　He亡ubindutika　ofBhatta　

Arcala

　with　

5

凵

b

−

（：ommentary 　

En

亡

itled

　

Aloka

（，

fDurveka

M

∫旧

，

Ed

．

　Sukhla

垣

Sanghavi 　and _丿

inavijayajL

　Gaekwad

’

s　

Oriental

　

Series，

　no

，

113

．

　

Baroda

：

Oriental

　

Institute

，

1949，

Bibliography

Ghoshal ，　Saratchandra

，

2002

．

　

Apta

−

mrmd 増5d　of　

Ac

σ

ry

α

Samantabhadra．

　

New

　

Delhi

：

Bharatiya

　　

Jnanpith

．

Katsura

　

Sh

δryU

桂 紹 隆 ．

1983

．

“

Darumakiruti

　no 　

inga−

r。n

”

ダルマ キ

ー

ルテ ィ の 因 果

Wh

．

　Nanto

　　

　

Bukky

δ

南都 佛教

50：g6

−

114

．

　　　　　，

2002．

“

Vasubandu

　no　setsunametsu 　ronsh6

”

_ヴァ ス バ ン _ドゥ の

刹

那

滅 論 証．ln

　

Sakurabe

　　

H 頭

me 　

h

譲邸 e

矧

u　

kl

ηεηroη5h沈

5h

面

Bu

妹

y

δ

k

α川

Abld

αrum α ε

櫻 部建 博

士

喜 寿 記 念論 集

：

初期

　　

　

仏 教

か ら アビダ ル マ へ

，259

−

276

．

KyotQ ：Heirakuji　

5hoten ，

Mimaki

　

Katsumi 御 牧 克

己

．

1984

“

Setsunametsu

　ronsh6

”

刹

那

滅 論

証

．

　In　Kδza　

Daij6

　

Bukky

δ

9

　　

Ninshikiron

　

to

　ronrigaku

講 座大乗

_{仏 教}

g

_{認 識 論 と 論 理 学，}

21

ア

ー254，Tokyo

；　

Shunjasha ．

Steinkellner

、

　

Ernst．

1967

，

　

Dharmakirti’

s　He亡ubinduh

．

　Teil　II_，　

Uber

∫etzung 　und 　AnmerkUngen

．

　Wien ：

　　

Osterreichische

　

Akademie

　

der

　

Wissenschaften．

Wakahara

　

YUsh6 若

原

雄 昭．1996，

“

Bukky6to

　no 　

Jainaky6

　

hihan

（

2）

：

Tattvasarpgraha

（

−

pafijika

）

，

　　

Syadv

巨

daparik

_￥

a

　

kenkya

”

仏 教 徒

の ジ ャ イ ナ

教 批 判

（

2）

：

Tattvasarpgraha（

−pa酬

k

巨

）

，

　　

SyadvadaparlkSa 研

究

．

　

lndngaku

　

Chibettogaku

　

kenkyU

イン ド

学

チ ベ ッ ト

学研 究 1

：

57−85．

（

This

　study 　was 　supPorted 　

by

　

JSPs

　

KAKENHI

　

Grant

　

Number

　15Ko2047

［

Grant−ir1

−Aid

　

for

　

Scientific

Research （

C）

_］

．

）

Key 　words 　 He加

b

加

du

，

　Dharmak 正rti

_，

　

He

加

bl

η

du

面 ，

　

Arcata，

跏 ek祕

 

α

p

α痴

，

　

Haribha

（

irasUri

，

　　　　　　　　　

5yddv

δ

d

α

、

Jaina

，

　

S

互即

khya

，

　

Mim

盃lpsaka

，

　causal 　relationship