Territorial Disputes

At present, Japan has three territorial disputes in Northeast Asia. With China over the Pinnacle Islands (JPN: Senkaku Shoto / CHN: Diaoyudao) which are located in the East China Sea; the Liancourt Rocks (JPN: Takeshima / KOR:

Dokdo) with South Korea in the Japanese Sea; and the Kuril Islands (JPN:

Hoppo Ryodo / RUS: Kuril'skie Ostrova) with Russia immediately north of Japan. These conflicts have been maintained ad hoc, and newer developments are moving the region towards a brinkmanship type foreign policy for regional assertion. This is exemplified by the territorial disputes such as the one centered on the Pinnacle Islands that re-emerged in 2010 and escalated in 2012. However, the realpolitikal situation of the present is likely symptomatic of a deeper and wholly different contention: the clash over the regional historicization of the shared narrative of the Second World War.

9.1.1.1 The Pinnacle Islands

The Pinnacle Islands are small, desolate, and uninhabited. They are home to marine resources and likely large hydrocarbon deposits.⁴⁶⁴ They sparked the

464 According to a survey by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1969, is possibly “one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Senkaku Islands (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).; and Economic Commission for Asia the Far East (ECAFE), "Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1969," ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST XX (1969/70),

http://www.unescap.org/publications/survey/#60s.

re-emergence of a territorial dispute in 2010 and that escalated in 2012 between China and Japan. The islands are a conflict-causing vector in the relationship between China and Japan. They make up part of the Chinese continental shelf separated from Japan by the Okinawa Trough, and are within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone of Japan.⁴⁶⁵ Both claim ownership over the islands and they have been administered by Japan since the United States returned them under such auspices in 1972.⁴⁶⁶ This nuance makes the ownership of the Islands not as straightforward as Japan would have it. Furthermore, China can trace ownership of the islands back to the fourteenth century, symbolically by using them for navigational aids, and by having defended them from piracy.⁴⁶⁷ Japan on the other hand, did not identify them until the nineteenth century, and then from British naval charts;

subsequently conquering them in 1895 after the first Sino-Japanese War. ⁴⁶⁸ Japan claimed they were terra nullius at the time of annexation.⁴⁶⁹ China can thus argue that the annexation was unlawful due to the historical ties to the islands. Furthermore, considering that China did not argue for their restoration in the aftermath of the war, hardly means they acquiesced to Japan’s claim and ensuing use of them.

465 Thomas J Schoenbaum, "Resolving the China-Japan Dispute over the Senkaku Islands," The Asia-Pacific Journal (2005), http://apjjf.org/-Thomas_J_-Schoenbaum/1734/article.pdf.

466 Gavan McCormack, "Small Islands–Big Problem: Senkaku/Diaoyu and the Weight of History and Geography in China-Japan Relations 小さな諸島− 大きな 問題−− 尖閣/釣魚と日中関係における歴史と地理の重さ• Japanese, Korean and Chinese Texts Available," Small 9, no. 1 (2011).

467 U. Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai'i Press, 2000). 112, 113

468 Ibid. 89-91, 124

469 Nico Schrijver, "China-Japan Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands?," The Hague Institute for Global Justice (2012),

http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PB-1-China-Japan-Dispute-DiaoyuSenkaku-Islands.pdf.

In 2010, the Japanese coast guard found a Chinese fishing trawler in the disputed area around the islands. The trawler was asked to depart the area, but instead collided with the coast guard ship. Japan subsequently arrested the Chinese captain. This sparked the re-emergence of the dispute.⁴⁷⁰ Then, in 2012, the former governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, escalated the dispute, as he tried to purchase the islands for Tokyo.⁴⁷¹ This ultimately resulted with the coast guards of China and Japan partaking in brinkmanship on the high seas. Prior to the unilateral foreign policy aspirations of one private Japanese citizen [Ishihara], and the 2010 incident, the Japanese government was preventing development on them in an effort not to provoke China–a distinction that suggest Japan acknowledged the dispute and as such did not claim unilateral ownership. This non-confrontational policy had been effective and would have let future generations address the issue at a more opportune time. A notion originally fronted by Chinese President Deng Xiaoping:

It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find a common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all.⁴⁷²

Instead through Ishihara’s unilateral bid for the islands, he was able to drag Japan along with him, and ultimately facilitated the orchestration of a regional crisis that has no immediate end in sight; rather than seeking a diplomatic solution looking to set a demarcation line bilaterally, a solution that worked for

470 Linus Hagström, "‘Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 3 (2012).

471 "Islands Apart," The Economist, 2012, accessed 19/08/2016.

472 McCormack, "Small Islands–Big Problem: Senkaku/Diaoyu and the Weight of History and Geography in China-Japan Relations 小さな諸島− 大きな問題−− 尖 閣/釣魚と日中関係における歴史と地理の重さ• Japanese, Korean and Chinese Texts Available."

Norway and Russia.⁴⁷³ This solution would include compromise, and more importantly, it would serve as a stepping stone in restoring trust and confidence between China and Japan. This in turn would enable a much needed thawing of relations to tackle the historical issues plaguing the relationship. Instead this confrontation of hard power has brought the threat of armed conflict back to Northeast Asia. It seems the threat of what further escalations might bring keeps the peace.

Ironically, China and Japan was able to reach an interim solution that had inherent similarities to the Norway-Russia solution as well as elements of the Åland and Denmark-Germany solutions in June, 2008.⁴⁷⁴ The agreement:

Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea, was the result of a meeting in May the same year between the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Chinese President Hu Jintao. They issued the following statement where they “resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’ between Japan and China.”⁴⁷⁵ They furthermore announced that they would align their relations with the trends of the international community “and together forge a bright future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world while deepening mutual understanding, building mutual trust, and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between their nations in an ongoing fashion into the future.”⁴⁷⁶ The agreement of June was a first concrete step towards a delimitation agreement between China and Japan.⁴⁷⁷ It also included the joint extraction of hydrocarbons from the disputed seabed whilst the two governments moved

473 See footnote 418 on page 155.

474 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea (June, 2008).

475 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on

Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests" (May, 2008).

476 Ibid.

477 Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea.

towards a comprehensive resolution. Furthermore, as it was explicitly announced in the May statement that the two governments would find a solution to the historical contentions as well, the process moving towards the latter stages V and VI on the Kacowicz and Archer scale had begun. Until Ishihara’s unilateral 2012 undertaking obliterated this movement towards stability and reconciliation, and instead set in motion a rapid deterioration of relations between the two countries. Considering the nationalist upswing in Japan and the simultaneous undermining of Article 9 and opening for collective self-defense, the current deadlock has no immediate end in sight.

Nevertheless, the 2008 agreement does show that there is capacity within the countries for reaching an amicable solution based in compromise and goodwill amongst peoples.

Henceforth and eventually, when the situation stabilizes in the future and becomes conducive to broaching another attempt at resolution, the 2008 agreement will surely be revisited. Another avenue for solving the territorial dispute, could be a condominium based solution, as what has been suggested for Hans Island between Canada and Denmark. It is worthy of being explored by China and Japan; not only looking at the suggestions for solving the Hans Island dispute, but also in how Canada and Denmark relates to the dispute. Both China and Japan have pandered to a nationalist sentiment that the islands belong to them, and ultimately losing sight of a bilateral solution, in lieu of a solution based in arbitration. And a bilateral solution will inevitably require compromise unless hard power is applied; a surefire recipe for regional disintegration and disaster.

As was the case for Norway-Russia, as well as for China and Japan in 2008, interim solutions towards development are also possible. Norway-Russia exploited the Barents Sea fishing grounds while negotiations were ongoing.

Similarly, China and Japan had started that process, yet were incapacitated by nationalist sentiments with realpolitikal consequences in 2012.

Alternatively, or in combination with a solution from the Nordic Region, would

be to place the islands outside military application as was done with the Åland Islands. This would guarantee for a peace centered on the geographical locality of the dispute, while a solution to ownership is pursued. A servitude of the Pinnacle Islands, akin to the Åland Islands, would in the very least, give stability and put an end to the brinkmanship between China and Japan over the islands.

9.1.1.2 The Liancourt Rocks

The Liancourt Rocks, are two rocky outcroppings in the Sea of Japan (Japanese Name) or the East Sea (Korean name). They are administered by South Korea which keeps a coast guard post there. The islands are rich fishing grounds and might have natural gas deposits.⁴⁷⁸ South Korea claim it can trace ownership of the islands back to 512 AD. ⁴⁷⁹ This claim is furthermore backed with evidence of Korean consistent presence on the islands. While Japan traces use of the islands to the seventeenth century as used by fishermen. The islands and Korea were annexed in 1905 by Japan.

Phil Haas states that Japan furthermore claims that prior to 1905 the islands were terra nullius. ⁴⁸⁰ Haas further highlights 1) for the Japanese claim: the San Francisco Peace Treaty as part of the Japanese evidence of its ownership; a claim with no mention in the treaty;⁴⁸¹ and 2) for the South Korean claim: the 1945 Potsdam declaration which defined and delimited Japan after its surrender, as well as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP) Directive 667. This directive according to South

478 James Card, "A Chronicle of Korea–Japan ‘Friendship,’" Asia Times Online 23 (2005).

479 Phil Haas, "Status and Sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks: The Dispute between Japan and Korea," Gonz. J. Int'l L. 15 (2011).

480 Ibid.

481 The San Francisco Peace Treaty was the peace treaty between Japan and the allied powers with the notable exception of China, the Koreas, and the Soviet Union.

Korea orders Japan in “decreeing the cessation of Japanese control over various non-adjacent territories from Japanese jurisdiction.”⁴⁸²

While the territorial dispute seems sterile on paper, it takes on a wholly different character amongst the peoples, especially for South Koreans.⁴⁸³ In 2012, Japan proposed to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). South Korea unequivocally rejected the offer, stating that “Dokdo is clearly part of Korean territory historically, geographically and under international law, and no territorial dispute exists … The Japanese government’s proposal to take the Dokdo issue before the ICJ is not worth attention.”⁴⁸⁴ It is interesting that South Korea refused this offer as their claim is likely stronger than Japan’s. Yet, it exemplifies how interconnected the dispute is with the historical issues that have been left to worsen. And it further shows the difficulty that arises when these deeper contentions do not reach a conclusion. Instead, the regional actors cater to nationalist sentiments in order to garner popular support that inevitably further sours their relationship.

The dispute is structurally similar to the preceding Pinnacle Islands’ dispute and as such can seek similar Nordic comparisons as presented in the former

482 Haas, "Status and Sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks: The Dispute between Japan and Korea."

483 The Korea-Japan Friendship Year in 2005 marked one century since Japan annexed Korea and 60 years since World War II ended. The year would however mark anything but friendship between the two countries as mass demonstrations broke out in South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in response to Japanese assertions over ownership of the islands. By the year’s end, South Koreans had burned Japanese flags; video games which themes centered on repelling Japanese invaders were made; further compensation for the sex-slaves were demanded; a Liancourt Rock bank branch was set up; the islands got mobile phone coverage; self-immolation took place; fingers were cut off; riot police protecting the Japanese embassy was firebombed; and the Japanese

ambassador’s home was attacked with flaming arrows. Card, "A Chronicle of Korea–Japan ‘Friendship,’".

484 Lee Eun-joo, "Seoul Rejects Tokyo’s Icj Proposal," Korea Joongang Daily, 2012, accessed 19/08/2016.

dispute. While seeking a resolution to the conflict, joint exploitation of resources could occur. Japan furthermore, with a likely weaker claim, has already shown its willingness to a solution by arbitration. South Korea has probably little or nothing to lose by agreeing to such a solution. However, as the impact of the conflict has taken a human toll in South Korea, a search for a bilateral solution is preferable. The Åland Islands solution could be a good fit for the Liancourt Rocks, in that Sweden and Finland were coerced by the arbitrator into finding a solution they both could live with. Japan and South Korea could preempt the need for an arbitrator and seek such a solution voluntarily.

9.1.1.3 The Kuril Islands

Japan and Russia has a territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, four islands that are located north of Japan. The islands were occupied by Russia after the Second World War and the southernmost is just a few kilometers from Japan.

According to Japan however, the disputed islands did not form part of the territory they ceded to Russia in the settlement of World War II. Because of this dispute Japan and Russia has not signed a peace treaty ending the Second World War. Where the “Japanese government has consistently argued that it is willing to conclude a peace treaty only if Russia agrees to return the four islands. For its part, Russia has steadfastly refused to transfer all four islands to Japan.”⁴⁸⁵ There has been elements of improving relations over the Kuril Islands. As the inhabitants were repatriated to Japan after the Soviet annexation, visa-free travel has been implemented through an exchange program for people with ties to the islands from both Japan and Russia.⁴⁸⁶

485 B. Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations (Taylor & Francis, 2007). 20

486 This program was not however a product of only goodwill between the

countries. Russia initially agreed to Japanese visits to the Kuril Islands only with