Swedish Policy Shift:

Neutrality, Nonalignment, and Nonbelligerency

Sweden is thus maneuvering to establish itself as a balancing middle power in Europe, while remaining a great power in the Nordic region. Sweden from 1814 is arguably a nonbelligerent power that is capable of showing restraint.³⁴⁷ The first proclamation of explicit neutrality of Charles John came in 1834. Sweden would proclaim neutrality unilaterally on more occasions.

The first, in 1834, marked the British-Russian War when British interests in the Ottoman Empire were threatened by Russian ambitions.³⁴⁸ Charles John stated Sweden’s neutrality as the war would likely play out partly in its backyard, the Baltic Sea, and accordingly in order to keep Norway-Sweden out of the conflict; essentially to remain both neutral and in theory nonaligned.

Whilst this proclamation was one of neutrality, it was paralleled with opening Swedish harbors for warships of both the warring parties. This would benefit the British more than the Russians, but notwithstanding, it maintained the Swedish position of neutrality and kept the peace for Norway-Sweden. The second proclamation of neutrality came in 1853 during the Crimean War and was related again to Russian expansion into the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans.³⁴⁹ Sweden, as in 1834, declared itself neutral though again the British and French warships would enter its backyard, and again, Sweden

346 Elgström and Jerneck, "Activism and Adaptation: Swedish Security Strategies, 1814–85."

347 Swedish and Norwegian troops in the First War of Schleswig were volunteers in a defensive war for Denmark.

348 Elgström and Jerneck, "Activism and Adaptation: Swedish Security Strategies, 1814–85."

349 Mikael af Malmborg, Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden (Palgrave, 2001). 94

would be favoring Britain and France by opening its harbors for provisioning the warships.

Sweden’s neutrality in the subsequent Crimean War 1854-6, was to all practical effect pro-English and pro-French. As in 1834, Sweden made use of its right under international law to allow warships of the belligerents to enter neutral harbours for provisioning. In 1854 and 1855 the Angle-French squadrons which cruised the Baltic [Sea] in the Crimean War could consequently use the harbour of Fårösund at Gotland as an operational base for attacks on Russian (and Finnish!) shipping, ports and fortifications. This interpretation of neutrality, which naturally caused irritation in St. Petersburg, helped Sweden maintain a balance of power in the Baltic Sea, against the threat of Russian naval dominance.”³⁵⁰

By this second declaration of neutrality, it becomes clear that the concept has not as yet sunk into the mentality of Sweden. It also shows the Swedish apprehensions towards its powerful neighbor to the east. Yet it was a necessity for a relatively weak Sweden. Realists would argue for Sweden to enter an alliance with the more powerful Britain or France to have their protection versus perceived threatening Russia. Power and the image of a Russian threat have, within realist thinking, direct causal links to the policy decisions. However, Sweden chooses nonalignment and neutrality in spite of having a perceived enemy-image towards Russia while ostensibly supporting the Anglo-French. Ole Elgström argues that while fundamental realist tenets treat nonalignment as a nonviable option in an anarchical system for small states as they are inherently weak, they fall short in adequately explaining Sweden’s nonalignment and neutrality.³⁵¹ For the 1834 and 1853 declarations of neutrality, he argues that Sweden employed a pendulum policy: “when independence and dignity were questioned by Russian arrogance, Charles John hastened to seek closer bonds with Great Britain, only to turn back when

350 Ibid. 94

351 Ole Elgström, "Do Images Matter? The Making of Swedish Neutrality: 1834 and 1853," Cooperation and Conflict 35, no. 3 (2000).

courted by the Tsar.”³⁵² This pendulum policy follows hand in hand Charles John’s Policy of 1812 in which he embraces, nonalignment and for Sweden, the need to keep good relations to both Russia and Britain. Elgström continues to argue that only when the perceived balance-of-power became unequal would Sweden look to alternatives to secure their position regionally.

It is the fluctuating perception of a Russian threat that brings Britain to Sweden’s attention as a possible counterbalance to restore the symmetry in the balance-of-power. Finally, he contends that over time the ‘great power images’ of Sweden are replaced with a ‘small state image.’³⁵³ The images that Sweden projects onto itself through time consistently matters in changing the perception of self. The longer the images remain steady and unswerving, the greater the likelihood they will exist in the future continuously strengthens; the new image reinforces and consequently sustains itself. The end result is a Sweden that abandons former aspirations of greatness and embraces a place as a small state that becomes greatly experienced in diplomatic maneuvering in balancing the big powers in its favor.

The Swedish neutrality is therefore initially ad hoc into the mid to late-nineteenth century. Rather than being an established principle, the neutrality becomes arranged as such Sweden sees necessary as to secure its position.

Swedish neutrality had always been unilateral and even though it faltered at times, and was biased towards the Western powers, it would ultimately stay true to itself and stand against perceived or real pressures.³⁵⁴

This resulting change, in the perception of self, set in relation to the internal movement away from the grandeurs of the past, transforms Sweden to realign itself as a neutral middle power within the confines of the European power balance; while maintaining its place as a great power in the Nordic Region.

While moving towards embracing and recognizing this smaller role, Sweden

352 Ibid.

353 Ibid.

354 O. Elgström, Images and Strategies for Autonomy: Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19th Century (Springer Netherlands, 2013). 58

externalizes the process using the pendulum policy as not to antagonize that which could retaliate against the security of the state. Furthermore, the very success of this movement that started in the early nineteenth century has stayed Sweden’s hand as it has not started nor engaged in any war following this transformation.