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The Schleswig Plebiscite: A Territory Lost, Partly Regained

ドキュメント内 The Nordic Peace (ページ 99-103)

The Second Schleswig War

5.4 The Schleswig Plebiscite: A Territory Lost, Partly Regained

By the end of the nineteenth century, Denmark had shrunk, having lost substantial parts of its territory and approximately half its people. Yet, some things lost, can be regained as was the case for Denmark in the aftermath of the First World War. Schleswig, which had not been entirely German in ethnic

240 Sarah Wambaugh and Peace Carnegie Endowment for International, Plebiscites since the World War: With a Collection of Official Documents, Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933). 52

241 Knut Kjeldstadli, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe: From the 17th Century to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

makeup, especially in the north, would again in 1919 rally Denmark in an attempt at recover both territory and people lost in 1864.

After the Allied Powers had come out of the First World War victorious and the armistice was in place, they convened in Paris in 1919. Here the Paris Peace Conference was established with the purpose of setting the terms for the Central Powers and to establish a political structure to secure peaceful relations in the future and thereby provide a framework for preventing wars.242 The League of Nations was established from the latter. For the former, which carried a deeper contemporary impact with the terms for the Central Powers, gave Denmark the opportunity for pursuing its claim to Schleswig: A commission was established for Belgian and Danish Affairs. This commission, for the Danish cause, set out to re-examine the cession of parts of Schleswig to Denmark.243 Under the auspices of the Peace Conference, it was decreed that a plebiscite would take place in Schleswig in 1920.244

It [the Commission] made the decision of principle that there should indeed be a plebiscite held in North Schleswig. It was also in a position to determine the border for the two plebiscites between North and South; that the working of the plebiscite be overseen by a specially convened International Commission with representatives of the Allied and Associated Great Powers, as well as delegates of the Norwegian and Swedish governments;

242 Harrison Hibbert, "Paris Peace Conference," in Encyclopedia of Global Justice (Springer, 2011). 809

243 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. V (U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1919). 64, 401, 559, 612-13

244 The idea of a plebiscite was not new in settling disputes using the

self-determination of a people as was seen e.g. in Norway in 1814. For Schleswig, it had not only been mentioned in the past, but was also part of the Treaty of Prague. In 1866, the Austro-Prussian war had been fought and had been concluded with the Treaty of Prague. In this treaty text, Article V dealt with the possible reunification of North Schleswig to Denmark if the people there so wished. Bismarck however, chose to ignore the treaty after it had been signed and Denmark was not in a position to push its claim. Robertson, Bismarck. 297

and that this commission would have powers of administration and policing in the territory until the final status of the territory was settled.245

Though Schleswig was divided into two zones for the plebiscite, there was a draft resolution calling for Schleswig to be divided into three zones: Zone One was North Schleswig, whereas the much larger Zone Two, which comprised Central and South Schleswig, was to be split and in so doing create a third zone. This split was ultimately scrapped in favor of keeping a smaller Zone Two. The reasoning behind wanting the bisection of the larger the second zone was due to the rise of pro-Danish sentiments there in order to give the Germans in South Schleswig a vote that counted. This draft suggestion of splitting the second

zone was

resolutely rejected by Denmark, in order to reduce the possible influx of German people that might bring them inside its borders once they had been set; the plebiscite would thus proceed with two Zones.246

245 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford University Press, 2012). 166

246 Jean A Laponce, "National Self‐Determination and Referendums: The Case for Territorial Revisionism," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 2 (2001).; and Wambaugh and Carnegie Endowment for International, Plebiscites since the World War: With a Collection of Official Documents. 86-91

Map of the plebiscite zones in Schleswig.

Source: Jens Ole Christensen and Inge Adriansen. The Second Schleswig War 1864. Prelude, Events and Consequences. Museum Sønderjylland, 2013. [Map scale not given]

The plebiscites that were to take place were right-sizing plebiscites. “Right-sizing referendums, that is, votes dealing with the drawing of disputed borders between countries.”247 The plebiscites took place in 1920 as per the Paris Peace Conference. Zone One in North Schleswig voted first with 91.5 percent of the electorate. 74.2 percent voted to be part of Denmark. Zone Two voted with a turnout of 91.7 percent of the electorate. 80 percent voted to be part of the Weimar Republic.248 Zone One was then reunited with Denmark. The plebiscites, which had evoked great nationalist sentiments, gave both countries’, minority communities in the border areas. Germans in southern North Schleswig and Danes in northern South Schleswig.

From the plebiscite, the minority question arose in addition to other practical issues the new border would present. In all, eighteen agreements would be drafted into the Dano-German Convention of 1922.

Respectively with (1 and 2) the new frontier trace and frontier crossings; (3) a new régime of boundary waters and dikes; (4, 9 and 10) fishing, (7) navigation, and (8) pilotage service in the Flensburger Föhrde and other boundary waters; (5) the further use of graveyards; (6) exemption from transfer duties for the alienation of landed property in the frontier area; (11) nationality questions; (12 and 14) pensions and social insurances; (13) tax questions; (15 and 18) certain financial settlements, and (16 and 17) the handing over of Land Registry records and administrative acts.249

Concerning the minority rights, they were largely domestic affairs in the 1920s.

One key reason for this was a fear in Denmark of external intervention by

247 M. Qvortrup, Nationalism, Referendums and Democracy: Voting on Ethnic Issues and Independence (Taylor & Francis, 2016). 134

248 Rerup, "Grundtvig and the 19th Century." 266-67

249 Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective. 10

treaty obligations.250 Thus, as the Danes refused German proposals for a minority specific convention, they did approach the minority question with liberal ideals based in the democratic tradition from 1849. There could only come good from in treating their fellow Germans as their own: it would ensure the well-being of the Danes in South Schleswig as well as showing the Weimar Republic there was no need for concern for the Germans in Denmark.

This would be the first steps towards a concrete convention on minority rights.

The mutual respect for the interests of the national minorities was rooted in the delineation of the frontier in 1920 … alignment of minority politics had developed in an important area: the recognition of “the principle of disposition” (das Gesinnungsprinzip). For example, this was expressed in a Prussian school order, where the Danish minority was simply defined as “those German citizens that confess to Danish nationality,” adding that “The confession to belonging to a minority may not be neither tested nor disputed.” From now on the rule was “Minderheit ist wer will” (“Those who wish to be part of the minority are part of it”).251

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