[PDF] Top 20 4th JapanTaiwan_1201 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... December 4, 2010, “Soukairou Hall ( 想海樓ホール )” 1 st floor , GRIPS, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo  Organized by GRIPS, Hitotsubashi University Global COE program “Innovation in the Japanese ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  Exist exactly one for ANY exchange problem.  Always Pareto efficient and individually rational[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Paul Romer (1955-, 内生的成長理論) → 学界から消えた！？ Ben Bernanke (1953-, マクロ、金融) → FRB議長を辞めたのは好材料？ Douglas Diamond (1953-, 銀行取付) → 金融は無い？ 清滝信宏 (1955-, マクロ、金融) → まだ早い ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Q = K 1 =4 L 1 =8 Then, answer the following questions. (a) In the short run, the …rm is committed to hire a …xed amount of capital K(+1), and can vary its output Q only by employing an appropriate amount of labor ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (1) Write the payoff functions π 1 and π 2 (as a function of p 1 and p 2 ). (2) Derive the best response function for each player. (3) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. (4) Derive the prices (p ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Two neighboring homeowners, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose how many hours to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn (denoted by l 1 and l 2 ). Since the appearance of one’s property depends in part on the beauty of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... R n + := {(x 1 , ..., x n )|x i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n} ⊂ R n . For any x, y ∈ X, x % y means x is at least as preferred as y. Consumption set contains all conceivable alternatives. A budget set is a set of feasible ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... If the two pennies match, then player 2 wins player 1’s penny; if the pennies do not match, then 1 wins 2’s penny. Although the existence of Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed, the natural extension of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore  ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Problem Set 2: Posted on November 4 Advanced Microeconomics I (Fall, 1st, 2014) 1. Question 1 (7 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照