are then given as follows.
E[b(ˆ a, θ) + m(ˆ a, θ) + q ∗ (ˆ a, θ)(p − m(ˆ a, θ))] − ˆ a
≥ E[b(a, θ) + m(a, θ) + q ∗ (a, θ)(p − m(a, θ))] − a for all a (IC1 S)
The buyer’s reneging temptation is derived as follows. First, if state θ satisfying q(a, θ) = 1 realizes, the buyer can refuse to pay b(a, θ) though she has to follow the formal contract and pay p. Her short-term gain is b(a, θ). Next if state satisfying q(a, θ) = 0 realizes, the buyer can refuse to cancel the formal contract and to pay b(a, θ), and instead negotiate to obtain
(a) Show that if u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then
s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree r.
(b) Show that if u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are quasi-concave, then m(x 1 , x 2 ) :=
min{u(x 1 , x 2 ), v(x 1 , x 2 )} is also quasi-concave.
Continuous
(a) Show that if % is represented by a linear utility function, i.e., u(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 + x 2
with ; > 0, then % satis…es the above three properties.
(b) Find the preference relation that is 1) Additive and Strictly monotone but not Continuous, and 2) Strictly monotone and Continuous but not Additive.
More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロアの恒等式
Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is
simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i
and ω after a sign change.
IEEE TCAD (ATPG)
H. Fujiwara, et al., "A design of programmable logic arrays with universal tests," IEEE Trans. on Computers, 1981.
Edward McCluskey 教授にも気に入られた論文 その後、 Stanford 大でも PLA の DFT の研究が行われた
• 2 k – 1 Θ(2 k ) where Θ = asymptotically tight bound • Less area overhead
LF 2 SR and LFSR:
• 2 k(k+1)/2 – 1 Ω (2 k ) where Ω = asymptotic lower bound • Inferior to I 2 SR in terms of area overhead
■ If you will not attend the ARSC general meeting on December 13, 2013, please email or fax the letter of attorney to the Organizing Committee by November 30.. Return address:2[r]
* PORT *
* digit:
* 3 2 1 0 * -a- -a- -a- -a- * | | | | | | | | * f b f b f b f b * | | | | | | | | * -g- -g- -g- -g- * | | | | | | | | * e c e c e c e c * | | | | | | | | * -d- -d- -d- -d- *
with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1
+ .
(a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)
“Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r]
Consider the case that M ≻ m. By I and C, there must be a single number v(s) ∈ [0, 1] such that
v(s) ◦ M ⊕ (1 − v(s)) ◦ m ∼ [s]
where [s] is a certain lottery with prize s, i.e., [s] = 1 ◦ s. In particular, v(M ) = 1 and v(m) = 0. I implies that