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トップPDF PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...

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PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 3: Due on May 28 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2013) 1. Question 1 (5 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing ...

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PS3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Problem Set 3: Due on May 24 Advanced Microeconomics I (Spring, 1st, 2012) 1. Question 1 (4 points) A real-valued function f (x) is called homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g : R → R is a strictly increasing ...

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... free 3- slice pizza under the following ...and 3). If a + b ≤ 3, then each player gets her/his requested demands (and the owner eats any leftover ...> 3, then both players get ...

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Final 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (5) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period payoff. ...

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en 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...

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PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Klemperer (2002), “How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions,” European Economic Review.  Milgrom (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge U Press[r] ...

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PS2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Characterize the first-best solution. (b) Suppose that the seller cannot observe θ: θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } and Pr[θ = θ L ] = β with 0 < θ L < θ H . Set up the seller’s optimization problem under this ...

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EX2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

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Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy.  Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R .  After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ...

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Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... A set S in R n is called compact if it is closed and bounded. Theorem 3 (Weierstrass, Existence of Extreme Values) Let f : S → R be a continuous real-valued function where S is a non-empty compact subset of R n . ...

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Lec7 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec7 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...

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Lec9 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...

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Lec2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis   ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3)   (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though  Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice!  Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) ...

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Lec4 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec4 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Both the Bertrand and Cournot models are particular cases of a more general model of oligopoly competition where firms choose prices and quantities (or capacities.).  Ber[r] ...

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Lec5 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...

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Lec8 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  A tree starts with the initial node and ends at.. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (b) If consumer’s choice satis…es the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we can always construct a utility function which is consistent with such choice behav- iour. (c) If a consumer problem has a solution, then ...

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