... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L **2** to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...

2

... c **s**) − |ν l τ(ˆ **s**) (c) \ {ˆ **s**}| o holds for any step l in the cycle, at any school c which ˆ **s** is admitted, q τ(ˆ c **s**) = |ν l τ(ˆ **s**) (c)| holds for any step l in the ...ˆ ...

14

... Substituting into p+q = 3=4, we achieve q = **1**=**2**. Since the game is symmetric, we can derive exactly the same result for Player **1**’**s** mixed action as well. Therefore, we get the mixed-strategy ...

2

... あい **1** 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき **2** 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき ...

70

... that a plea bargain is allowed): If both confess, each receives 3 years imprisonment. If neither confesses, both receive **1** year. If one confesses and the other one does not, the former will be set free ...

27

... all **s** i ∈ S i , which is identical to Nash equilibrium ...equilibrium **s** ∗∗ 6= **s** ∗ . Pick player j with **s** ∗∗ j 6= **s** ∗ j ...Since **s** ∗∗ j is a Nash equilibrium ...

5

... A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r] ...

2

... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, **1**) and the consumer’**s** wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’**s** ...

2

... St Petersburg Paradox (**1**) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P **s**∈S p(**s**)**s**. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in ...

15

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... or u i ( i ; i ) u i (**s** i ; i ) for all **s** i **2** S i . (**2**) 7. Mixed strategies: Application A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but ...

3

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...

20

... Let w = (w **1** , w **2** , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the ...

2

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1