# トップPDF PQ2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

### PQ2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices third-degree price discrimination. Group A’s elasticity of demand is ǫ A and

### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

X c∈C max n 0, q τ(ˆ c s) − |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c) \ {ˆ s}| o holds for any step l in the cycle, at any school c which ˆ s is admitted, q τ(ˆ c s) = |ν l τ(ˆ s) (c)| holds for any step l in the cycle. Hence, ˆ ss rejected status for any school which ˆ s once proposed to cannot change to the non-rejected status by reproposal conditions (i) or (iii). Moreover, since a student s such that s ∈ S τ(ˆ s) and f (ˆ s) < f (s) cannot be assigned to a school which ˆ s prefers to her own assignment, reproposal condition (ii) does not apply to ˆ s. Therefore, ˆ s is always assigned to the same school in the cycle. Now we can separate the set of students who are always unfree because they do not change their assignments in the cycle. With the set of students who are always free in the cycle, only the reproposal condition (iii) could apply and it is when there was a reproposal before step t ′ . But a reproposal based on (iii) gives
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### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Substituting into p+q = 3=4, we achieve q = 1=2. Since the game is symmetric, we can derive exactly the same result for Player 1s mixed action as well. Therefore, we get the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: both players choose Rock, Paper and Scissors with probabilities 1=4; 1=2; 1=4 respectively.

### 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

るい ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ あい あい あい あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき こうき

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### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

that a plea bargain is allowed):    If both confess, each receives 3 years imprisonment.    If neither confesses, both receive 1 year.    If one confesses and the other one does not, the former will be set free immediately ( 0 payoff) and

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### PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

for all s i ∈ S i , which is identical to Nash equilibrium condition. To establish uniqueness, assume on the contrary that there is another Nash equilibrium s ∗∗ 6= s ∗ . Pick player j with s ∗∗ j 6= s ∗ j . Since s ∗∗ j is a Nash equilibrium strategy,

### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

A good is called normal (resp. inferior) if consumption of it increases (resp. declines) as income increases, holding prices constant.. Show the following claims.[r]

### Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference can be expressed in the form of U (x, y, z) = V (x, y) + z. Derive V (x, y).

### Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

St Petersburg Paradox (1) The most primitive way to evaluate a lottery is to calculate its mathematical expectation, i.e., E[p] = P s∈S p(s)s. Daniel Bernoulli first doubt this approach in the 18th century when he examined the famous St. Pertersburg paradox.

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### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)

### PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)

### PracticeM2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

or u i ( i ; i ) u i (s i ; i ) for all s i 2 S i . (2) 7. Mixed strategies: Application A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but prefers that someone else make the phone call. They choose either “call” or “not” independently and simultaneously. A person receives 0 payo¤ if no

### EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

### PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show that if U is quasi-concave, V is concave. 5. Question 5 (4 points)

### Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r]

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### PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Let w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) ≫ 0 be factor prices and y be an (target) output. (a) Does the production function exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale? Explain. (b) Calculate the conditional input demand function for factors 1 and 2. (c) Suppose w 3 >

### PQ2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]