トップPDF Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Edgeworth Box | エッジワース・ボックス The most useful example of an exchange economy is one in which there are two people and two goods. This economy’s set of allocations can be illustrated in an Edgeworth box ( エッジワース・ボックス ) diagram.

28 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics  I  (ECO600E)  in  which  we  study  individual  economic  decisions  and  their  aggregate [r]

2 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics  I  (ECO600E)  in  which  we  study  individual  economic  decisions  and  their  aggregate [r]

2 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics I (ECO601E) in which we study individual economic decisions and their  aggregate consequence[r]

2 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics  I  (ECO600E)  in  which  we  study  individual  economic  decisions  and  their  aggregate [r]

2 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics I (ECO601E) in which we study individual economic decisions and their  aggregate consequence[r]

2 さらに読み込む

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

syllabus micro2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics I (ECO601E) in which we study individual economic decisions and their  aggregate consequence[r]

2 さらに読み込む

最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

The main theorem shows that the condition that a schools’ priority profile ≻ C has a common priority order for every type t ∈ T is sufficient for the existence of feasible assignments which are both fair and non-wasteful. This condition may be strong and hard to be satisfied when the classification of types is coarse. For instance, if the type set is {high income, low income} and there is a priority for students who live in each school’s walk zone, priority orders for high income students will differ across schools in general. However, this can be modified by making a finer type classification, {high income, low income} × {c 1 ’s walk zone, c 2s walk zone,...}.
さらに見せる

14 さらに読み込む

EX2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

PS2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

j + x j − x i x j , where x i is i’s effort and x j is the effort of the other player. Assume x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Is it Pareto efficient? (b) Suppose that the players interact over time, which we model with the infinitely repeated version of the game. Let δ denote the (common) discount factor of the players. Under what conditions can the players sustain some positive effort level k = x 1 = x 2 > 0 over time?

2 さらに読み込む

Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Proof of Pratt’s Theorem (1) Sketch of the Proof. To establish (i) ⇔ (iii), it is enough to show that P is positively related to r. Let ε be a “small” random variable with expectation of zero, i.e., E(ε) = 0. The risk premium P (ε) (at initial wealth x) is defined by

14 さらに読み込む

EX2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Similarly, player 2 must be indi¤erent amongst choosing X and Y , which implies 4q + 6(1 q) = 7(1 q) , 5q = 1 , q = 1=5. Thus, the mixed-strategy equilibirum is that player 1 takes A with probability 1=5 (and B with probability 4=5) and player 2 takes X with probability 3=4 (and Y with probability 1=4).

2 さらに読み込む

PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ2 2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r]

1 さらに読み込む

Final2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that can achieve (U, L) is the first period? If so, describe the equilibrium strategies. If not, explain why. 2. Duopoly (32 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by firm 1 and firm 2, simul- taneously and independently select their own price, p 1 and p 2 . The firms’ products

2 さらに読み込む

Final2 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final2 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

(c) Confirm that by choosing the tax t appropriately, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced. (d) Add a second firm with a different production function. Now the consumers observe a pollution level b = b 1 + b 2 . Show that the social optimum can still

3 さらに読み込む

Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

Three firms (1, 2 and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= E). A firm advertises exactly once per day. If more than one firm advertises at the same time, their profits become 0. If exactly one firm advertises in the morning, its profit is 1; if exactly one firm advertises in the evening, its profit is 2. Firms must make their daily advertising decisions simultaneously.

2 さらに読み込む

Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 15 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

However, it is difficult to assess how reasonable some axioms are without having in mind a specific bargaining procedure. In particular, IIA and PAR are hard to defend in the abstract. Unless we can find a sensible strategic model that has an equilibrium corresponding to the Nash solution, the appeal of Nash’s axioms is in doubt.

11 さらに読み込む

Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

where u i (x, θ i ) is the money-equivalent value of alternative x ∈ X. This assumes the case of private values in which player i’s payoff does not depend directly on other players’ types. If it does, then it is called common values case. The outcome (of the mechanism) is described by

16 さらに読み込む

最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

るい ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ ひとみ あい あい あい あい 1 位 位 位 位 ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき ともき だいき だいき だいき だいき 2 位 位 位 位 こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき こうき ともき ともき ともき ともき 3 位 位 位 位 だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき だいき こうき こうき こうき こうき

70 さらに読み込む

Show all 10000 documents...