トップPDF Lec1 6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec1 6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Slutsky Equation (1) When the price of a good declines, there are two conceptually separate reactions: The consumer is expected to substitute the relatively cheaper good for the now relatively more expensive good ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 + x 2 with ; > 0, then % satis…es the above three ...is 1) Additive and Strictly monotone but not Continuous, and 2) Strictly monotone and Continuous but not ...
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Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (5) Suppose that this game is played finitely many times, say T (≥ 2) times. De- rive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of such a finitely repeated game. Assume that payoff of each player is sum of each period payoff. ...
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en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...
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Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Show that the following type of Nash equilibria does NOT exist: One firm chooses pure strategy M , and other two firms use mixed strategies. (c) Derive a symmetric mixed ...
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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A function f (x) is homothetic if f (x) = g(h(x)) where g is a strictly increasing function and h is a function which is homogeneous of degree 1. Suppose preferences can be represented by a homothetic utility ...
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PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 【戦略】 個々のプレイヤーがとることのできる行動 【利得】 起こり得る行動の組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲームの解（予測）はどうやって与えられる？ A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ...
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Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロアの恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices (price ratio) and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, a and b, have the following indirect utility ...
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Final1 11 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (d) If the relative risk aversion of some risk averse decision maker is independent of her wealth, then her absolute risk aversion MUST be decreasing in wealth.. (e) The competitive equi[r] ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Suppose that the decision maker’s preferences under uncertainty are described by the vNM utility function, u(x) = √ x. (a) Is the decision maker risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Explain why. (b) ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... endowment of time is 2ω 1 units. There is no (initial) endowment of consumption good. Each individual has a common utility function U (x) = ln x 1 + 2a ln x 2 . Sup- pose that only Ann owns the firm and its ...
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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... not have any Nash equilibrium, including mixed strategy equilibrium. 5. Question 5 (6 points, Review) A crime is observed by a group of n people. Each person would like the police to be informed but prefers that ...
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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams upcoming, Mathematics (M) and Japanese (J), and have to decide how to allocate your time to study each ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...
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Lec6 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A strategy in dynamic games is a complete action plan which prescribes how the player will act in each possible.. contingencies in future..[r] ...
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