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トップPDF Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

トップPDF Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website によって編集されました 123deta JP

Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... called 1 continuous at a point x 0 if, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that d(x, x 0 ) < δ implies that d(f (x), f (x 0 )) < ...domain. 3 uniformly continuous if, for all ε > 0, there ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Micro1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... where x is a vector of choice variables, and a := (a 1 , ..., a m ) is a vector of parameters ( パラメータ ) that may enter the objective function and constraint. Suppose that for each vector a, the solution is unique ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

EX1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

EX1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

Slide1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 5. Production Economy (25 points) Consider an economy with two firms and two consumers. Firm 1 is entirely owned by consumer 1; it produces good A from input X via the production function a = 2x. Firm 2 is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 囚人ジレンマ:注意点  このゲームでは個々プレーヤーが最適戦略を持つ  【最適戦略(支配戦略)】 他プレーヤーたちがどのような行 動を選択しても、自分がある特定行動Aを選ぶことによって 利得が最大化されるとき、行動Aを「支配戦略」と呼ぶ。 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... and 3) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= ...is 1; if exactly one firm advertises in the evening, its profit is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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EX2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

EX2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

MOF Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  Klemperer (2002), “How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions,” European Economic Review.  Milgrom (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge U Press[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PQ2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

PS2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... . Consumers buy at most one unit and have utility function u (s|θ) = θs if they consume one unit of quality s and 0 if they do not consume. The monopolist decides on the quality and price that it is ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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EX2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

EX2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

Lec2 3 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda&#039;s website

Lec2 3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Price Discrimination (1) A monopoly firm may further raise profit by charging different prices across consumers. This exercise is called price discrimination. The traditional classification of the forms of price ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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