... called **1** continuous at a point x 0 if, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that d(x, x 0 ) < δ implies that d(f (x), f (x 0 )) < ...domain. **3** uniformly continuous if, for all ε > 0, there ...

16

... vNM Utility Function (**1**) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ...

15

... where x is a vector of choice variables, and a := (a **1** , ..., a m ) is a vector of parameters ( パラメータ ) that may enter the objective function and constraint. Suppose that for each vector a, the solution is unique ...

34

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...

26

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+**1** + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...

1

... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...

20

... 5. Production Economy (25 points) Consider an economy with two firms and two consumers. Firm **1** is entirely owned by consumer **1**; it produces good A from input X via the production function a = 2x. Firm 2 is ...

2

... 囚人**の**ジレンマ：注意点 このゲームでは個々**の**プレーヤーが最適戦略を持つ 【最適戦略（支配戦略）】 他**の**プレーヤーたちがどのような行 動を選択しても、自分がある特定**の**行動Aを選ぶことによって 利得が最大化されるとき、行動Aを「支配戦略」と呼ぶ。 ...

22

... and **3**) put three items on the market and can advertise these products either on morning (= M ) or evening TV (= ...is **1**; if exactly one firm advertises in the evening, its profit is ...

2

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Klemperer (2002), “How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions,” European Economic Review. Milgrom (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge U Press[r] ...

22

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... . Consumers buy at most one unit and have utility function u (**s**|θ) = θ**s** if they consume one unit of quality **s** and 0 if they do not consume. The monopolist decides on the quality and price that it is ...

2

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...

1

... Price Discrimination (**1**) A monopoly firm may further raise profit by charging different prices across consumers. This exercise is called price discrimination. The traditional classification of the forms of price ...

12