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トップPDF Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

トップPDF Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website によって編集されました 123deta JP

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... i (p, u) denote the Hicksian demand function of good i and e(p, u) denote the expenditure function. Then, state the Shephard’s lemma. (c) Using envelope theorem, derive either (a) Roy’s identity, or (b) ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Micro1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... More on Roy’s Identity | もっとロア恒等式 Roy’s identity says that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for good i is simply the ratio of the partial derivatives of indirect utility with respect to p i ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Midterm 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

...  【戦略】 個々プレイヤーがとることできる行動  【利得】 起こり得る行動組み合わせに応じた満足度、効用 Q: ゲーム解(予測)はどうやって与えられる? A: 実はノイマン達は一般的な解を生み出せなかった… ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PQ1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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EX1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

1

PS1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... vNM Utility Function (1) Note the function U is a utility function representing the preferences on L(S) while v is a utility function defined over S, which is the building block for the construction of U (p). We ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... 6. General Equilibrium (30 points) Consider a production economy with two individuals, Ann (A) and Bob (B), and two goods, leisure x 1 and a consumption good x 2 . Ann and Bob have equal en- dowments of time (= ω ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the lottery ...with 1 − ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PracticeM 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeM 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... Consider a consumer problem. Suppose that a choice function x(p; !) satis…es Walras’s law and WA. Then, show that x(p; !) is homogeneous of degree zero. 6. Lagrange’s Method You have two …nal exams ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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PracticeF 最近の更新履歴  yyasuda's website

PracticeF 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... long-run total, average, and marginal cost functions. 7. Expected Utility Suppose that an individual can either exert e¤ort or not. The cost of e¤ort is c. Her initial wealth is 100. Her probability of facing a loss 75 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

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