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電力小売全面自由化が小売価格に与える影響に 関する実証研究

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電力小売全面自由化が小売価格に与える影響に 関する実証研究

Empirical Study on the Impacts of Electricity Retail Market Full Liberalization on Power Retail Prices

張 砣

京都大学 大学院経済学研究科 再生可能エネルギー経済学講座

Email: [email protected]

(2)

目次

1. 自由化政策の歴史と背景

2. データセット、モデル、および識別戦略

3. 実証結果

1.

固定効果パネルモデルの回帰結果

2. GLS

パネル回帰の結果

3.

操作変数法回帰の結果

4. まとめと今後の課題

(3)

1 自由化政策の歴史と背景

(4)

日本 電力小売市場政策の歴史

研究問題:自由化政策が家庭小売電価に与えた影響

(5)

自由化改革政策

垂直統合的 · 地域独占市場 水平分業的分散型市場

(6)

自由化改革政策の効果(I):

小売電気事業者の登録件数の推移

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

20164 20167 201610 20171 20174 20177 201710 20181 20184 20187 201810 20191 20194 20197 201910 20201 20204 20207 202010 20211 20214 20217 202110 20221 20224 20227

登録件数

(7)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Apr-16 Aug-16 Dec-16 Apr-17 Aug-17 Dec-17 Apr-18 Aug-18 Dec-18 Apr-19 Aug-19 Dec-19 Apr-20 Aug-20 Dec-20 Apr-21 Aug-21 Dec-21 Apr-22 Aug-22

新規電力小売取引量の 市場シ(%)

特別高圧 高圧 低圧(電灯) 低圧(電力)

自由化改革政策の効果 (II):

新規電力小売取引量の市場シェア

研究問題:自由化政策 が家庭小売電価に与え

た影響

(8)

2 データセット、モデル、

および識別戦略

(9)

労働コスト

電力卸売価格 送電コスト 再エネ賦課金 その他運営費用

およそ61%

電力小売価格のコスト構造

前日卸電力市場価格:

日本卸電力取引所(JEPX)

地域の電力輸入:

電力広域的運営推進機関(OCCTO)

再生可能エネルギー発電促進賦課金 毎月勤労統計調査(地方調査):

卸売業,小売業平均月間現金給与額 誤差項

被解釈変数:

家庭の電気 料金の平均

ガス取引単価電力 監視等委員

(10)

再生可能エネルギー発電促進賦課金の推移

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

再生可能エネルギー発電 促進賦課金

(JP Y/ kW n)

(11)

0.1.2.3.4新新新新新新新新新新新新新

2016m7 2017m1 2017m7 2018m1 2018m7 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1 2020m7 2021m1 2021m7 2022m1 2022m7 新新 新新 新新 新新新 新新

新新 新新 新新 新新

解釈変数: 新電力取引量の小売市場シェア 明らかな群間異質性

東京 大阪

北陸 中国 北海道

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実証モデル

𝑃𝑃

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅:家庭の電気料金の平均単価電力

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿:新電力取引量の小売市場シェアは、市場自由化の指標と

して使用されている。

• 上記のモデルで考慮されている卸売電力価格

𝑃𝑃

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊 、雇用コスト

𝐶𝐶

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 、 送電コスト

𝐶𝐶

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿などに加え、地域固定効果

𝜆𝜆

𝑖𝑖と月次固定効果

𝜂𝜂

𝑖𝑖を制御

している。

𝑡𝑡

:擬似相関(

Spurious Correlation

)を回避するために、時間を制御している。

𝜀𝜀

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

:

誤差項の異質性(時間的自己相関やグループ間の相関)を考慮するため、

GLS

推定法を用いる。

𝑃𝑃

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅

= 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

+ 𝛽𝛽

1

𝑃𝑃

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊

+𝛽𝛽

2

𝐶𝐶

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

+ 𝛽𝛽

3

𝐶𝐶

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

+ 𝜆𝜆

𝑖𝑖

+ 𝜂𝜂

𝑖𝑖

+ 𝜀𝜀

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(13)

内生性 :逆因果性の問題 (I)

家庭の電気料 金の平均単価

電力 新電力取引量の小売

市場シェア

The increase in market share of new retail firms can promote competition,

leading to lower retail prices.

逆因果性:High retail prices attract more retail companies to enter the

market, thereby increasing the market share of new retail firms

+ -

Migration is usually unaffected by Electricity price, but will affect the

share of new small retailers

(14)

内生性 :逆因果性の問題 (II)

Migration and Switch Behaviors

Residents are more likely to switch their contracted electricity retailer after Moving/Migrating:

• Firstly, the switching costs associated with changing electricity retailers is lower during the moving process;

• Secondly, electricity retailers often conduct

Marketing/Sales-Promotion activities during the moving process to attract consumers to choose them as their provider.

Active Clients

(15)

解釈変数: 新電力取引量の小売市場シェア (再揭)

明らかな時間異質性( Steeper Growth in April, May and June )

東京 大阪

北陸 中国 北海道

(16)

Selection of Instrument Variable(IV):

Share of residents migrating to the region

Residential movements inside the region would NOT directly affect the total demand and therefore, the retail price, but will affect the swifts from the Otte Denryoku(

大手電力

) to the Shindenryoku(

新電力

).

On the one hand, the residential moving behaviors are not likely to be associated by the retail power price.

On the other hand, residents are more likely to switch their contracted electricity retailer after moving.

In Japan, promptly registering one's residential information to the municipal government(

市役所

) is a legal obligation of residents.

The info on monthly movement is recorded on the Basic Resident Registration Card(

住民基本台帳

), and is made public by the local government.

Therefore, we use the accumulated share of female and male migration as

the instrumental variables for share of new retailers.

(17)

4 実証結果

(18)

固定効果パネルモデルの回帰結果

(1) (2) (3) (4)

baseline0 baseline1 baseline2 baseline3

Share of New

Retailers(%) 8.243*** (0.931) -3.002*** (0.938) -3.599*** (0.904) -3.431*** (0.893)

Wholesale Price 0.124*** (0.017) 0.118*** (0.017)

time 0.066*** (0.005) 0.044*** (0.005) 0.041*** (0.006)

Wind Output(log) -0.378*** (0.125)

Solar Output(log) 0.545*** (0.180)

Import(log) -0.010 (0.014)

Constant 18.056*** (0.120) 20.338*** (0.228) 19.440*** (0.251) 16.779*** (2.753)

Region Dummy Y Y Y Y

Month Dummy N Y Y Y

Samples 711 711 711 711

Groups 9 9 9 9

Adj R2 0.089 0.852 0.863 0.867

F 78.394 52.707 57.194 57.035

rho 0.478 0.890 0.887 0.907

Spurious Correlation

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GLS パネル回帰の結果

(1) (2) (3) (4)

longpanel

0 longpanel

1 longpanel

2 longpanel

Share of New 3

Retailers(%) -4.130*** (1.382) -3.671*** (1.359) -3.752*** (1.350) -3.752*** (1.350) Wholesale Price 0.023*** (0.007) 0.023*** (0.007) 0.023*** (0.007)

time 0.061*** (0.004) 0.062*** (0.004) 0.062*** (0.004)

Wind Output(log) 0.059 (0.039) 0.059 (0.039)

Solar Output(log) 0.050 (0.074) 0.050 (0.074)

Constant 19.419*** (0.407) 19.048*** (0.406) 17.767*** (1.089) 17.767*** (1.089)

Region Dummy Y Y Y Y

Month Dummy Y Y Y Y

Samples 711 711 711 711

Groups 9 9 9 9

when the proportion of small retailers reaches 100%, the retail electricity price will decrease by 3.752 JPY/kWh

(20)

操作変数法回帰の結果

(1) (2) (3) (4)

ivregr0 ivregr1 ivregr2 ivregr3

Share of New

Retailers(%) 18.861*** (3.296) -2.105** (1.062) -3.325*** (1.022) -3.031*** (0.984)

Wholesale Price 0.124*** (0.017) 0.119*** (0.017)

time 0.549* (0.303)

Sales of New

Retailers(%) -2.491*** (0.554)

Wind Output(log) -0.342*** (0.124)

Solar Output(log) 0.405** (0.179)

Region Dummy Y Y Y Y

Month Dummy N Y Y Y

Samples 711 711 711 711

Groups 9 9 9 9

Adj R2 -0.082 0.851 0.863 0.871

F 32.753 52.550 57.119 59.007

when the proportion of small retailers reaches 100%, the retail electricity price will decrease by 3.031 JPY/kWh

(21)

4 まとめと今後の課題

(22)

まとめと今後の課題

Using data from the period between April 2016 and October 2022, a total of six and a half years, we empirically demonstrate that this policy indeed has a

significant lowering effect on prices.

For example, between April 2016 and October 2022 in Tokyo, the proportion of electricity sold by new retailers increased to 37.16%, resulting in a net reduction of 1.2846 yen/kWh in retail electricity prices.

In the nine major distribution regions of Japan, the proportion of electricity sold by retail power companies was 26.69% in October 2022, leading to an overall decrease of 0.9227 yen/kWh in retail electricity prices by the end of October.

The nationwide average penetration rate is around 20%, with the lowest share in the Hokuriku region at only 7%.

Therefore, how to encourage households to further participate and promote

competition will be an important focus of future policies.

(23)

主要な参考文献

Defeuilley, C. (2009). "Retail competition in electricity markets." Energy Policy 37(2): 377-386.

Mirza, F. M. and O. Bergland (2012). "Pass-through of wholesale price to the end user retail price in the Norwegian electricity market." Energy Economics 34(6): 2003-2012.

Guo, B. and G. C. Gissey (2021). "Cost pass-through in the British wholesale electricity market."

Energy Economics 102: 105497.

Xiaoping, H. and R. David (2015). Why Do More British Consumers Not Switch Energy Suppliers?

The Role of Individual Attitudes, EPRG Working Paper 1515, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics1525.

Erdogan, M. R., et al. (2022). "The switching behavior of large-scale electricity consumers in The Turkish electricity retail market." Energy Policy 160: 112701.

Shin, K. J. and S. Managi (2017). "Liberalization of a retail electricity market: Consumer satisfaction and household switching behavior in Japan." Energy Policy 110: 675-685.

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