従来の中小企業は営業利益のみを追求して自己変革を行ってきましたが、このような経営は当時「第二の創業」と呼ばれ、中小企業は新たな時代を迎えました。新しい中小企業の経営発展が注目されています。
事業価値の観点から、新興中小企業にはデジタルトランスフォーメーション(DX)が必要です。
CFO’s Relative Compensation and Stock Price Crash Risk
Introduction
This study found that in the total sample there is a significant positive relationship between the relative salary of the CFO and the risk of a stock price crash. That is, as the relative salary of the CFO increases, salary incentives have a negative incentive effect, increasing the risk of a crash in corporate stock prices. Phased tests showed that after salary regulation in 2014, the positive correlation between the relative salary of the CFO and the risk of a stock price crash in state-owned enterprises weakened.
Further research showed that the significant positive relationship between the CFO's relative pay and the risk of a stock price crash is only found in companies with low accounting conservatism and companies with high monopoly power.
Literature review and research hypothesis
- The relative salary of the CFO and stock price crash risk
- Ownership, the relative salary of the CFO and stock price crash risk
- Salary regulation, relative salary of CFOs and the stock price crash risk
In this context, this paper argues that compared to non-SOEs, the downside risk of SOEs' stock prices may be increasingly influenced by the relative pay of CFOs. H2: All things being equal, compared to that of non-SOEs, the relative pay of CFOs of SOEs has a greater and more significant impact on stock price downside risk. H3a: After wage regulation, the positive correlation between the relative pay of CFOs of state-owned enterprises and the risk of exchange rate depreciation is weakened.
H3b: After wage regulation, the negative correlation between the relative wages of SOEs' CFOs and the risk of exchange rate depreciation increases.
Research design and descriptive statistics
- Sample selection and data sources
- Variable setting
- The independent variable is stock price crash risk
- The dependent variable is the relative salary of CFOs
- The control variables-personal characteristics of CFOs
- The control variables are the company characteristics
- Model setting
- Descriptive statistics of the main variables
- Statistics of stock price plunging events
The first indicator is the NCSKEW, which is used to measure the downward trend in the stock price of individual stocks. The second indicator is DUVOL, which is used to measure stock price volatility. Secretary If the CFO is also the secretary of the board, the variable is assigned the value 1;.
Drawing on existing literature [1,10,45] combined with the needs of this study, this paper constructs model (6) to measure the impact of relative CFO pay on stock price crash risk.
Empirical analysis
- The relative salary of the CFO and stock price crash risk
- Salary control and the stock price crash risk
- Robustness test
- Endogenous control
- Winsorize
This article uses model (6) to test the influence of the relative salary of the CFO of state-owned enterprises on the risk of a stock price crash in stages before and after the 2014 reform of the 'salary regulation'. The table shows that in SOEs Although the regression coefficient of the relative salary of financial directors before and after the salary regulation is significantly positive, the regression coefficient becomes significantly smaller after the salary restrictions, and the salary regulation improves the effect of managers' salary incentives in SOEs. companies to some extent. To ensure the rationality and reliability of the above conclusions, the following robustness tests are performed in this article:
This article refers to the research by Jiang Dequan et al. and uses the following methods to control for endogeneity. First, given that the position of the CFO, that is, the relative level of pay, may depend on the characteristics of the CFO, such as age, education, part-time background, etc., of the model. Next, SalaryRes is taken as the relative variable of CFO salary to re-examine the main effect as shown in model (9).
Column (1) and column (2) show that the regression coefficients of the CFO's relative compensation residual and the two stock price crash risk indicators are positive and significant at the 10% level. Columns (3) through column (6) respectively report the regression results of the CFO's relative salary residual and two stock price collapse risk indicators in different ownership samples. The results show that the risk of stock price collapse is only positively correlated with the relative salary residual of the CFO in samples of SOEs.
Column (7) to column (10) show the impact of pay controls on the sample of SOEs, and the results show that the exacerbating effect of CFO relative pay on the risk of stock price crash in SOEs. companies have weakened after the wage adjustment. The main continuous variables in this study were treated at 1% double-tailed winsorization to eliminate the influence of extreme values of samples on the results, and the results were tested again.
Further analysis
- Accounting conservatism, the relative salary of the CFO and the stock price crash risk
- Market competition, the relative salary of the CFO and the stock price crash risk
The regression results show that in the samples with low accounting conservatism, the risk of a share price crash increases as the CFO's relative salary increases. In companies with high accounting conservatism, however, the CFO's relative salary has no significant effect on the risk of a share price crash. This result confirms the rationality of the above inference and provides evidence and support to strengthen corporate governance and reduce the risk of stock price crash.
Studies have shown that in addition to corporate governance, the competitive pressures of the product market can also constrain managerial behavior [63]. Therefore, it can be inferred that in industries with weak competition, the relative salary of the CFO has a greater impact on the share price crash risk. According to this inference combined with hypothesis 2, it is inferred that in industries with weak market competition, the relative salary of the CFO of state-owned enterprises has a greater impact on the stock price crash risk.
Specifically, according to the 2012 CSRC industry classification standard, manufacturing industry is divided according to the first two characters, and non-manufacturing industries are divided into 22 industries according to the first character. The market share is defined by the ratio between business revenues and the total annual volume of business of the industry, and the degree of market competition (HHI) by the sum of the squares of the market share. The regression results show that in a sample of firms with weak market competition, the risk of a stock price decline increases as the relative pay of the CFO increases.
However, in competitive companies, there is no significant relationship between the relative salary of the CFO and the risk of a stock price crash. Judging from the nature of property rights, the positive correlation between the relative compensation of the CFO and the risk of a stock price crash exists only for state-owned enterprises with weak competitiveness, that is, with a high degree of monopoly power, indicating that there is a significant negative governance effect in the executive compensation system.
Conclusion and Discussion
私は、TPSであるトヨタ生産方式が重要な位置を占めていると考えています。トヨタ生産方式(TPS)はトヨタ自動車株式会社によって創設されました。 「ジャストインタイム(JIT)」と「自動化」の2つの柱について2回に分けて解説します。
これは、需要に基づいて生産することを意味します。バックエンド プロセスをレンダリングするための主なツールはカンバン方式です。大野耐一氏の著書『トヨタ生産方式』の「なぜ」を5回繰り返します。前述したように、トヨタ生産方式のシステム「ジャスト・イン・タイム(JIT)」の2が柱となっている。
本章では、トヨタ生産方式の創成期と確率論的時代を振り返る。5 専門家へのインタビューによれば、製造業において優れた生産方式を確立した企業には必ずそのルーツがある。私が持って生まれたもの。
53 第 3 章 トヨタ生産方式の模倣が難しい要因とは TPS が設立されたのは、トヨタ生産方式の実現に対する揺るぎない信念がありました。生産面では、生産ラインの滞りや無駄をなくすためにTPSを導入しました。
62 第 4 章 トヨタ生産方式の形成と模倣の難しさ このような考え方のもとにジャストインタイムが発展し、現在のトヨタ生産方式が発展した 大野耐一(1978)「トヨタ生産方式:規模の経済の観点から』ダイヤモンド社