The Importance of Regional Power Status ; US-China Relations as a Contrasting Case

The Importance of Regional Power Status ; US‑China Relations as a Contrasting Case

著者 Haddad Michal

journal or

publication title

人間社会環境研究

volume 15

page range 107‑124

year 2008‑03‑27

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2297/9836

論文

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

Thelmportanceof･RegionalPowerStatus；

US-ChinaRelationsasaContrastinｇＣａｓｅ

社会環境科学研究科国際社会環境学専攻 MichalHaddad

地域大国としての地位の重要`性

一対照的事例としての米中関係 ハダド・ミハル

要旨

この論文は，修士論文のために私が提出した仮説Ｉの実証を補強することを目的とする。こ の仮説は，地域大国の地位が同盟結成の決定的な要因であるというもので，修士論文では米国 の日本との同盟をそれによって説明した。本論文では，中国と米国との関係を対照的事例とし て説明する。戦争直後に，米中の関係は，中国の弱さ，不安定さのために同盟を形成しない場 合となった。５０年代には，米国はアジアで中国をその主な敵とみなした。次第に米国は，中国 の勢力を見直すようになり，６０年代には中国を地域大国として見るようになった。ベトナム戦 争は，米国に中国と国交を結ぶ必要性を確信させた。

キーワード：地域大国，米中関係，冷戦

thatlackofregionalimportancemightleada s叩erpowertorefiamfTomfbnnmganallianceorto abstamfi･omhavmgrelationsaltogetherlThus，fbr example,theUSchosetoallocatefewerresourcesand devotedconsiderablylesseHbrttofbnnmgrelations withConⅡnunistChmalnilthel960slnternational pressuresandmoreurgentproblemsaswellasthe complicatedsituationinChmacombmedtominimize America，sfbcusonsecurlngaworkmgrelationship withChmaFurthermore,ｔｈｅＵＳ－ＣｈｍａｃａｓｅｗＵｌｂｅ ｒｅｖｉｅｗｅｄｉｎordertoprovidemoleevidenceanda generalbasisfbrthehypothesis・Whenasupelpower hasnorelationsoraconfiDntationwitharegional power，thatstateofaffairswillpersistuntilthe superpowerencountersregionalissuesthatitcannot solveorpromotebenefitiallyうaloneOncelegional quandariesarise,thevalueofrelationswitharegional lntroduclion

Thisarticlepresentsacontrastmgcasetoa

hypothesisIdevelopedandprovedmtheMaster,s

thesis1Ihypothesizedthatas叩elpowerneedsto

alignwithatleastoneregionalpowerlnanygiven

region,ifitwishestomaintamitsworldwidestatusA

regionalpowercanprovideabasefbrsupport,which

facilitatesthechancesfbrsuccessoftllegeatpower,s

engagementmtheregionForasuperpoweL

alignmentswithkeyactorsmvariousregionsarethe

bestwaytomaxmizeitsbenefitsandtorealizeallof

itsinterests・USrelationswithChinaarepresented

hereasacontrastmgcasetoprovidefiJrtherevidence

thatregionalstatusisannnportantftlctorlna

superpower,scalculationmfbnningrelations

ConverselyうｔｈｅＵＳ－Ｃｈｍａｃａｓｅｉｓｆｉｒｓｔｌｙａｎｅｖｉdence

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８３

1０８

FarEastareawereclearlyfbcusedoｎＣｈｍａ,butthe USsoonrealizedthatthismightbehardertoachieve thanitthought,giventhecomplexsituationmChma

ThroughoutthecivilwarmChma，theUS

supportedChiangKai-shek，sKuomintang（KMT)４

actively，withthehopethatitwouldprovideastable regmemthefUtureNevertheless,theUSmamtamed

relationswithboththeKMTandtheChmese

Communists（CCP)うthroughvariousmissions6

WiththesimationmChinagrowmgmorecomplicated anddifHculttodecipher，theUSrealizedgraduaUy thatChmamｉｇｈｔｎｏｔｂｅａｂｌｅｔｏｌｉｖｅｕｐｔｏＦＤＲ，svision Yet,theUScontinuedwithitseffbrtstofbnnastable regmemChmamainlythroughaidtothe Kuommtang

OnceWOrlｄＷａｒIIended,ｔｈｅｋｅｙｇｏａｌｓｏｆｔｈｅＵＳ ｍＥａｓｔＡｓｉａｗｅｒetoelnmateJapanesemilitarism，

andpromotedemocracywhileworkmgtoendthecivil warmChmaandtorestoreChmaasasovereignstate BothbefbreandafterthewaLAmericaneconomic

interestsinJapangreatlyexceededthoseinChma7

Nevertheless,ＣｈｍａｗａｓnotunnnpoltanttotheUSas theUSheldouthopethatChmawouldactasabuffbr betweenRussiaandtheWest,ａｍｉｄａｎａｔｍｏｓｐｈｅｒｅｏｆ ｇｒｏｗｍｇｂｉｐｏｌａrconfiDntationTherefbre，theUS contmuedtoaidtheKMⅢbothbecauseAmericastill opposedｔｈｅＣＣＰ，sideologyandbecausetheUSand theKMThadcooperatedbefbreandtheUScontinued tobelievethatChiangwasthepreferredrulerofChma AfterJapan,ssulrendeE50,OOOAmericantroopswere transferrｅｄｔｏＣｈｍａ，toassistmdisarnnngthe Japaneseandtoensurethattheannsandevacuated

areasweretumedovertotheNationalistsratherthan

theConmnuniｓｔｓ８ＴｈｅＵＳsuppliedandtramedthe KMTsmilitaryfbrces，providedintelligence，and guardedtheirlmesofconⅡnunication9Although

America,sfbcusgraduaUyshiftedfiomChinatoJapan，

theUSstillremamedengagedmChinaandcontmued itseffbrtstostabilizetheregion

TheStateDepartment，seffbrtsattheendofWOrld powermcreasesandtheyevenbecomeanecessityfbr

thesupelpower・

Thisalticlepresentsapatternmthebilateral relationSSevereconfiFontationmthel950sledto America，sassessmentofChinaasafbnnidablefbe OnceChmeseweaknesseswererealized，ｔｈｅＵＳ

ｇｒａｄｕａｌｌｙｓａｗＣｈｍａｌｅｓｓａｓａｒｅvolutionary threatenmgpowerandmoreasaregionalpowerwith somelimitations21arguethattheViemamWar hastenedthesignificanceofthosereassessmentsof Chma,ｓｐｏｗｅｒ，andencouragedtheUStobegm rapproｃｈｅｍｅｎｔｌｗｉｌｌｓｈｏｗｔｈａｔｔｈｅＵＳｆｉｒｓｔ

consideredChinaasitsmainrivalmAsia，and filrthennore,ａｓａｎmportantrivalmthecontextofthe ColdWar・hthel960s,theUS,begantoreexammeits viewofChma，andcametobetterappreciateits weaknessesmbothmilitaryandeconomictennsThis reexammationbytheUSreducedChma,sstatusasa threatenmgrivaltothatofaconsequentialregional poweLbutnotwithsufHcientpowertoposeadanger directlytotheUSTheViemamWaracceleratedthe

needtofbnnrelationswithChinaUntillossesm ViemamposedtheUSwitharegionalpredicament，

ｔｈｅＵＳｄｉｄｎｏｔｖｉｅｗＣｈｍａ，sregionalstatusas mportanttoAmericaninterestsmAsia

ＷｏｒｌｄＷａｒｌＩｉｎＡｓｉａａｎｄｔｈｅｌｍｍｅｄｉａｔe Aftermath

DurmgWOrldWarlLtheUSsoughttoavoidthe civilwarmChmauntilafterJapan，sdefeaththe earlystagesofthewarｌｔｈｅＵＳｈｏｐｅｄｔｈａｔＣｈｉｎａ ｗｏｕｌｄｂｅｃomeastrongstabilizmgfbrcemEastＡｓｉａ inthefUture,asoneofRoosevelt,ｓ‘fburpoliceInen・

ＦｏｒＣｈｍａｔｏａｃｔａｓｔｈｅ‘policeman’ｔｈｅｗａｙＦＤＲ ｗｉｓｈｅｄ，ｉｔｗｏｕldhavetohaveareliableandstable regmesimilartothatoftheUSIntheAmericanview;

withoutastrongandstableregme，Chmacouldnot

regamitsregionalstａｍｓａｎｄｈｅｌｐ‘policeotherstates

intheareaTheAmericanmterestsandhopesfbrthe

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStatus

ＷａｒＩＩｆｂｃｕｓｅｄｏｎｂｒｉｎｇｍｇａｂｏｕｔａｃｏａlition govemnentbetweentheKMTanｄＣＣＰＡｍｅｒｉｃａ,s goalwasstilltostrengthenChmathroughunification andasitwasalreadyclearatthatpointthatChiangdid nothavethecapacitytouniteChmabymilitarymeans，

acoalitiongovenⅡnｅｎｔｓｅｅｍｅｄｔｈｅｏｎｌｙｗａｙｔｏｂｒｍｇ ａｎendtothehostilitiesandtostrengthenChma10 ArrivmgmChinamDecemberl945，asheadofthe MarshallMission，GeneralMarshalrsaimwasto bolstertheChmesegovernmentbyaITangmga cease-fireandbyencouragmgpoliticalnegotiations betweentheparties'’ＨｏｗｅｖｅｌＢＭａｒｓｈａｌｌｃａｍｅｔｏ ｔｈｅｓａｍｅｃonclusionashispredecessor,Hurley〕that neithersidewaswillmgtomakethesubstantial concessionsneededtofbrmacoalitiongovemment12 ThroughsuchmissionsmChina，ｔｈｅＵＳｃａｍｅｔｏ ｒｅａｌｉｚｅｔｈａｔａｉｄｍｇａｎｄsupportmgtheKMTmightbe morecostlythanmitiallythoughthcomparisonwith Japan,wheretheUＳｈａｄａｍｏｒｅｏｒｌｅｓｓ‘ffeehand，m shapmgthepost-warorderthere,Chmaappearedquite unmanageable

Moreover,MarshallgraduallyrealizedthatChiang,s govemmentwasnotaneHectiveallyfbrtheUSmits conffontationwiththeSovietUnion13Evenpriorto theｅｎｄｏｆＷＯｒｌｄＷａｒｌｌ，ml944，theUSrealized ChiangdidnothaveasuitableregmefbrtheUSto

support14TheUSmissio､smChinasoonagreed thatmediationwashopelessandbothpaltieswishedto resolvetheissuethroughamilitarycampaignlsA coalitiongovemnentmChlnacouldhaveprovided theoptnalsolutionmtennsofAmerica,smterests lnpromotmgstabilityandreducmgitsengagementm thearea・Asnegotiationswereffuitless,ａｓｅｃｏｎｄｃｉｖｉｌ ｗａｒｍＣｈｍａｓｅｅｍｅｄｕｎａｖoidableandinⅡninentln l94ユtheUSstatedthatitwouldassisttheKMTbut wouldavoidusmgAmericanmilitaryfbrcesto mtervenemChma,smternalaffairs16Befbrelong，

thehostilitiesmChinaunraveledmtoanall-ouｔｃｉｖｉｌ

ｗａｒ．

TheSecondChineseCivilWar

DurmgthesecondcivilwarmChina，themam Americanmterestwastofindawaytolimitits mvolvementwithoutjeopardizmgdomesticsupport essentialtoitspoliciesfbrtheprotectionand reconstructionofEuropeTheUSstrategicand economicinterestsmChmaweremsufficienttojustify agreatermvestmentoflimitednationalresourcesAs theUScouldnotsustamsizeablecomnitmemsm everypartoftheworld,USofficialschosetofbcus theireffbrtsonthecountriesmtheareawhere

Americaninterestsandtheprospectsfbrsuccesswere 印eateLsuchasJapanandthePhilippmesPresident TrumandidnotbelievethatAmericanpowercouldbe productivelyappliedeverywhere，ａｎｄｄｉｄｎｏｔｔｈｉｎｋ ｔｈａｔｔｈｅＵＳｈａｄａｓｓｅｒｉｏｕｓｏｆａｎｅｅｄｔｏａｃｔｍＡｓｉａａｓｉｔ

ｄｉｄｉnEurope17Furthennore，economicsecurity

considerationsplayedalesserrolemEastAsiamthe

inunediatepostwarworldthantheｙｄｉｄｍＥｕｒｏｐｅ１８

ＷｉｔｈｔｈｅｇｒｏｗmgbipolarconfiPontation，theUS decidedthattheEuropeanspherewasmoreunportant bothstrategicallyandeconomically〉andleqUired

moreofAmerica,sresourcesandattentionthanthatof theAsiansphereOncethepolicyofcontannentwas meffect,theUSrecognizedthelimltsofitspowerand thatthecostsandimportanceofitscomnitmentsm theEuropeantheaterlniteditsengagementelsewheTe.'g hthiscontext，directmvolvementormilitary

interventionmthecivilwarmChinawouldmtelfere withcanylngoutavastEuropeanaidprogram,Thus，

theUSassembledamilitarypackageｆｂｒＣｈｍａｍ ｌ９４７thatgrantedrestricted，shoIt-tennassistanceln specifiedmilitaryfields，whileavoidmgdirect mtervention20TheUSresolvedtoconcentrateon economicaidandavoiddirectmilitaryintervemion

AdebateoverthedirectionofChmapolicybroke

outamongpolicy-makersmWashingtonThefbcusof

thedebateconcernedtheprovisionofexclusiveaidto

Chiang,ｓＫＭＴＳｏｍｅａｄｖｏｃａｔｅｄｔｈａｔｔｈｅＵＳshould

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

connectedtootherchaUengesaroundthewoddand theperceivednportanceofChma,srolemthebipolar rivahy

Kennanconcludedthattherewerefivevitalpower centersmtheworld-theUS，TheUSSRGreat Britain,theRhineValleyandJapan-andthatthetask

ofcontannentwastoseetoitthatmostofthose

centerswillnotbeunderSovietcontrｏｌ２３ＴｈｅＵＳ ｃａｍｅｔｏｖｉｅｗＣｈｍａａｓａｎｕｎｉmportantactormthe evolvmgcompetitionbetweentheSovietsandtheUS AsTnckernotes，“Stakesseemedcriticallyhighm Europe,theMiddleEast,mcreasmglymJapan,butnot

inpoor，overpopulated，underdevelopedChma''２４

AmericawasdealmgwithnewchallengesmEurope，

suchasprovidmgaidtoGreece，ｓｅｔｔｍｇｕｐｔｈｅ ＭａｒｓｈａｌｌＰｌａｎａｎｄＮＡＩＯ，ｔｈｅＢｅｒｌｍｂｌｏｃｋａｄｅａｎｄ ｍｏｒｅＥａｃｈｏｆｔhesechallengesreqUiredmcreased attemionanddeeperAmericanconⅡnitmentlnthe ColdWarcontext，Europewastheareaofprimary strategicnportance,theMiddleEastcamenext,then NorthwestAfTica,LatmAmericanandHnallytheFar East・Z51ncomparisonwiththepressmgchallengesln Europe,EastAsianproblemswereviewedasremote26 AccordmgtoAmericanofficials，ｔｈｅｐｒｏｂｌｅｍｓｍ Ｃｈｍａｈａｄｎｏｔｒｅａｃｈｅｄｅmergencystatus；Chmawas notapproachmgcollapseas，fbrexample，Greece was27hthelatel940s,theriskoftheestablishment ofaco､ⅡnunistregnemChmaseemedtolerable

lnGaddis,analysis,mainlandChmadidnotappear toprovideafavorableterramtofight叩on，ｉｆｗａｒ ｏｃｃｕｒｒｅｄＴｈｅ“inabilityoftheUSSRtorapid]yextend linesofcomnunications,ｂａｓｅｄevelopmentoperations andmilitarycontrolthrougjlthevastareasofSiberia andintoChmesetelritoly，，wasmportantmassessmg

Chma,smportancemtheColdWar､２８hadditionto

doubtmgChma，sgeo-strategicmportance，American policymakersdoubtedthaｔＣｈｍａｗｏｕｌｄｂｅｃｏｍｅａ ｕｓｅｆｉｌｌａｌｌｙｍｔhefiltureTheStateDepartment,s assumptionwasthatsmceChlnawasneitheran mdustrialnormilitarypower，ａｃｏｍｎｎｎｓｔＣｈｍａ assistbothcamps，ｍｏｒｄｅｒｔｏ血proverelationswith

theCCPByl947-1948,theＣＣＰ,supperhandmthe civilwarwasapparent，andsomepolicymakers realizeditwouldbemAmerica，sbestmteresttomvest moremitsrelationswiththeConmnunists､However，

ｔｈｅｏｐｔｉｏｎｏｆａｉｄｍｇｂｏｔｈｃａｍｐｓｏｆｔｈｅcivilwarwas quick]yabandoned,duetoAmerica，slmitedresources andtoparticularlystrongoppositionbytheAmerican publictoaidmgaconⅡnunistregnelnFebruary l949,NSC41wasissued,anditrecomnendedtheuse ofecono血csanctionstowlnconcessionsfiomthe conmunists・NSC41explamedthatChmawouldneed ｗｅstemandJapanesetrade,capitalandtechnicalaid todevelopitsmdustryうsmcelocalandSovietsources

ofcapitalweremadequate21

Byl949，ComnunistvictorymmainlandChma wasapparentThePeople,sLiberationAnnymanaged tocapturemostofthemamcitiescontrolledbythe Nationalistslnlatel94９，ChiangKai-shekretreated firomthemainlandtotheislandofnliwanalongwith 600,OOONationalisttroopsandmanyotherrefUgees fiomthegovenⅡnentandbusmessconununityln Decemberl949，ChiangproclamedTnipei，asthe temporarycapitaloftheRepUblicofChmalnAugust l949，evenbefbretheNationalistsofficiallylost,the StateDepartmentpublishedtheＣｶﾉ"αﾉﾘﾉﾉｶﾉ花Pqpe7、

TheStateDepartmentlaidresponsibilityfbrthe commgConununists，victoryonChiang，ｓｒｅｇｍｅ，

claimingtheUShaddoneeverythmgpossibleto supporttheNationalists22TheUSdidnotdisengage

itselfffｏｌｎＳｍｏａffairs，andcontinueditspolicyof supportandassistancetotheKM工butreducedthe amountsothatitssupportwouldnotmpairother Americanpoliciesmtheregionandaroundtheworld

ThelntemationalSettimg-TheColdＷａｒ

TheintemationalsettmgandtheevolvmgColdWar

playedacrucialrolemthefbnnationofAmerican

policytowardsChmaThechoicesmadeweredirectly

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStatus

wouldnotimposeadirectthreattocrucialAmerican mterestsmtheAsianPacificareaorglobally29 CohenaddsthatKennanthougdlt,“Chmalackedthe resourcestobecomeagPeatmilitaryormdustrial poweｒｆｂｒａｌｏｎｇｔｎｎｅ ・’'3oThelossofChmawas undesirable，butnotunendurablePPS（Policy PlannmgStafD39statedthat“manywarmthe fbreseeablefUtureChｍａｃｏｕｌｄａｔｂｅｓｔｂｅａｗｅａｋａｌｌｙ ｏｒａｔｗｏrstanmconsequentialenemy,,､31Ｃｌearly，

Ｃｈｍａ，sregionalstatuswasimportantmasｓｅｓｓｍｇｉｔｓ ｎｅｃｅｓｓｉｔｙａｓａＵＳａＵｙ

Ｔｂｂｅsure，theChmesemainlandwasnot unnnportant，andwasnotneglectedaltogether Nonetheless,asnotedabove,America,sChmapolicy

hadtobefbnnulatedmaccordancewithitsinterestsm theAsianregion,itsresourcesandcapabilities,andthe needtorespondtoSovietchallengesaroundtheworld AmericahadmdeedconsiderableambitionsmthｅＦａｒ Ｅａｓｔ,ｂｕｔｔｈｅＨｕｍａｎａｄｍｍistrationdidnotconsider

thoseascrucialasthoseinterestsmEurope321n Gaddis，words，theUScapabilities“laymorem technologythanmanpowerandbecauseofcompetmg obligationsmEurope,aregionofgreatervitalinterest，

itmadesensetoconfinetheAmericanpresencemthe FarEasttoislandscapableofbemgdefendedbyair andnavalfbrces,thusavoidmgthecostsofoperations agalnsthighmanpowerbutlowtechnology

adversanesonthemamand''３３AccordmgtoGaddis，

thiswasarealisticrecognitionbothofglobalpriorities andinterestsandofexistmgasynmetriesofpowerm theFarEast，ａｓwellasglobally､３４Thus，mamland Chmawasnotconsideredanareaofgeatstrategicor economicimｐｏｒｔａｎｃｅｔｏｔｈｅＵＳｍｔｈｅｅｖｅｎｔｏｆａ

ｍｏｄemconfiontation

HeinrichsremmdsthatthecontahⅡnentpolicydid notdictateresistancebeyondtheresoumestheUShad orwithoutreasonableprospectofsuccess35Even aftertheUShaddecideduponacontannentpolicyin ordertopreventSovietexpansion,ithadto`chooseits battles，ｗｉｓｅｌｙＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎｐｏｗｅｒｃｏｕｌｄｎｏｔｂｅａpplied

everywhereandAmericanpolicymakershaｄｔｏａｐｐｌｙ ｉｔｓｐｏｗｅｒｗｉｔｈｍａｓｅｔｏｆｐｒｉoritiesandmareaswhere successwashighlyprobablelnthiscomext，

contammgcomnunismmEuropewasconsidered morefeasiblehEastEurope,mostoftheconⅡnunist reg血eshadratherweaksupportfiFomthepeoplethey ruledlnＣｈｍａ，howeveLtheConnnunistswere popularamongthemassesandwereactuallythe preferredrulers36TheUSrealizedquiteearlyit

wouldbefiFuitlessandcostlytofightconnnunismm ChmaTheUSrecognizedthatconcessionsregardmg

Chmawereeasiertomakethanconcessionsover Japan，ａｎｄthus，ａｓｎｏted，itsfbcusmAsiashifted towardsJapan

hNovemberl949，aninternalStateDepartment memorandumconcludedthatAmerican,sposition wouldnotbedirectlyjeopardizedbythelossofChma aslongasthesecurityoftheislandsismaintamed37 Therefbre，Washmgtonacceptedtheconceptofa defensivepermeterlnthis，ｔｈｅＵＳｗｎｌｍａｍｔａｍ ｍｍｉｍａｌｐｏｓｉｔｉｏｎｍＡsiamordertoachievea successfUldefenseagamstfUtureSovietaggression Thisconsistedofthepresentmilitarypositionmthe Asianoffbhoreislandcham-Japan,Okinawaandthe

Philippmes381nJanuaryl950，ｗｈｅｎAcheson

announcedthedefbnsivepermeteLitexcludedboth TtliwanandKorea39

ColdWarrivahies，prioritiesandpreocc叩ation withEurope，economicandstrategicmterestsinthe Asiansphereandperceivedmasssupportfbr ConⅡnunismmChma，aswellaslhnitationson Americanresourcesandcapabnities，allcombmedto mpactthefmnulationofUSChmapolicymthelate l940sTheseparametersevolvedandchangedrapidly，

andthusattimesAmericanChinapolicyhasbeen

criticizedasbothmconsistentandunclear4o

However，Iassertthattheunderlymgreasonfbrthe

USnottoactivelypursuerelaｔｉｏｎｓｏｒａｎａｌｌｉａｎｃｅｗｉｔｈ

Ｃｈｍａｉｓｐｒmarilyconnectedtoitsassessmentofthe

AsianregionalbalanceTheUSwaslooｋｉｎｇｆｂｒａｎ

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

allymtheregionthatwouldassistmpreservmg Americanpowermtheareawithmmmalcosts,while mamtahnngitssecurityうeconomicandstrategic nerestsmtheregionSmcetheFarEastwasalesser prioritythanEurope,theUSdesiredanallythathad strategicmportance，thatwasastableandstrong regimeａｎｄｔｈａｔｈａｄｔｈｅｐｏｔｅｎｔｉａｌｔｏｂｅａｒｅｇional powercapableofbemgmanagedandcontroUedh lightoftheserequlrements，Chmacamemadistant secondtoJapan、Ｃｈｍａ,sstrategicmportanceand valuemafUturebipolarwarwasdoUbtfhllts conditionofmtemalstrifecouldnotbeeasilysolved，

andUSpolicy-makersbelievedthatitwouldtakea longtimefbrastableandstrongregmeｔｏｅｍｅｒｇｅｍ ＣｈｍａＢｅｃａｕｓｅｏｆｔｈｉｓａｎｄｏtherregionalfhctors，

Ｃｈｍａ,sregionalposturewasbleak，ａｎｄＣｈｍａ,s abilitiestoassisttheUSmmamtammgaregional balanceseemedquestionableMoreover,comparedto occupiedJapan，Ｃｈｍａｃｏｕｌdnotbeeasilymanaged TheUSrecognizedthattheConmunistsmChma wereprevailmg,andconsideringtheabovementioned otherfactors，ａｃｏｎⅡnunistChmadidnotappear menacmgtｏＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎｍｔｅｒｅｓｔｓｍＡｓｉａＣｈｍａｄｉｄｎot havethepotentialJapanhadtobeｃｏｍｅaregional powermthenearfUture、

ＡｔｔｈｅｅｎｄｏｆＭａo,sthreemonthslongvisitto MoscowBMaoandStalmsignedanalliancetreatym Februaryl950TheSmo-Sovietalliancetippedthe balanceofpowermAsiamfavorofAmerica,senemy A1thoughnotsoactively§theUSattemptedto

encourageaSmo-Sovietrift41Inresponseto

conmunismmChma,ｔｈｅSoviet,ｓｐｏｓsessionofthe nuclearbomb，andtheSmo-Sovietalliance，ｔｈｅＵＳ ｉｓｓｕｅｄＮＳＣ６８ｍＡｐｒｉｌｌ９５０,outlininganewpolicy TheproposalentailedasharpmcreasemAmerican militaryexpensesandannedfbrcesltalsomdicated anAmerican-ConununistrivallyうandAmerican

intentionstofighttheconmunistthreat4zThe Smo-AmericanconfiFontationwassettobegm．

ＴｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａｒ

SomeobservethattheKoreanWardictatedthe

mternationalenvironmentmthepostwarperiodand

establishedthecontoursoftheSmo-American

confiOntationfbrthenextZOyears43TheKorean

War,ｓ血portanceisattmesunderestimoted，

especiallymcompansonwiththeVietnamWarLack ofspacedoesnotallowadeservedlengthydiscussion ｏｆｔｈｅｗａＬｂｕｔｉｔｈａｓｂｅｅｎｔｈｅｏｎｌｙｗａｒAmerican troopsdirectlyfbughtChmesetroopsFollowmga shortreviewofthewaLIwillfbcusontheeffectsｏｆ

policyandperceptionsofChmaduringａｎｄａｆｔｅｒｔｈｅ

ｗａｒ・

ＯｎＪｕｎｅ２５１９５０，ＮＣrthKoreaattackedSouth Korea44TheattackseemedtocorroborateAmerican suspicionsaboutacoordmatedintemational

comnunistheat､4５TWodayslateLtheUN

unanimouslyapprovedUNSCresolution82，ｃａｌｌｍｇ

ｆｂｒｌＮｔｏｍｔｅｒｖｅｎｅｍＫｏｒｅａ４６Ａlthoughitwasa

UNjomtoperation,theUSledit,andprovidedmost ofthemilitaryfbrcesOntopofamilitarymtervention inKorea,theUSsentitsSeventhFleettotheTHiwan Strait,butrefUsedChiang,soffertoassistmthewa工

EarlyinOctoberl950,aftertheUStroopsmanagedto fbrcetheNorthKoreanstowithdrawfiBomSouth Korea,theUSproceededbeyondthe38thparauelmto

NorlhKoreanterritory48TheChmesewereworried

thewarwouldgobeyondtheYaluRiverandthatthe USmightattempttomvadeChinaaSwell,morderto

activelyfightconnnunismmChmaPassmgthe38ih

paralleliscitedasthemamcausetheChineseentered

theKoreanWar､491nlateNovemberl95qChma

enteredthewaragamstUNfbrces､ByJanuaryl95L

theCommunistfbrceswereabletocaptureSouth

Korea,ｓcapital，SeoulBetweenNovemberl950and

Junel951，ｔｈｅＣｈｍｅｓｅａｎｄＫｏｒｅａｎｆｂｒｃｅｓａｎｄＵＳ

ｆbrcesclashedmseveralbloodybattleshMayl95L

aftertheUNfbrcesreacｈｅｄａｆｅｗｍｉｌｅｓｎｏｒｔｈｏｆ

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStaｍｓ

parallel38，thefightmgdecreasedFortwoyears，

whilefiFustratmgnegotiationswereconducted，a stalematewassustamed，ｗｉｔｈsmall-scalebattlesln Julyl953，acease-firewasestablished，creatlnga demilitarizedzonearoundthe38thparallel,withNorth

Koreantroopsononeside，ａｎｄＳｏｕｔｈＫｏreanand AmericantroopsontheotheI50

BefbretheKoreanWaLtheUSperceivedtheUSSR asthemamthreattoAmericaninterestsmtheFarEast Theconta血nentpolicymcluded，ａｍｏｎｇothers，

contammgChma，seenasaSovietclientslChen sununarizesthat“Washmgtondidnotviewthe ChineseConmunistsasaqualifiedchallengertothe strategicｍｔｅｒｅｓｔｓｏｆｔｈｅＵＳｍＡｓｉａ''５２Itisoften clamedthattheUSmiSjudgedconⅡnunisminChina，

ａｎｄｔｈｅＣＣＰ,sdetermmation,mterestsandcapacityto actmKorea53WiththeKoreanWaLAmerica rｅｖｉｓｅｄｉｔｓｖｉｅｗｏｆＣｈｍａａｇａｍ，andalteredthe directionofAmericaｎＣｈｍａＰｏｌｉｃｙＣｈｍａｗａｓｎｏｗ ｓｅｅｎａｓａｎａｇｇｒｅｓｓｉｖｅａｎｄｈｏstilecountryぅmother words，America,ｓｅｎｅｍｙｍｔｈｅＦａｒＥａｓｔ５４Ａｓａ

ｒｅｓｕｌｔ，theThFumanadministrationfi･ozeallChinese financialassets，prohibitedAmericanshipsand citizensfTomtravelingtoChma，establishedatotal embargo，andhardeneditsstancetowardsＣｈｍａ,s

admissiontotheUN55Followmgthewar,ｂｏｔｈｔｈｅ

ＵＳａｎｄＣｈｍａｒｅｍａｍｅｄｃｏｎⅡnittedmKorea，and increasedcommitmenttootherareassuchas lndochinaandnliwan56TheKoreanWarrevealed theeffectsofthelackofcommunicationbetweeｎ ＷａｓｈｍｇｔｏｎａｎｄＰｅｋｍｇＡｓｔｈｅｒｅｗｅｒｅｎodiplomatic relations,neithersidecouldsuccessfUllyconununicate eitherthreatsorreassurances､５７Changsumnarizes

theKoreanWarascompletmgthe“break，,between theUnitedStatesandChina58

TheimportanceoftheKoreanWarcannotbe underestmatedBefbrethewaLSmo-American relationsweredeterioratmg，ａｎｄｔｈｅＵＳｂｅｇａｎｔｏｓｅｅ

ＣｈｍａａｓａｃｌｉｅｎｔｏｆｔｈｅＳｏｖｉｅｔＵｎｉｏｎＣｈｍａｗａｓ

ｖｉｅｗｅｄａｓａｎｉｄｅｏｌogicalrivalwithmthebipolar

conffontationAfterthewar§Ｃｈｉｎａｗａｓｖｉｅｗｅｄａｓａｎ ｅｎｅｍｙ，globallybutmorespecificallywithmtheAsian regionTheUSnolongerconsideredChmatobeweak andmconseqUential，ｂｕｔｒａｔｈｅｒｖｉｅｗｅｄｉｔａｓａ ｍｅｎａｃｍｇａｇｇressorandafiercerivalboth ideologicallyandmUitarilyTheSmo-American confiFontationappearedinFeversible

Sino-AmericanConfrontationinthel950s andEarlyl960s

Ｉｎｔｈｅｌ９５０ｓ，theSmo-AmericanconfiFontation mtensifiedmallareas;economicrelations,diplomatic relationissuesandmilitarizedcrisesFollowmgthe KoreaｎＷａＬｔｈｅＵＳｍｃｒｅａｓｍｇｌｙｖｉｅｗｅｄＣｈｍaasthe mamthreattoAmericanmterestsmAsiaand

worldwideTheUShadreassesseditsviewsofChma，

ftomaweak,non-threatenmgcountlytoafbnnidable rivalandahostileaggresso正Thel950ssolidified theseperceptionsonbothsideswithconflictsover numerousissues・Throughoutthedecade，American policymakersattemptedtobrmgaboutaSmo-Soviet split,andAmericanChmapolicywasfbnnulatedwith thata血Ｉｎｔｈｅｅａｒｌｙｌ９６０ｓｔｈｅＵＳｖｉｅｗｏｆＣｈｍａａs anommousaggressorcontmuedChma，swarwith lndiaml96Z，anditsacquisitionofusablenuclear weaponsml964mcreasedAmericanfbarsand suspicionsofthePeople,sRepublicofChma

TheKoreanWartriggeredtheThFuman admmistrationtoissueatotalembargoagamstChma lnfiact,thetradecontrolsonChmawereharsherthan

those血posedontheUSSRP9Thiseconomicpolicy towardChmacontinuedthroughoutthel950s,butdid undergochangesZhangassertsthattheUS“attached agreatdealofimportanceｔｏ［American］economic weapon,,ｗｈｅｎｄｅａｌｍｇｗｉｔｈｔｈｅＰＲＣ６ｏＴｈｉｓ

"economicweapon，,wasannportanttoolm

Americanpolicytoward‘drivingawedge,m

Sino-SovietrelationsAtfirst，theembargoand

minimalSovietassistancecausetheoppositeefIect．

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

1１４

demonstratedtheConununists,capacltytocontroland directtheChinesemasses,ａｎｄｔｏ“evokeareleaseof

ahostffanticenergyffomthenation,smasses､''６３

HilsmangoesontonotethatAmericarecognizedthe PRC,swillmgnesstokeepthelivmgstandａｒｄｄｏｗｎｍ ｏｒｄｅｒｔｏｐｅｎｎｉｔａｌｌｈｕｍａｎｅnergyandmateｒｉａｌ ｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｓｔｏｇｏｍｔｏｍａｋｍｇＣｈｍａａfbnnidable militarypower､６４Despitetheeconomicfnilureofthe

`GreatLeapForward,,itdidhavesomepsychological effectsthathelpedtheUSreassessChma,ｓｐｏｗｅｒａｎｄ

ｔｏｆｔｌｒｔｈｅｒｌｅａｄｔｏａｒｅａｓsessmentofChmaasan

alannmgthreaｔｔｏＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎｎ並erestsmAsiaand

worldwide

RecognitionandadmissioｎｔｏｔｈｅＵＮｒｅｍａｍｅｄａ ｓｏｕｒｃｅｆｂｒｃｏｎｆｌictbetweentheUSandthePeople,s RepublicForreasonsmentionedearlieEtheUS mamtaineditsnon-recognitionpolicytowardthe

PRC650ntopofthose,theUSnowidentifiedPRC

asahostileaggressonandthushardenedits non-recognitionpolicyandmadeeffbrtstokeep ConnnunistChinaoutoftheUmtedNationslnearly l945，ChiangKai-sheksignedtheUnitedNations OrganizationCharteLasarepresentativeofChina66 ThereaftertheROCrepresentedChinaattheUNand theUSattemptedtomamtamthatlnl951，ｔｈｅＵＳ ｍａｎａｇｅｄｔｏｐａｓｓａｒｅｓｏｌｕｔｉｏｎａｔｔｈｅＵＮ，labelmg Chmaasanaggressor・ThisputConunl血stChinam directbreachoftheUNChaｒｔｅＬｍａｋｍｇｉｔｓｅｎｔｌｙｔｏ

ｔｈｅＵＮｅｖｅｎｍｏredifficult671nthel950s,theUS ledthe‘moratorium,procedure,mwhichtheGeneral AssemblyagreedａｎｎｕａＵｙｎｏｔｔｏｄｅｂａｔｅｔｈｅｉｓｓｕｅｏｒ

ｍａkeanychangesmChma，ｓrepresentation68This

issuecontinuedtodeepentheanmositybetweｅｎｔｈｅ

ＵＳａｎｄＣｏｍｍｕｎｉｓｔＣｈｍａ

ｌｎｔｈｅｌ９５０ｓａｎｄｅａｒｌｙｌ９６０ｓｔｈｅｒｅｗｅｒｅａｓｅriesof crisesbetweentheUSandConmunistChma，over twoislandsmtheFonnosaStraits;QuemoyandMatsu Atthetne,theconflictsbroughtthesidesclosetoa wide-scalemilitaryconflictTheseintensifiedtherift betweenthetwo，andsolidifiedAmericanmagesof TheCCPmovedqUicklytotakecentralcontrolofthe

countly,soveralleconomyHoweveEwithtmｅｔｈｅ ＰＲＣｈａｄｔｏｍｃｒｅａｓｅｉｔｓｒｅｌｉａｎｃｅonSovietaid，

suppliesandmarkets・Thisdidfbster“harshfbelings,，

towardtheRussiansandpavedthewayto estrangement,ｂｕｔｎｏｔａｓｑＵｉｃｋｌｙａｓＷａｓｈｍｇｔｏｎｈａｄ ｈopedDulleswascontentwiththepsychological impactthattheembargogeneratedAnd，evenmally theembargodidreachitslong-tenngoaLasit hastenedthecollapseoftheSmo-Sovietalliancｅ

ＴｈｅｃｈａｎｇｅｓｍｔｈｅＵＳｅｍｂａｒｇｏｐolicytoward Chmademonstratethegrowmghostilitiesbetween ChmaandAmerica,ａｎｄａｔｔｈｅsametimesuggestthe needfbrdiplomaticrelationsmfUtureJapanwasthe firsttoactivelypursuetradewithChmaandthefirstto signnon-officialtradeagreementswiththeＰＲＣ，m l95262DespiteChma,sweakeconomy，ｉｔwasstill

consequentialmregional，ａｎｄglobal，economy America,schiefalliesgloballyぅandespecially regionallybdemandedarelaxationofthesanctions ColdWarpolicies,ideologicalrivally，ａｎｄｔｈｅｇｒｏｗｍｇ ｐｅｒｃｅｐｔｉｏｎｏｆＣｈｍａａｓAmerica,smamthreatmthe regionledtothestrictembargoJtwasregionaltrade andeconomicneed,enhancedbythedemandsofthe globalmarkets，ｗｈicheventuallyfbrcedtheUSto relaxitsembargoagamstChinaHence，evenfbra supelpoweLregionaldemandsandpressuresoften influenceitsglobalpolicies

TbgetherwithamoderatelysuccessfUleconomic

policytowardChma,theUSalsoslowlychangedits

viewoｆＣｈｍａ,ｓｅｃｏｎｏｍｙａｎｄｐｏｗｅｒｌｎｔｈｅｌａｓｔｌg40s

andearlyl950s，Chmawasseenasalargeand

over-populatedcountry,recovermgfiFomyearsofcivil

warandWesterndommanceChma，seconomywasm

shattersandfewmtheUSbelieveditcouldrisetobe

anmdustrialandeconomicpowermtheregiｏｎｈ

ｌ９５８ｔｈｅ‘GreatLeapForward,wasannouncedm

ChinaAlthｏｕｇｈｔｈｉｓｔｕｒｎｅｄｏｕｔｔｏｂｅａｆａｉｌｕｒｅｍ

economictenns，ｉｔｄｉｄｈａｖｅａｎｍｐａｃｔｏｎＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎ

ａｓｓessmentofChinesepower､AsHilsmanremarks,iｔ

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStaｍｓ

mamandChmaasamenacmgaggressor、

Thefirstcrisisocculredinl954-1955,whichwas thelongestofthethreeconflictsTheConⅡnunists

mitiatedasheUmgofQuemoymSeptemberl954`，

TheUSthoughtBeUmgintendedtobegmanassault onTaiwan,andtestAmericanconⅡnitmenttoQuemoy

andTaiwan7oTheUＳｗasmaqUandary・America

wishedtoavoidbemgmvolveｄｍａｎｏｔｈｅｒｗａｒｗｉｔｈ Ｃｈｍａ，ｂｕｔａｌｓｏｗａｎｔｅｄｔｏｐｒｅｖｅｎｔａＰＲＣａｔｔａｃｋｏｎ

Ｔｔｌｉｗａｎ７１ＴｈｅＵＳｒｅａｃｔｅｄｔｏｔheshellmgwith

mcreasmgAmericanmilitarypresencemtheTHiwan Strait,strengthenmgNationalistsdefenses,ａｎｄｉｓｓｕｍｇ

ｗａｒｎｍｇｓｔｏＰｅｋｍｇ７２Ｔｈｅｃｒisispeakedinl955and

almostescalatedtoopenhostilities,butthenbeganto

sUbside73ChangandHeconcludethatmutual

miSjudgmeｎｔｓａｎｄ“misassessments'’１edtothe escalationofthetensions,andthiswasmostlydueto lackofregularmeansofconⅡnunicationBecauseof this,eachsidemisreadtheother,sintentions74 Durmgthecrisis,theUSdecidedtofbnnanalliance withT1aiwanlnearlyl955，theCongresspassedthe FonnosaResolution，andEisenhowerobtained

NationalistTaiwanandotherrelatedpositionsmthe

Straits75Thetensionsduringthecrisisandthe

resultmgalliancebetweｅｎｎｌｉｗａｎａｎｄｔｈｅＵＳｌｏｃｋｅｄ ｔｈｅＵＳａｎｄChmamtoapattemofconfiFontation

lnl958tensionseruptedagam、Ｔｈｉｓcrisiswas shorterthanthefirst，butmoresevereDullesnoted thatthePRCandtheUScametothe"brinkofwar''76

ＴｈｅｔｈｉｒｄｃｒｉｓｉｓｏｃｃｕｌＴｅｄｍｌ９６２ｈｒeactionto

movementoffbrcesmTaiwan,thePRCalsomcreased itstroopsalongthenliwanStraitTheUSdefUsedthe crisisthroughambassadorialtalksandKennedy，s declarationthattheUSopposedusmgfbrcemthe area77Thecrisesdidbrmgaboutsomepositive

developmemsFollowmgthefirstcrisis，ｔｈｅＵＳａｎｄ ｔｈｅＰＲCbeganambassadorialleveltalks，which assistedmconⅡnunicatmgmessagesmthefbllowing crises78Theramificationofthecrisesextendedto

AmericanChmapolicy・Thecrisesstrengthenedthe Chmalobbymdomesticaffairs，helpedfUrther politicizetheChinaquestionsanddelayedAmerican

recognitionofthedepthoftheSmo-Sovietsplit79

Inlatel962,mtandemwithon-gomgtensionsand smallshootmgmcidents，Chinalaunchedama]or attackonIndianfbrcesalongtheborderofdisputed areasbetweenthetwonationsThefightmgexpanded tothetwomainlydisputedareas;theAksai-Chmand theArunachal-Pradeshareas8oTheSino-IndianWar wasconductedunderveIydifHcultconditionssuchas fteezmgweatherconditionsandcombatsmhigh altitude，reaching5000metersandmoreTheWar

endedwithm2monthswithaChmeseunilateral

cease-fire，afterithadcapturedbothofthedisputed areas81TheharshdefeatlndiasufTeredmthewar causedtheIndianleaderstobemorerespectfUlof

Chma,spower82Thewarundoubtedlymcreased

Chma，ｓｐｒｅstigeandperceivedstrengthmtheregion，

butthenplicationsofthewarwerenotlimitedtothe Asianregion

AsHilsmandescribes，“theattackhadbeena masterpieceoforchestratmgmilitaly，politicaland psychologicalmstrumentalitiesasasmglQlmited，

disciplmedandcontrolledoperationdirectedtoward

andsubordmatedtoapoliticalend''８３TT1roughthis

campaign，Chmamanagedtohunnliateaprincipal rivalfbrAsianleadershipaswellasproveitspower andcapabilitiesintheregionIheSmo-Indianborder disputeconvmcedAmericanofficialsthatChmawas

fimdamentallydangerousandexpansiomst84

Moreover,itwasobviousthatChinawasnowaskilled andsophisticatedregional,andaspirmgglobal,power・

ＡｓｕｃｃｅｓｓｆＵｌｔｅｓｔｏｆａｎａｔｏｍｉｃｂｏｍｂｍｌ９６４ａｎｄａ

ｈｙｄｒｏｇｅｎｂｏｍｂｍｌ９６７ｅｌｅｖａtedChma，sprestige

regionaUyandworldwide,andpresentedtheneedfbr

policyadjustmentswithmtheUSTheUSworried

aboutChma,spositionmtheglobalsystemandits

nnpactonthesecurityandpsychologymtheAsian

regionButmostly〉theUSbegantoreconsider

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

116

whetherthepolicyofisolatmgChmaunderthese cｎ℃umstancesremamedthebestoption85AsFoot notes,“objectively;Chmaasanuclearweaponsstate hardlyexercisedanyconstramtsonUSactivity,[but］

itwasrecognizedthatthischangeofstatushad

politicalandpsychologicalramifications''８６Ａsa

nuclearpoweLtherewasagreaterneedtodrawChma intotheintemationalconⅡnunityうandespeciallymto

disarmamentandarmscontrolnegotiations87The

USwasfbrcedtoreviewandreassess,ｙｅｔａｇａｍ，its Chinapolicy

FollowingtheSmo-Sovietallianceml950,theUS

madeeHbltstocausestrainsmtheallianceandcause

asplitmtheconⅡnunistblocDullesbelievedthebesｔ ｗａｙｗｏｕｌｄｂｅｔｏｆｂｌｌｏｗａｈａｒｄ－ｌｍｅｐｏｌｉｃｙｔｏｗａｒｄ ＣｈｍａＡｓＣｈａｎｇｐｕｔｓｉｔ，“Chmesedependencyon MoscowwouldilritatetheSoviets，andmadeqUate SoviethelpfbrChmawouldfiFustratetheneedyand ambitiousChinese''８８Thel950sbrouｇｈｔａｃｈａｎｇｅ

ｍＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎｖｉｅｗｓａｎｄｉｔｓestnationofChma，ａｓ Ｃｈｍａｗａｓｍｃｒｅａｓｍｇｌｙｖｉｅｗｅｄａｓａｇgressive BeginningwiththeKoreanWar，theUSregarded

“militant，

Chmaasand

unrecognizable''８９ChinawaschallengmgAmerica,s regionalandglobalhegemony〕makmgitselfacentral actormintemationalpoliticslnthelatel950s，the Sovietappeareddetennmedtoachievedetentewith theWest，andthusChmawasconsideredmore .angerousandattmesevenAmerica，smamenelny・

Ａｔｔｈｅｓａｍｅｔｉｍｅ,ｔｈｅＵＳａｎｄＣｈｍａｍａｍｔａｍｅｄｔｈｅ ａｒｍｅｄａｓpectoftheconflict，withtheescalatmg presenceandnatｕｒｅｏｆａｎｎｓｍｔｈｅａｒｅａＳｍｃｅＣｈｍａ ｗａｓｓｅenasaprovokingaggressorandthemamthreat toAmericaninterestsmtheregion,fbnnmganykmd ofrelationswasoutofthequestionHoweveLsoｍｅ ｉｓｓｕｅｓｄｉｄｓｌｏｗｌｙｒｅｖｅａｌａｎｅｅｄｔｏａｖｏｉｄａｌｉｅｎａｔｍｇ ＣｈｍａａｓｍｕｃｈａｓｆｉｒｓtplannedItwasnotuntil Chinesepowerwasreassessedandregional complexitiesdemandedthatfbnnmgrelationswith

Chmacametobeconsidered

TheSino-SovietSplitandReassessmentof

China，ｓＰｏｗｅｒ

OnceAmericanofficialsunderstoodthedepthofthe Smo-SovietriftａｎｄｉｔｓｅｆｆｅｃｔｓｏｎＣｈｍａ,spowelB Chma，ｓｔｈｒｅａｔｔｏｔｈｅＵＳｃｏｕｌｄｂｅｒｅｅｘａｍｍｅｄand policychangesmplementedInitially,theSmo-Soviet allianceassistedmelevatmgChma，spowerand prestigeWithmtheUS，thealliancewasindeed viewedasthreatening,andAmericanpolicyamedat causmgariftThealliancemcreasedChina,ssecunty andcapabilities,butmthel950s,Mao,sselfLasseltion conflictedwiththeSoviethegemonymthe ConmunistworldTheKoreanWar,Ｃｈｍａ,sgrowing mmilitarystrength，ａｓｗｅｌｌａｓＳｔａｌｍ,sdeath，

seemmglyreducedChma，sdependenceonthe Soviets91Befbrelong，thetwoconununistpowers driftedfUrtherandfUrtherapart,untilanapparentsplit

wasvisibleｍｌ９６９ｗｉｔｈｔｈｅｏｎｓｅｔｏｆｔｈｅｂｏｒｄｅｒ ｃｏnflict

Durmgthel950s,theChineseandSovietinterests andpoliciesconflictedandmcreasmglyclashed ChinaperceivedthegrowingUS-Sovietd6tenteas occulringattheexpenseofChmesenerests Moreover，theUSSRandChmahaddiffermg perceptionsregardmgSovietaidtoChma,smUitary andnucleartechnologydevelopment92Smo-Soviet economiccooperationwasslowlycollapsing，asthe

Chmesegrewmoresuspiciousanddiscontented93

SovietattemptstocontrolChma,sbehaviorwere

reducmgthevalueandunityofthealliance94The

riftmtheSmo-Sovietrelationswasvisiblemmdirect

mumalcriticismsmthelatel950sandbecamepublic

mtheearlyl960swithharshmutualaccusatioｎｓ９５

Ｉｎｔｈｅｌ９６０ｓ，Americanadmmistrationsgradually realizedtheriftwassofhr-reachingthatthealliance wasmoperableandthatanySovietattemptstorestrain

andcontrolChinawouldrequiretheuseoffbrce96

TheUScametorealizethatChinaviewedtheSoviets，

nottheUnitedStates，asitsbiggestthreatthatwas

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStaｍｓ

morelikelytoattacktheChinesemainland97Some scholarscriticizetheEisenhowerandKennedy adnnnistrationsfbrnotactmgfnsteronthemfbnnation oftheriftanAmericanpolicygoalsmceAcheson98 Iclaimthatatthetime,regionalcircumstancesstilldid nｏｔｃｏｍｐｅｌｔｈｅＵＳｔｏａｌｔｅｒｉｔｓｐｏｌｉｃｙａndexploitthe rifththeearlyl960s,theUSstillconsideredChma asanaggressoranddangerousWhiletheSino-Soviet riftwasunfbldmg,theUSwantedfUrthermgdetente withtheSovietUnion,ratherthanrapprochementwith China99 UntiltheUSrecognizedChma，s weaknessesanditsstrengthasaregionalpowerlather thanconsidermgitamenacmgadversalyぅｔｈｅＣｏｌｄ ＷａｒｓｅｔｔｍｇａｎｄｔｈｅＳｍｏ－Ｓｏｖietriftdidnotplompt normalizatiｏｎｗｉｔｈＣｈｍａＴｈｅＵＳｃｏｕｌｄｐｒｏｍｏｔｅｉｔｓ mterestsandpolicieswithinthecontextofthebipolar rivahy§withoutaneedfbrgoodrelationswiｔｈＣｈｍａ ｌｔｗａｓｎｏｔｕｎｔｉｌｔｈｅＵＳｆａｃｅｄｄisastermAsiathatit

requiredmprovedrelationswiththeonlypowermthe

Area,andworldwidawhichcouldassistthｅＵＳｔｏｅｎｄ

TheSmo-Sovietriftdeepenedinthelatel960s Beginnmgmthemid-1960s，theSovietsmoved nuclearcapablemilitaryunitstotheFarEastandbotｈ ＣｈｍａａｎｄｔｈｅＵＳＳＲｍｃｒｅａｓｅｄｔｒｏｏｐｓａlongthe ChmeseRussianborder.'Ｏ０１ｎＭａｒｃｈｌ９６９，sporadic

incidentsdevelopedmtoasenousannedconflict whichcontmuedfbrsixmonths1o1Atfirst，the Chmesewereunyieldmgtoapproachesfbrceasefire negotiationswiththeRussiansButafterthemcident

threatenedtoreachanall-outwaLmaregionwhich housedsomeofChina，snuclearmstallations，the ChmeseagreedtonegotiateThetalkstemporarily easedthetensions1o2Withthisclearsplitbetween theChmeseandtheSovietspoweLasｗｅｌｌａｓｍｔｈｅ ｗａｋｅｏｆｔｈｅＶｉｅｔｎａｍＷａｒａndAmerica,sweakened lntemationalposition,therearosea“needtoreassess

.”１０３

fiiendsandenemles

AmericanperceptionsofChinesemilitarypower underwentchangesmthel960s,toolnthel950s,the

ＵSconsideredChmatohaveapotentialfbrbemga fearsomemilitarypower・lo4Experienceoffightmg theChmesemtheKoreanWarhelpedtoshapethaｔ ｍａｇｅＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎａｄｍ血strationsleamedthatif Chmesefightersshouldmasterthetechniquesof modernwarfare，thenChinacoulddevelopmtoa

"fbrmidable，ｗｏrld-classmilitaryfbe，oracandidate

greatpower､'''０５However,itwasalsothoughtthatif ChmafnUedtoreachthosedevelopments，ｉｔｓｐｏｗｅｒ ｗｏｕｌｄｒｅｍａｍｌｍｉｔｅｄｔｏｔｈeregionalsphereThe hdo-ChmaWarimpressedandremmdedWashmgton ofChinesefighters,capabilitiesofaswiftsuccess1o6 AcquisitionoftheatomicbombfUrtherstrengthened theideathatChinacouldbeconsideredanaspirmg

greatpower・

hthel960s,theUSgraduaUyreevaluatedChina,s militarypotentialandrealcapabilitieshtheViemam WaLChma,sfbrcesmdeedseemedfbrmidable，but eventuallyprovednottohavefUllyrealizedthe modemizationpotential1o71nthel969Smo-Soviet borderdispute，China,slackofdevelopmentof advancedConventionalfbrceswasapparent Accordmgly,theUSconcludedthatChmacouldnot fightconvmcmglybeyondthemainlandborders1o8 ThelossofSovietsupportsmcel960wasan importantfactormAmerica，sreassessmentofChma,s

conventionalmilitarycapabilitieslo，ThePLAmight notbeagreatpower,oramodemmilitaryfbrce,butit retamedcredibilityasadeterrentfbrce11oThus，

graduallyAmericanofficialsrealizedChmawasnotas threatenlngaswasthought，butithadconsiderable militarypoweIBandwasrespectedaroundtheworld，

butmostlymtheAsianregionTYleUSｂｅｇａｎｔｏｖｉｅｗ Ｃｈｍａａｓａｎｍｐｏｒｔａｎｔｌｅadmgregionalpower、The reassessmentofChma,smilitarycapabnitiesandits positionasal1eg7o"α/powerhelpedspeedthemoveto rapprｏｃｈｅｍｅｎｔ

Ｂｙｔｈｅｅｎｄｏｆｔｈｅｌ９６０ｓ，ｔｈｅＵＳｈadalso

reexammedChma,seconomicandpoliticalmodelln

theearlyl950s，AmericanofTicialswoniedChina

人間社会環境研究第１５号２００８．３

TheViemamWarhighlightedChma,smportantrole mtheregion,andatthesametmeaddedinfblmation concernmgitsoverallpowerpotentialBoththe AmericansandtheChmeseappearedtoneedan acuteanddangerouscrisisbefbreacceptmg rapprochementTheVietnamWarmightbedescribed asthelaststrawlntheend,itwasacrucialneedm regionalaffairsthatbroughtaboutnonnalizationm

theirrelations・

America,smvolvementmViemammcreasedmthe

earlyl960s，withtheKennedyadmmistration,s mcreaseofmilitaryadvisersmSouthVietnamThe USmitiallygotmvolvedmlndochina(Viemam)mthe

earlyl950s，maneffbrttohelptheFrenchfbrces・''５

ＴｈｅｐｏｌｉｃｙｗａｓａｆｆｅｃｔｅｄｂｙｔｈｅＤｏｍｍｏTheoryうwhich stipulatedthatifonecountlｙ‘felrtoconnnunist

regme，thenothercountrieswouldfbllow・''６

MoreoveEtheUSwishedtopreserveltsprestigeand credibilitymsupportmgwhatseemedtobea

democraticregｎｅｍＳｏｕｔｈＶｉｅｍａｒｎ１１７１ｎＡｕｇＵｓｔ

l964VietnamesetorpedoboatsattackedAmerican navalvesselstwicemｔｈｅＧｕｌｆｏｆＴｂｎｋｍ・Following theGulfofTbnkmmcident，PresidentJohnson receivedauthorizationftomtheCongresstoconduct militaryoperationsmSouthEastAsiawithout declarmgwar・ＴｈｉｓｌｅｄｔｏＡmericanairstrike

operationsanmｇａｔｂｏｍｂｍｇｋｅｙｈｏｌｄｓｏｆｔｈｅＮＬＦ１１８

Ｆｒｏｍｌ９６５，ｔｈｅＵＳｓｅｎｔｍａｒｉｎｅｆｂｒｃｅｓｔｏＳｏｕｔｈ Ｖｉetnam,withwhichUStroopsreachedover550,ＯＯＯ

ｂｙｌ９６９''９ＦollowmgthefierceTetOffensivem

l968,PresidentJohnsondecidednottoseekreelection ThisfilrtherdemonstratedAmerica,sftagilestrategic positionmViemａｍ,ａｎｄAsiamgeneral12o

ConculTently）ＣｈｍａｗａｓａｌｓｏｅｎｇａｇｅｄｍＶｉｅｍａｍ Ｆｒｏｍｌ９５６，Chmacontinuallyprovidedmilitaryaid andannsshipmenttotheNolthVietnamese､Chmese aidtoViemamincreaseddramaticallyfroml963l21

Froml965,Chmeseaidmcludedthreemamtypes;the dispatchofChmeseengmeersfbrconstructionand maintenanceofairfieldsandroadsetc.；ａｌｌｏｗｍｇｔｈｅ

mightappealtoThirdWOrldcountriesashavmgfbund asystemfbrrapideconomicdevelopmentandthe abilitytocontrolalargepopulationmThe

ideologicalrivallybetweentheUSａｎｄＣｈｉｎａｗａｓａｔ ｔｍｅｓｅｖｅｎｇｒｅａｔｅｒｔhanwiththeSoviets，asChina seemedtoprovidearolemodeltoAsianandThird WOrldcountriesfbrdevelopmgastrong，mHuential moderncountlyHowever，ｍｔｈｅｌ９６０ｓ，dueto domesticpolicyfailuressuchastheGreatLeap Forward,Ｃｈｍａ,sprestigeasamodelfbrdevelopmg nationsdnmished112TheJohnsonAdmmistration concludedChinawaｓａｓｔａｔｅ“capableofcausmg troublemitsborderareas,developmganatomicbomb，

butnotcapableofsolvingfbod-populationproblems ordevelopmgabroadmdustrialbase・'''1３Ｔｈｅ ｗｅａｋｅｎｍｇｏｆＣｈｍａ,spositionasarolemodelanda leaderfbrconmunistregmesreducedalittlethe severeideologicalrivallythatdommatedtherelations

mtheｌ９５０ｓ

Ｂｙｔｈｅｅｎｄｏｆｔｈｅｌ９６０ｓ，Chmesefbreignpolicy

seemedmoredefensiveandcautiousthanadventurous

・’'４ＡｍｅｒｉｃａｖｉｅｗｅｄＣｈｍａａｓａ ａｎｄａｇｇresslve

regionalpowerthatwouldnotbecapableofreachmg superpowerｓｔａｔｕｓａｎｄｃｈａｌｌｅｎｇｍｇｔｈｅＵＳｉｎｔｈｅ nIemationalsphereanytimesoonThishelpedm pavmgthewayfbrasignificantreductionoftensions，

andadvancetowardrapprochement

TheVietnamWarandRapprochement

Mosthistoriansagreethatthecrucialfactorm America，sdecisionfbrrapprochementwithCｈｍａｗａｓ ｔｈｅＶｉｅｍａｍＷａｒＴｍｓｗａｒｉｓｅｓｐｅciallynoteworthym thatitgreatlyaffectedAmericanpolicymtheFarEast andtowardChinaMoreoveEtheViemamWar acceleratedtheseemmgdeclinemAmerica,s internationalpowerandstamsWhiledurmgthel960s，

ｔｈｅＵＳｂｅｇａｎｔｏａｓｓｅｓｓＣｈｍａａｓｐｏｓｍｇｌｅｓｓofa

challengetoAmericanmterests,andlessofathreatto

theUS,theUSwasfightmgaprowwarwithChina

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStaｍｓ

useofChmeseantiaircraftartillelytroopsfbrthe defenseofNorthⅥetnam;ａｎｄａｃｏｎｔｍｕｍｇｓ叩plyof militaryequlpmentandmaterials122TheJohnson admmistrationfhllyrecognizedthelinkbetween ChmaandNorthVietnam，ａｎｄｗａｓａｄａｍａｎｔｉｎｉｔｓ ｄｅｃｉｓｉｏｎｎｏｔｔｏｌｅｔＶｉｅｍａｍ‘ftllrtoconnnunisml23 ChmawasbelievedtobebehmdtheViemamWarぅａｎｄ ｍｐａｒｔ,theUSmtervenedintheVietnamWarmorder

toreduceChma,srevolutionalypolicy124Duringthe

waEitbecameclearthatChinawasnotthecauseof

themsurgencymViemam，butrathermerely providingmilitaｒｙｓ叩port'2５However，theUS recognizedthatChmaheldtheｋｅｙｔｏｅｎｄｍｇｔｈｅｗａｒ，

asatrustedallyofNorthViemam

TheViemamWarnotomyraisedawaveofanti-war publicopmionandprotestｓｗｉｔｈｍｔｈｅＵＳ，italso dmmishedAmerica,sprestigeworldwideThe prolongedｗａＬｗｉｔｈｎｏａｐｐａｒｅｎｔｅｎｄｎｏｒｃｌｅａｒgoal，

andcontinuedlossesontheAmericansidareduced AmericanprQjectionofpowermtheworldEspecially mtheFarEast,America,ｓｒｏｌｅａｎｄｐｏｗｅｒｓｅｅｍｅｄｔｏ ｂｅｄｅｔｅｒｉｏratmg126Ａlocal，regionalAsianwar fbrcedAmericatoreconsideritspowerandAsianand globalpolicy、

ForPresidentNixon,electedml96afindmga solutionfbrｔｈｅＶｉｅｔｎａｎｌＷａｒｗａｓａｔｔｈｅｔｏｐｏｆｈｉｓ

prioritiesNixonwithdrewsoldierstoreduce Americancasualties，bombedsupplyroutesm CambodiaandｓｏｕｇｈｔｔｏstrengthentheSouth ViemameseannyButaboveaU，hesoughttoopen relationswithChma,asthatwasclearlythebestway

toendA1nerica,smvolvementmtheVietnaInWar・

Ｃｈｍａ，astrongregionalpower＞couldcompelNorth Viemamtonegotiations,ifempoweredevenfi1rtherby

relaｔｉｏｎｓｗｉｔｈｔｈｅＵＳ

Ｉｎｌ９69,asNixontookoffice，ｔｈｅＵＳｂｅｇａｎ ｓｅｎｄｍｇｍｅｓｓａｇｅｓｔｏＣｈｍａSecretcontactsand messageswerepassedbetweenbothsidesregardmga possiblerapprochementAtatimewhenWashmgton realizedtheneedandoppomnityfbrnonnalization

ｗｉｔｈＣｈｍａ,Ｃｈｍａ,too,recognizedtheadvantagesfbr suchamove128TheUSsignaleditsdesirefior rapprochementbyeasmgtravelandtraderestrictions，

andlaterceasedtheSeventhFleet，spatrolsofthe

TniwanStrait・'２９ Afterextendedtalksand

Kissmger,ssecretvisittoBeUmg,mJulyl971theUS andChinaannouncedPresidentNixonwouldvisit

Chinamearlyl972l3oLaｔｅｒｍｌ９７１，theUS supportedtheproposaltoreplacetherepresentatives ofChmamtheUmtedNationsfiomthoseoftheROC tothePRC131

RapprochementdidhelpleadtoAmerican withdlawalfiFomaprolongedandcostlywal；ｂｕｔｄｉｄ ｎｏｔｓｏｌvetheVietnameseproblemmthewaytheUS hadhopedfbrthroughoutthemterventionTY1eUS pulleditstroopsoutandwithdrewcompletelyfi･ｏｍ Ｖｉｅｍａｍｂｙｔｈｅｍｉｄ－１９７０ｓＪｎｌ９７５，NoIthViemam attackedtheSouthagamandcapturedthemamcities lnl976,NorthVietnamdeclaredthefbnnationofthe

SocialistRepublicofViemamUltimately;the

unificationofVietnamdealtablowtoAmerican contannentgoals・However;ｔｈｅｌｏｓｓｏｆＶｉｅｍａｍｗａｓ ｎｏｔｓｏｄａｍａｇｍｇtoAmericaninterestsandpoweL becauseoftherapprochementSmo-American rapprochementcausedthemostprofbundshiftmthe Asianregion,butmostlymthemternationalbalance durmgtheColdWar・'3２Rapprochementgreatly improvedChｍａ,sstrategicpositionandinternational status,asitwasallocatedakeypositionmtheUN133 RelationswithChinaalsoenabledtheUStoenhance itsstrategicpositionvis-a-vistheSovietUnionThe mcreasedleveragetheUSgamedcontributedtoa lnitedd6tentewiththeSoviets，andtheSALT treatieSl34Butmostoｆａｌｌ,theUSwasabletoendits

engagementmtheViemamWaralittlemore gracefｉｌｌｌｙＡｓｔｈｅＵＳｒｅａｌｉｚｅｄｉｔｃｏｕｌｄｎｏｔwmthe VietnamWar,endingthecostlyeconomicandnlitary interventionwasAmerica,sprommentobjective

AmericanreasonsfbrrapprochementwithChmaare

variedThereislittledoubtthattheinternational

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

ＵＳｍｔｅｒｅｓｔｓｍｔｈｅＦａｒＥａｓｔＣｈｉｎａｗａｓｎot

unimportant,butthesimationwasmorecomplicated anddemandedgreatermvestmentandresources，ata timewhenAmericafbcusedmoreonEuropethanon AsiaThrouglloutthel950sandearlyl960s,theUS regardedChmaaspossessmgamoreradicalideology andamorerevolutionaryfbreignpolicythanthe SovietUmon,ａｎｄａｓｓｕｃｈ,constimtedalargerthreat toAmericaninterests・l370veraU,theSmo-American relationswereconstramedbytheideological conffontation,withneithersidewillmgtoattemptto improvebilateralrelationsfbralongtneDiplomatic，

Ｃｕlturalandeconomiccontactsweremｍｍａｌ，and militarilyうconflictoccasionallyflaredTheUSand ChmafbughtoneanothermKorea，experienced periodiccrisesmtheTniwanStraitandwereengaged inanmtensiveproxywarmViemaml38Therivalry

wassustameduntilaseemmglyinexhaustibleregional quandarydemandedachangemrelationsTheUSwas reassessmgChma，ｓｐｏｗｅｒｆｂｒｍｏｓｔｏｆｔｈｅｌ９６０ｓ,but thedecisivefactorlnlnltlatlngrapprochementwith ChinawastheＶｉｅｍａｍＷａ工TT1us，theevolutionof Smo-Americanrelationsprovesthatregionalpower statusisanmportantfactormasuperpower,sfbnnmg

relationsoralliances．

settmgoftheColdWarandrivalrywiththeUSSR

influencedAmerica,sdecisiontonormalizerelations withChinaNixonandKissmgerthoughttheycould useChinatoreduceSovietstrengthandelevate AmericanprestigeandpowerwithmtheColdWar context135Moreover，theAmericaneconomyhad beensuffermgfromdeficitsandhighinflation，and withwarexpenditures,ｔｈｅＵＳｗａｓｌｅｓｓｃｏｍｐｅｔｉｔｉｖｅ ＣｈｍａｏｆＩeredavastmarketthatcouldpotentially

contributetotherecoveryoftheeconomy・'３６But

thereisalsolittledoubtthatthecrucialfactorfbr

rapprochementwasthelengthyVietnamWarTheUS realiｚｅｄｉｔｓｌｍｉｔｓｏｆｐｏｗｅＬａｎｄｔｈｅｎｅｔｗorkof alliancesandrelationsithadmplacewasmsufficient tobrmgaboutasuccessfillconclusiontothewarThe onlywaytobrmganendtobloodshedwashough easmgoftensionswithChinaAsaregionalpower thathads叩portedtheNorthVietnamese,Chmacould exerciseitsｐｏｗｅｒｔｏｃｏｍｐｅｌＮｏｒｔｈＶｉｅｍａｍｔｏ ｎｅｇｏｔｉａｔｅａｎｅｎｄｔｏｔｈｅｗａｒ・Ｃｈｍａｗａｓ，asastrong actormAsia,theonlypowerthatcouldhelpAmerica enditsmvolvementmtheViemamWar,Otherfactors，

suchasmcreasedadvantagevis-a-vistheSoviets，

economicbenefits，ａｎｄｔｈｅｎｅｅｄｔｏｃｏｎｔｒｏｌＣｈｍａ,s nuclearcapabilities,werennportantbutnotdecisivem attemptmgtofbnnrelationswithChmaThetmmgof theUS-Smorapprochementisaclearmdicationofthe effectsofthewaronAmerica,snecessityfbrfTiendly

relationswithChina．

NotesandRefen℃nces

’SeeMichalHaddad,“ASmdyoftheOrigins,Durability andStabilityoftheUS-IsraelandUS-JapanA11iances,，，

Ｈ２ｨｍα〃α"cノＳｂｃｊｏＥｍﾉﾉ、"ｍｅ"ｍノＳｆｍｊｅｓ，Ｎｏ．１２，

（September2006),ppl83-l99

ZThisthesisonSino‐Americanrelationsuntill971is basedonRosemaryFoot，ssmdyandpartlyonGordon Chang，ｓｓｍｄｙａｓｗｅｌＬＳｅｅ;RosemaryFoot,ＴｈｅPractice Conclusion

TheevolutionoftherelationsbetwｅｅｎｔｈｅＵＳａｎｄ

ＣｈｍａａｆｔｅｒＷＯｒｌｄＷａｒｌｌisdiscussedhereasa

contrastmgcasemordertoprovemyfirsthypothesis However，itisalsoaconoboratmgcase，ａｓｉｔ ｄｅｍｏｎｓｔｒａｔｅｓｔｈａｔｉｆａｓ叩erpowerhasnorelations witharegionalpoweLitwilllikelyseekthemdueto pressures，needsandmterestsmtheregionlnthe latterl940s，Chmawasconsideredlessimpoltantｔｏ

(Oxfbrd

ClaredonPress，1995)；GordonHChangFriendsand

(StanfbrdStanfbrdUniversityPress,1990）

３WarrenLCohen，

(411ｌｅｄ,NewYork：

istorvofSino-AmericanRelations

ColumbiaUniversityPress,2000),ｐ142.

4ChiangKai-shekwastheleaderoftheKuonnntangparty

duringthecivilwarwhichlaterbecametherulingpartym

ThelmportanceofRegionalPowerStatus

ｎｌｉｗａｎＴｈｅＫＭＴａｒｅａｌｓｏｏｆｔｅｎｒｅｆｅｒｒedtoasthe

Nationalists

５CCPdenotesChmeseComnunistparty，latercalledthe CPC,ＣＯ､ⅢnunistpartyofChina・MaoTBe-tungwashead ofCCPduringthecivilwaLandafterwardstherulerofthe People,sRepublicofChina(PRC）

６Fordetajlsaboutthemssions,mcludmgdocumentations

andprivateinterviews，see；JospehWEsherick，（ｅｄ)，

LostChanceinChina:TheWOrldWarIIDespatchesof

America，sResponsetoChin2 ｐ158．

z4TilckenPattemsintheDustpl4 ｐｌ４．

z5AkiraIriye,“ＷａｓＴｈｅｒｅａＣｏｌｄＷａｒｉｎＡｓｉａ?,，，ｉｎＪｏｈｎ ChayKed),TheProblemsandProspectsofAmeriCan-EaS1 坐1211-匹皿19,§１（BouldeLColorado：WestviewPress，

1977),p9

26Heinrichs,“AmericanChmaPolicy;,，ｐ282．

z7Paterson,“IfEurope,ＷｈｙｎｏｔＣｈｍａ?,”ｐ３０.Paterson

addsthatmGreecearoadtoastable，non‐Communist govemmentandpeaceseemedfeasible,whereasinChina itwascleaLafiertwodecades，ｔｈａｔｉｔｗａｓｉｍｐｏｓｓｉｂｌｅｔｏ ｅｎｄｔｈｅｈｏｓtilitiesandpreventamilitarizedsolution

z8Gaddis,“TheStrategicPerspective,,，ｐｐ７３－７４

Ｕﾕ』ﾕｰS-旦旦ｎＬ１Ｑ且(NewYork:RandomHouse,1974）

７１hlJPl69

８ＭesseＬ‘`AmericanPerspectives,，,ｐ257；ThomasG

paterson，‘`IfEurope,WhynotChina？TheContainment Doctrine,1947-1949,,,ＰＭＯg"e,Ｖｂｌｌ３,(1981),Ｐ２３．

９Westad,ColdWarandRevolutionpl72．

Z8Gaddis,“Ｔ ２ｇＪｉａｎＣｈｅｎ

ｏｆｔｈｅＳｊ

KoadtotheKore用

Sino-AmericanConfirontation

(NewYork：

l０ＣｏｈｅＬ １１１ｈｌＬｐ

ｌ２ＴＱ－ハロ

America,sResponsetoChmE ｐｐｌ４２，150-151

ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),,ｐ４７．

３oWarrenlCohen，“Acheson，hisAdvisersandChina，

1949-1950,,,mDorothyBorgandWaldoHeinrichs(eds.)，

UncertamYears:Chinese-AmericanRelationsl947-1950 lhlLpl51;Westad,ColdWarandRevolutionpl32、

JianChen,Mao1sChmaandtheColdWar（Chape]Hill：

UniversityofNorthCarolinePress,2001),pp33-34

13Westad,ColdWarandRevolutionpl64 （NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1980),pla 31Chen,Ｃｈｍａ１ｓＲｏａｄｔｏｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａｒｐ４７ ３２CohenAmerica，sResponsetoChinan-l58 '４Chen,Ｍａｏ１ｓＣｈｉｎａａｎｄｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａｒｐ２３・

l5Cohen,America，sResponsetoChiiiaD

Mao1sChinaandtheColdWar

pp33-34． Gaddis,``TheStrategicPerspective,，，ｐｐｌｌ５－ｌｌ６ Ｌ１Ｊ.ppll6

Heinrichs,“AmericanChinaPolicyう,，ｐ283．

chang,FriendsandEnemiesp21．

'６Chen,Mao1sChinaandtheColdWarpp33-34 l7NancyBemkopfTnckeLPatteriismtheDust：

Chinese-AmericanRelationsandtheRecoEnition

ControversM1949-1950

(NewYOrkColumbiaUniversity ’Gaddis,“TheStrategicPerspective,，，ｐ､６５．

Ilhl4pp64-6a

IChen，ＣｈｉｎａｊｓＲｏａｄｔｏｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａｒｐｌ１７；fbr

reasonswhytheUSexcludedKoreaseaMineoNakajima，

`TheSino-SovietConfiPontation：ItsRootsinthe lnternationalBackgroundoftheKoreanWaL,,Ｔｈｅ 伽s/７．αﾉﾉα〃ん”"α/ｑ／Ｃ/ｚｊ"ｅｓｅ４ﾉｳﾞｩﾉﾊ,Ｎｏｌ，（January l979),pp20-22;NancyBemkopfTilckeLmnL2lL-LiQlﾕ９

Press,1983),plL

18Pollard，ＥＥＱ１ﾕ旦型２－s且２１』ｴlnLppl94-195；Cohen，

America,sResDonsetoChinE ｐ1５８．

I9MesseL“AmericanPerspectives,，，ｐ259；Paterson，“If

Europe,WhynotChina?,,,ｐ３０．

zoRongquLuo,“ChmaandEastAsiainAmerica，sGlobal

Strategy，1931-1949,,,mAkiraIriyeandWarrenCohen

(eds)，

KongandtheUnitedStates、194.1992：Uncertajn

(Wilmmgton,ＤＥＳＲＢｏｏｋｓ， Ｅｴ1旦旦｡§h狸(NewYork:TWaynePublishers,1994),ｐ２２

４ｏＣｈａｎｇ,ＦｒｉｅｎｄｓａｎｄＥｎｅｍｉｅｓｐ２１

1990),ｐ287；fbrfilrtherdetailsonthereasonsbehind America,sdecisionnottointerferewiththecivilwarin

China，see；Paterson，“IfEurope，WhynotChina?,”pp

l9-38

zlPollard,匙Ql1Q型２－旦旦Qllユロムｐｌ９１，fbrfUrtherreasons

fbrtheAmericanchoicetofbcusoneconomicsanctions see；ShuGuangZhangEconomicColdWar:AmericaIs

41Changnotesthatthis・wasanAmericanambition，ｂｕｔ

ｔｈｅｒｅｗｅｒｅ“conflictsingoalsandmethods"・Achesonhad notedthattheWesthaddonenothingtoattractYUgoslavia awayfromtheSoviets(andyettheriftoccurred)Acheson wasskepticalthattheUSwouldbeabletomduceariftin suchashorttimeSee;chang,FriendsandEnemies,ｐ２０．

４２Chen，Ｃｈｉｎａ１ｓＲｏａｄｔｏｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａｒｐｌｌ３；David

EmbargoagainstChinaandtheSino-SovietAlliance ｕ12二12ロユ(Washington,ＤＣ：WOodrowWilsonCenter Press,2001),ppl7-30

zzMesseL‘`AmericanPerspectives,，，ｐ、260；chang，

FriendsandEnemiespp35-39．

Mayers， CrackingtheMonolith：ＵＳＰｏｌｉｃｖＡ２ａｍｓｔｔｈｅ

Sino-SovietAlliancel949-1955（BatonRouge：

LouisianaStateUniversityPress,1986),p80

43Nakajima,``TheSino-SovietConfirontation"pl9 44Mayersstatesthatmostevidencenowavailablesuggests

thatChinawassurprisedandnotwellpreparedfbrNorth Korea，sattackontheSouthMayers，Crackingthe Monolithpp97-98・Foracontrastmgview§see;Ｔｈｏｍａｓ

z3JohnLewisGaddis,“TheStrategicPerspective:TheRjse

andFallofthe``DefensePerimeter，，Concept,’947-1951,,, inDorothyBorgandWaldoHeinrichs,（eds),LJncertain Years：Chinese-AmericanRelations､1947-1950,（New

York：ColumbiaUniversityPress，1980)，ｐ６７；Cohen J､Christensen,“Ａ`LostChance，fbrWhat？Rethinkingthe

人間社会環境研究第15号２００８．３

1２２

USinclinedtodistrustThismadeitdifficultfbreither

sidetoproperlyassessactionsaseitherthreatsor

reassurances

58Chang,Ｅｴ1旦』ﾕ旦旦-2』ﾕ｡_且旦旦1.2塾ｐ８０

５９ＳｉｍｅｉＱｉｎｇ，“TheEisenhowerAdministrationand ChangesmWestemEmbalgoPolicyAgainstChma，

1954-1958,”mWarrenLCohenandAkiraIriyｅ（eds)，

OrigmsofUS-PRCConfiPontation,”肋ＣＪＤ”"αノｑ／

伽ｅ７ｊｃα"ＥＵｓＭｓｊα"化伽o"s,Ｖｏｌ４，Ｎ０３，(Falll995)，

pｐ262-263.ＦorreasonsleadingtothewarmKorea,see；

Nakajima,“TheSino-SovietConfiPontation,,,ｐｐＺ７‐３２；

Chen,ChinalsRoadtotheKoreanWar懇ｐｐｌＯ５,125-157 ４５Chang,Ｅｴ1旦旦旦旦-2ﾕﾕｰ旦旦目､２１且旦學p76

46Forfilrtherdetailedaccountregardmgthereasonsfbr

AmericaninvolvementmtheKoreanWaLsee；Mayers， (NｅｗＹＯｒｋ

ＦｏｏＬＴｈｅ TheGreatPowermEastAsia、1953-1960

ColumbiaUniversityPress，1990)，ｐｌ２２；Foot，

PracticeofPowerp53．

China1sRoad

ｐｐ８２－１２５；Chen，

ｐｌ２５‐209；Ｎｉ Crackm且theMonolith

ｔｏｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａＬｐｐｌ２５‐209；Nakajima，“The

Sino-SovietConfiFontation,，，pp23-25． 6oZhang,E２９且9,ﾕ里旦９１回皿旦ｐ４９ ６１ｌＵ△pｐ49,78,112,138,140-173,236 6zFoot,ThePracticeofPowe典.ｐ５８ ６３Ｈｉｌｓｍａｎ,JbMoveANation､ｐ２８２．

６４１U△ｐ２８３．

６５ForfUrtherderajlsonthereasonstheUSdidnot recognizeChina,see;WilliamWBoyerandNeylanAkra，

“TheUnitedStatesandtheAdmissionofCommunlst

China,”ＰＣ〃cαノＳｂｊｅ"ｃｅＱ"αr花rlbﾉｺＶｏｌ７６，Ｎ０３，

（Septemberl961),ｐ３３９

６６ＢｏｙｅｒａｎｄＡｋｒａ,“TheUnitedStatesandtheAdmission

ofCommunistChina,，，ｐ３３３．

６７Foot,ThePracticeofPowerpp30-31 68Fo０t,ThePracticeofPowenp,３２

６９Cohen，America，sResponsetoChinaPl84；ｆｂｒｍｏｒｅ ４７Cohen，

ｐｌ６９Ｃｏｈｅｎ

assertsthattheTTumanadministrationhadseveralreasons fbrsendmgtheSeventhFleettotheFonnosastrait;first，

sinceAmericawasdefendingKoreawhichwasplaced outsidethedefensiveperimeter，itwouldbedifficultto explamwhytheUSwasnotprotectingTniwanMoreover，

theUSwasuncertainbutsuspiciousabouttheconnechon ofthewarinKoreaandthecivilwariｎＣｈｍａ,andfeared simultaneousattacksbytheChinesebothontheislandand inKorealhiswayAmericacouldleavealloptionsopen See;lhlJ.,ppl69-170､Tuckersuggeststhatthemovewas anattempttoreassuretheChinese，bypreventinga possibleprovocationbyChiangKai-shekagamsttheCCP．

Cohen，

nliwanHonEKongandtheUnitedStates ｐ３３．

TnckeL

ontheChineseandSovietreasonsandbehaviorduringthe ChristensenclaimsthatthismoveintensifiedMao，ｓｎｅｅｄ

ｔｏｅｎｔｅｒｔｈｅｗａＬａｎｄｕｌｔｉｍａｔｅｌytheSino-American conffontationSee；Christensen，‘`Ａ‘ＬｏｓｔChance，fbr What?,，，pp263-271

48AccordmgtoChristensen,therewereseveralreasonsthe Americantroopsdidnotstopatthe38thparallelForone，

ｉtwouldhavebeendiBHcultandalmostimpossibleto affbrdapennanentstandingdefensealongthelineSee；

Christensen,``Ａ`LostChance,fbrWhat?,，，pp269-270 49Christensen,“Ａ`LostChance，fbrWhat?,，，pp266-269；

Chen，Ｃｈｉｎａ１ｓＲｏａｄｔｏｔｈｅＫｏｒｅａｎＷａｒｐｐｌ５8-189；

CrackingtheMonollth

ｐｐｌ３５－１４Ｚ;

crisis，seaMayers，

Chen,Ｍａｏ１ｓＣｈｍａａｎｄｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａｌｐｐｌ６７‐１７０ ７oTnckeLTniwan･HongKongandtheUnitedStates ｐ４０；

GordonHChangandDiHe,“TheAbsenceofWarinthe US‐ChinaConftomationoverQuemoyandＭａｔｓｕｉｎ ｌ９５４－１９５５：Contingency，Luck，Deterrence?,，，Ｔ７ｚｅ Ａｍｅｒｊｃα〃Ｈ/ｓｍｒｊｃａノルWew,Ｖｂ1.98,Ｎ０５，（December l993),ｐｐｌ５０２,1507-1508;Hilsman,エQ-L4g1L2_△ＬＬ且119ユュ ｐ２８７．

７１Hilsman,JbMoveANationop299

72ChanganｄＨｅ,“TheAbsenceofWaL，,ｐ､1502.

73Fordetailsonthestagesofthecrisis,seaKalicki,ェh且

PattemofSino-AmericanCriseS1ppl36-152．

Nakajima,"TheSmo-SovietConftontation,"pp32-34

０１２３５５５５

America，sResponsetoChm2

ｐ1７２．

Cohen，

Crackin日theMonolith

ｐｌＯＯ．

Mayers，

７４ＣｈａｎｇａｎｄＨｅ,“TheAbsenceofWar,”ｐｐｌ５１７，1523；

ｓｅｅalso;Kalicki,rhePattemofSino-AmericanCrises.ｐ

1５３．

Chen,Chma1sRoadtotheKoreanWanpZZO

Nakajima，“TYleSino-SovietConfiPontation，”ｐ２７；

Chang,Ⅱ旦旦旦旦且_且』ﾕd-En且』ﾕﾕ』且旦塾ｐ７８

７５ＣｈａｎｇａｎｄＨｅ,‘`TheAbsenceofWaL，，ｐｌ５０２;TuckeL ５４Cohen，

THiwan､HongKongandtheUnitedStateap,４０．

７６Hilsman,TbMoveANationp289;Chen,皿旦旦迫_Ｑﾕｭﾕ且 ａｎｄｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａＬｐ２０２・ForafilllaccountonChina，s decisionandbehaviordurmgthel958crisis,see;lhlLpp

l71-204．

Crackin2theMonolith ｐｌＯＯ．

５５Mayers, ５６Ｊ．Ｈ、Ｉ

Crackin2theMonolith

plOL

Sino-AmericanCriSCS1 ThePattemof

Kalicki，

(NewYork：

〕olitical-Militarvlnteractionsmthe1950,ｓ

CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),ｐ７５;TilckeL工山12｣ﾕュ

７７TilckeE

４５．

nljwanHon日Kon2andtheUnitedStates

ｐ４３，

on2Kon2andtheUnitedStates ｐ３３．

s7Kalicki，工hePatternofSmo-AmericanCrises二ｐ７２．

KalickiaddsthatPekingreliedo、Moscow§although SovietandChinesemterestswerenotsimilaratalltimes、

WashingtonreceivedinfbnnationfiDmlndia，whichｔｈｅ

７８TheAmericansweremainlyinterestｅｄｍｓｏｌｖｉｎｇｔｈｅ

ｉｓｓｕｅｏｆＡｍｅｒｉｃａｎｐｎsonersinChinaCohen,America，ｓ

堕匹｣ユエー19＿ロユ１１ﾕｭｭｐｌ８５；Mayers，旦旦JEj』29-1h且