Kagawa U:目iversi~y Economic Revieω Vol.67， No.2， October 1994， 355-365
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Introductory This paper aims to present succinctly the inter-relationships among collective bargaining， joint consultation and workers' behaviour at the Biggest Five enter -prises in the iron-steel industry. Considering the weight and significance they have in the Japanese economy，
the internallogic showed in the following seems to be an exemplified aspect of industrial relations in Japan. The facts below are based on the representative researches， which are all published in the early eighties in J apanese (see reference)Even if we concentrate ourself on such a limited theme， however， several reservations must be put on this rough paper in advance; First of all here is paid few attentions to the important differences within the Biggest Five， and concerned with this point， to the structure of the internallabour markets which are supposed to have some decisive influence on the behaviour of the enterprise unions and of workers.
Collective Bargaining
-356- Kagawa UniversiかEヒonomicReview 590 collective bargaining on wages in the field of the iron-steel industry
I
t
is com-monly named in a word “one-shot offer"(Ippatsu Kaito) system， which means as follows; The bargaining process is concentrated not on the detai!ed debate about the demanded wages of the unions but exclusively on exchange of opinions on grounds or causes of the demands Concrete answer from the management remains obscure unti!the definitive answer day The answer is put forward at the same time and on the same amount by the Biggest Five Companies The amount once presented will never be revised in the negotiations thereafter. Even if it falls behind the demand， enteprise unions do not， in a stricter sense of word， can not， resort to the strikes in order to push the management under pressure.I
t
is the informal parley taking place parallel to the bargaining process that enables such a system Two kinds of parley are known to existOne is called“round parley"(Junkai Sessho)， where the chairman of Tekkor-oren together with the chairman of its affiliated enterprise unions (Kigyoren) make a visit in order at the five enterprises and take a talk with each responsible persons of management about the unions demand.. The other is called“individual parley" (Kobetsu Sessho) or“hot-line
ぺ
thatis， individual talks， usually under the table， based upon their personal connections of which they could make use. Through these informal networks union leaders could detect the answer in advance which would have in this way adjusted to the level of their demands so as for them to be able to persuade the union members without any turbulence. We might therefore say that this process is far from being the collective bargaining determined as an official and organizational demonstration of the union bargaining power¥ So long as they presuppose“one-shot offer" system， which has survived for 20 years， trade unions could not help smearing their own interests onto the various joint consultations Otherwise they would lose their reason d'etre perfectly591 Joint Consultation in the Iron-Steel Industry in Japan
-357-Joint Consultation
Joint consultation systems-whether they may be stipulated in the collective agreement or not-are set up on the three levels， that is， at the head office， plants and factories.. Union's counterparts are Kigyoren， Tanso and Shibu in order In terms of the frequency they really take place， the head office and Kigyoren put their activities rather upon the above mentioned collective bargaining， while the main concerned party of the joint consultation is the plants and Tanso or the factories and Shibu. Naming， topics， way of disposal， participants and fre -quency are very various from plants to plants， factories to factories. See the tables
Table 1 Nippon Steel Corporation， Kimitsu plant Joint Consultation at plant level
Naming Management Council J oint Committee
Topics 1. Production plan I 1. Monthly production plan 2. Building， operation and sus-
I
2 Important manning issues pension plan of the mainI
occurred by the change of equipments production plan 3 Establishment or abolish-I 3 Guide lines as to mass trans -ment of office regulations fer of workers 4. Important issues as to busi-I
4 Guide lines as to short time ness， management and pro-I workduction I 5. Guide lines as to dismissal 5 . Other important issues as toI 6. Building or abolishment of management welfare facilities 7.. Important issues as to wel -fare 8.. Prevention of accidents 9. Other important issues recog -nized by the both
-358ー
Way of disposal
Participants
Frequency
Kagawa Universi~y Economi，じReview 592
Explanation and report by man-agement as well as expression of the opinion by the union within 15 members from each side once in a quarter 1: Explanation and report by management 2， 5， 7， 8: Consultation 6: Explanation and report by management as well as hearing of the opinion of the unions 9: Explanation， report， or hear -ing the opinion of the union， or consultation within 15 members from each side
once in a month and when the both consider to de necessary Source: NITT A， 1981
Table 2 Joint Consultation at factory level (Nippon Steel Corporation， Kimitsu) Naming Workshop Production Committee
Aim To deepen the understanding each other and promote the production as well as safety smoothly
l Production plan
2 Estab1ishment or abolishment of office regulation Topics 3“ Building and improvement of the main equipment
4 Manning 5 ， Safety， health and welfare 6 Others the chairman recognizεd Way of 1-3: Explanation or report by management 4-6: Explanation， report or hearing the disposal opinions of union Within 10 members from each side
Management side: Kacho， Kakari-cho and formen nominated by Participants Kacho
Union side: the head and the vice-head of Shibu， and the central committee nominated by the head of Shibu
Frequency Once in a month out of working time Chairman Kacho
593 Joint Constiltation in the Iron司SteeIIndustry in J apan
-359-From these tables however we could deduce very little; We might say that almost all the items as to the company operations are on the table with a view to deepen the understanding each other.
In regard to the relationship between the joint consultation at Tanso level and the one at Shibu level， a union official of Tanso express himself as follows ; “Joint committee at centrallevel (L e at Tanso level) takes place at the end of every month， and that after having been de1iberated hard at the W orkshop Production Committee (i e.. joint consultation at Shibu leve，)ltherefore hardly get into trouble there.. Most issues are solved at this W orkshop Production Committee.." Also at a plant where there is no consultation system specified in the collective agreement， it is said as follows ; “If manning problems should occur， production planning should be drawn all over again. It is not decided without any consent of the Shibu." In what way on earth then is the consent of the concerned Shibu obtained? Now we proceed to examine this crucial point in its relationship with the rationalization on manning Rationalisation on manning Needless to say， rationalization on manning is the reduction of the number of workers necessary to perform a certain volume of work. Managements are day to day trying to reduce manning and thereby to reduce the labour costs. Retrenchment of the labour costs would be attained， when both aims are being
-360- Kagaω'a Universily Economic Revieω 594 pursued simultaneously， in terms of not only the increase of the labour producti -vities but also of the labour intensification， which in turn would be attained just by way of restructuring of the work organization
，
that is，
rationalization on manning Take an example; at a plant belonging to one of the Biggest Five， manning has been reduced by about 9300 within the period from 1972 to 1978， in other words every half a year in the range from 400 to 1000. The measures were following ; (1) Mechanization， (2) Revision of manning， (3) Mobile allocation， (4) Decrease of work volume， (5) Change of management organization， (6) Putting out (2)as well as (3) are typical measures for reduction of manning without accompanied by mechanization“ Revision of manning leads to deprive theworkers of their reserve time they had so far， because manning standard is now oriented not to the contingent maximum work volume but to the normal situation And also mobile allocation of workers aims to do a certain work with smaller manning through bringing up workers' versatility“ It seems that the so-called
“flexibility" of Japanese industrial relations has its roots in the joint consultation as to the rationalization on manning
The concerned Shibu usually gets an information about issues with regard to the rationalization on manning inofficially a few months before they will be officially proposed on the table of the joint consultation at the plant level， which takes place one and half months before they will be put into practice.. At this prior consultation do attend a head of the Shibu， an official elected by the Shibu from the central committee of Tanso， and Kocho (group leader) from the workers' side， and concemed Kakaricho (head of sub-section)， concemed foreman from the management side
Now we have a consultation about a proposal to cut a worker at the precision workplace where six workers including Kocho pro one shift are engaged in the precision of the produced tube As this workplace is operated by four shifts
，
the proposal will lead to make four workers superfluous Consultation was carried595 Joint Consultation in the Iron-Steel Industry in Japan -361-out mainly upon the theme how the proposal could be achieved， and gets to some contr討ancessuch as setting-up of the movable seats， interphones and the more TV -cameras， for which the management side makes a definitive promise on the spo.t
Issues with regard to the rationalization on manning are processed as if they should be solved within the concerned workplaces， as an absolute norm set upon the whole members， not only the concerned workers but also the concerned management. To our surprise， there is no attention to the inter-personal ralationships which might have established between workers. We will later mention to this point again
As far as the consequential work intensification and work loads are con -cerned， recorded is only the following talks ;
Shibu: “Physical and psychologicalloads of the workers will increase Fatigue will get bigger.一"
Management :“Indeed the increase of the work volume will raise fatigue somewhat But"'we could adopt a rotation，."
Shibu: “山刷besidesthe range of 50b will be enlarged owing to the reduction of one worker， we would ask you to raise the pay -ment by 50b of Kocho-Jiseki (sub-group leader)" Management :“一Asfar as our honest feeling is concerned， we could under -stand your demand But existing evaluation system has its weight on the knowledge and skills， therefore intensification alone cannot come to level it up…" Various measures of the rationalization on manning are necessarily ac -companied by the coordination of manning between different factories， from the one with superfluous workers to the ones lacking， that is Haiten (transfer of
-362ー Kagawa Universi(y Economic Review 596
workers) Various consequences brought about by the rationalization on man-ning-e.. g work intensification and Haiten-are mostly absorbed into the unique wage component explained below
Collateral
In responce to their sacrifice， workers gain a reward literally meaning “Retur -ned Payment of Results from the Rationalization on Manning" This payment has been introduced since October 1972.. The fund to be returned to workers，
which amounts to 65 % in the payroll in April 1978
，
consists of two elements.. The one is a general return fund that is distributed to all the blue-collar workers.. This is calculated by the following formula ;Fund (per capita， per month)=unit pricexrationalized degree
Unit price was raised for the first time in April 1978， from 430 yen to 600 yen If you divide this fund by the average monthly wage of a worker， you will get a return rate， which holds in the whole company
The other fund is cal1ed a priority payment especial1y distributed to the workers who directly bear the brunt of the rationalizations. In fact this is said to function as Haiten allowances. And this fund is also increased by 100
%
in October 1977.The returned fund in this way calculated is distributed firstly to the Kakari (sub-section) and then through the filter of the personal judgement by Kakari-cho and foremen to the individual workers.. Expressing this relations in a formula， as fol1ows;
597 Joint Consultation in the Iron-Steel Industry in Japan -363-In this formula， coefficient of return means the personal judgement by Kakari -cho and foremen， which varies from L45 to 0..55， averaging L 0“
Individual workers may wel1 endeavor to get the returned payment more than any other fel10w workers in the same workplace by way of obtaining a better personal judgement， in so far as this kind of behavior would be the most realistic way for them to improve their own lives
Social relationships at the workplaces As a corol1ary we can observe a constel1ation which characterizes the social relationships at the workplaces in the Biggest Five The questionnaire to the union members discloses fol1owing ; Competing consciousness against the fel10w workers is strong; Superiors are positively evaluated; Grievances are solved by talking with each other or with their superiors. In order to clarify this situation， it is of use to compare it with the ones of (1) other unions， for example， Denkiroren(Japanese Federation of Electrical Machine Wor kers' Uロions)，Zendentsu(Japan Telecommunications Workers'
(2)
Union) and Doro(Nihon National Railway Motive Power Union). Among these four unions， at the opposite side of Tekkororen does exist Doro， where the competing relations among workers are restricted， superiors are negatively evaluated and grievances are brought first of al1 to the unions.. Zendentsu gets a middle position between the both and Denkiroren is rather similar to Tekororen When we look into how the workers deal with the grievances especially as to the manning and Haiten， it becomes much more clear. In the Tekkororen， about 45% workers answer “do noting"， fol1owed by “deal with it by talking with each other" (about 25 %)，“deal with it by talking with superiors" (about 18%) and only
364- Kagawa University Economic Review 598 2%“deal with it by talking with the union". This last answer amounts to about 70
%
in Doro， about 20%
in Zendentsu and 5%
in Denkiroren In short we might say as follows; At the workplaces in the iron-steel big companies there are very few in the union activities which are able to regulate the competing relationships among workers， therefore workers cannot help but resort not to the union but to their superiors in order to manage with the day-to day problems， which leads to the positive evaluation toward Kakari-cho and foremenConclu
，
ding remar ksIndustrial relations in the Biggest Five of the iron-steel industry are estab -lished under the premise of the overwhelming strength of Management which is symbolized by the“one-shot offer" system. For the Tekkororen is the way strictly closed to demonstrate its official and organizational power
The affiliated unions therefore find the measures to realize their own demands in the non-organizational way of power. Here 1ies some reason why they push the joint consultation and prior consultation And indeed for the management it is not dispensable for deepening communication each other， in so far as unions hold in their hands the control power to mobilize their members into the fluent accomplishment of the rationalization on manning.
It is no wonder that the consultations have sometimes a tint of negotiations For the opportunities of the unions to make a display of their existence toward union members are enclosed into the place of consultation. Nevertheless in fact some demands are excluded in advance from the issues of consultation， or， even if they are put on the table， they would at best play a role of alibis when they would not correspond to the minds of management， above all management at the factory level. Itmight be not too much to say， therefore， that the consultation is degraded into a place where it is discussed by the both representatives jointly to what extent the demands at the workplace should be accepted and how the
599 Joint Consultation in the lron-Steel Industry in Japan -365 unacceptable demands should be distorted.
One important channel to distort is the unique wage component， that is，
“Returned Payment of Results from the Rationalization on Manning'¥Individual workers have to strive hard toward the more rationalization in order to enlarge the fund， and even more have to compete with fellow workers in order to obtain the more distribution out of that fund Footnotes 本Thisis a paper presented by the author at the seminar which was held under the auspice of Prof Joachim Bergmann at the Technische Hochschule Darmstadt， Ger -many， in 20 July 1986. Since then circumstances surrounding Japanese industrial relations have chang巴dsignificantly To mention most obvious ones; National cen
-ters of the trade unions were restructured， a new one called Rengo was estab!ished ; Japan's National Reilway was privatized However. industrial relations in substance seem to be unchanged
( 1) It is now renamed DENKIRENGO
( 2) After privatization of the J apan's N ational Railway， it is now renamed JR -SOUREN References IN AGAMI， Takeshi: Roshi Kankei no Shakaigaku (The Sociology of the Industrial Relations)， Tokyo 1981 NITT A， Michio: Tekkogyo ni okeru Roshikyogi no Seido toJittai (The system and the actual conditions of the joint consultation in the iron-steel industry)， Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu， VoL 32 No 5， 6， 1981， later compiled into his book， Nihon no Rodosha Sanka (Worker's Participation in Japan)， Tokyo， 1988
MATSUZAKI， Tadashi: Nihon Tekko Sangyo Bunseki (The analysis of the Japanese iron-steel industry)， Tokyo 1982
MOTOJIMA， Kunio: Daikigyo Rodosha no Shutai Keisei (The Class Consciousness of the big companies' workers) Tokyo 1982.
