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(1)法科大学院論集第１１号. Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan Kensuke Ueda. Introduction. Britain and Japan look to have similar political systems in that both countries have a parliamentary government based on a dual chamber system. Recently, the functions of the Prime Minister（PM）and his/her supporting sections in the‘Centre’ may have been strengthened in both countries. However, reflecting upon the basic differences of the PM’s substantive power and authority in both countries, the means of dealing with recent problems in the UK and Japan may be somewhat different. The purpose of this paper is to describe the development of the Cabinet Office of both countries, to analyse them from the perspective of a constitutional lawyer, and to reflect on their implications for the‘Centre’ in Japan.１）. １）I would like to thank Professor Adam Tomkins, who gave me the opportunity to stay and study at the University of Glasgow and provided valuable advice and comments regarding my research. I would also like to thank Mr. Kevin Winters for his grammatical review.. ― ― 145.

(2) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. １. Development of the Cabinet Office in Britain―After Blair １.１ No. １０ Office In an attempt to take into account the historical development of the Cabinet Office（CO）, Lee, Jones, and Burnham depicted the organisation and function of each section of the No. １０ office in the １９９０s（Lee, J. M., Jones, G. W., and Burnham, J. １９９８: ２９）. They found that the No. １０ consists of four sections: the Private Office; the Political Office; the Press Office; and the Policy Unit/Policy Adviser. The Private Office was staffed by civil servants from major government departments and engaged in the management of the diary, selection of letters and papers, and maintaining of relationships with departments. The Political Office consisted of Political Secretaries and Parliamentary Private Secretaries. This section dealt with backbenchers and the members were paid not by public money but by the government party. The Press Office was staffed by the Chief Press Secretary and several Press Officers. The Chief Press Secretary came both from within and outside of Whitehall, i.e. the press. This section managed communications with the press, would broadcast offair, and coordinated press sections throughout the entire Executive. The Policy Unit was formally set up by then Prime Minister Wilson in １９７４, but its origins date back to the１９６０s, when Wilson appointed economists in the CO and Heath launched the Central Policy Review Staff. The composition of the Policy Unit’s membership varied according to the Prime Minister, but businesspersons, academics, and journalists were often given posts in this Unit. The role of this Unit was to analyse information ― ― 146.

(3) 法科大学院論集第１１号. relating to major policies and to inform the PM of its opinion. When Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, she appointed Special Advisers separately from the Policy Unit and asked for advice regarding the monetary policy and the Falklands War. This four-part structure of the No. １０ Office suggests that the No. １０ plays four functions: private secretary and liaising with government departments, maintaining a relationship with parliament engaging with the media, and supporting the PM’s policy-making. Since the Blair Administration, the organisation of the No.１０seems to have changed. Firstly, the post of‘Chief of Staff’ was created as the head of this office instead of the Principle Private Secretary. This means that the Special Adviser had come to serve as its head. Second, the Strategic Communication Unit was established in November １９９７. This seems to have been charged with coordinating the release of departmental statements in order to ensure effective coverage in the media（Burch and Holliday２００４:５） . Then, at the start the second term, the Blair government implemented a significant reorganisation in the Centre’. No. １０ had been shuffled into three directorates: the Policy Directorate integrated the private office with the policy unit; the Communication and Strategy Directorate was substituted for the Press Office and the above-referenced Strategic Communication Unit; and the Government Relations Directorate was established to oversee the PM’s communications both within and outside of the government, which included the former Political Office （Burch and Holliday ２００４: ８９）. Through these changes, the role of the press officers seems to have developed significantly. They would not only regularly release government information to the entire British media but ― ― 147.

(4) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. would also attempt to control the content of these press releases so as to reflect favourably on the government through communicating with the specific press correspondents. In addition, the number of Special Advisers has increased and their roles have become more important. Such development would have led to greater influence both in communicating government policy to the broader British media（Special Advisers dealing with such things are often called‘spin doctors’.）and in government policymaking（The way in which the policy-making was conducted, not by the formal Cabinet or Cabinet Committee but by the PM and his/her special advisers, is criticized as ‘sofa government’.）. However, it remains the same that the four functions referenced above still play a major role for the No.１０.. １.２ Emergence of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit When one considers the development of the Cabinet Office as outlined above, particularly when compared to that which has occurred within the Japanese Government and its Cabinet Office counterpart, it can be pointed out that several noteworthy changes occurred under the British system. Firstly, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit（PMDU）came into existence. It was created after the ２００１ election to ensure the delivery of the Prime Minister’s top public service priority outcomes（Richards and Smith ２００６: ３３４）. As background for its creation, the recognition of the failure of the“joined-up government”policy in terms of effective policy delivery is often noted（Richards and Smith ２００６: ３３４）. The PMDU was located in the CO, but moved to the Treasury in ２００２. The PMDU consisted of approximately ４０ members, the composition of which is a ― ― 148.

(5) 法科大学院論集第１１号. mixture of both civil servants, who are seconded from the public sector （Lindquist ２００６: ４２４）, and consultants from the private sector. This unit made use of Public Service Agreements（PSAs）as a means of controlling and overseeing policy implementation. PSAs contain aims, objectives, and performance targets with resources allocated to each service and are agreed upon between individual departments and the Treasury. However, when dealing with areas of great political significance, it was said that the PM set targets on his/her own, with the assistance of the PMDU（Richards and Smith ２００６: ３３４; Lindquist ２００６: ４２４）. Following the conclusion of a PSA, the PMDU reports to the PM on the progress and the PM regularly meets with the representative of these delivery units. In a particular case where a target could not be met, members of the PMDU engaged with departments, identified the obstacles to efficient policy delivery, and proposed a solution to remedy the situation. Consequently, the PMDU, working in this way, could make a direct connection between the‘Centre’ and the delivery parts, sometimes even without mediation by individual departments. In addition, what is interesting from the point of view of a constitutional lawyer is that the PMDU was allowed to directly report to the PM even after it was moved to the Treasury. The PMDU could be substantially classified as a PM supporting section as the name indicates. Therefore, the appearance of the PMDU might mean adding a new function to the CO, i.e. control of policy implementation. The PMDU was absorbed into the Building Capacity section of the CO together with the Strategy Unit, Office of Public Sector Reform, Better Regulation Unit, etc. in ２００５（Richards and Smith ２００６: ３３５６）. Then, the ― ― 149.

(6) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. PMDU moved to the Treasury and took on the oversight of the entire suite of ３１ PSAs, rather than concentrating on selected priority areas（Harris and Rutter ２０１４: ６５）. However, the name ‘Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit’ survived as one component of the Public Service and Growth Directorate（Cabinet Office ２００７b: ２６４; Cabinet Office ２００９: ２３２, ２３８） . The PMDU ceased operations following the election of the Cameron Coalition Government. However, the structure of ordering departments to set objectives and overseeing their implementation from the Centre’ has remained. The coalition launched a new scheme called Department Business Plans in November ２０１０. In this regime, departments prepared their plans in line with the Coalition Agreement and the Programme for Government. Each plan consisted of parts entitled‘Vision’,‘Coalition Priorities’, ‘Structural Reform Plan’, ‘Departmental Expenditure’, and Transparency’. The Implementation Unit（IU）was created in the CO （later moved to the Policy and Implementation Unit in the No. １０）and this has ‘performed the leading role in centre-led implementation, managing the Business Plans, and reporting to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister on which actions have not been achieved on schedule’（Truswell and Atkinson ２０１１: ２６）. Although Cameron seems to have appealed the rhetoric of these plans bringing‘a new system of democratic accountability’（Cameron ２０１０）and their details are also different in that this system leaves departments to articulate their plans themselves, the basic scheme of this implementation chasing/monitoring system is the same as in the previous Blair and Brown Administrations. The PM support section can be evaluated to play a dominant role in this scheme by referring to the following points: the ― ― 150.

(7) 法科大学院論集第１１号. Performance and Innovation Unit（PIU）is situated in the No.１０; the PM and DPM set the agenda for the IU on a quarterly basis; the Business Plans are formulated separately from the Spending Review in which the HM Treasury plays a key role; the PM leads the Growth and Enterprise Committee to discuss and follow up on the IU reports（Harris and Rutter ２０１４: ６６７）. The PMDU（and the IU and the PIU）had a significant impact on the relationship with departments. Firstly, the ‘Centre’ has ‘alternative information resources which give it leverage over departments’. Secondly, this section ‘led to policy being driven much more from the centre’ （Richards ２０１１: ４２）.. １.３ Development of Public Service Related Sections １.３ Corporate Management Sections Another noteworthy change of the PM supporting section is that the public service section that deals with public service management and its reform seem to be established as one significant section in the CO. Until the end of １９９０s, the functions relating to civil service management basically belonged to the HM Treasury, except during the decade when the Civil Service Department existed（１９６８ through １９８１）. Though some functions with respect to recruitment and general policy were moved to the Management and Personnel Office, which is under the supervision of the PM as the Civil Service Minister, after the CSD was abolished, the main functions relating to pay, grading, and terms and conditions were returned to the Treasury. The Treasury controlled the Civil Service Management and Pay section, which contained the ― ― 151.

(8) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. Pay Group, Personnel Policy Group, Management Policy Group, and ultimately dealt with matters related to pay, recruitment, conditions and terms, industrial relations, pensions, etc. However,‘［w］ith the decentralization of responsibility for the pay and grading of staff to departments and agencies, and the introduction of control of departmental running costs in place of manpower controls’, the functions of central staff management were transferred from the Treasury to the Minister for Public Service, i.e. the Prime Minister（Daintith and Page １９９９: ６６）. The Transfer of Functions（Treasury and Minister for Civil Service）Order １９９５ provides for a transfer of the functions with respect to the number of civil servants and their grading, classification, recruitment and appointment, remuneration, expenses and allowances, and other working arrangements, from the Treasury to the Minister for Civil Service（Section ２）. In addition, the Senior Civil Service was created. Following this reallocation, the organogram had also suggested significant changes. The Civil Service Year Book of １９９６ shows that the Civil Service Management and Pay sections disappeared and only three sections relating to pay, policy, and pensions remained in the Treasury as part of the Budget and Public Finances Directorate, whereas the sections dealing with Senior Civil Service pay, contracts, and staff management had been added to the Office of Public Service, which itself was situated under the CO（Cabinet Office １９９６: ７２７４, ６７４５）. In addition, the sections titled Civil Service Pensions Division’ and‘Personnel Management and Conditions of Service Division’ had appeared as part of the OPS in １９９７（Cabinet Office １９９７: ７３７５）. After the OPS was integrated into the CO, these sections, the jurisdiction of which covers both the SCS management ― ― 152.

(9) 法科大学院論集第１１号. and pay, pensions, and general employee relations policy of Civil Service in general, have been situated in the CO. This organogram has not substantially changed after the Constitutional and Governance Act ２０１０ placed the civil service on a statutory footing. In short, though departments are charged with the authority to prescribe the qualifications for the appointment of（home）civil servants, with the exception of the First Stream Development Programme, and to determine the number, grading of posts, and the terms and conditions of employment of civil servants outside the SCS（see, Civil Service Management Code, Introduction, Para.３） , the CO（legally this refers to the Minister for the Civil Service）has the power to prescribe the conditions relating to the above-referenced delegation（ Cabinet Office requirements’, the expression of which would be the provisions of the Civil Service Management Code（Daintith and Page １９９９: ７３））, and the power to prescribe the qualifications for appointments concerning the First Stream Development Programme and to determine the number, grading of posts, and the terms and conditions with respect to the SCS.. １.３ Civil Service Reform Section When dealing with public service management, it is important that the section dealing with civil service reforms was established in the CO under the Blair Administration. Certainly, before Blair, there were a great many sections dealing with this agenda. The Efficiency Unit, set up during the Thatcher Administration, is well-known to have instigated the cutting of civil service numbers and implemented the Next Step programme, which may have led to the delegation of low-level staff ― ― 153.

(10) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. management functions to individual departments under the Civil Service （Management Functions）Act of １９９２.２） The Citizen’s Charter Unit of the Major Administration developed and coordinated the Citizen’s Charter initiative that pressed departments and agencies to make Charters including certain principles such as audited performance standards; choice where possible; and a possibility of redress’（Burnham and Pyper ２００８: １３２）. This might mean that this initiative reformed the way in which the civil service works, i.e. one element of civil service reform. However, the Blair Administration set up the unit entitled‘Public Service’, i.e, the Public Service Delivery Division, although this unit had substantially inherited the Efficiency Unit（then Efficiency and Effectiveness Unit）and the Citizen’s Charter Unit（rebranded as the Service First Unit）（Burnham and Pyper ２００８: １４３）. At the beginning of the Blair Administration, these units might have been integrated into the Modernising Public Services Group, the function of which involved‘two important aspects of the modernizing government agenda: work on meeting user needs, including the Charter Mark and People’s Panel and Better Government for Older People; and the programme for helping to improve effectiveness of departments, agencies, and the wider public sector’ （Cabinet Office １９９９: ６３６４） . This group ceased to exit after ３０ September ２００１. It is suggested that the reason for this, as shown above, was the recognition of the failure of join-up government programme in the aspect of delivery, and because the mission of civil service reform was carried out. ２）These functions were delegated to Ministers and they could decide to allow Agency Chief Executives to exercise these functions.. ― ― 154.

(11) 法科大学院論集第１１号. by the PMDU. However, certain matters were still dealt with in the CO; in the existing civil service management division; and in the newly established Office of Public Service Reform（OPSR）（Cabinet Office ２００１: ４３, ４７９; Burnham and Pyper ２００８: １４４）. The OPSR seems to have disappeared in ２００５. The work might have been dispersed throughout the CO and integrated into the Building Capacity Section. The brand of ‘Public Service’ or ‘Reform’ had disappeared from the organogram. However, civil service reform could have been accomplished in the Delivery and Transformation Group in the CO. The Capability Review Programme, which was carried out by the Capability Reviews section in this group, was considered as a‘part of the wider Civil Service agenda’（Cabinet Office ２００７a: ６１）. On the other hand, the Transformational Government section led the implementation and further development of the Transformational Government strategy, which was developed to provide overall technological leadership in the three key areas: the transformation of public services; the efficiency of corporate services and infrastructure of government organisations; and the steps necessary to achieve the effective delivery of technology for government （Cabinet Office ２００５: ２） . Both sections remained under the Brown Administration. In the present Cameron Administration, the section titled Civil Service Reform has emerged again and is located within the Civil Service Capability Group. In addition, the Efficiency and Reform Group could also substantially deal with civil service reform, because the key priorities of this group were ‘making government more efficient’ and ‘radically reforming the way public services are provided to ensure they meet rising ― ― 155.

(12) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. public expectations’（Cabinet Office ２０１１: ６７）. These concepts seem to follow the trend of both the Thatcher and Brown Administrations. Another significant consideration may be the objective behind the Capability Review. This was launched by O’Donnell in ２００５. The aim of this review was to assess each department’s capabilities for leading policy and strategy and for delivery of citizen-centred services to meet challenges in the future. The first phase（Phase １）was carried out in ２００６７ and the second phase（Phase ２）took place in ２００８９. The model of capability, which is used as a kind of benchmark for this review, was revised in ２００９ and focused on delivery. The Capability Review is closely related both to the PMDU and to civil service reform because the implementation of this review was assisted by the PMDU and the Civil Service website explains that‘the Capability Review Programme is part of the wider Civil Service Reform agenda and is designed to lead to a Civil Service which is better at delivering public services’. In ２０１２, the Civil Service Reform Plan was published. This is ‘a working action plan that sets out key actions’（HM Government ２０１２: ８） that includes introducing new delivery models and sharing transactional services between departments; improving policy-making capabilities; improving delivery of major projects by different means; building capability by strengthening skills, abilities, and performance of civil servants; and creating new conditions and a new environment for staff that encourage and reward a productive, professional, and engaged workforce. This reform is still in progress（Civil Service ２０１４）, and the CO leads delivery of this plan. As part of this reform, the CO published the Capabilities Plan in ２０１３. The Efficiency and Reform Group is charged ― ― 156.

(13) 法科大学院論集第１１号. with this work. In other words, the section carrying out civil service reform could have been established in the CO in these two decades. Certainly, this trend appeared to have weaken in the first and second terms of Blair Administration and blurred after ２００５. However, as the discussions about the leadership of the Cabinet Secretary suggests（see, Public Administration Committee ２０１１: ７; Public Administration Committee ２０１２: ３０）, civil service reform could have been one of the top government priorities and the sections dealing with this project should be a significant part of the CO.. ２. Comparison with Japan―Development of Cabinet Supporting Sections in Japan after the ２００１ Central Government Reform. ２.１ Background of the Traditional Cabinet Supporting Sections in Japan In Japan, the role of the Prime Minister has traditionally been weak. Under the Meiji Constitution, the PM was considered to hold exactly the same status as the other Ministers and this idea led to the strict（but strange）rule that the Cabinet could not decide on a policy if any one Minister was against it. This might be one reason why Japanese politicians were not able to control the Army’s seizing power at the beginning of the war against the USA in １９４１. The present Constitution of Japan provides that the Prime Minister shall be the head of the Cabinet （Art. ６６）and that he/she has power to appoint and remove Ministers of ― ― 157.

(14) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. State as he/she chooses（Art. ６８）. Arguably, the status of the Prime Minister should have been strengthened in light of this provision. However, the practice of politics in Japan has not followed this constitutional provision. Presently, the strict unanimous decision rule in the Cabinet seems to have remained valid, which might be closely connected with strong departmentalism（departmental bureaucracies） . The Prime Minister has not been able to decide his/her own policy or take initiative in the government. This means, from the viewpoint of a constitutional lawyer, that the prerequisite conditions of the government as a whole being held accountable by the Diet are not fulfilled.３） This might be also implicated by the fact that the Cabinet supporting system was small and weak. The following sections could have been pointed out as Cabinet support offices until the end of last century: the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, the National Personnel Authority, and the Security Council. The Cabinet Secretariat is charged with supporting the Cabinet and coordinating important policy across different departments in order to. ３）In addition, not only the Prime Minister at the Cabinet level but also Ministers at each departmental level, look very weak. It has been said for a long time that Ministers have not substantially made or initiated policy within the jurisdiction given to them by law as the head of the department. They seem to have just signed proposals by the departmental civil service, i.e. departmental bureaucracy（Ringi System）（Abe, Shindo and Kawato １９９４: ３７８）. Many Japanese people have come to recognize this situation as peculiar and have argued that Ministers, i.e. politicians, should initiate policy-making. However, at the beginning of the DPJ Administration after the government change in ２００９, which was substantially the first time for a full-scale government change after the one dominant party system（the LDP was established in１９５５）, many new Ministers seem to have misunderstood the meaning of political leadership’ and were involved with technical or administrative-level decisions like undersecretaries and directors.. ― ― 158.

(15) 法科大学院論集第１１号. ensure consistency in government policy. Some members, like the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Private Secretaries, etc., are located in the Prime Minister’s Office（this is the same term as the PM’s department in British English, but here it only means the building where the PM works）. However, this organisation was considerably small and its functions were very limited. The Cabinet Secretariat seems not to have embarked on actively uniting policies but just played the role of an‘arbitrator’. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau is a unique office from the point of view of comparative constitutional law（Hasebe ２００２: ２９８９; Sakaguchi ２０１４: ６０１）. The CLB is also small, but the officers have been selected on the basis of their high capability from various departments. The CLB has two roles, the first of which is ‘opinion-giving work’, that is to give opinions in terms of the interpretation of law in order to unite the interpretation within the Executive when a department executing a law has doubts about its meaning or there is a dispute about the interpretation between departments. The second role of the CLB is‘examination work’. All government bills and draft cabinet orders, drafted by each department, should be checked in terms of the formality of their text and the conformity with the existing legal order, the pinnacle of which is the Constitution. In Japanese bureaucratic culture where legal technical art４）would be considered significant, this bureau could have a high degree ４）In Japan, it could be said that there are two kinds of lawyers. One is of the legal profession: attorneys, judges, and prosecutors. The qualifications for these professions are common and given to people who pass the National Bar Exam operated by the government. The other is a civil servant, especially high profile people who passed the（specific type of） first class exam upon recruitment. This exam focuses on the knowledge of law, especially administrative law. This might have initiated the Japanese bureaucratic culture that sets great store by knowledge and skill in administrative law.. ― ― 159.

(16) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. of authority and a great deal of influence on department bureaucracies. What is important in this article is that political heads of the department, i.e. Ministers, might have completely depended on the interpretation of the CLB. The primary reason would be that Ministers, in general, do not have a significant amount of knowledge concerning the practice of public law. Though the Courts have power to decide upon interpretation of law as a last resort, the lack of litigation in the area of public law５） could have made the bureau’s interpretation the de facto standard. The CLB could have worked to prevent politicians inside the Executive from overstepping the scope of law. However, the“examination work”could have been embedded in the peculiar Japanese pre-legislative process of government bills, in which informal negotiations between business-related influential LDP MPs（Zoku -Giin）and governmental departments, as their administrative counterparts, complete substantial discussions on the content of bills behind the scenes before the Cabinet decides to propose them（Abe, Shindo and Kawato １９９４: ４９）. This elaborate informal pre-legislative process would have made formal discussion and revision of government bills in the Diet meaningless and hollow. This practice would have improperly interrupted the PM and the Cabinet while developing their policy, and blurred who had responsibility and accountability in. ５）Required subjects on the National Bar Exam were constitutional law, private law, commercial law, criminal law, private procedural law, and criminal procedural law, and the subject of administrative law remained one of minor selected subjects. This might have caused the lack of knowledge and interest in public law within the legal profession and may have generated insufficient development of legal accountability inside the judicial branch. However, since the judicial system reform that occurred at the beginning of this century, administrative law has been included as one of the required subjects on the National Bar Exam.. ― ― 160.

(17) 法科大学院論集第１１号. terms of government bills. Such practices ultimately hinder any attempt to instil a sense of transparency in Japanese politics. The Security Council should be consulted on the implementation of important defence policies, such as the National Defence Basic Guidelines and the National Defence Programme Guidelines. It could be classified as one component of the Cabinet Committees. However, this council had not been effective and for a long time was simply a ceremony for the Cabinet. It is in ２０１４ that this section was activated by being reconstructed and renamed as the National Security Council under the present Abe Administration. At present, meetings have been held regularly on a weekly basis. In order to support this council, the National Security Secretariat was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat in January ２０１４. The PM had its own department until ２００１, and it was named the Prime Minister’s Office. However, its real function was much different from the image given by its English name. The PMO consisted of a small central office primarily dealing with honours, statistics, very limited staff management（later） , and miscellaneous external sections, for example, the Economic Planning Agency, the Management and Coordination Agency, the Environment Agency, the National Land Agency, and the Defence Agency. These external sections were set up under the administration of the PMO, partly because functions of some agencies were not suitable to any other departments due to the nature of the work involved and partly because some agencies could not be given department status for political reasons, such as the Defence Agency. What is significant is that the PMO was considered as one administrative department and its status was deemed to be no different from any other department. The implication of ― ― 161.

(18) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. this was that neither the PM, who is the political head, nor the officers of the PMO were able to interfere with work within another department’s jurisdiction, even if the functions of the PMO’s sections appeared to include coordinating related departments, for example, in the case of the Economic Planning Agency and the Administrative Management Agency.. ２.２ Development of‘Headquarters’ and Their Supporting Sections in the Cabinet Secretariat In the １９９０s, the opinion that administrative reforms should be implemented became more popular. The planning in the government began in the Administrative Reform Council set up by the Hashimoto Administration in １９９６. The bill, which made the individual contents of the reform plan that was recommended in the council’s report clear and ordered the government to make the necessary arrangements to meet the specific deadline, has become the statute known as the‘Central Government Reform Basic Act of １９９８’. Following this Act, ７８ bills leading to the revision of the clauses of over １６００ existing statutes was drafted and passed in the Diet. It took five years to finally implement this reform. The Centre’, i.e. the Cabinet supporting system, was enhanced by this reform. Firstly, the functions of‘planning and drafting’ were added to the duties of the Cabinet Secretariat（Cabinet Act, Art. １２）. Secondly, the structure of the Cabinet Secretariat was reorganized and enhanced in the following ways: the number of Deputy Chief Secretaries was increased to three; the Deputy Chief Secretary for Crisis Management was created; the heads of the previous three sub-sections under the Secretariat that ― ― 162.

(19) 法科大学院論集第１１号. dealt with domestic, diplomatic, and security policy fields were renamed and upgraded to the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary; and the Special Adviser of the Prime Minister was also recognized for the first time with a limit of three people（later increased to five）. Thirdly, the Cabinet Office was established separately from the existing Cabinet Secretariat. The previous PMO was abolished and some functions of this office, including various external sections, have been inherited by the new CO. These functions are generally considered as policy-making and delivery functions within the specific jurisdiction as well as the functions of other departments. However, some powers were added to the CO by the statute in order to support the Cabinet with regard to important policies （the Cabinet Office Establishment Act, Art. ３, ４）. In this sense, the new CO has been recognized as holding superior status to that of other departments. The four special councils with responsibility for key policies was established in the CO: the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy; the Council for Science and Technology Policy; the Council on Gender Equality; and the Central Council on Disaster Prevention. Here, the development of the‘headquarters’ in the Cabinet Secretariat should be addressed. The headquarters were established in order to plan government policies several times before １９９０. The Pollution Control Headquarters was set up by a Cabinet Decision in １９７５ and this might be the first case. Headquarters consist of the related（often all）Ministers of State. Supporting functions have been provided within the Cabinet Secretariat and the official staff was seconded from related departments. However, after the end of the administrative reforms of the １９９０s, many headquarters were successively established and official teams for support ― ― 163.

(20) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. were set up within the Cabinet Secretariat under the supervision of three Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries. The new scheme, in which the previous three sub-sections were abolished and it became flexible for various sections to go in and out within the Cabinet Secretariat, could have succeeded. In addition, what is interesting is that some headquarters have been established by the‘Basic Acts’. For example, the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters was set up by the Intellectual Property Basic Act （Act No. １２２ of ２００２）‘in order to promote measures for the creation, protection, and exploitation of intellectual property in a forced and systematic manner’（Art. ２４）; the Headquarters for Ocean Policy was established by the Basic Act for Ocean Policy（Act No. ３３ of ２００７）‘in order to promote measures with regard to the oceans intensively and comprehensively’（Art. ２９）. These headquarters are headed by the PM and consist of all Ministers of State（the Intellectual Property Basic Act, Art. ２７２９ and the Basic Act for Ocean Policy, Art. ３２３４）. The affairs concerning the headquarters shall be dealt with within the Cabinet Secretariat（the Intellectual Property Basic Act, Art. ３１ and the Basic Act for Ocean Policy, Art. ３７）. We can see the development of new supporting sections with the appearance of the equivalent of Cabinet Committees. What might also be interesting from the viewpoint of comparative constitutional law is that these Basic Acts have provided that the duties of the headquarters are as follows:‘The Headquarters shall take charge of development of the strategic affairs listed in the following items: program, and promotion of the implementation of the program; and . in addition to what is prescribed in the preceding item, study and ― ― 164.

(21) 法科大学院論集第１１号. deliberation on planning important measures on the creation, protection and exploitation of intellectual property, and promotion and comprehensive adjustment of implementation of the measures’（Intellectual Property Basic Act, Art. ２５）;‘The Headquarters shall take charge of affairs listed matters with regards to drafting and to the in the following items: matters with regard promotion of Basic Plan on Ocean Policy; . to synthesis coordination of measures of implementation by relevant in administrative bodies based on Basic Plan on Ocean Policy; and . addition to the tasks referred to in the preceding two items, matters with regard to planning and drafting of important measures with regard to the oceans as well as synthesis coordination’（Basic Act for Ocean Policy, Art. ３０）. The supporting sections in the Cabinet Secretariat for these affairs could be the equivalent of the Delivery Unit in the UK. However, in Japan where the role of legislation is decisive in the administrative system, the role of the‘Centre’ focuses more on the drafting and planning than it does in the UK. These sections are expected to help cross-cutting coordination. The number of headquarters of this type has been increasing. In the second Abe Administration, the Headquarters for Water Cycle Policy, the Headquarters for National Resilience Promotion, and the Headquarters for Healthcare Policy（HHP）have been established. It is worth mentioning that the HHP not only monitors the progress status of measures based on the PDCA cycle with the Key Performance Indicators set out in the Healthcare Policy but also makes an expenditure allocation policy to be followed before each department requests its allocation to the Treasury that makes Budget plan.. ― ― 165.

(22) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. ２.３ Management of Civil Service In terms of the management of the Civil Service, a characteristic of the Japanese system is that the‘Centre’ has had little authority over it, in the sense that management of the Civil Service is dispersed throughout the government. The function of the management of a civil servant is vested in each Minister（National Public Service Act, Art. ５５）. This means that a Minister charged with one department basically has the power of management, which includes not only the individual recruitment, appointment and promotion, but also pay, remuneration, other terms and conditions, and the discipline of the civil servants within that department. In effect, the senior civil servants of the department decide these individual matters. Secondly, the office that manages the entire system has also diverged. In terms of this divergence, the existence of the National Personnel Authority（NPA）is peculiar. In Japan, officials in the Civil Service are deprived of the right to set up employee organisations, the right of bargaining to make collective agreements, and the right of collective actions of dispute. Instead of this prohibition, the NPA, which is an independent authority, was established and has authority over affairs concerning recommendations for improvement in personnel administration as well as in remuneration and other conditions of work; position classification; examination, appointment, and dismissal; remuneration; training; change in employment status; disciplinary action; processing of complaint; maintenance of ethics relating to the performance of public duties; and other matters concerning the maintenance of fairness in ― ― 166.

(23) 法科大学院論集第１１号. personnel administration, the protection of the welfare of public officials, and the like’（National Public Service Act, Art. ３）. The NPA is not just a regulatory office like the Civil Service Commissioner in the UK, but it is also an administrative agency. For example, it issues recommendations about the level of remuneration to the Cabinet, operates the United Civil Service Recruitment Exam, and executes training for civil servants. In addition to this authority, one section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications dealt with matters concerning retirement allowance, pension, and exchange of staff with the private sector and between departments. The Treasury, of course, contains one section charged with pay, remuneration, and pension in relation to the budget. What is significant is that for a long time, there was really no section dealing with the management of civil service located in the‘Centre’ until the CBPA was set up in ２０１４（see discussion on this issue below）. In Japan, the notion of the‘Head of the Civil Service’ does not exist. The （Official）Deputy Cabinet Secretary６） can often be identified as the top post of the Civil Service, but this office seems to hold neither the functions nor the authority held by the Cabinet Secretary in Whitehall.. ２.４ Civil Service Reform Sections In Japan, the civil service system has been stable. Although the sections in charge of conducting general research into the management system existed both in the National Personnel Authority and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications（before the ２００１ reorganisation ６）In Japan, the Cabinet Secretary is a political appointee and one of significant Ministers of State is seconded to this post.. ― ― 167.

(24) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. of the central government, this was known as the Management and Coordination Agency） , reforms were fractional and the entire system has remained unchanged over the half century since the fundamental reform after World War Ⅱ. However, this system has, at times, been criticized in that the officers recruited by passing the first class exam were privileged in the promotion. Those, named ‘career’ bureaucrats（in Japanese English） , were often promised to be placed in high-profile posts in the private sector after retirement from the government. This practice was suspected to have been supported by inappropriate connections between government departments and the private sector. The criticism of elite bureaucrats was particularly more severe in the １９９０s because of various bribery scandals by civil servants. The first Abe Administration eventually embarked on the civil service reform. The‘Civil Service Reform’ policy was decided in the Cabinet on２４ April ２００７. This policy aimed for the introduction of a more capabilityoriented management system and a more comprehensive regulation of the redeployment of ex-civil servants in the private sector. Following this Cabinet decision, the Committee on the Civil Service General Reform was established to make a detailed plan by the PM on １２ July, ２００７. The secretary function of this committee was played by a section in the Cabinet Secretariat. This might be the first‘Centre’ section dealing with civil service reform. This committee reported the reform plan on ５ February ２００８. This plan could have been radical. It called for the abolition of the‘career’ system and the reform of the recruitment exam and staff management ― ― 168.

(25) 法科大学院論集第１１号. system. It also proposed a review of the general deprivation of basic labour rights for civil servants. What is significant with regards to this paper is that this proposition contains the introduction of a centremanaged senior civil service system and the establishment of the Cabinet Bureau of Personal Affairs under the Cabinet. This means that various fragmented management functions would be brought together in the Centre’. On ６ June ２００８, the‘National Government Employee System Reform Basic Act’ was in effect. This act provided the above-referenced principles as a reform policy, ordered the government to prepare bills executing these principles with specified deadlines,７） and established the National Government Employee System Reform Promotion Headquarters under the Cabinet. The section in the Cabinet Secretariat descried above continued to operate as a secretary office of this headquarters. However, the action for civil service reform seems to have met strong opposition inside the Kasumigaseki（the Japanese equivalent of Whitehall） in the stage of drafting bills for executing this policy. The Treasury and the National Personnel Authority, some functions of which would be deprived and transferred into the Cabinet Bureau of Personal Affairs, struggled against the establishment of this new bureau, and this opposition might have succeeded. On ２８ November ２００８, the PM declared postponing the establishment of this bureau until April ２０１０. Although bills were proposed three times before the deadline, these bills failed to be. ７）Article ４ of this act provides that the legislation necessary for this reform shall be developed until approximately three years from the effective date of this act and that the necessary arrangements for delivery of this reform within the government shall be executed until approximately five years from the effective date of this act.. ― ― 169.

(26) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. passed in the Diet. This civil service reform project had not progressed under the Liberal Democratic Party Administrations between ２００９ and ２０１２. In the meantime, the ‘Centre’ section dealing with civil service reform also was marginalized. This section eventually disappeared from the Cabinet Secretariat and was moved into the Cabinet Office. It is in ２０１４ that part of this reform was eventually realised by introducing a centre-managed senior civil service personnel system and by establishing the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in the Cabinet Secretary under the second Abe Administration. The CBPA was charged with support of the centre-managed senior civil service personnel system and with management, coordination, and planning concerning the entire civil service system. Therefore, the CBPA was expected to become a permanent‘Centre’ section that deals both with civil service management and with civil service reform. Analysing reasons why it took such a great deal of time and energy to establish one‘Centre’ section is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this fact itself is interesting because it suggests that Japanese departmentalism is quite strong.. ３. Consideration from the Viewpoint of Constitutional Law ３.１ Basic Viewpoint: Westminster Model and Ministerial Responsibility As was argued above, the PMDU and the sections dealing with the civil service management in general and civil service reform in particular have significant effects on the relationship between the ‘Centre’ and the ― ― 170.

(27) 法科大学院論集第１１号. departments in the UK. In Japan, similar trends, though not as clear as those that are apparent in the UK, have appeared. How can we consider these situations from the viewpoint of constitutional law ? Firstly, the existence of these sections could be viewed as a de facto part of the Prime Minister’s department（Fosters ２００５: １７０１８））. The sections dealing with civil service management could also be characterized as such, because the Prime Minister has the responsibility as the Minister for Civil Service from a legal point of view, though the Head of the Civil Service can receive reports and make decisions regarding these matters in practice. Should we think of this situation as a deviation from tradition ? On this point, some political scientists argued that recent situations are not necessarily considered a departure from the Westminster model but a transformation within the Westminster model that responds to the increasing administrative autonomy as a result of the NPM reforms during this time（Richards and Smith ２００６: ３４２３; Richards ２００８: １９６２０３）. This author agrees with this argument, and it can be made by using the terms of constitutional law as follows. The key concept of constitutional law, which corresponds to the Westminster model, is ministerial responsibility. This principle could not only lead to. ８）He precisely seems to have distinguished those units that could be part of a de facto Prime Ministerial Department and those to do with civil service management（Foster２００５:１７１n.７９）. The functions concerning civil service management are different on the point that the PM could not be directly concerned, but the Cabinet Secretary would have the primary responsibility as the head of the Civil Service. However, on the point of the relationship between the‘Centre’ and the departments, both could be treated as a group. In addition, it is not clear that Foster himself considers the PMDU as one characteristic of a prime ministerial government, because he seems to focus on the increasing of political advisers as the object of his criticism.. ― ― 171.

(28) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. dominance of the executive with the development of democracy and party politics（Woodhouse ２００３: ２８２）but could also define the relationship between ministers and civil servants. Does the development of the Centre’ as discussed above contradict this ministerial responsibility principle ? Here it should be confirmed that this notion is not a simple rule but a complicated conglomerate of various conventions. At first, this could be divided into two doctrines: collective responsibility and individual responsibility. Then, both could be taken apart into several more elements. These doctrines and their elements will be analysed in turn.. ３.２ Collective Responsibility At first, how can the development of PM supporting sections be evaluated in relation to the doctrine of collective responsibility ? The element in the collective responsibility doctrine that relates to this issue is the requirement for collective decision-making. Certainly, several ministers seem to have considered this requirement to be relevant. For example, Heseltine’s criticism against Thatcher’s decision-making method in the Westland affaire is often pointed out. However, this statement should not be understood as a rigid rule. The decision-making style employed in the Cabinet might be dependent on political climate, such as the PM’s authority and his/her relationship with other Cabinet members. Though Geoffrey Marshall pointed out the confidence rule, wherein the unanimity rule and the confidentiality rule are branches of the collective responsibility convention, he seems not to have considered the demand for collective decision-making as part of this convention. When he explains the unanimity rule, he appears to suppose ― ― 172.

(29) 法科大学院論集第１１号. that this rule means only that the Ministers should speak and act outside the Cabinet following government policy（Marshall １９８６: ５４６１）. Even if the requirement of collective decision-making was included in the collective responsibility, the development of the‘Centre’ supporting sections does not contradict it. The function of chasing delivery, a characteristic of the PMDU, is to follow objectives already decided by the departments. The civil service management functions belong to the Minister of Civil Service as one Minister being responsible for several functions as well as other Ministers, and these matters do not seem to be subject to the Cabinet/Cabinet Committee discussion in general, though this would require coordination with the Treasury. Issues regarding the civil service reform could be the same. Certainly, reform matters could be treated as so significant that they should be included in the agenda of the Cabinet/Cabinet Committees. However, this would not prevent the public service reform section from being set up in the CO under the Minister of Civil Service.. ３.３ Individual Responsibility We must consider whether there are any problems regarding the concept of individual responsibility. Here, it might be helpful to make clear the contents of this doctrine at the outset. This doctrine is generally deemed to consist of the following: １. explanatory accountability, which means that Ministers must explain their policies and provide information about errors and malpractice in their departments; ２. amendatory accountability, which means that Ministers must fix every failure in their departmental policy and administration, for example, investigating these ― ― 173.

(30) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. faults within their department, specifying and calling out officials, and arranging systems preventing this fault from happening again in the future; and ３. responsibility（in a narrower sense）, which means that Ministers must make the decision to resign themselves. This doctrine implies the anonymity principle of civil servants, though these could be understood as sequential elements based on a single principle（Woodhouse ２００３: ２９５; Turpin and Tomkins ２０１１: ５７３８６）. This principle seems to have been difficult to maintain because Ministers have tried to deploy the argument of the division between policy and administration on the one hand, and on the other hand, because the development of select departmental committees would have raised the idea that the appearance and evidence of Accounting Officers, i.e. permanent secretaries, would be helpful for effective inquiry and efficient control of the government by the Parliament. The NPM reforms might have accelerated this trend. Generally, research interests seem to have been focused on these points. However, returning to the topic of this paper, the following legal proposition of individual responsibility is relevant: the principle that legal powers have been conferred not on the Cabinet or the Prime Minister but on Ministers（Secretaries of State） . These legal provisions could be considered to have legally defined the scope of duty and responsibility of Ministers charged with departments.９）. ９）The NPM reform, for example the introduction of an agency system, has blurred out the existence of this responsibility. That could have resulted in the above-referenced issue regarding the division of responsibility/accountability of Ministers/civil servants（in the case of an agency, the chief executives）.. ― ― 174.

(31) 法科大学院論集第１１号. According to this legal practice, the function of the PMDU appears to have invaded each department’s jurisdiction, because the objective of ensuring policy implementation within each department’s jurisdiction could, of course, be deemed as the core function of each department, even though the policy areas on which the PMDU focused were crossdepartmental. From a comparative viewpoint, in Japan, where the notion of each department’s jurisdiction seems to be very strict, how the British address this question is interesting. However, this issue does not seem to be consciously discussed in Britain. The reason might be that the British may accept this practical structure as natural. Certainly, there are several problems and criticisms to be pointed out: the complexity of the policy-initiating Centre’ organisation brings about confusion and inefficiency; the consequence that only departments should take responsibility for policy implementation in spite of being initiated and pushed by the‘Centre’; and lastly, the insufficient system holding the Centre’ accountable（House of Lords Constitution Select Committee ２０１０: ３０; Richards ２０１１: ４１４２）. However, we could rebut these criticisms. These arguments can be summarized as follows. Firstly, it might be generally accepted that the Cabinet, or the Prime Minister as the chairperson of the Cabinet, can deal with any matter that he/she judges as necessary for the government. The role of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees is not limited to the matters of coordinating departments like‘questions on which there is an unresolved argument between departments’（Ministerial Code, Para. ２.２b）. The role also includes matters that are ‘major issues of policy’ and of. critical. importance to the public’（Ministerial Code, Para. ２.２a）. This might ― ― 175.

(32) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. indicate that the PM could take the initiative concerning matters that he/she considers to fall into the above categories. These matters could, of course, be closely related to the functions of each department. Therefore, the PM might be engaged in any policy, even within the specific departmental jurisdiction, if he/she wants. In addition, the PM has the prerogatives’ of recommending the appointment of Ministers and determining the membership of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees’ （Cabinet Manual, Para. ３.３）. This would be the source of the PM’s authority within the Cabinet, with the PM’s position of normally being the accepted leader of a political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons’（Cabinet Manual, Para.３.１） . By virtue of the position as organiser of the Cabinet, the PM could promote his/her policy vis--vis the Ministers charged with departments. These PM powers seem to be covered, and at the same time, controlled by the doctrine of collective responsibility. The House of Commons could overthrow the government by passing a motion that‘this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’（Cabinet Manual, Para. ２.１９; Fixed-term Parliaments Act ２０１１, Section ２）. Although the possibilities of pursuing this motion would be certainly very small in a culture of strict party discipline,１０） the significance of this convention should not be underestimated. What is important in the context of this paper is that the reason why the House of Commons would vote ‘no confidence’ is indefinite. This means that Parliament（the House of Commons）can. １０）In Britain, the doctrine of collective responsibility could have been used by the PM to shield each minister from political criticism in Parliament（Woodhouse ２００３: ２９５６）.. ― ― 176.

(33) 法科大学院論集第１１号. choose options between individual responsibility and collective responsibility in order to criticize an entire government policy, even if the policy seems to be within the jurisdiction of only one specific department. Responding to that, the PM could also treat any issues as if they are engaged with collective responsibility and then take the initiative in these matters. Ministerial Code provides as follows: ‘The business of the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees consists in the main of: questions which significantly engage the collective responsibility of the Government because they raise issues of policy or because they are of critical importance to the public’, whereas‘No definite criteria can be given for issues which engage collective responsibility’（Ministerial Code, Paras. ２.２a and ２.４, italics added by author）. Secondly, as regards the CO sections dealing with civil service management and civil service reform, it is important that the Prime Minister also acts as the Minister for the Civil Service. ‘The Prime Minister has held the office of Minister for the Civil Service since that office was created in １９６８, in which capacity he or she has overall responsibility for the management of most of the civil service’（Cabinet Manual, Para. ３.６）. Therefore, it might be self-evident that a supporting section can be established in the CO. What is interesting is that this function of management of the civil service is unique in that it relates neither to policies concerning citizens（as with the inner departments） nor to policies related to foreign countries（as in the Foreign and Commonwealth Department and the Defence Department）, but addresses management matters within the government. In addition, this function has an overall, interdepartmental nature. Therefore, the PM（and the ― ― 177.

(34) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. Centre’）could affect the entire area of policy by using these functions as a lever’（House of Lords Constitution Select Committee ２０１０: ９２（Q. １９８））. Certainly, two reservations should be added to this point. Firstly, though the function of civil service management is conferred on the PM as the Minister for the Civil Service, the involvement of the PM or other politicians, in practice, should be limited because of the political neutrality of civil servants. Secondly, as a result of the first, this function may not be as strong as a‘lever’.１１） For example, the Capability Review, which was introduced by O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary, with the aim of changing the culture and improving the quality of civil service, focused on the department management system in general rather than the outcome of individual policy implementation. In short, the PM’s stronger involvement with individual departmental matters and the development of the supporting section in the CO could be explained by the PM’s status as organiser and chairperson of the Cabinet, on one hand, and the PM’s status as the Minister of the Civil Service（and as the First Lord of the Treasury）on the other hand. Each role is. １１）On this point, the PM as the First Lord of the Treasury might have more significant implication for the deployment of ‘levers’（see, House of Lords Constitution Committee ２０１０: ３４）. The status of the First Lord of the Treasury could certainly be historical and symbolic. According to the Cabinet Manual, the First Lord of the Treasury is one of the members of the Treasury Commissioners that is conferred statutory powers, but ‘the Treasury Commissioners do not meet in that capacity. In practice, the Treasury is headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer supported by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and other junior Treasury ministers’（Para. ３.２９）. Nevertheless, the authority of the PM, as the First Lord of the Treasury, could be still strong. For example, the fact that budget and finance matters are generally thought to be decided by only the PM and the Chancellor within the government, might represent this status. With regards to this paper, the function of the PMDU was used in conjunction with the PSA, which was within the jurisdiction of the Treasury.. ― ― 178.

(35) 法科大学院論集第１１号. engaged with collective responsibility and individual responsibility. Therefore, this trend could be seen not as a departure from the existing cabinet government system but as a development still within the cabinet government system.. ３.４ Accountability Gap in Britain This analysis could provide insight into how to resolve problems caused by development in the‘Centre’. The problems can be summed up by the complexity of the policy-making process and the insufficient or lack of accountability of the‘Centre’. Here, the latter will be considered（The key for a solution to the former problem could be found by addressing the latter） . When it is argued that the ‘Centre’ lacks accountability, what does it mean ? There are three tools by which Parliament（especially the House of Commons）hold ministers accountable: parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, and select committees（Tomkins ２００６: ４０）. By these three means, parliamentary debates and questions can be used against the‘Centre’ as well as other departments. Concerning parliamentary questions, questions to the Prime Minister are well-known, although the change from １５ minutes every Tuesday and Thursday to ３０ minutes every Wednesday in １９９７ could be viewed as a decline in accountability. In addition to this, the Minister for the Cabinet Office could be also slotted into the rotation for regular oral questions. On the other hand, there is no departmental select committee corresponding to the CO. The more the effectiveness of the select committees is recognised, the more difficult it will be to criticize the‘Centre’ for the lack of this system. ― ― 179.

(36) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. Therefore, the lack of a mechanism holding ministers accountable through the work of a select committee in terms of the Cabinet Office（especially No. １０）can be seen as a significant problem（House of Lords Constitution Committee ２０１０: ２２, Evidence ２０） . On this point, two approaches are possible from the above analysis. One is that the accountability process could be devised following the doctrine of collective responsibility. When this doctrine is discussed, only a narrower sense of responsibility seems to be the focus. However, we could consider this sense of responsibility as based on a broader meaning of responsibility. We could suppose an explanatory and amendatory accountability at an earlier stage before calling for resignation.１２） In terms of the collective responsibility, the most suitable person for actually taking the role of explanation could be the Prime Minister, because the PM plays, as discussed above, a key role as the chairperson and organiser in the Cabinet. The organisation parallel to departmental select committees, which could involve matters engaging collective responsibility, could be established based on collective responsibility. Another option is to make use of an accountability mechanism focusing on the PM’s status as the Minister for the Civil Service.１３） Certainly, there are several limits to this approach, as mentioned above. However, it would be easier to establish the means to hold the PM, as an. １２）In Japan, where only the collective responsibility is discussed because the Constitution of Japan refers to only this notion in Article ６６. This author would argue that accountability should be discussed as a part of collective responsibility. １３）Following the same argument, we can imagine a similar accountability mechanism against the PM as the First Lord of the Treasury. In this case, the Treasury Committee should be activated.. ― ― 180.

(37) 法科大学院論集第１１号. individual Minister, accountable. This mechanism might have already existed, because the Public Administration Select Committee deals with matters relating to civil service. The terms of this committee are limited to‘the quality and standards of administration’. However, the terms will be able to expand and the scope seems to already be substantially broad. Improving this existing select committee could also be effective to respond to the development of the‘Centre’. Certainly, whichever method is pursued, several obstacles could be identified in practice. Firstly, the scope of the select committee dealing with the‘Centre’ could overlap with other departmental select committees. However, in this context, we will not be concerned with the duplication, because holding the government accountable in this way will provide greater transparency within the government policy-making process, rather than generating more confusion. In the case where evidence from the related department members is needed, there would be more possibilities of responding to this need by assigning them to both types of committees. Secondly, there might be a problem regarding whether the PM could actually present evidence in a committee as other ministers do. The PM’s heavy work load would have been the reason why the frequency of the Prime Minister’s Questions decreased in １９９７. Taking into consideration the rapidly changing economic situation and the increasing significance of representatives of Britain in international politics, the necessity to ensure the PM enough time for these activities might precedes holding him/her accountable. However, the PM should not behave as if he/she is viewed to be evading responsibility and accountability. The committee system ― ― 181.

(38) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. would not burden the PM much more than the PMQs because it might be that the PM must attend the committees in person only when necessary whereas the PMQs demand the PM attend regularly. Moreover, we could call for both the Minister（s）of the Cabinet Office and the top civil servant（s）in this area, the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretary in the No. １０ to contribute to this accountability procedure. Consequently, sufficient explanation and information could be provided by these procedures without significantly interfering with the work of the Centre’.１４） Thus,‘structures of accountability should mirror structures of power. Greater prominence in the role of the Prime Minister should be mirrored by increased transparency and more effective accountability’（House of Lords Constitution Committee, ２０１０: ２３）.. ３.５ Comparison with a Japanese Case Turning to Japan, the political practice in which the Parliament holds the government responsible sits in sharp contrast with Britain. We have a tendency to focus on the resignation of the entire government when ministerial responsibility is discussed. One of the reasons might be that the Constitution of Japan, as stated above, refers only to collective responsibility（Art. ６６）and does not use the term individual. １４）Concerning Special Advisers in the Centre’, there would not be an obstacle to assign them to the committees, because they are‘exempt from the general requirement that civil servants should be appointed on merit and behave with impartiality and objectivity’（Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, Para. ４） . They could be generally treated the same as in the case of the Special Advisers in each department in relation to departmental select committees.. ― ― 182.

(39) 法科大学院論集第１１号. responsibility’. However, what is significant is that the Cabinets often fall as a fact. In the ２１st century, the PM changed eight times, in ２００１, ２００６, ２００７, ２００８, ２００９, ２０１０, ２０１１ and ２０１２. Except the Koizumi Administration, which continued for over five years, and the present second and third Abe Administration, the PM changes almost every year. This political fact may encourage the parliamentarian attitude of simply overthrowing the Cabinet rather than holding the government accountable.１５） Therefore, there might not have been a prerequisite for the argument that a proper accountability system should be introduced. Certainly, some systems classified as a means for holding government accountable have been provided for by the Constitution. Article ６３ provides that‘The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations’. This might suggest a system that involves questions and debates as in Britain. In addition, Article ６２ provides as follows:‘Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records’. This article could have promoted the establishment of a system similar to the British select committees.. １５）This trend could be the same with the government party parliamentarians who complain about the PM’s policies, appointments, and management. In fact, the PM has been changed within the same government party except in ２００９, in which case the government changed as a result of the general election on the House of Representatives, nearly the first time under this present constitutional scheme, and ２０１２ where the LDP retrieved the position of the government party as a result of the subsequent general election.. ― ― 183.

(40) Transformation of the Prime Minister’s Support Sections in the UK and Japan. However, the practice could not have developed an effective control system over the government. Concerning Article ６３,‘explanation’ might be uniquely interpreted as the government providing explanations during the bills proceedings, whereas‘answers’ are responding to questions on various topics independent from the legislative process. However, the latter, which is the equivalent of the British system of debates and questions, has been rarely used. Oral questions have been allowed only in emergent cases and have not been allowed in this decade except in one case. The new committee where the PM and the opposition leaders debate about current important topics, modelling after the‘question time’ in Britain, has been established in both Houses since ２０００.１６） However, there have only been a few of these meetings where this debate has actually been held: twice in ２００９, at no time ２０１０, four times in ２０１１, three times in ２０１２, twice in ２０１３, and once in ２０１４. On this point, we should take into consideration the practice that general policy is usually discussed during the budget examination process and that unrelated topics could, at times, have been addressed within various bill discussions in Japan. In addition, written questions have been more actively used by Parliamentarians in this decade. However, the number still remains four or five hundred per year. The government control system is not substantially developed yet in Japan. This is the same in terms of the investigations provided for in Article ６２. The House Investigation Act（Act Concerning Solemnization and Testimony of Witness before the House） , established after this article, provides the way in which each House may trigger this procedure with. １６）In practice, the committees of both Houses are to be combined.. ― ― 184.