It Was Almost War:
The Military Conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between
Japan and China in 2012
SUGANUMA, Unryu
1keywords: Diaoyu Islands, Senkaku Islands, Japanese nationalization in 2012,
U.S.-China Conflict, Barack Obama Administration, and DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan)
Introduction
In 2019, Xi Jinping ( 習近平 ) visited Japan during the G20 meeting; it was over 11 years since the Chinese leader Hu Jintao ( 胡錦濤 ) made his official trip to Japan. Since 2008 after Hu’s visit to Tokyo, both Japan and China basically had no direct exchange between senior leaders until now. One conflict after another between Tokyo and Beijing over the territorial islands – the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands2 ( 钓鱼 / 尖閣 ) in the East China Sea (ECS) became a bottleneck for two countries since 2010. The escalation of the territorial disputes reached a peak when the Japanese government officially purchased certain islets from a Japanese national in 2012 in efforts to nationalize the Diaoyu Islands.
In 2012, an Australian scholar Hugh White published The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, emphasizing that the Chinese superpower was overtaking the United States.3 Based on Hugh White’s assumption, this paper constructs how Washington would have been ensnared into the military conflict when both Japan and China refused to back down over the territorial issue in the ECS. Since both the U.S. Congress and the White House have been trapped in the Diaoyu Islands mess for decades, essential questions can be raised. Will Japan support American primacy against China? What has China been trying to achieve by building its increased maritime capability against Japan? Could Beijing persuade Japan to accept China, not as a harsh overlord, but as a firm and kindly elder brother as during the pre-Ming times (when China was the superpower in the world)? China has accepted American primacy for as long as Beijing believes that it works for China. This is not new. How can China and the United States ensure that healthy competition does not give way to an entrenched bloody mindedness that aggravates existing insecurities and results in serious conflict in the ECS?
Today, because China, which is unlike Germany, imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union, seems to have no territorial ambitions beyond its current borders, it is hard to see how its territorial ambitions
provide a motive for conflict with the United States. Will the President of the United States tell his fellow Americans that their country is going to compromise its position on supporting Japan regarding the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands in order to protect American national interests? China restored its wealth and strong military to its old place at the head of the Chinese world order. Is time on China’s side to do what — in resolving this conflict to its satisfaction or some other issues? This paper demonstrates that Japan and China almost went to war in 2012 when Sino-Japanese relations reached an unprecedent low, the nadir point of the relations since 1972 as both countries had just normalized relations.
Prologue of the Sino-U.S. Military Conflict
As Charles Horner states, “of all the relationships in the world that do not directly involve the United States as one of the parties, the one between China and Japan is likely to have the greatest effect upon us in the first half of the twenty-first century.”4 A flashpoint regarding the Diaoyu Islands in the ECS is highly possible; a conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces could occur anytime soon since China set up the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 after Japan nationalized some islets of the Diaoyu group. As the Western media have warned about the possibility of World War III (WWIII),5 both China and United States might go to war in the ECS. Hugh White has indicated the following two scenarios of Sino-U.S. conflict in the Asian region by providing an example of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict scenario in the SCS,6 which can easily apply to the Diaoyu Islands case in the ECS; the warlike consequences between Beijing and Washington could escalate in Asia.
The bottom line is this: If Beijing backs off, America’s status as the dominant maritime power in Asia will have been confirmed. If Washington fails to back Tokyo against Chinese pressure in the Diaoyu Islands disputes, Beijing’s ascendency will have been confirmed. As a result, American maritime primacy in Asia will be badly damaged. Therefore, both the United States and China have a lot more at stake today than “rocks” and “reefs” above the seas, or even petroleum and gas under the sea. Today, the Japanese are no longer interested in collecting guano or feathers at the Diaoyu Islands in the ECS, while the Chinese do not need to gather any herbs on these islands nor use these islands as navigation aids to the Liuqiu Islands/Okinawa ( 琉球 / 沖縄 ) anymore. Let’s say the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessel interferes with Chinese surveillance ships, which have regularly patrolled the Diaoyu Islands and surrounding seas since 2010 after the trawler collision incident.7 In response, the Chinese might fight the Japanese ships, causing the Japanese to fire on a Chinese vessel. China fires back, resulting in sunken Japanese ship. While Tokyo turns to the United States for support, Beijing increases its force in the conflict zone. As Abe Shinzo ( 安倍晋 三 ), hawkish prime minister in Japan, is seeking to exercise the right to collective self-defense under the pacifist constitution, Washington has welcomed publicly the idea.8 Given the unpleasant
history of past Japanese invasion, the Chinese have undoubtedly and understandably attached greater emotional sentiments to the Diaoyu territorial disputes against the Japanese moves. Because Tokyo and Washington have the security treaty pact, America has treaty obligations to defense Japan’s administrative control of the Diaoyu Islands under Article 5 of the treaty pact. Therefore, America does not have a choice, but to support Tokyo since Washington would fear that they would be seen to have backed down to Beijing’s pressure. The crucial question will be, Will Washington support the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) directly or indirectly if Tokyo and Beijing are fighting the Diaoyu Islands in the ECS? In the former case, the United States would risk direct confrontation with the Chinese military (as in the 1950 Korean War). In the latter case, America would supply logistics, such as weapons, missiles, and intelligent information to Tokyo (as in the Libya War).
The Case One: Direct Involvement Case
In 1996, the U.S. dispatched two carrier battle groups, the USS Independence and USS Nimitz, to the Taiwan Strait as China demonstrated a missile test targeted near Taiwan, where the presidential election was held.9 China could not do anything but back off. Since then, Beijing has decided to develop its “Carrier-Killer” missile, the 21D and others. More specifically, the DF-26, which was displayed in the Chinese military parade on September 3, 2015, has shocked Washington. Immediately after Beijing demonstrated the DF-26, Lockheed Martin Co. homepage announced a contract with the Pentagon by updating Aegis Navy ships system on September 4, 2015.10 Similarly, DF-17, which was appeared in the 70th anniversary military parade on October 1, 2019, is believed capable of circumventing American anti-defense system and a nuclear-capable glider.11
Even an American historian from Yale University, Odd Arne Westad, have questioned the current American power in the world.
Under the Trump administration, the country’s overall standing in the world has never been lower, and even close allies no longer view Washington as a reliable partner. Since well before the presidency of Donald Trump, U.S. foreign policy elites have been lamenting the decline of any consensus on foreign affairs, but they have proved incapable of restoring it. Now, the rest of the world questions the United States’ potential leadership on issues great and small, issues on which American guidance would have been considered indispensable in the past.12
By the middle of January 2014, furthermore, the Chinese had successfully launched the hypersonic glide vehicle, “Wu-14,” reported by the U.S. media. The “cutting edge” hypersonic weapon technology is highly sought in the world. The ultrahigh speeds of this missile make it difficult for existing defense systems to intercept and give targets less time to react. Among the three nations, China, Russia, and the United States, that have tested such weapons, this Chinese test flight would put Beijing ahead in a hypersonic arms race with Washington and Moscow. Analyst Li Mingjiang
( 李明江 ) from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore stated, “There is some intention to show Japan in particular that China has got the military capability to achieve its objectives in the ECS with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute.”13 The interesting questions are, What will the United States do? Will Washington deploy aircraft carriers again to the Diaoyu Islands like it did to the Taiwan Strait in 1996? Today, the answers are not so simple. The Chinese military has a much better chance of sinking one of the carriers now than it had in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.14 As commentary from the Xinhua ( 新華 ) News, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece, states, “What’s more important is that China is no longer the weak and poverty-stricken country in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894, nor the disunited nation in the September 18th incident in 1931. With its national power greatly promoted, China can by no means be contained by Japan.”15 Unlike his predecessor, Hu Jintao, who chose “peaceful development” and “harmonious society” as slogans, Xi Jinping launched “China Dream” — The Great Renaissance of China — pledging that “We must achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation, and we must ensure there is unity between a prosperous country and a strong military.”16
Given the above facts, the Pentagon might hesitate to deploy aircraft carriers in the surrounding area of the Diaoyu Islands. If the American carriers launch their aircraft and sink some Chinese ships, how China responds will be obvious. For Chinese leaders, not responding to the sinking of a Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval ship by the American Navy would seem to be impossible, unless the Beijing regime is willing to be overthrown by the Chinese people. Therefore, the Chinese Navy would sink an American ship, maybe a USS carrier. If this scenario happened, all hope of resolving the Diaoyu crisis would be over. Once Washington employed its “Air-Sea Battle”17 against Chinese forces, the PLA navy and air forces could be ensued in a tussle.18 The nuclear force could provide peace or maybe not.19 Beijing has pledged a “no first use” of the nuclear weapons and a “not use” against non-nuclear states, but it might change during the war. As a Chinese TV commentator warns, unlike his predecessors, Abe Shinzo, after taking power in December 2012, has not publicly mentioned Japan’s long-standing three Nos nuclear principles.20 In contrast, his confrère, former Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio ( 岸田文雄 ), publicly stated in February 2014 that Japan might officially allow the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan if an emergency threatens Japan’s safety, violating Japan’s long-held three Nos principles.21 It would be very unwise to assume that China would not consider the use of nuclear force against the U.S. bases surrounding the Diaoyu Islands from which those operations would originate, such as Okinawa in the ECS. As a high-ranking SDF official has noted, “the U.S. would appreciate Japan’s exercise of the right to collective self-defense only if the U.S. armed forces controlled the SDF.”22 In other words, the Middle Kingdom will face both SDF and American forces together. Since Japan, backed by the United States, has touched one of China’s “core national interests,” the Diaoyu Islands, there is no law to prohibit China’s use of all necessary means, including its nuclear
weapons, to respond against “aggressors” who touch Chinese core national interests. Even an American scholar has raised some questions regarding the nuclear war. The 70th anniversary military parade also displayed the debut of the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which can be range of 9,500 miles and capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Thus, DF-41 can target the mainland of the United States.23
How will Beijing react? as an American scholar has questioned. Will China practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down?24 The big question will always be whether Japan can convince the United States that it will accept a nuclear strike on Tokyo rather than allow Los Angeles or Washington to take the Diaoyu Islands. The answer probably is “no.” Will American leaders risk war directly with the Chinese to protect uninhabited islands in the ESC, which is millions of miles from the American continent? Is it worth it for American soldiers to sacrifice their lives and blood to fight with the Chinese for some rocks (i.e., to protect the Japanese administrative rights) that do not belong to the U.S. and that the American people have never known in their lifetime?
The Case Two: Indirect Involvement Case
Unlike the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, it is unlikely that the United States would choose direct confrontation with China. Obama’s commitments to Japan during his 2014 trip there and his foreign policy speech at West Point a few weeks later demonstrate that Washington will not directly involve itself in military confrontation with China if the Diaoyu Islands get out of control. As former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew ( 李光耀 ), stated, “The U.S. cannot afford to abandon Japan unless it is willing to risk losing its leverage on both China and Japan. Whether or not there is an America-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the only stable balance that can be maintained is a triangular one between Japan and the U.S. on the one side and China on the other. This is inevitable because of China’s potential weight, which far exceeds that of the U.S. and Japan combined.”25 Japan would certainly be supported by the United States logistically (e.g., intelligence and weapons), showing the commitment by the United States under the security pact. Even though the SDF has the most sophisticated weapons from Washington, this does not mean that Japan would win the war with the Chinese this time (even though Japan won the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894). Without U.S. troops directly involved in the fight against the Chinese forces, it might be impossible for the Japanese SDF to win the war with the Chinese forces to protect the Diaoyu Islands and surrounding seas. A diplomatic resolution might not be possible once war starts in the ECS. The war would be long and include a slow escalation. “If the SDF attacked missile bases in China … as part of a counterattack against China, the U.S. would find itself involved in a war that it
did not ask for.”26 “China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal.”27 The indirect involvement by the United States ultimately would be changed to direct confrontation with the Chinese forces, because the reputation of the American primacy in Asia is entangled. Washington cannot back off either! The fear of America backing down would be felt not only in Tokyo, but also in Manila, Hanoi, Jakarta, Seoul, and even Delhi; the United States as an Asian power would apparently fade away. As Henry Kissinger has warned,
Sooner or later one of them is going to lead to a confrontation. I don’t want China and the US to be like Germany and Britain in 1914, but I don’t think we can resist it primarily by military deployments along the Chinese border. So the question is: can we create a space between ourselves and China … with an American military presence being on the horizon but in which we can compete by some established rules?28
Japan might have to choose the in the following options: (1) continued emphasis on the American alliance, (2) adoption (i.e. acceptance) to China’s rise, and (3) reliance on an increasingly national foreign policy.29 The current Abe regime has chosen the first option. In the final analysis, if both Pax Americana cannot endure in its current affairs in the ECS, and Pax Sinica lacks appeal to the international community, “What kind of new world order might emerge in Asia that could maintain peace and accommodate the aspirations of all the region’s states?”30 Three ways in which America can respond to China’s challenge to its leadership in Asia are as follows: (1) China’s withdrawal from any major role in Asian affairs, (2) America’s maintenance of its primacy while resisting China’s challenge, and (3) Sino-United States sharing power under a new world order.31 If Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” comes true, according to Time, this century will belong to the nation that millennia ago named itself the Middle Kingdom.32 However, the dangerous stand-off over the Diaoyu Islands “has finally brought home to Washington just how dangerous the escalating rivalry between the world’s two strongest states is.”33 Inter alia, both Barack Obama and Xi have to find a new way to solve a number of issues in world affairs since both leaders met for two days of informal talks at Sunnylands in California. Regrettably, this did not happen until the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2014. While China has refused to co-operate on cyber and other sensitive problems, the United States resists the Chinese ambitions.34
Conclusion
The essential questions for the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands in the 1800s is as follows. What was Japan’s purpose in persuading the Chinese to sign the first Sino-Japanese peace treaty in 1871? What was Japan’s plan to wipe the Liuqiu Kingdom/Okinawa off the map? What was the involvement of the United States regarding the Liuqiu Islands/Okinawa in the period prior
to the first Sino-Japanese War? What would have happened if President Ulysses Grant did not mediate between Tokyo and Beijing in 1879, the year Japan wiped the Liuqiu Kingdom off the map? Was the Diaoyu Islands a part or an appertaining island of Taiwan, which was ultimately ceded to Japan under the C: Maguan ( 馬関 )/J: Shimonoseki ( 下関 ) Treaty, or was it a part of the Liuqiu Islands/Okinawa, which Japan annexed in 1879? All of these questions were not addressed thoroughly in any publications available today.
In the final analysis, the involvement of the United States in Sino-Japanese territorial disputes has been over hundred years. When Japan annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom/Okinawa in 1879, President Ulysses Grant attempted to solve the dispute between Japan and China. Even though Ulysses Grant indirectly intervened the Diaoyu Islands, his efforts failed when the Chinese did not show up to sign a treaty between Japan and China. In WWII, the United States directly occupied Okinawa for nearly three decades – meaning occupying the Diaoyu Islands. After the United States signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement with Japan in 1972, Washington returned the Diaoyu Islands to Japan, along with Okinawa chain. Since then, Washington had tried to avoid a direct statement of the involvement regarding the Diaoyu Islands. However, it was broken in the Obama Administration, when Secretary Hillary Clinton unambiguously stated that the Diaoyu Islands was covered by the Japanese-US security pact in 2014. Even the current Donald Trump administration has not changed the position of Sino-Japanese territorial issue which his predecessor took since 2014, President Trump has replaced a number of Obama’s policies including Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), Iran nuclear deal, and Paris climate accord etc., but surprisingly not the Diaoyu Islands issue.
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Endnotes
1 Note: Chinese and Japanese personal names are given in the text in the customary order of family name first. Works published in English by Chinese and Japanese authors, however, are given in the Western order of putting the surname last.
2 The “Diaoyu” will be used in this research because the letter “D” (i.e., Diaoyu) comes before “S” (i.e., Senkaku). However, this use does not imply that the author takes a position over the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. Regarding geographical location of the Diaoyu islands in details, see Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2000),
pp. 13-15.
3 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc, 2012).
4 Charles Horner, “The Third Side of the Triangle: The China-Japan Dimension,” National Interest (Winter 1996/1997): p. 23.
5 “From Sarajevo to Senkakus: The Road to World War III?” Huffington Post, December 8, 2013. Also see, “Is China Making the Same Mistakes as Kaiser’s Germany?” Toronto Star, December 10, 2013.
6 White, The China Choice, p. 120.
in the East China Sea (ECS) The Miscalculation of the ‘September 7th Trawler Collision Incident’ in 2010,” The Journal of J. F. Oberlin University: Studies in Humanities, no. 10 (March 2019): pp. 115-126. 8 “Rift Growing between Allies,” Japan Times, December 20, 2013.
9 Regarding the 1996 Taiwan crisis in detail, see Robert Ross, “The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use for Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): pp. 87-123.
10 “Zhangguo zhanfa” [The Chinese warfare], Phoenix TV, October 10, 2015, at
http://v.ifeng.com/mil/mainland/201510/01ff3743-3e94-46b9-9849-815c127c3fee.shtml (accessed on December 1, 2015). Also see, Lockheed Martin, “Outfitting Aegis: Lockheed Martin Wins Contract to Integrate Combat System on Navy Ships,” Lockheed Martin Website, September 4, 2015, http://www. lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2015/september/150904-mst-outfitting-aegis-lm-wins-contract-to-integrate-combat-system-on-navy-ships.html (accessed on December 1, 2015).
11 “China’s Rise ‘Unstoppable,’ Says Xi,” Japan Times, October 2, 2019. Also see, Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel, “How 1 Parade Proves China’s Military Is Becoming Very Dangerous,” National Interest, October 4, 2019.
12 Off Arne Westad, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2019): p. 92.
13 “China Confirms First Test of Hypersonic Missile Carrier,” Straits Times, January 16, 2014.
14 Fu Zhengnan and Lin Zhiyuan, eds., and trans., “Meikan wenzhang yice zhoongmei zai 2015-nian fashen haizhang, Zhongguo jichen meijun hangmu” [US scholars hypothetical 2015: US aircraft carrier George Washington was sunk by China], Xiandai Junshi [Contemporary Military], no. 400 (May 2010): p. 82-85. Even an American scholar has warned Chinese nuclear capability against the U.S. See Caitlin Talmadge, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2018): pp. 44-50
15 “Abe’s Plot to Contain China Is Doomed to Fail,” Xinhua News, June 13, 2013. 16 Hannan Beech, “How China Sees the World,” Time, June 17, 2013, p. 20.
17 The “Air-Sea Battle” (ASB) is basically a “containment of China” policy, created by a Western scholar. The ASB is the policy to prolong the Pax Americana strategy against China’s peaceful rising. See, p. 243. 18 Hu Xin, “‘Konghai yiti zhan’ jianzhi dongya” [US “Air-Sea Battle” aimed at China], Xiandai Junshi, no.
417 (October 2011): pp. 20-23. Also see, Zhang Hao, “Meijun ‘konghai yiti zhan’ gainianxia yuancheng daji xitong xilie fazhan dongyin ji qushi yanjiu” [The development of US long-range strike system families under the concept of “Air-Sea Battle”], Xiandai Junshi, no. 430 (November 2012): pp. 46-49. 19 Li Youguan, ed. and trans., “Xiaochu hewuqi shifou hui pohuai shijie heping” [Will the world be a more
peaceful place without the A-bomb?], Xiandai Junshi, no. 396 (January 2010): pp. 78-79.
20 Japan has long held “three Nos” nuclear principles: not possessing, not producing, and not allowing nuclear weapons on Japan’s territory. “Fengkuang quanqiu lianxian” [Phoenix global connection], Phoenix
TV News, February 26, 2014.
21 In a Diet committee meeting on February 14, 2014, Kishida responded to the question from Okada Katsuya from DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan). Okada, former foreign minister, led an investigation in 2010, disclosing that Japan and the United States signed secret pacts during the Cold War era including one under which Tokyo agreed to allow U.S. nuclear armed vessels to make port calls in Japan. See “U.S. May Get Official Nod to Bring in Nukes in Emergency,” Japan Times, February 15, 2014.
22 “Rift Growing between Allies.”
23 Bowman and Gabel, “How 1 Parade Proves China’s Military Is Becoming Very Dangerous.” 24 Talmadge, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” p. 48.
and selected by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), pp. 40-41. 26 “Rift Growing between Allies.”
27 Talmadge, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” p. 49.
28 “Henry Kissinger on a Convulsing Planet Henry Kissinger,” Independent, September 27, 2014. 29 191.
30 Alan Dupont, “An Asian Security Standoff,” National Interest (May/June 2012): p. 58. 31 White, The China Choice: Why American Should Share Power, p. 98.
32 Beech, “How China Sees the World,” p. 21.
33 Hugh White, “Gloom for US at Sunnylands Summit,” Straits Time, June 22, 2013. 34 “Australia Wades into Dangerous Water.”
