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(1)Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. 論説. Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia Phaik Chean LIM Introduction In Japanese diplomatic history, Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission of Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) (1947-1956) deserves a mention regarding his contribution to the aiding of Japan to gain admission into ECAFE before acquiring eligibility in 1952. It is on record that Lokanathan bypassed the ECAFE rules and acted on his own initiative to encourage the acceptance of Japan’s application as an associate member in 1952 which then opened the way to Japan’s acquisition of formal membership in 1954. However, not much study has been made of Lokanathan’s contribution and why he chose to help Japan return to Asia in a time of high anti-Japanese sentiments.1 ） This paper aims to shed light on how Japan’s postwar return to Asia was contributed to by a non-Japanese economist, P. S. Lokanathan, and to discover the background and the process this economist undertook in accomplishing his own vision which reengaged Japan with Asia. It is hoped that this paper provides insight into examining Japan’s reentry into Asia not from the traditional methodology of examining political and state factors in the 353.

(2) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. Cold War paradigm, but from an approach emphasizing the role of personal actors and by stressing non-political motivations.2）. P. S. Lokanathan’s Career Background as an Economist P. S. Lokanathan was born in 1894 in a village in Tirunelveli (Tamilnadu).3） Coming from a deprived background motivated Lokanathan to choose economics as his profession, through which he vowed to fight against poverty. After joining the Economics Department of the University of Madras during WWI, in 1929, he took study leave from the University, to set sail to the UK and obtained a DSc at the London School of Economics in 1934. His two books were titled “Industrial Welfare in India” and “Industrial Organization in India”. After returning to India, Lokanathan became Professor at Madras University and founded Eastern Economist from 1943. As the editor of Eastern Economist, Lokanathan concentrated on economic policies and problems created by wartime defense production, civilian shortage of goods and services, inflation and taxation for the War. The paper covered these problems without being packed with tons of statistical materials, but in a scholarly way with economic analysis in depth. The weekly discussed post-war economic problems well in advance of the termination of the War. Lokanathan invited leading economists to contribute articles. Swaminathan, son of Lokanathan recalled that his father enjoyed the confidence of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was greatly influenced by Lokahanthan’s sound and mature counsel.4 ） Industrialists and economists John Mathai and G.D. Birla were close friends of Lokanathan where the latter brought him into the limelight. Lokanathan was a member Secretary to the Indian industrialists’ delegation to the UK and the US in 1945, and a delegate to the Asian Pacific Relations Conference, held at Delhi in 1947. 354.

(3) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. Lokanathan was an ardent nationalist. He firmly believed in the economic freedom of India as well as its political liberation. Lokanathan wanted to build a self-reliant India which would earn enough foreign exchange to pay for her imports. Opposed to wasting time, energy and money in rediscovering known developments in the world, he believed it was wiser to import the latest technology and then improve and innovate upon it. He did however, deplored continuous import of technology, machinery and equipment which tended to inflate the capital cost of Indian industrial enterprises. While recognizing the need for liberal foreign aid in the early years of development, he said foreign aid did not mean automatic economic development. Foreign aid, to him was useless if it did not create the capacity to save. He argued strongly for indigenous manufacture of capital goods that could lead to import saving and deplored the lack of emphasis on research in this area. From 1947, Lokanathan served ECAFE in Shanghai and later Bangkok, as the Executive Secretary. After returning to India in 1956, Lokanathan founded the National Council of Applied Economic Research, and served as the first Chairman of the Indian National and the Asian Productivity Councils. The Council conducted a techno-economic survey for most Indian states which was of great value and impetus to the inception of the national planning process, as India embarked upon its early industrial and agricultural development in the 1950’s. As an academician turned government economist, with high national esteem, Lokanathan welcomed Japan’s technical assistance for an economic development through industrialization. Besides, as an educationist himself, Lokanathan must have realised that education was one of the key points of Japan’s civilization and something to be emphasized on. 355.

(4) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. P. S. Lokanathan in ECAFE In 1947, when UNESCO offered Lokanathan to join ECAFE, he rejected the offer as it was against his principles that only an Asian should head this Commission. At that time, India was still a British colony. Soon enough, the offer came back and he became the Executive Secretary of ECAFE, a rank equal to the Under Secretary General of the U.N. Under Lokanathan’s stewardship, numerous systematic studies were prepared on the economic problems and prospects of the region. He organized several working parties of experts from the region and outside, to study problems and come up with recommendations. These, he placed before the countries of the region to develop their economies in a diversified and dynamic manner. The position was politically difficult and economically complex, but it offered him tremendous opportunities, which he used admirably, not so much for his personal glorification as for that of the great organization which he guided and member countries in the region, during a difficult period. Lokanathan made contributions towards Asian economic cooperation through the ECAFE. In 1951, Lokanathan broke the resistance of the western powers which were none too friendly to the idea of sustained Asian economic development; by asserting that outside powers which had voting rights should not interfere in matters affecting the Asian nations and that ECAFE existed primarily for advancing the interests of the Asian countries. Often Lokanathan came into conflict with the UN HQ on the scope of activities of the ECAFE, but he always asserted the rights of the ECAFE General Assembly to formulate schemes of importance to the region and stood his ground.5). 356.

(5) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. P. S. Lokanathan’s Pulling Hands and Japan Promotion of Trade The idea of linking Japan with the economic development of this region appeared in debates prior to the establishment of ECAFE. In the debate in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), besides setting measures in the face of “the changes in the economic setting within the Asiatic region,.. [noteworthy] the adjustments required to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of Japan as a supplier, a consumer, and a competitor,”6） it was argued that reparations made by Japan might play a part in the economic reconstruction of devastated areas in the Far East.7 ） They envisaged the role Japan could play in the region, as they observed “the new attitude of the people of Asia towards industrialization” which could be found in practically every Asiatic country, and there was a “widespread and insistent demand for modernization of the economy, in order to raise living standards.”8） Promotion of trade with Japan as an alternative hope for economic development of regional members was to a certain extent due to the various passive attitudes of the Western Powers in postwar years. The UK, as the big colonial power in Asia, for instance, was not keen in cooperating as its role in pioneering regional collaboration in this region through the Special Commission’ s organization in Southeast Asia was now being challenged by ECAFE.9） The evolution of the idea of promoting trade with Japan started as early as Lokanathan’s first visit to Japan, four months after ECAFE’s first Session. After receiving a request from Lokanathan, as the first ECAFE Executive Secretary, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) invited him to Japan to discuss matters concerning the economic relationship between Japan and the ECAFE region.10 ） This visit marked an auspicious beginning to the cooperative relationship as both parties acknowledged the necessity of 357.

(6) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. mutual information and advice on matters concerning the economy of Japan in relation to that of Asia and the Far East.11） On reporting to the Commission, Lokanathan presented his optimistic view about the promising prospect of trade with Japan, which was then being hampered by several political factors. In his visit he revealed the fact that “while it [was] obvious that industrial recovery in Japan, in the face of desperate shortages of materials, had been truly impressive, the desired recovery can be brought to fruition only with the re-emergence of normal foreign trade conditions as a result of the peace treaty opening the broad avenues of peaceful trade with all countries.”12）Although this visit bore no immediate results or concrete plans because Japan’s international trade was still under strict control of SCAP, it had a significant effect as an attempt to sound out and to assure cooperation from the occupation authority of Japan, and to hint them what ECAFE expected from Japan and what Japan could expect from ECAFE. In a nutshell, this visit which was initiated by Lokanathan, had a groundbreaking impact in building confidence between the two organizations with regards to future Japanese involvement. ECAFE’s idea of trade development between Japan and the Asian region coincided with a report published by Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) of SCAP, titled “A Possible Program for a Balanced Japanese Economy.” This report identified the problems of Japan as an industrial nation, who must rely upon imports of a substantial portion of her foodstuffs and necessary industrial raw materials. The report also, elaborated on natural complementarities between the economies of Japan – exporting chiefly higher fabricated goods – and other less industrialized areas which can supply Japan with food and raw materials while themselves developing a manufacturing base in textiles and other light industries. The importance of trade with Japan and the utilization of Japanese 358.

(7) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. industrial power were highlighted at ECAFE. At the 3rd Session of ECAFE in October 1948, member countries were advised of the arrangement of a possible exchange of natural resources with Japan for production and capital wealth. In November 1948, at the 4th Session, because of inadequate capital and infrastructure within the ECAFE region, a study was made on the possible use of Japanese economic potentiality. These lines of achieving regional economic development through trade with Japan were finally instituted in a resolution on trade with Japan at the 5th Session in October 1949. In 1949, SCAP officials started to boost Japanese industrial policies, which for the past three years had been idle because of strict controls. Lokanathan, was receptive, now that he saw his vision gradually come into focus, made another visit to Japan. In 1949, Lokanathan and his colleague Turnage, a former SCAP official, visited Japan to discuss preparations for ascertaining the possibilities of expanding Japan’s production of capital goods for export in exchange for food and raw materials from countries of the region. A meeting between Lokanathan and Japanese economy planners was arranged by SCAP for the first time.13 ） Okita Saburo, who then became a prominent economic policy maker of the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB), and who served as the first Japanese official at ECAFE in 1952, was among the other ESB officials who attended the meeting.14） This was a good opportunity to enquire into matters concerning the economic situation in ECAFE which until then remained to a certain extent uncertain by only judging on data information. Lokanathan’s visit significantly marked the beginning of another phase of ECAFE’s work to stimulate trade within the region by having an immediate bearing on Japan’s recovery. He also mentioned ECAFE’s acceptance of Japan’ s re-entry into this region through more Japanese participations (accompanying SCAP representatives) to discuss matters of regional economic planning in 359.

(8) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. future ECAFE meetings.15）Two months soon enough after this announcement, a Japanese technical adviser16） was sent to accompany SCAP observer to the ECAFE Sub-commission on Iron and Steel held in Bangkok in August 1949. Besides, an expectation for Asian solidarity was explicitly expressed in his remark over disappointment to the former colonial powers and anticipation of a role for Japan to play in the regional development. Lokanathan further argued that the technical aspects, such as fertilizing, and irrigation systems of Asian countries could be improved to produce more crops, Japanese technical assistance in agriculture needed to be promoted, to replace that taught by the former colonial powers.17） Afterwards the Japanese held an evaluation meeting to discuss the matters of great concern such as the industrialization problems in the Asiatic region, where Japanese technicians would be Japan’s biggest resource.18） . Opening Ways for Japanese Technicians into ECAFE Region A short account should be given describing how Lokanathan succeeded in bringing Japanese technicians into this region again.19） Following resolutions on the “Contribution of the Japanese Economy to the Reconstruction and Development of the ECAFE Region” and “Technical Assistance in Economic Development” of ECAFE in 1948, chances were broadened for Japan to reenter regional plans through its supply of capital goods, materials and consumer goods needed by this region. ECAFE hoped that the industrial level of this region would be built up by acquiring technology through exchange among members and by importing technology from Japan. In Tokyo, even though SCAP received requests for Japanese technicians to work abroad, not only from Asian countries but also European countries, there was still no blanket policy allowing such travel. SCAP was forced to 360.

(9) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. consider this policy earnestly when they received a formal request from Lokanathan for technical exchange between ECAFE regional members and Japan after the ECAFE resolutions were passed. Lokanathan conveyed requests from several Asian countries which asked for Japanese technical experts to be sent to their countries to assist in erecting factories or in training skilled workers in specific factories and for Japan to receive trainees.20 ） One may argue that Lokanathan’s enthusiasm could easily be misconstrued as pursuing India’s economic interest,21） as compared to the immediate need for the rest of the Asian region as a whole. However, acting in his capacity as the Executive Secretary of ECAFE, Lokanathan’s request could not simply be ignored by SCAP, as it was SCAP’s policy to cooperate with the United Nations and its other organizations.22 ） Considering that these travels could “strengthen the Japanese economy” and “materially benefit the economies of the Allied nations,”23 ） SCAP officials viewed with favor ECAFE’s proposal, and were also willing to consider ECAFE requests on a case-by-case basis as long as the requests were not harmful to the Japanese economy.24） Instead of initiating a policy, the Chief of Staff in Tokyo decided to leave this proposal to the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington for deciding on such a policy.25） Incidentally, Lokanathan’s effort was complemented by the Indian Liaison Mission in Tokyo. In order to contribute to the development of Indian industries, the Indian Liaison Mission on the one hand persuaded the SCAP authorities in Tokyo to send Japanese technicians; on the other sent requests for approval to home government to accept Japanese technicians. A report was made on June 29 1949 that a list of 150 Japanese technicians had been sent to the Indian Government for approval. Those technicians would accompany shipments of machinery to India to assist in setting them up, mostly in 361.

(10) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. connection with the textile industry, which was contracted for $20 million worth of Japanese machinery.26） Almost a year had passed since Lokanathan’s first request and no SCAP policy had been made, Lokanathan continued to send in requests from ECAFE member countries and urged the approval of SCAP. The Pakistani government for instance, joined in requesting for Japanese technicians in manufacturing wire netting and metallurgists for rolling mills.27） Lokanathan viewed this issue as urgent and highlighted it in his agenda during his visit to SCAP in June 1949. Soon after that, Lokanathan’s perseverance was rewarded. SCAP finally crystallized its policy in SCAPIN 2035 by declaring that in order “to assist the Japanese economy through deposits in the SCAP Commercial Accounts, broadening Japanese participation in world-wide industry, advertising Japanese technical skills and products abroad and accruing good will, the restrictive policy of the SCAP concerning travel abroad of Japanese technicians is now liberalized”.28 ） Two months after that, it was announced that seven Japanese industrial specialists had been dispatched to India for the first time, on a purely non-reparation basis, to participate in India’s cottage industries program and to aid in the development of small industries by providing the necessary technical skills and advice on the purchase of machinery.29）. In Search for an Asian Marshall Plan ECAFE’s regional members, at any rate, appeared to hope that the Commission would act as a foundation and channel of aid from the West.30 A US Marshall Plan of 5 to 10 billion dollars was hoped for by ECAFE countries.31）Lokanathan, though not an Indian delegate, vigorously supported this objective.32） On more than one occasion, he argued that the rehabilitation of the Asian economy 362.

(11) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. instead of being regarded as an end worthy in itself, was too often merely looked upon as a desirable by-product; for there existed no corresponding Marshall Plan offer to Asia even though these countries needed it more than Europe. Although the US never even seriously entertained the possibility of launching anything like a Marshall Plan in Asia, the Indian government, for example, had continued to try and use ECAFE as a lever to gain important economic concessions from the West. By and large, the Marshal Plan in Asia was merely an Asian dream which attracted no attention in the US. However, in 1949, a wise Lokanathan put forth a suggestion urging that the US fund be rendered to the developing countries to purchase goods from Japan whereby Japan could play the role to channel financial assistance from the reluctant US to this region. Whether it was a strategic or a genuine attempt, a means or an ultimate goal, Lokanathan suggested that a US fund be rendered to the developing countries to purchase goods from Japan. In his second visit to Japan, speaking for the ECAFE region, Lokanathan advocated that Japan should look to the rest of Asia and not to the US for its economic life. This was shared by his other fellow Indian policy makers in India.33 ） This could be argued as a strategy because until 1949, one of the “major objectives” of US economy policy in Southeast Asia was “to increase production of food and needed exports for Europe and Japan.”34）Moreover, the US concern was to help Japan establish its erstwhile trading position through helping the Asian countries re-establish their markets, or else the US should be prepared to bear the cost as a continuing drain against the US and its resources.35 ） To the US, the real objective in Southeast Asia was to increase raw materials production and exports, and that aid was only a means to this end.36 Receiving favourable responses from SCAP and the efforts put through 363.

(12) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. preparing for the promotion of trade with Japan, Lokanathan gave another push hoping to intensify further the injection of Japanese capital goods in this region. In April 1950, Lokanathan sent a personal and confidential letter to Sherwood Fine, the economic advisor of SCAP, with the aim of easing further the existing financial problems.37 ） Lokanathan was seeking the possibility of increased US aid to Japan for long-term credits to ECAFE countries, besides other alternatives such as giving dollar credits to the ECAFE region for purchasing Japanese goods. In a tone emphasizing common benefit for ECAFE-Japan-US, Lokanathan explained that if capital goods could be moved quickly from Japan to the ECAFE region, the effects would be beneficial to all concerned. As the ECAFE region would accelerate its economic development and increase its exports of essential products to Japan, Japan would also speed up its mutually beneficial trade with ECAFE and consequently reduce the US burden of supporting Japan.38 ） It should be noted here, that instead of continued urging for US assistance to the ECAFE region, Lokanathan had changed his plea for US assistance to be rendered to Japan instead due to the fact that it would be more persuasive to use the Japan card in channeling US economic assistance to this region, in view of the priority given to Japan in US policy making as compared to the ECAFE region. Repeated efforts were made by ECAFE Secretariat to suggest ways in which the Counterpart Fund in Japan could be used to accelerate trade between Japan and the ECAFE nations. At the 6th ECAFE Session, the Secretariat even presented SCAP observer a confidential Secretariat paper indicating specific recommendations for use of the Counterpart Fund which if adopted by SCAP would be most advantageous for both Japan and the ECAFE region.39 ） The SCAP observer expressed reluctance to comment in detail upon proposals on the basis that the Secretariat was “getting involved 364.

(13) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. in an area completely beyond their competence.”40） Lokanathan’s effort did not bear fruitful result. With regards to the dollar shortage problems which lied between Japan and ECAFE region, there was a split in opinion. To solve the worldwide dollar shortage; which had become a hindrance to Asian-Japanese trade, Lokanathan urged thrifty spending on the US dollar among the Asian region. Acquiring freedom from dollar constraint rather than being constrained through commitments should be the better choice, as Lokanathan argued. He urged Japan to procure more from the Asian region than to depend on US imports, as this not only solve the dollar problem, but also provided a multiple trading base for Japan’s economic rehabilitation.41） Lokanthan’s inward looking opinion was of course aimed at helping the Asian countries. However, Lokanathan could be criticized for his perceived attempt to building a regional economic bloc which would exclude the US through a lessening dollar influence. It was also hoped that by shifting Japan’s emphasis to ECAFE region, it would strengthen the region’s bargaining power against the US. In contrast to Lokanathan’s view that Japan should minimize dependency on the US economy, the Japanese policy planners hoped to solve this problem with an expansion of US assistance, similar to GARIOA and EROA,42 ） to other Asian nations.43 ） The changing pattern of trade in postwar years revealed that, in 1947, 92% of Japanese imports came from the US and only 6% from Asia. Meanwhile, Japan shipped only 12% of its exports to the US and 66% to Asia. Given this pattern, Japan had to ensure its position in the international economy by becoming an ally of the US.44 ） The Japanese policy took into account that their Boeki-cho (Trade Agency) foresaw an increase in trade with the Southern market based on a report on 1949 exports produced by the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB). This report predicted that it 365.

(14) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. would be difficult for Japanese goods to penetrate into the Southern market because of Japan’s shortage in US dollar; they proposed that Japan could first obtain permission from World Food Committee to utilize GARIOA funds in purchasing food supplies from Southern market and thus strengthen their purchasing power for Japanese goods in due course.45）In the meantime, the US perceived that Japan would undoubtedly wish to maintain normal political and economic relations with the Communist bloc, and that “Japan’s economy cannot possibly be restored to a self-sustaining basis without a considerable volume of trade with China”. As a means of diversion, the US reiterated the importance of developing export markets for Japan in Southeast Asia to lessen Japanese economic dependence on China.46）. Japan’s ECAFE Admission Towards the end of the occupation years, the US seemed to have acted in haste to grant a gradual but high speed Japanese resumption of international relations mainly because of the escalation of the cold war in Asia, and the urgency of ending the occupation of Japan. SCAP too, without the slightest doubt, had been supportive to Japan’s representations at international conference. However, different from their colleagues in Washington offices, SCAP officials had been acting with great caution so as not to provoke any anti-Japanese sentiments. ECAFE started to give way to Japan’s resumption of relations with the ECAFE region. Lokanathan strongly supported the idea that Tokyo hosted the 3rd Session of ECAFE Sub-Committee on Iron and Steel in 1950 because of the importance of Japanese steel industry to the countries of the area. If this session were held in Tokyo, it would not only provide a good chance for the other member nations to visit Japan and observe the “newly changed” Japan, 366.

(15) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. but also secure more commitment on the Japanese side towards cooperation in this aspect. The Diplomatic Section of SCAP thought it a desirable point of view, the reviving of Japan’s connections for trade and international relations with other nations of Asia, but the ongoing war in the Korean Peninsular made it difficult for Japan to accommodate an international conference.47） Both ECAFE and SCAP seemed to have tacit consent over Japanʼs participation in ECAFE’s meeting which would contribute to early psychological acceptance of the region with regards to the Japanese peace treaty.48 ） SCAP and the Japanese government were eager to continue to corporate with the ECAFE Secretariat on an informal basis until such time as Japan was accepted as a member nation in ECAFE.49） The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) too, had been keen to join ECAFE in order “to make contribution to the Commission as well as to derive benefits there from.”50 ） The MOFA policymakers regarded admission to ECAFE as a way to regain the diplomatic green light in resuming and developing foreign relations with the Asiatic region. MOFA viewed this admission as important based on four merits.51 ） Firstly, the admission could bring about closer politico-economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries. Secondly, by formally becoming an associate member, Japan got a chance to voice her opinion, request and expectations, in the course of participating in development plans of member countries and while attending ECAFE conferences and through ECAFE Secretariat. Thirdly, Japan could have access to abundant information regarding the economic situation of regional countries. Fourthly, technical assistance to regional countries could be carried out smoothly. Consequently, this would lead to greater future exports of capital goods to Southeast Asian countries. The Japanese diplomatic officials thought it timely to submit their application to ECAFE for approval in the 367.

(16) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. coming session in January 1952 so that Japan can be admitted to ECAFE in conjunction with their achieving independence and show its new face in foreign relations. Perhaps, to the MOFA officials, ECAFE membership was regarded more important as a stepping stone for Japan’s admission to the Colombo Plan and United Nations membership. However, to the Japanese economic policy planners, ECAFE was a vital source to gather economic information on the region which could be incorporated into Japan’s economic policy planning. The admission further gave confidence to the Japanese policy makers on their departure of “economic diplomacy”, and the “technology diplomacy” to approach the Asian countries. There was a split in views among ECAFE Asian members even though the UK observed that “probably ECAFE wants Japan to become a member more than Japan wants to become a member of ECAFE”.52 ） On one hand Pakistan and Thailand were keen supporters of the US to propose Japan’s admission.53）On the other, the Philippines, since the beginning had been antiJapanese and drew demarcation to allow only Japanese goods but not Japanese nationals, and had opposed to Japanese representation before peace settlement. A way for Japan to speed up admission to ECAFE was to approach ECAFE directly, urging it to modify the ECAFE terms of reference at the January 1952 8th Session of ECAFE in Rangoon. Lokanathan decided to allow Japan to take this procedure so that it could be admitted as a member of ECAFE sooner than if it followed the normal route to wait for the ECOSOC meeting in 1954. After Japan submitted its formal application to ECAFE on December 19, 1951, for the first time, Lokanathan extended an invitation to Japanese officials to attend the Session as observers and not technical adviser to SCAP as in the previous years.54） The Japanese delegation was made up of 368.

(17) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. prominent officials who were experts in their fields, including Okita Saburo who Lokanathan “knew very well” 55） At the 8th Session of ECAFE in Rangoon, Pakistan’s proposal to include Japan in the ECAFE geographical sphere and to admit Japan as an associate member was put to the floor. The Philippines objected, arguing that Japan had no proper status before regaining responsibility for its international relations, and should not apply for membership before the peace treaty was ratified.56） Thailand had developed trade relations with Japan and had signed a barter agreement, so it had no objection to voting for Pakistan’s resolution. The US delegate, supported Japan’s admission by arguing the de facto involvement of Japan in the UN organization. Vietnam consented with moral support for Japan’s admission “in view of close intellectual relations between the two countries and in view of the necessity for greater solidarity between the various peoples of the world.”57） Finally a resolution was adopted on January 29 recommending to the ECOSOC that Japan be admitted as an associate member of ECAFE. Lokanathan’s effort was rewarded with success at the Rangoon session. Lokanathan revealed his long pursued hope for Japan in his letter to Shima Shigenobu, the high ranking foreign official in the Japanese delegation, stating that “since I joined ECAFE in 1947 I was looking forward to the day when new Japan would join ECAFE and make a most valuable contribution to the successful work of the Commission. I am one of those who believe that, with Japan’s constructive cooperation, the countries of the region can look forward to a more rapid era of economic development. There is much that Japan herself can get from the other Asian countries both by way of economic prosperity and spiritual development. In my judgment, the next 25 years is going to see the speedy march of Asia in economic advancement, and it is of the utmost 369.

(18) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. importance that countries should help one another in all possible ways.”58） Lokanathan used his authority to bypass ECOSOC procedure in order to allow Japanese representation at the Rangoon session. It was time for Lokanathan not only to realize his own vision, but also to respond positively for the sake of his counterpart in SCAP’s office and the Japanese officials whom he had met, who had been cooperative in the past few years and had shown great sincerity and dedication to ECAFE regional economic activities.. Conclusion Japan’s admission to ECAFE, as an associate member in 1952, three months before independence, marked a significant achievement in its return to Asia. The admission was preceded by the resumption of trade followed by human resource, i.e. Japanese technicians. Lokanathan contributed to Japan’s return to Asia, not as a politician nor a diplomat, but an economist. He pursued his realist yet idealist economic vision in developing Asian countries with the aid of Japanese technical knowhow and the US financial support. Thus, this laid open the ground for a free return of Japan to Asia. Lokanathan might not have successfully negotiated a consented policy over issues such as the Asian Marshall Plan; his fruitful effort in resuming entry for Japanese technicians into the Asian region was remarkable. Furthermore, he has put into words the expectations of the Asian region towards Japan’s contribution, which were then incorporated into Japanese policies towards the Asian region. Japanese technical skill which was vital in the development of the Asian region, as envisaged by Lokanathan, enabled Japan to reenter Asia through “technician outfit.” If the return of Japan to the Asian region is put in terms of a push and pull mechanism, whereby pushing hands represent the supportive roles of 370.

(19) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. the SCAP while pulling hands are derived from the expectations of the Asian countries, Lokanathan’s role had been one of the important pulling hands at the initial stage before Japan’s independence. Unlike the SCAP’s motive which changed from an economic to more political motivation towards the end of the occupation, Lokanathan had consistently, even at a time where most of the Asian countries which were still engulfed by the postwar legacy, as a pure economist with vision for the region, maneuvered opportunities to get Japan back, not to conquer but to contribute as a stimulus for regional economic reconstruction and development.. Words of Gratitude I am most delighted and honoured to be given this opportunity to contribute to this special issue commemorating Prof. Tatsuhiko Ikeda’s retirement. I owe Prof. Ikeda my gratitude for his advice and support during my doctorate years. Especially, without Prof. Ikeda’s introduction and assistance, my research trip to the headquarters of ECAFE in Bangkok would not have been successful. Also, my thankfulness goes to Mr. Philip Miles for proof reading this article.. Notes ＊ ‌The documents of GHQ records are quoted in numbers as in the holdings of National Diet Library, Japan. 1）‌Well studied work on Japan’s postwar return to Asia are Miyagi, Taizo, 2001, Bandon Kaigi to Nihon No Ajia Fukki: Amerika to Ajia no Kyoukande, Tokyo: Soshisha; Hatano, Sumio, 1994, ‘ “Tonan Ajia Kaihatsu” wo meguru Nichi, Bei, Ei Kankei – Nihon no Koronbo Puran Kanyu (1954nen) wo Chushinni,’ in Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 16, Tokushu: Sengo Gaiko no Keisei, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha; Inoue, Toshikazu, 1994, “Kokuren to Sengo Nihon Gaiko – Kokuren Kamei he no Michi,1945-56”, in Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 16, Tokushu: Sengo Gaiko no Keisei, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, just to name a few. 371.

(20) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. 2）‌Detailed studies for Japan-US-Asia relations during Occupation period are Borden, William S, 1984, The Pacific Alliance: The United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery 1947-1955, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press; Schaller, Michael, 1997, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation, New York: Oxford University Press. Writings on ECAFE are well presented by Wightman, David, 1963, Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia: The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, New Haven: Yale University Press; Singh, Lalita Prasad, 1966, The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia, Columbia: University of Missouri Press; Singh, Lalita Prasad, 1979, Power Politics and Southeast Asia, Radiant Publishers. 3）‌Background and career of Lokanathan is written based on the following; - Lokanathan, Dr. P.S. Memorial Society, 1994, Dr. P. S. Lokanathan Birth Centenary, Madras: Nagaraj & Co; Lokanathan, Dr. P.S Seventy-Second Birthday Commemoration Volume Presentation Committee, 1966, Economic Development: Issues and Policies, New Delhi: Vora & Co; Lokanathan P.S., 1945, ‘The Bombay Plan’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 23, no.4, July 1945, pp.680-6; Lokanathan, P.S., 1946, India’s Post-war Reconstruction and its International Aspects, New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Lokanathan, P.S., 1946, ‘Indo-American Economic Relations’, India Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, January 1946, pp. 11-17; Lokanathan, P.S, 1953, “ECAFE-The Economic Parliament of Asia”, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs’, Vol. II, p.7; Lokanathan, P.S, 1960, Supply of Entrepreneurs and Technologists with Special Reference to India, New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research. 4）‌Correspondence from Swaminathan to the writer dated 21 April 2004. 5）Lokanathan, 1994:4. 6）‌“Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas; Draft Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East,” February 28, 1947, FEC 1486. 7）‌Letter to Mr. David K. Eichler, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Commission (Secretary of the Reparations Committee) from Nelson T. Johnson, Secretary General, 25 February 1947. FEC 1033. 8）‌“Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas; Draft Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East,” February 28, 1947, FEC 1486. 9）‌For reference on postwar British regional involvement in Southeast Asia, refer to Tarling, Nicholas, 1998, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-50, Singapore: Cambridge University Press; Remme, Tilman, 1995, Britain and Regional Cooperation in SouthEast Asia, 1945-49, London: Routledge; Tomaru, Junko, 2000, The Postwar Rapproachment of Malaya and Japan, 1945-61, London: Macmillan Press. 372.

(21) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. 10）‌E/CN.11/33; Lokanathan to MacArthur, October 18, 1947, FSP 2369. Refer to Document from Sebald to Secretary of State, October 24, 1947, FRUS , 1947, Vol. VI, pp.308-311. 11）‌“Statement of the Executive Secretary at the First Plenary meeting of the 2nd Session”, E/CN.11/45, 25 November 1947. 12）‌Note by Executive Secretary, E/CN.11/33, 20 October 1947. 13）‌Until then, Japanese participation in meetings with foreign authorities was very much restricted by SCAP until mid 1946. Along the road to the gradual gaining of autonomy so as to allow Japan be self-reliance first in the economic aspect, SCAP saw an urgency in allowing more direct contact and involvement between Japanese and foreigners especially in dealing with matters concerning foreign affairs. A request was sent from Prime Minister Yoshida to SCAP urging for more participation and involvement, contact between the Japanese officials and the trading partner in the signing of agreements. ‘Yoshida Syusyo kara no Yosei Jiko 1949.9.5’, Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 25, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. 14）‌Two meetings were held, one on 30 May and another on 1 June, 1949. At the first meeting, presents were Lokanathan, Turnage (from ECAFE secretariat, a former SCAP official in ESS Statistic and Research Division), Levine (SCAP ESS), Noda Nobuo (Vice president), Horikoshi Teizo(Keidanren Secretary General), Sato Busaburo, Inaba Hidezo, Okita, Ando. ‘Lokanesan oyobi Taneji Shi to no Kaidan Yoshi, Keihon Kanbo Chosakacho Ki’, Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 25, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. At the second meeting, presents were Lokanathan, Turnage, Horikoshi Teizo, Tsuru, Okita, Saeki, Goto, Ando, ‘Kokuren Ajia Kyokuto Keizai Kaigi Jimukyokucho Rokanesan Hakase to no Kaikeinki (ni), Keihon Kanbo Chosakacho Ki’ Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 25, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. 15）‌Press Release by Lokanathan, June 2, 1949. ESS(B) 15584. 16）‌Mitsui Takichi, an iron and steel metallurgist who was the Chief of Production Section, Iron and Steel Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, accompanied SCAP delegation to the meeting. Takichi spoke English to a fair degree. Informal Memorandum for from Mauriss M. Class, (Industry Division of ESS) to C Verity, (Production and Utilities), Representative for ECAFE Conference (Sub-com on Iron and Steel in Bangkok), August 12, 1949. ESS(A)09439. 17）‌‘Lokanesan oyobi Taneji Shi to no Kaidan Yoshi, Keihon Kanbo Chosakacho Ki’, ‘Kokuren Ajia Kyokuto Keizai Kaigi Jimukyokucho Rokanesan Hakase to no Kaikeinki (ni), Keihon 373.

(22) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. Kanbo Chosakacho Ki’, Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 24, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. 18）Okita Diary, entry 1949.5.30. 19）‌For discussion on reentry of Japanese technicians into ECAFE region, see Lim, Phaik Chean, 2005, “Asia’s Call for a “Return” of Japan?: Travel abroad of Japanese Technicians in the Early Postwar Years”, Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences, vol.10, no.1, pp.11-28. 20）‌Lokanathan to DS, September 17, 1948; March 7, 1949. 21）‌Also see work on relations between Japan and India in Lim, Phaik Chean, 2006, “Economic Relations between India and Japan, 1947-49”, Tokyo: Report for Fuji Xerox Kobayashi Setsutaro Kinen Kikin. 22）‌G-1 to ESS, October 5, 1948, FSP186. 23）‌SCAP to Dept of Army, August 25, 1948; From G-1 to C/S, August 31, 1948, G1-00353. 24）‌Check Sheet DS to G-1, September 27, 1948; G-1 to ESS, October 5, 1948; ESS to G-1, October 16, 1948, FSP186. Check Sheet DS to ESS, September 27, 1948; ESS to DS October 7, 1948, FSP 185. 25）‌Check Sheet G-1 to Chief of Staff, October 26, 1948; CofS to G-1, November 1, 1948; G-1 to DS, November 3, 1948; DS to CS, October 25, 1948, Draft letter from Sebald to Lokanathan, FSP 185. 26）‌AFP in English Morse from Tokyo, June 28, 1949. FEC(A)0829. 27）Lokanathan to Chief of Diplomatic Section, April 14, 1949, G-1 00413. 28）SCAPIN 2035, August 1, 1949. 29）‌This group was headed by Michael M. Enomoto, president of Kiya Company, Ltd., Tokyo exporting firm. Other members consisted of Kosuge Katsuzo, technical advisor for the Kiya Company, and former president of the Mechanical Toy Manufacturers of Japan; Suzuki Saichi, associated with the Hiyoshi Company of Okozaki, a specialist in the “garabo” weaving industry; Kokubun Kadanasuka of the Kokubun Iron Works of Hamanatsu City, a specialist in braiding machinery; Adachi Masayoshi of the Bambenia Company, Kyoto, a specialist in bamboo ware manufacturing and inventor of the bamboo plywood processing machine; Hozen Akira and Kudo Yoshiro of the same Bambonia Company. Press Release of GHQ, October 17, 1949, FEC0829. 30）Wightman, 1963: 40. 31）Fourth Session of ECAFE, report by David Maynard, FSP 185. 374.

(23) Contribution of Dr. P. S. Lokanathan in Japan’s Postwar Return to Asia. 32）Meyer, 1968: 203. 33）‌“Fortnightly Report contains from Indian Liaison Mission Tokyo, Japan” 485C.J&K/49. (NAI) 34）Borden, 1984: 114. 35）Borden, 1984: 116. 36）Borden, 1984: 116. 37）Lokanathan to Sherwood Fine, April 22, 1950. 38）‌Lokanathan to Sherwood Fine, April 22, 1950. As Lokanathan regarded this urgent, he also sent the same content to other SCAP economic officials:－ Robert West, W. E. Reid, John Logan, Merill Gay, Emerson Ross, Harlan Cleveland and Edwin F. Staton. 39）‌S.M Fine Memo for Record, June 29, 1950, ESS(E)08401. 40）S.M Fine Memo for Record, June 29, 1950, ESS(E)08401 41）‘Lokanesan oyobi Taneji Shi to no Kaidan Yoshi, Keihon Kanbo Chosakacho Ki’, Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 24, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. 42）‌Both GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) and EROA (Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area) were US aid programs; where the former focused on humanitarian aspects in prevention of disease and unrest, the latter went beyond humanitarian relief to finance industrial recovery and raw material imports. 43）‌‘Yoshida Syusyo kara no Yousei Jikou’ Keizai Antei Honbu Sengo Keizai Seisaku Shiryo, Vol. 25, Tokyo: NIRA Sengo KeizaiSeisaku Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1995. 44）Gao, 1997: 201. 45）Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 1948. 46）‌NSC48/1, December 1949. 47）Check sheet from DS to G1 through ESS, July 17, 1950, ESS(F)01916. 48）Personal letter from Bill Turnage (ECAFE) to Marquat, September 28, 1949. ESS(F)01741. 49）Check Sheet from ESS to DS, April 11, 1951. 50）“Shinsei suru setsumei”, B’0045, vol. 1, p.0215. 51）‌‘Ajia oyobi Kyokuto Keizai Iinkai (ECAFE) ni kansuru setsumeisho’, 1952.1.10、B’ 0045,vol.1, p.0206. 52）‌Tomaru, 2000: 134. 375.

(24) 横浜国際経済法学第 21 巻第 3 号（2013 年 3 月）. 53）‌‘ECAFE Kaigi Kamei Tetsuzuki ni Kansuru Ken’, 951.9.11, B’0045, vol.1. 54）‌In previous cases, a non-member country was not allowed to send observers to ECAFE sessions. For instance, in 1948 Nepal was denied sending its observers to ECAFE session. This time, for Japan’s case, Lokanathan had allowed Japanese officials to replace SCAP’s position who had been representing Japanese government on observer status. Wightman interpreted that it was a misinterpretation Lokanathan made over a cable from the UN Legal Department. Wightman, 1963: 33. However, Lokanathan’s decision did not seem to be accidental but more of a demonstration of his keenness to Japan’s admission. In his cable on December 29, 1951, Lokanathan concluded that it was his duty to invite Japanese government to participate in a consultative capacity and hoped that sessions of commission and subsidiary bodies would explain to these bodies the action he had taken, and hoped that they would confirm his action in welcoming observers from Japan. From Lokanathan, December 29, 1951. B’0045, vol.1, p.0186. 55）‌From Togo Fumihiko to Lokanathan, January 10, 1952. B’0045.vol.1. The other Japanese officials in the delegation were, Shima Shigenobu, Special Assistant to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hattori Hisaji, Japanese Government Overseas Representative in Rangoon, Suma Michiaki, Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Okita Saburo, Chief Research Section, Economic Stabilization Board, and Inoue Makoto, Chief Trade Research Section, Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Okita and Tabata Shintaro, Chief of Iron Production Section MITI would attend Sub-committee on Iron and Steel. Okita and Takashima Setsuo, Public Utilities Commission would attend sub-committee on Electric Power. December 28, 1951, B’0045, vol.1, p. 0180. 56）‌The Philippines had consistently protested against Japan’s resuming international relations before the signing of peace treaty. This was because the Philippines did not want to lose its bargaining power on giving Japanese peaceful resumption in return for Japan’s repaying its war debt in the form of reparation. 57）E/CN.11/SR.91, January 29, 1952. Department of State Publication, 1951:314. 58）Lokanathan to Shima, February 3, 1952. B’0045,vol.1, p. 0252.. 376.

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