Vol.63 , No.3(2015)226崔 境眞「刹那滅論証に関するBo dong 'Jam pa'i dbyangs Sho re baの理解 ： Pramanaviniscayaに対する註釈を基にして」

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service

The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

.lburnal

ofincfian

andBudtthist

Studies

Vbl.

63,

No.

3,

March

2015

(235)

Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'i

dbyangs

Sho

re

ba's

Understanding

of

the

Proof

of

Momentariness:

His

Commentary

on

the

Pramduavinis'caya

CHoi

Kyeongii'n

By

what

_pramdua

can one confirm

that

all

_produced

things

are

impermanent?

Dharma-kirti

set

fbrth

his

so-called "vindsitvkenumdna"

(hereafter

_VA)

and

ba{thakaprama"a

(here-after

BP)

arguments

in

order

to

answer

this

_question.

While

in

the

Pramduavarttikasvavrtti

Dharmakirti

only employs "krtahatvdnumana"

(hereafter

KA)

and

VdL,

in

his

next work

(PVin)

he

uses

KA

and

VA,

as well as

BP

in

a complete

fbrm

fbr

the

first

time.

Earlier

studies,

_pointing

to

the

fact

that

only

_proofs

using sattvdnumana and

BP

can

be

fbund

in

Dharmakirti's

later

works

(such

as

the

VZidaaydya)

,

present

the

substitution

ofVA

with

BP

as an

instance

of

development

in

his

thought.

However,

I

am

hesitant

to

accept

this

view

because

I

believe

VA

and

BP

in

PVin

each

have

their own

_purpose

and are not redundant.

Tb

explore

this

idea,

in

this

_paper,

I

would

like

to

examine

Bo

dong

'Jam

_pa'i

dbyangs

Sho

re

ba's

(13

c.,

hereafter

Sho

re

ba)

_plausible

understanding of

the

relationship

between

these

two

arguments

that

is

fbund

in

his

PVin

commentary.

(While

there

are studies on

the

relationship

between

VA

and

BP

that

use

Indian

commentaries,

there

are

few

treatments

of

PVin

commentaries written

by

scholars of

the

bKa'

_gdams

school.)

Sho

re

ba

wrotq

this

commentary at

Brag

ram mgon

khang,

a monastery

that

had

been

fbunded

by

Bo

dong

brTson

'grus

rdo

lje

(b.

1200),

who may

have

nicknamed 'Jam

dbyangs

Sho

re

ba.

How-ever, according

to

the

Deb

ther

cimarpo

(pp.

69-70),he

was connected

to

the

_gSang

_phu

sNe'u

thog

monastery ofthe

bKa'

_gdams

_pa

school.

I

will also show

that

Sho

re

ba

is

influ-enced

by

Sa

skyapaitdita

Kun

dga'

rgyal mtshan

(1192-1251,

hereafter

Sapai;)

who criti-cized

the

riVgqg

lugs.

The

various understandings of

the

relationship

between

VA

and

BP

in

PVin

commentar-ies

fa11

into

the

following

three

_patterns:

(1

)

V?eL

is

a supponing

inference

for

concretely

demonstrating

BP.

:

Dharmottara

(8

c.) i)and rGyat tshab

Dar

ma rin chen

(14-15

_c.)

-1329-The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service

The JapaneseAssociation ofIndian and Buddhist Studies

(236)Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'idbyangs

Sho

re

ba's

Understanding

ofthe

Proof

ofMomentariness

(K.

CHoi)

(2)

BP

is

a

_part

ofexplanation

for

the verification ofVA.

:

JffaiiaSribhadra,

rNgog

Blo

ldan

shes rab,

Phya

_pa

Chos

kyi

seng

_gc,

_gTsang

nag

_pa

brTson

'grus

seng

_ge,

Chu

mig

_pa

Seng

_ge

dpal

(11-13

c.)

(3)

VA

confirms

the

_positive

concomitance of

KA,

and

BP

confirrns

the

negative concomitance of

ka

:

bCom

ldan

rig

_pa'i

ral

_gri,

Bu

ston

Rin

chen

_grub

(13-14

c.)

On

the

other

hand,

Sho

re

ba

sees

VA

as

being

directed

towards

those

who agree with

the

notioll of

the

impermanence

of all

that

exists and

insist

that

there

is

an

external cause

that

leads

something

to

become

extinct, and

BP

as

being

directed

towards

those

who reject

the

notion

that

all

that

exists

is

impermanent.

In

other words,

he

regards

them

as each

function-ing

to

_persuade

a

different

type

ofinter]ocutor.

Below

I

will

_present

details

regarding

Sho

re

ba's

understanding, which _comes

from

Sa-pap,

and argue

that

it

could

be

categorized as

(2).

In

his

commentary

on

the

PVin,

Sho

re

ba

understands

the

overall structure ofthe

_proof

ofmomentariness as

fbllows:

[A3]

Proving

that

the

definition

is

confirmed

in

terms of

[a

svabhtn;ahetu] which

has

been

fied

[into

twe

kinds

before

in

the

preyious

verse

(no.

51)].

(69b6)

[A3B1]

Proving

that

a

_produced

thing

or an existent

thing

is

[a

kind

ofi svabhavahetu.

(69b7)

[A3BICI]

Proving

[that

a

_produced

thing

or an existent

thing

is

a

kind

vahetu] with

[an

inference

that

uses

the

idea

ofl

independence

(nirapeksatva)

to

respond toan opponent who agrees with

the

extinction

[ofthings].

(69b8)

[A3BlC2]

Showing

that

ba`thaka[-prarndwa]

responds

_to

_{an opponent} who

ciaimsthat

[things]

do

notvanish.

(71b2)

[A3B1C3]

The

manner

by

which a

_produced

thing

or an existent

thing

is

_pervaded

by

rough

imperrnanence

(rags

_pa

'imi rtagpa).

(72bl)

[A3BIC4]

Proving

[that

a

_produced

thing

or an existent

thing

is

a

kind

vahetu]

by

means ofanother method.

(73a3)

[A3B2]

Apply

[this

above

inference]

to

another

kind

[ofsvabha-vahetu].

(74a9)

Sho

re

ba

seems

to

be

saying

that

from

[A3BICI]

to

[A3BIC4]

Dharmakirti

examines

that

which

is

produced

1

that

which exists as an example ofa svabhth,ahetu, and

in

[A3B2]

argues

that

the

above verification of a

logical

reason as a svabhdvahetu could

be

applied

to

other

kinds

ofsvabhnvahetu.

Here,

Sho

re

ba's

understanding of

the

relationship

between

VA

and

BP

can easily

be

seen

by

his

statement

that

[A3B1C1]

is

argued

by

Dharrnakirti

in

PVin

76,l1-78,15

and

[A3BIC2]

in

PVin

79,1-80,9.

Sho

re

ba

states

in

the

former

that

-

1330

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service

The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'i

dbyangs

Sho

re

ba's

Understanding

of

the

ProofefMomentariness

(K,

CHoi)(237)

VIAL

is

addressed

to

an opponent who agrees with

the

impermanence

of all

that

exists, and

in

the

latter

that

BP

is

addressed

to

someone who

insists

on

the

existence ofa

_permanent

thing.

Furthermore,

befbre

he

begins

to

his

discussion

of

[A3BIC2],

Sho

re

ba

rejects

two

other opinions on

the

relationship

between

VA

and

BP,

and

_presents

another on

the

same subject

that

came

from

Saparp.

They

are as

fo11ows

(C

£

dyi

ma'i sayingpo:

71b2-4)

:

(a)

Dharmottara

argued

that

VA

_purifies

the

inferential

_process

of

BP

and

that

neither of

them

are superfluous.

(b)

BP

is

another

kind

of

inference

for

_proving

that

a

_produced

thing

or an existent

thing

necessarily extinguishes.

Thus

BP

is

not superfluous.

(c)

According

to ttchos

ny'e

pa"

(Sapap)

,

MA

and

BP

are aimed at

two

opponents with

dif

ferent

fa11acious

understandings about a

thing

extinguishing.

(a)

appears

to

correspond

with

the

aboyepattern

(1).

Sho

re

ba

states

that

(a)

is

incor-rect

because

lvCl!L

and

BP

each

have

different

objects of activity

O'ug

_yul)

:

VA's

object

to

be

_proven

(sndhya)

is

that

a

_produced

thing

is

accompanied

by

the

extinction of something

by

itselg

and

that

of

BP

is

that

a

_permanent

thing

lacks

causal efficacy

(arthakrlya).

On

the

other

hand,

(b)

appears

to

correspond

to

_pattern

(3).

Sho

re

ba

criticized

(b)

by

say-ing

that

if

it

were

true,

it

would

have

been

well

known

to scholars throughout

history.

(In-cidentally,

in

the

later

works of

dGe

lugs

school,

it

became

_quite

common.)

In

the

end,

Sho

re

ba

embraces

(c),

which comes

from

Saparp.

While

Sho

re

ba

does

not mention

the

titleof

Saparp's

text,

Rigs

_gter

rang 'grel,

there

are

_quite

similar statements

in

it

(pp.

148,15-14g,1).2)

Sho

re

ba

criticizes

(1)

and

(3),

but

does

not

discuss

_pattern

(2),

that

BP

is

a

_part

of an explanation

in

which

VA's

function

is

validated.

Nevertheless,

I

would

like

to

_point

out cautiously

that

(c)

(also

advocated

by

SapaiL)

and

(2)

(advocated

by

several scholars of

the

bKa'

_gdams

_pa

school) are not

totally

incompatible

with each other.

For

example, rNgog

argues

that

when

there

is

a

Buddhist

opponent,

XLA

confirms

the

_pervasion

of

KA,

and when

the

opponent

is

a non-Buddhist, ivQXcannot

_prove

momentariness

by

fbrce

of

the

in-nate nature ofextinction unless

the

epponent accepts

impermanence

first

(cZKa

'gnas rnam

bshad)

84b4-6).

In

such a case,

the

Buddhist

must,

by

means of

BP,

make the opponent

realize

that

there

is

nothing

_permanent,

and

BP

would

be

a

_part

of explanation

in

which

VA's

fUnction

is

validated.

Therefbre,

Sho

re

ba's

contention

that

VA

and

BP

have

each

different

objects

to

_prove

_{and each}

different

_opponents

_to

defeat

is

_similar

_to

_pattem

(2)

_.

1331

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service

The JapaneseAssociation ofIndian andBuddhist Studies

(238)Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'idbyangs

Sho

Te

ba"s

Understanding

ofthe

ProofofMomentariness

(K.

CHoi)

1

)

For

more

infbrriiation

about

DharTnottara's

understanding, scc

Sakai

Masamichi,

"Dharmottara's

Interpretation

of

the

Causelessness

of

Destruction,"

indogakor

Bukkyo-gakor

kendyti

fPRil}l{L,if{l}E

fiif

n

58,

no.

₃

(2010),

_pp.

_1241-1245.

2

)

Nemoto

Hiroshi

introduced

Sapan's

thought using the same statements

in

Rigr

_gter

rang 'grel.

See

Nemeto

Hiroshi

_sc7ts

as

va,

Geruku-ha

ni okeruJ'ikan-ron no

kenlp?a

_{>'JV

7

ifik

a:

S5

CJ

6

ve

ue

th

OfiJf

Yli

(Kyoto:

Heirakoji

Shoten,

2011),

_p.

121.

PVin

bKki

'gnas

rnam

bshad

?Yi,i

ma 'isaying

_po

Rigs

_gter

rang 'grel

<Key

words>

Dharrnakirti,

Pramauavinis'caya.

Ernst

Steinkeltner

ed.

Dharmakirti

's

Pra-mduavinis'caya

(Chapters

1

and

2)

.

Sanskrit

Texts

from

the

Tibetan

Autono-mous

Region,

no.

2.

Beijing:

China

Tibetolegy

Publishing

House;

Vienna:

Austrian

Academy

of

Sciences

Press,

2007.

rNgog

Ble

ldan

shes rab,

khad

ma rnam nges

tvi

dka'gnas

rnam

bshad;

bKa'gclams

pa

'i

gsung

'bum,

vol.

1,

pp.

419-707.

Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'i

dbyangs

Sho

re

ba,

7)had

ma rnam

par

nges

pa

7

'gret

bshad

tshig

don

rnam

_par

nges

_pa

_ayi

ma 'i

saying

_po,

TRBC

no.

W26444.

Sa

skya

_papdita

Kun

dga'

rgyal mtshan,

tshad

ma rigr

_pa

'i

gter

gyi

rtsa

ba

dong

'grelpa.

Beijing:

Mi

rigs

dpe

skrun

khang,

1989.

Bo

dong

'Jam

pa'i

dbyang

Sho

re

ba,

badhakaprama4a

<Graduate

Student,

The

University

of Ibkyo)