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Japan's Defense Policies in the Post-World War II : History, Issues and New Ideas: 沖縄地域学リポジトリ

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Author(s)

Nakachi, Kiyoshi; Irei, Ryo

Citation

名桜大学紀要 = THE MEIO UNIVERSITY BULLETIN(19):

117-131

Issue Date

2014-03

URL

http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12001/12342

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I. Introduction

Constructing new security ideas (policy) in the post-Cold War era is a hot topic today. Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced discussions on revising the Japanese constitution, Japan-US security policy has also become a matter for reexamination. Both the Japanese Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty were introduced by the SCAP occupation government right after the end of the Pacific War in 1945. At that time the Japanese government had no basis to reject the proposals from SCAP and later from the US government.

The Japanese Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty functioned well during the Cold War era. The constitution and the security treaty really contributed to Japan to keep her secure and to develop her economically. However, the Abe Cabinet has proposed revising the Japanese Constitution or to create anew constitution as the most important task for itself. Many people are now paying attention to Abe's initiatives on the constitution and a security

treaty.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze problems regarding the defense treaty in the Cold War period and propose a new type of ally for defense and peace in the post-World War era. The paper consists of five parts: The first deals with establishing the aims of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan of 1950. The second part identifies the reasons for revising the Security Treaty of 1950. The third part reviews the weak and strong points of the treaty as well as the dilemmas posed by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America of 1960 to both Japan and the USA. The fourth part introduces some current views on making a new treaty in the post-Cold War era. The fifth part summarizes and presents a proposal for security in the post-Cold War era.

Japan's Defense Policies in the Post-World War

Ⅱ:

History, Issues and New Ideas

戦後の日本の防衛政策: 歴史,課題そして新思考

NAKACHI Kiyoshi, IREI Ryo

 

Abstract

The paper reviews and analyzes the history of the Japan-US Security treaties from 1945 to today. The Shinzo Abe Cabinet is now preparing to revise the Japanese Constitution, in particular the Article 9 of the constitution which disallows military bases and forces for use in international conflicts. However, the Abe Cabinet has repeatedly stated it will maintain the Japan-US Security Treaty. The Cold War ended in 1988 and China and Russia are now no more enemies for Japan and USA. Although Okinawa people have demanded the removal of US military bases out from Okinawa, the Japanese and US governments have always insisted on the need for US bases in Okinawa because of the Japan-US security treaty. This paper proposes new ideas for peace and security in the global era. Keywords: Japan-US Security Treaty, European Union, ASEAN, East -Asian Community

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II. Construction of bilateral relations  The Japan-USA Security Treaty of 1951

(1) General Douglas MacArthur's Dream as Supreme Commander of SCAP

When Japan was under the control of the occupation authorities, the main objectives of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), were to promote Japan's democratization and demilitarization. The SCAP government was created by the Allied Forces, but it was in fact led by US forces. Anew Japanese Constitution was drafted by the staff of the occupation authorities, and was submitted to the Japanese Diet. The new Japanese Constitution came into effect in May, 1947.

The occupation authorities did not fail to insert Article 9 in the new constitution to prevent Japan from causing war again. Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution reads as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 1

General MacArthur intended to deny Japan's right to self-defense at the first stage of drafting the new constitution. In other words, the new c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s d r a w n u p w i t h o u t s e r i o u s consideration for Japan's autonomy as a nation-state. Article 9 of the new constitution was supported by the vast majority of the Japanese people even though it had not been drafted by them, and it had been regarded as being imposed upon Japan by an occupier. During the post-war period in Japan, denying military forces was quite a natural sentiment since Japan had lost almost three million lives, and its major cities were devastated in the war. Therefore, pacifism appealed to the Japanese people in the post-war period. 2

However, some conservative groups, who persisted in holding on to their pre-war values,

were embarrassed by the United States' policy of demilitarization and democratization and opposed these policies. In order to counter the conservative groups' discontent and carry out the demilitarization and the democratization smoothly, therefore, General MacArthur ensured the continuance of the imperial system in Japan. Ensuring the imperial system worked well because there was an eminent possibility of another Communist revolution. This would not only threaten the existence of the imperial system, but also the conservative groups' primary rights. General MacArthur's policies were also influenced by the Soviet Union. This policy rose from realistic conditions of national security. The occupation authorities' aim was to transform Japan into a democratic agrarian nation that would never again pose a threat to world peace. 3

According to Japanese economic commentator Taichi Sakaiya, “The reform implemented under the aegis of the Occupation Authorities--dissolution of the imperial army and navy and of the zaibatsu, educational reform, agrarian reform that put farmland into the hands of those who tilled it, property tax reform, encouragement of the labor movement, enactment of a pacifist constitution--went far beyond anything the Japanese had anticipated.”4 But

Japanese government smoothly accomplished such reforms under the occupation authority.

(2) The US decision to make Japan her ally

Changes in international politics led the United States to reexamine its policy toward Japan. From 1947 through 1948, the United States began to consider Japan a potential ally. The US was worried about Soviet expansion in Asia. Thus, the United States government realized Japan's strategic importance. George F. Kennan, director of the State Department's policy planning, recognized that if Japan were totally disarmed and demilitarized, in its vulnerability it would fall under the influence of the Soviet Union.5

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 as well as the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 further accelerated the US review of its policy toward Japan. In 1950, John Foster Dulles, an adviser to the U.S. Secretary of State, visited Japan and urged Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru

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(1946-47, 1948-54) to embark on a program of rapid remilitarization. The United States aimed to build up Japan as the Western camp's bulwark in the Far East.6

At that time there were still some very conservative politicians who wished for Japan to remilitarize. In 1948 former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida was one of them. He argued that Japan should remilitarize with 183,000 soldiers supported by $200,000,000 from the United State by means of the Vanderburgh Resolution of 1948.7 He proposed15

divisions of troops which was almost the same number of Japanese imperial forces before the Pacific War. However, Prime Minister Yoshida argued that Japan's economic weakness and new constitution precluded large scale rearmament.8 Nevertheless, he

believed that Japan would be making a serious error if it opted for nonalignment or friendship with the Soviet Union.9

In July 1950, General MacArthur proposed the establishment of a National Police Reserve Force consisting of 75,000 men. Prime Minister Yoshida carefully considered General MacArthur's proposal because he believed that US naval and air power had already the capacity to protect Japan from a Communist invasion. General MacArthur demanded the transfer from Japan of US troops to Korea to deal with the emergent Communist invasion. Thus, Prime Minister Yoshida reluctantly decided to create a minimum defense force called the “National Police Reserve,” which later became Japan's Self-Defense Force. Prime Minister Yoshida's political stance has been called the “Yoshida Doctrine,” focusing on the economy, keeping the military to a minimum, and cooperating with the United States. This doctrine continued to serve for many years as the foundation of Japanese policy.10 The Yoshida Doctrine has been

inherited by successive prime ministers.

The Japanese government began to worry about its defenses during the Korean War. How to protect a demilitarized Japan had become an urgent concern. Thus, Japan wished to negotiate a peace treaty with the United States as soon as possible. The US also had reasons to negotiate a peace treaty. One reason was that the occupation authorities felt a need to continue to implement occupation policies. Another reason was that the United States had to

keep its military forces in Japan in order to contain Communist expansion.

President Harry S. Truman appointed John Foster Dulles, who strongly opposed Communism, as the special advisor to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April, 1950. Dulles began to make a draft of a peace treaty with Japan, intending to have such a treaty with Japan as soon as possible. The US had to secure Japan as its partner in order to win the Korean War, and contain China and the Soviet Union. When Dulles visited Japan for the first time, his primary purpose was to get Japan to accept a proposal in which the United Sates could ensure the right to use their forces at their own convenience, without any interference from the Japanese government.

Dulles, however, regarded the proposal as very difficult on the ground that it might violate Japan's sovereignty.11 Opposition was expected from Japan

in regards to the United Sates' proposal. Dulles was afraid that the US might be compelled to compromise with Japan because Japan's strategic position had gained in importance due to the Korean War. In other words, Japan could have refused the US proposal.

However, contrary to the fears of Dulles, the Japanese government willingly let the US station its military in Japan. As a result, Dulles could take a firm stand for Japan. The United States succeeded in showing that their forces were stationed on Japanese territory because Japan expected it.12 Thus, the

governments of the United States and Japan reached an administrative agreement in which United States military forces were allowed to be stationed in Japan continuously after conclusion of a peace treaty. (3) US-Japan negotiations for the security treaty

In the process of negotiation between the United States and Japanese governments regarding a security treaty, two main problems remained. The first problem was the existing gap between Japan and the United States concerning security policies. While the Japanese government demanded a guarantee of protection in case of an emergency, the US denied the obligation to protect Japan on the grounds that Japan's contribution of land was not enough to fulfill US needs. In other words, the

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United Sates disavowed a permanent stationing of its forces in Japan after conclusion of a peace treaty. Therefore, in the process of negotiation regarding the security treaty, the Japanese government could not withdraw any warrant of obligation from the US to protect Japan in case of an emergency.13

The second problem was that the United States included a principle stipulation about the Far East into the security treaty. In February 1951, the first draft of the agreement stated that US forces would be used only to contribute to the security of Japan. Nonetheless, the United Sates government suddenly came up with the principle of maintaining peace and security for the Far East region as such. The region was assumed by both Japan and the United States to cover the northern tip of the Philippines, Taiwan, and China, all the way to the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the administrative agreement became an exceptional treaty in comparison to the standard security treaty between the two nations. The standard security treaty between the two nations usually applied to the territories of the two nations only. 14

However, included in the stipulation with respect to the Far East, the United States was granted the ability to station its military force both in Japan and the region of the Far East. The United States asserted that Japan should accept the aforementioned demand on the ground that Japan's contribution was not equal to the United States' contribution. Thus, with the stipulation regarding the Far East, the United States justified Japan's having to share the bilateral burden of the security treaty.15 Behind

the United States' strong demand concerning the remilitarization of Japan lay the logic that Japan would not be able to become an equal partner with the United States unless Japan became a stronger nation militarily.

(4) The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty of 1951

The United Sates sent letters of invitation for a peace conference to fifty nations on July 20, 1951. However, some nations opposed such a conference. For example, Taiwan refused to participate. The Taiwanese demanded the return of Ryukyus to China because they believed that the Ryukyus once belonged to China. Burma announced that they would also

not sign the treaty. They believed that reparation negotiations between Japan and other Asian nations, who had suffered from Japanese aggression and occupation, were not yet completed. India opposed the withholding of American military forces in Japan. Thus, they eventually refused to participate in the peace conference all together.16

The San Francisco Peace Conference was held September 4-8, 1951, in San Francisco. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by forty-eight nations on September 8, 1951. The peace treaty gave Japan its independence but made Okinawa a U.S. territory. On the same day, Japan and the United States signed a security treaty as well. It went into effect on April 28, 1952. Before the security treaty even went into effect, however, Dulles ruled it a temporary agreement.

The security treaty suggested that the United Sates still did not regard Japan an equal partner. In other words, the United Sates expected Japan to become a stronger military power in order to contribute to US security. Therefore, according to Irwin Isenberg, the Security Treaty of 1951 was little more than a base-leasing agreement.17 Isenberg

further explained that the Security Treaty of 1951 did not meet both governments' minimal requirements, and that neither the United States nor Japan was satisfied. Although US bases in Japan provided a de facto guarantee of Japan's defense, some Japanese were unhappy with the Security Treaty of 1951 because it did not include an explicit guarantee and was not also mutual. The United States government felt that the Japanese people did not appreciate the gravity of the Soviet threat, and that they were not showing enough energy in providing for their own defense. 18

(5) The Security Treaty of 1951: merits to USA and demerits to Japan

Two main problems existed in the Security Treaty of 1951 concerning US violation of Japan's sovereignty. The first problem was that, under the Security Treaty of 1951, the Japanese government had not been allowed to know anything about the United States military's strategy even on Japanese land. What was worse, the Japanese government did not have any right to show whether or not they

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agreed with the US military decisions on their land. This system of secrecy supported by the Security Treaty of 1951 violated Japan's sovereignty. The Socialist Party of Japan pointed out US secrecy and criticized Japan-US defense policies.

The second problem was in Article 1 of the security treaty. Article 1 stipulated that US forces were to be permitted on Japanese territory to suppress large-scale civil war or internal disturbances in Japan. The mention of large-scale civil war or internal disturbances in Japan was a sign of the uncertainty which surrounded post-war Japan, as well as an indication of help to safeguard Japan's security from any outside armed attack. This meant that Japan had to rely on United States forces to suppress any domestic civil war or internal disturbances in Japan. Japanese people criticized the stipulation of Article 1 strongly on the ground that it violated the sovereignty of Japan as a nation state. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan was granted status as a sovereign state. However, the primary concern of the United States during that time was how to keep the rights that it already enjoyed under the United States Occupation Authorities. Instead of granting Japan's independence, US military forces were granted permission to be stationed in Japan by the Security Treaty of 1951, and this permission was now written into law.

The administration agreement protected the national interest of the United States because it guaranteed the United Sates the right to use Japanese land, air and naval facilities in Japan. In this sense, the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty of 1951 guaranteed a great benefit for the United States.

Dwight David Eisenhower became President of the United States on January 20, 1953. President E i s e n h o w e r c o n t i n u e d t o f o l l o w T r u m a n ' s containment doctrine. Eisenhower saw in the Korean War the most painful display of Communist aggression throughout the world. In this sense, a certain consistency could be seen running through the foreign policies of presidents Truman and Eisenhower. On the other hand, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, who took office in December 1954, had a completely different viewpoint from his

predecessor Yoshida, whose administration was born under the United States Occupation Authorities and had a negative attitude against remilitarization. However, Hatoyama's administration willingly tried to allow Japan to have its own military forces by changing the Japanese Constitution, and then to carry out their own foreign diplomacy. In other words, Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to have an equal partnership in diplomacy with the United States.

III. Constructing an equal treaty: The Security Treaty of 1960

(1) Gaps in expectations between Japan and the United States

On August 29th and 30th, 1955, a conference

was held in the United States between Mamoru Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the Eisenhower Administration. This conference was the first official conference between the US and Japan since the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Shigemitsu was dispatched by Prime Minister Hatoyama.

During the conference, Mamoru Shigemitsu suggested a change regarding the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951. During that time, anti-U.S. feelings, mainly supported by leftist groups, flourished in Japan. Shigemitsu attributed these anti-U.S. feelings to the lop-sided Security Treaty of 1951. The Japanese wanted to revise three points in the treaty. First, the Japanese government wanted to change its weapons strategy on Japanese territory. In addition, the Japanese government intended to relate the security treaty to the Charter of the United Nations and put an expiration date into the treaty.

Furthermore, the Japanese government pointed out that the Security Treaty of 1951 had been criticized by the Japanese people because it had only emphasized the militaristic aspect of the treaty as well as had denied Japan's sovereignty as a nation state. In order to soften the militaristic aspects and emphasize other aspects of the security treaty, the Japanese government insisted on putting economic cooperation into articles of the treaty.

In response to the proposal from the Japanese side, Dulles criticized the government's inadequate

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policy toward Communist activities in Japan. Moreover, Dulles complained that the Japanese government's defense efforts were insufficient. In short, the United States government argued that Japan was not in a position to demand anything, not to mention equal partnership associated with the Security Treaty of 1951. The United States government took the stance that ratifying a new security treaty depended on the Japanese government's effort to increase its military power. As a prerequisite to revising the security treaty, the United States government expected Japan to change the Japanese Constitution regarding Article 9, in which Japan renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as a means of settling international disputes.19 The Japanese

government interpreted the article as allowing national possession of only those weapons that were minimally necessary for self-defense. Because of the strict interpretation, Japan could not deploy any armed forces outside its borders.

By changing the Japanese Constitution and promoting remilitarization, the United States government expected Japan to have a stable political environment. In other words, the United States government expected Japan to strengthen its conservative political forces which would support the US strategy of anti-Communism in the near future. 20

(2) Japanese preparations for revising the Security Treaty of 1951

In order to appease the US dissatisfaction, Japanese policy makers undertook three measures. Japanese conservative political forces recognized the importance of uniting their conservative political forces in order to have an equal partnership with the United States. Thus, conservative political forces came together in 1955to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Reflecting the establishment of the LDP, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who took office in February, 1957, eventually ratified the new security treaty in 1960.

For the purpose of revising the Security Treaty of 1951, Prime Minister Kishi set to work on promoting the remilitarization of Japan. He made a long-term military plan in which the government would increase sea, air and land military forces from

1958 to 1960. This was very significant because, for the first time, the plan was approved by the Japanese Congress.21 Prime Minister Kishi also visited

Southeast Asian nations, and argued that Japan should foster good relationships with them. He also felt it was necessary for Japan to take the initiative in supporting peace and prosperity in Asia. If he could succeed in establishing Japan's status in Asia as a leader, it would conduce to reinforcing Japan's goal of achieving an equal partnership with the United States. In fact, this visit by Prime Minister Kishi to the Southeast Asian nations was welcomed by the United States government because the US expected Japan to take a leadership role among Asian nations.22

(3) The Pre-conference between Kishi and MacArthur, and agreement regarding the Security Treaty of 1951

A pre-conference between Prime Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower was held several times from April 13, 1957 until the middle of June 1957 to revise the Security Treaty of 1951. The pre-conference m e e t i n g s w e r e s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e o f K i s h ' s enthusiasm to revise the Security Treaty of 1951. Eisenhower was influenced by Dulles and members of the US National Security Council as well. 23

The United States government reached a point where they also wanted to revise the security treaty. Eisenhower thought Japan's political climate was in a crisis. He could not ignore the Japanese people's resentment of the Security Treaty of 1951, which they regarded as unfair. It was possible that the Japanese people's strong resentment of the Security Treaty of 1951 might promote Communist activities in Japan. Eisenhower feared that Japan would turn away from the United States and would become a neutral nation unless the United States government reviewed the policy toward Japan and revised the Security Treaty of 1951. If Japan became neutral, its neutrality would damage the national interest of the United States. Thus, Eisenhower's appeals and suggestions eventually led the US government to review the Security Treaty of 1951. 24

The United States-Japan Summit Conference was held in the United States on June 19, 1957. At the beginning of the Summit Conference, Prime Minister

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Kishi suggested President Eisenhower revise the Security Treaty of 1951. Prime Minister Kishi raised two reasons for his suggestion. First of all, Japan's self-defense forces had been increasing in military power since the beginning of their establishment. Secondly, Japan had become a member of the United Nations. 25

(4) The outcome of the new Security Treaty of 1960 Prime Minister Kishi convinced the United States government to accept the establishment of a prior consultation system. This proposal was addressed in a joint announcement as follows:

Both the Japanese and the U.S. governments affirmed that they have reached an agreement to have the prior consultation system in order to discuss any important change in armaments, or deployment and dispatch of troops direct from Japan for over-seas-battle operations. 26

Prime Minister Kishi's proposal to relate the Security Treaty of 1951 to the Charter of the United Nations was approved by Dulles, who thought that a combination of the two was advantageous if the United Nations reported any actions taken to maintain international peace and security under the security treaty. Thus, Kishi's proposal was addressed in the joint statement: The United States and Japan will meet regarding the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee. The meeting will revolve around voting to keep the prior consultation system. 27

Three months after the summit, the meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee acknowledged that the security treaty between the United States and Japan should yield to the Charter of the United Nations. In other words, it affirmed that any action taken under the security treaty should not be carried out beyond the Charter of the United Nations. This is the understanding Japan and the United States had with regard to the Charter of the United Nations.

(5) The weak points of the new Security Treaty of 1960

Although both the Japanese and the US government confirmed that they had reached an

agreement to keep the prior consultation system for discussing any important changes in armaments, or deployment and dispatch of troops direct from Japan to US over-seas-battle operations, this agreement contained an obvious defect because only the United States could decide whether or not the prior consultations should be held. In other words, Japan would not automatically be in a position to know about important changes in armaments such as visiting nuclear aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines to Japanese ports, or deployment and the dispatch of troops. Japan was meant always to consent to US military decisions. This reveals the new security treaty's limits. The prior consultation system did not end up functioning very well even though the United States government agreed not to use its bases in Japan for combat operations outside Japan, or to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan without the prior consent of the Japanese government.

Another problem of the new Security Treaty of 1960 was Article 3 concerning the Vanderburgh Resolution of 1948, which ruled out aid to any country not capable of helping itself and of giving mutual aid. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution allows Japan to use its defense forces only when under direct attack by other countries. However, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits sending its military forces to any other country. Therefore, even if the territories of the United States were attacked or invaded by other nations, Japan could not send its military forces to aid the United States. Hence, Article 3 of the new Security Treaty contradicted Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Security Treaty of 1960 contained a problem. Since Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits sending troops overseas, Japan still had an obligation to provide bases to US forces and, at the same time, recognize use by US forces of these bases in any action necessary for the security of the Far East.28 Thus

the Security Treaty of 1960 contained no provision for Japan to come to the aid of the United States in the event of an attack upon the United States. Yukio Okamoto, Former Director of the First Northern American Affairs Bureau in Japan, pointed out concerning Article 5 of the Security Treaty of

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1960: “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.” 29 According

to Yukio Okamoto, the United States is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East under Article 6 of the Security Treaty of 1960. Okamoto stated:

For all its reservations about using force, Japan is in no position to quibble when it comes to Article5's attack against Japanese t e r r i t o r y . S h o u l d J a p a n f i n d i t s e l f s o threatened, there is no doubt that the security arrangements would swing into action, no matter what obstacles might have to be overcome. What is problematic is how Japan might react if a conflict broke out in the Far East regions and Japan itself were not directly endangered. 30

Additionally, Article 5 of the new Security Treaty of 1960 was still ambiguous because in that it did not specify who would command the US-Japan military forces as well as how both the United States and Japanese military forces should be used to meet a common danger.

Contrary to the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, which did not state any obligation of the United States to defend Japan, the Japanese government succeeded in correcting the defects of the Security Treaty of 1951 and set up the new Security Treaty of 1960, which does state the obligation of the United States to defend Japan. In addition, Japan was exempted from the obligation of protecting the United States. The United States compromised with Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, which prohibits sending its military forces to any other nation, on the ground that as long as the United States could make Japan its partner and station its military forces on Japanese lands consistently, Japan did not have to dispatch its own military forces to the United States.

Moreover, since an expiration date was not addressed in the Security Treaty of 1951, the

Japanese people were thinking that they would be controlled by the United States indefinitely.31

Therefore, putting an expiration date into Article 10 of the new Security Treaty of 1960 was significant for Japan. Moreover, Article 1 in the Security Treaty of 1951, which allowed the United States to suppress domestic civil war or internal disturbances in Japan, was removed from the new Security Treaty of 1960 because it violated the sovereignty of Japan as a nation state.

(6) Benefits accruing to the US from the new Security Treaty of 1960

The administrative agreement of 1951 between the United States and Japan protected the national interest of the United States because it guaranteed the right of the United States to use the facilities of Japan's land, air and naval forces. Therefore, it was no wonder that the United States insisted on keeping the administrative agreement indefinitely and incorporates it into Article 4 of the new Security Treaty of 1960. The United States was also able to incorporate the stipulation regarding the Far East, which was addressed in the Security Treaty of 1951, into the new security treaty. Article 6 of the new Security Treaty of 1960 stipulates that the United States is granted the use of the facilities of Japan's land, air and naval forces, and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.32 With this stipulation the

US could not only secure its military forces but also smoothly carry out its military strategy in the Far East. Therefore both the United States and Japan government offered lands in Okinawa and facilities for US forces. This is the basic reason why the USA wished to keep the function of the Futenma Airbase in Okinawa.

Furthermore, that an expiration date was included in Article 10 of the new Security Treaty of 1960 was notable for the United States. Article 10 stipulates that “after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.”33 It guaranteed the

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for at least eleven years. This guarantee would be a great benefit for the United States to keep peace and stability in the Far East regions.

(7) The movement against the new security treaty in Japan

On January 19, 1960 the new security treaty was ratified in Washington, DC. At the same time, both governments reached an agreement that President Eisenhower would visit Japan in June of that year. Prime Minister Kishi brought the agreed upon new Security Treaty back to Japan, and submitted it to be approved by the Japanese Congress. However, by around 1960, there was a fierce conflict of opinion between the LDP, which took a capitalist, pro-American stance, and the leftist camp, the Socialist and Communists in particular, which advocated Marxist socialism and called for closer ties with the Soviet Union and China. 34

Thus, cooperating with each other, Shakaito (the Socialist Party) and MinshuShakaito (the Liberal Socialist Party) opposed the US-Japan agreement over the new security treaty. In the House of Representatives, May 26, 1960, Prime Minister Kishi took a vote to approve the new security treaty supported by the LDP. Prime Minister Kishi's decision caused the biggest counter-movement by socialist Japan.35 On June 10, 1960 the press secretary

for Eisenhower was preparing for the president's visit to Japan. However, he was disturbed by opposing groups gathered at Haneda International Airport. This incident greatly shocked Prime Minister Kishi. Since the incident, the US government changed its policies regarding the Kishi administration. In other words, the government of the United States began to have doubts about Prime Minister Kishi's political power. 36

On June 15, 1960 almost four thousand members of the Zen Gakuren (The National Federation of Japanese University Students) surrounded the Diet and crushed the police force. In the melee a student, Michiko Kanba, was killed. Japan Echo explained, “In those days, memories of bitter wartime experiences were still fresh, and strong feelings of antipathy toward Japan's renewed involvement in anything military, especially war itself, swelled the ranks of those favoring peace with all countries and opposing

the mutual security setup.” 37

These incidents led Prime Minster Kishi to reconsider inviting President Eisenhower to talks. “Amid this highly dramatic turn of events, the Kishi cabinet resigned.”38 Four days after these incidents,

the new “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America” was automatically enacted on June 19, 1960. 39

IV. Permanent allies

(1) The renewal of the new Security Treaty of 1960

In the mid-1960s, a discussion again began to flourish regarding the future security treaty arrangements because the term of the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America” would expire in the beginning of the 1970s. Eisaku Sato, who became Prime Minister in July 1964, deciding that Japan's defense structure could be based on a long-term arrangement, took the appropriate steps for this to happen. 40

In 1966, the Liberal Democratic Party's Security Research Committee released an interim report. They strongly urged renewal of the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America” for another ten years along with the support of the majority of the Japanese party. In addition, the Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Relations Research Committee also took this position. Also some committee members proposed an automatic extension. However, none of the committee members objected to the continuation of the treaty after the term of the treaty expired. 41

Gradually, the Liberal Democratic Party's opinions began to change in favor of an automatic extension. One reason for this change was the United States government insistence that it would be difficult to obtain Senate ratification of renewal of the mutual security setup of 1960 for another ten-year term. The United States Senate considered the Security Treaty of 1960 as an unequal treaty and cited the Vanderburgh Resolution of 1948, which ruled out aid to any country not capable of helping itself and of giving mutual aid. If Japan were to advocate renewal of the mutual security

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arrangements of 1960 for another ten-year term, the extension would be criticized by the US Senate. 42

Another reason for the Liberal Democratic Party's change in favor of an automatic extension was the desire to repeat the turmoil of the past. The Japanese government as well as the Liberal Democratic Party assumed that the automatic extension would not require Diet approval. It would be very convenient to avoid such strong reaction as experienced in 1960. Thus, in a joint meeting, the Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Research Committee, the Security Research Committee and the Special Committee on Okinawa Problems agreed on a policy of an automatic extension on October 6, 1969. This policy was finally approved by the United States and Japanese leaders at an executive meeting on October 14, 1969. 43

Behind the policy lay the government's belief that tension still continued in the Far East regions. Furthermore, the Japanese government considered that the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations was still inadequate in order to secure Japan's peace and prosperity. Thus, it was decided that the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty between Japan and the United States” should be continued after its expiration in 1970.

Finally, in the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of November 22, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato affirmed that the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America” was necessary to maintain peace, prosperity, and security in the Far East regions. Thus, the automatic extension was agreed upon by both parties. From this point Japan and the USA could keep their friendship indefinitely.

(2) Bilateral relations: Achievements and lingering problems

The new Security Treaty of 1960 was of greater benefit to Japan in comparison to the old treaty of 1951 because Japan was able to obtain a guarantee of the United States defending Japan in case of armed attack. The new Security Treaty of 1960 was also beneficial to the United States because the administrative agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty of 1951, which was most

advantageous for US military strategy in the Far East, was guaranteed indefinitely by the new Security Treaty of 1960.

However, the Security Treaty of 1960 left many problems. There was still the contradiction between Article 9 of Japan's Constitution and the new Security Treaty of 1960 itself. This contradiction has been resolved by the Japanese government until now. The new Security Treaty of 1960 stipulates that the United States has to defend Japan in case of armed attack. This issue is directly connected to the Japanese government's interpretation of Japan's Constitution relating to Japan's self-defense. The Japanese government has long been insisting that Japan has the right of collective self-defense, authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and acknowledged in Article 5 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. The Japanese government simultaneously, however, has been taking the stance that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is prohibited by Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. Because of this interpretation, Japan was exempted from the obligation to protect the United States in the new Security Treaty of 1960. The United States willingly agreed to this compromise on the grounds that the United States could make Japan its partner and station its military forces on Japanese lands indefinitely by the administrative agreement, the Japan-US defense treaty, and the pre-consultative agencies. This was done in accordance with the Cold War paradigm whereby Japan had to face no crisis from the outside world due to the stationing of US forces. However, Japanese government always demanded to keep the military bases largely in Okinawa. The US government also agreed to large US military bases in Okinawa. Both the Japanese government and US government understand that Japan-US defense policy has many problems today and know very much about the contradiction posed by the treaty. Both governments understand that the people of Okinawa have carried many burdens for security not only for both Japan and United States, but also for the sake of Asian stability. Because the current the US-Japan security treaty has automatically been extended since 1970, not much attention from the government side has been given to rethinking the Japan-US security

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pact. However, the Futenma base issue has more recently brought the Japan-US Security Treaty once again into focus.

V. New security policies in the global era

(1) Prime Minister Abe's challenge and dilemma The cold war ended in 1991.Prime Minister Abe has recently said, “We should be proud of the path we have followed as a peaceful nation over the 68 years since the end of the World War Ⅱ” 44

The Japanese government made a peace treaty, and the United States also made a peace treaty with China in 1978.The People's Republic of China was no longer an enemy to Japan and the USA in the post-cold war era. With these treaties the value of the US military bases against China, the former Soviet Union and other communist nations has seemed to decrease.

However, the White Paper Book, an official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, points out regions of Asia as being instable today. Since the Japanese government bought the Senkaku Islands and attached them to Japan's national territory, disputes between China and Japan have arisen. And the US government has also realized that Asian regions are still endangered due to Korean Peninsula issues and other territorial issues in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government started to think about protecting the southern islands within Okinawa Prefecture. Prime Minister Abe has clearly stated the importance of the presence of the US forces in Japan and also the importance of the Japan-US defense treaty. He said, “Placing the Japan-US alliance the corner stone, we will enhance our partnership with which we share the values of freedom: Democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law.” Thus, Abe has clearly stated deterrence will continue in terms of the Japan-US agreement. Moreover, he decided to station Japanese Defense Forces on Yonaguni Island which is Japan's southernmost island. Despite this, the Chinese government has repeatedly claimed the Senkaku Islands are Chinese territory.

The Blue Papers, an official document of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, says, “Japan-US defense policies are still important. In particular US Marine bases in Okinawa are very important.

We need Okinawa for the military bases because of its great geographical advantage near the Asian Continent, the Southeast region and the Korean Peninsula.” 46

Prime Minister Abe also stated he would take strong actions to defend Japanese territory in his speech at the 185th Diet. He meant to create a Council

on National Security and strengthen the “control tower” function of the prime minister's office and agencies under the leadership of the prime minister for quick decision-making and movement in crises. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated three directions for Japanese foreign policy: Keeping the US-Japan alliance,good relations with neighboring Asian nations, and economic diplomacy to recover Japan's economy. 47

(2) The challenge of Okinawa

On November 10, 2013, the Okinawa Law and Political Science Academic conference discussed the concept of security in the Cold War era. The conference concluded to keep the old concept of security which relied on military power or bilateral alliances, such as Japan-US cooperation, which were really useful during the cold war period. Academe's researchers and thinkers stopped to examine the merits and demerits of such bilateral alliances to test whether the Japan-US Alliance would still be useful in the post-war period. 48

On November 11, 2013 The Okinawa Times published an editorial article under the title “Ask yourself whether you can freely stop thinking of keeping US Marine bases in Okinawan islands forever.” The editorial opined that the role of the US Marine ended after the Vietnam War, and that today US Marines are only useful in rescue operations and cooperating with recovery in disaster-stricken areas. The editorial concluded that, although their presence was an essential symbol of a defensive war strategy in the Cold War era, Marine bases in Okinawa were no longer important. 49

Tomohiro Yara, once journalist for The Okinawa Times, also stated in his book that the Marines need not necessarily be located in Okinawa because it is both convenient and fast in a crisis to reach the Korean Peninsula from mainland Japan, Hawaii or Guam either by sea or air. 50

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Yukio Hatoyama, a former prime minister who did not succeed in having the Futenma Marine Bases moved from Ginowan City in Okinawa to outside of Okinawa Prefecture during his term in office, is now willing to reexamine Japan's defense policy. His idea was inspired by the EU in Europe. He said the EU succeeded in organizing many nations into one community. It should be therefore possible to cooperate and construct peace in Asia. He proposed creating an East Asian Community. For that purpose, he set up the East Asian Community Institute. He did not reveal any ideas for making a security organization, but rather he hopes to accomplish peace through exchange activities under the East Asian Community. He found its model in the EEC of 1967. Today 26 nations have joined the EU, which has been equated to an organization for defense. It has a common security and defense policy (CSDP) which is composed of two parts: One is a common force or heavy crises, and the second consists of daily activities for natural disasters and decreasing tension among nations. Among the 26 Nations, 19 still belonged to NATO. Therefore, most EU members must fulfill their responsibilities to NATO, and all members must execute their EU role. EU also has approved Article 51 of the Unite Nation Charter which refers to collective security. Hence, the EU can activate and send its forces into a crisis situation. However, only with the consent of member nations can EU forces be created. The EU is a typical example of a multipolar alliance. 51

ASEAN was created in 1967 by five countries. Today the organization has 10 member nations. The impetus to forming ASEAN was the worry over communist expansion to Southeast Asia in 1961. It was led by the USA, Thailand, Malaysia and The Philippines which were its original members. However today it has developed into a purely neutral organization which includes all types of nations in Southeast Asia. ASEAN plans by 2015 to evolve into three organizations: the ASEAN Security Community, the Asian Economic Community, and the Asian Social and Cultural Community. ASEAN is also based on a multipolar alliance. ASEAN's success in 2015 may prove to be a great model for East Asian nations. 52

VI. Conclusion: Summary and proposal

Now is the time to create new security ideas for the post-war era. This paper has reviewed the history of Japan-US security treaties from 1951 to 1970. Since 1970 there have not been many deep discussions of the Japan-US security alliance until today. Since 1970, every ten years, the Japan-US security arrangement has been automatically agreed to. The Japanese and Americans have relied simply on the US-Japan Defense Treaty and the peace constitution for the last 68 years. However, moving the Futenma Marine Air Base became an issue giving a strong impetus to reconsider the Japan-US bilateral alliance. The Japanese government and US government and their citizens have concerned themselves about Okinawans' heavy burden of keeping, for so long a time, peace and security for Japan, USA and Asian regions.

Policy-makers, academic professionals and citizens have begun to examine Japan-US security policy in the cold war period. They propose to make a rescue center using US military hospitals in Okinawa and to create a North-West Center in Okinawa like the East-West Center in Hawaii. The Human Security Program at Osaka University with other universities is one of the soft power approaches for the peace. This program aims to exchange students and scholars among universities in Southeast Asia. Through this project, students and researchers are expected to understand the reality in Asia and cooperate with each other to make a peaceful situation in Asia.

The Philippines and Singapore have vacated US military bases and allow, only in crisis situations, the United States to use their territory for military facilities in terms of a visiting forces agreement. Costa Rica has provided land to the UN Peace University and has renounced setting up military bases in her territory.

The Japanese government still believes Okinawa is the best place for US forces because of its geographical proximity to the Asian Continent, East Asia and Southeast Asian region. The Japanese government defense policy was constructed under the balance of power theory which was the standard idea in the Cold War period. Now we question the old

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concept by which the military power was essential to keeping the peace. The issue of the removal of the Marine Air Base at Futenma has brought a new chance to reexamine the Japan-US Defense Treaty. To apply a multipolar system like EU and ASEAN, and to take soft power approaches are new ideas to replace the bipolar alliance which Japan has engaged in since the end of the War in the Pacific.

Footnotes

1 Leslie Wolf Phillips, Constitution of Modern States, (New York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1968), pp. 106-113.

2 Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Winter, 1990), pp. 3-4.

3 Taichi Sakaiya, “The 1993 watershed and the agenda for reform”, Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Special Issue, 1997), p. 72.

4 Ibid. (Zaibatsu means the huge financial and industrial combines which provided the economic base for Japan's military power).

5 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p.367.

6 TaichiSakaiya, “The 1993 watershed and the agenda for reform,”Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Special Issue 1997), p. 75.

7 Masakazu Yamazaki & Kazuki Kasuya, Taking Stock of the Postwar Era,”Japan Echo,(Japan Echo Inc., Winter, 1994), p.68.

8 Irwin Isenberg, Japan Asian Power, (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1971), p. 167. 9 Japan Echo,(Japan Echo Inc., Special Issue,

1995), p. 6.

10 Japan Echo,(Japan Echo Inc., Winter, 1990), p. 4.

11 NarahikoToyoshita, Anpojoyaku no Seiritsu: Yoshida Gaiko to Tennou gaikou, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, December, 1996), p. 48. 12 Ibid.

13 Masashi Nishihara &TsujioTsuchiyama, Nichibeidomei Q & A 100, (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, February, 1998), p.58.

14 Ibid, p. 110.

15 Yoshihisa Hara, Nichibeikankei no Kouzu, (Tokyo: Nihon ShuppanKyoukai, 1991), p.20. 16 Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan relations

1945-1972, (Philippines: Hiyapass Press Inc., 1989), p. 53.

17 Irwin Isenberg, Japan: Asian Power, (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1971), p. 167.

18 Ibid.

19 Seth Cropsey, “Uncle Samurai: America's Military Alliance with Japan”, Policy Review, (Fall 1991), p. 24.

20 Yoshihisa Hara, Nichibeikankei no Kouzu, (Tokyo: Nihon ShuppanKyoukai, 1991), p. 44. 21 Ibid, p. 62. 22 Ibid, p. 64. 23 Ibid, p. 67. 24 Ibid, p. 70. 25 Ibid, p. 74. 26 Ibid, p. 77. 27 Ibid, p. 77.

28 Japan in Current World Affairs, (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, Japan Times, Ltd., 1971), p. 177.

29 See the following website: http://www.mofa. go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan):

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Article V

30 Yukio Okamoto, “Why We Still Need the Security Treaty”, Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Winter, 1995), p. 13.

31 Masashi Nishihara & Tsujio Tsuchiyama, Nichibeidomei Q & A 100, (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, February, 1998), p. 183.

32 Shinichi Kitaoka, “The Case for a Stronger Security Treaty”, Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Summer, 1996), p. 73.

33 Ibid, p. 73.

34 Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc., Winter, 1990), p. 4. 35 Yoshihisa Hara, Nichibeikankei no kouzu,

(Tokyo: Nihon Housou Shuppan Kyoukai, March, 1991), p. 186.

36 Ibid,p.186.

37 Japan Echo, “Japan's View of the World”, (Japan Echo Inc., Special Issue, 1995), p.5. 38 Masakazu Yamazaki & Kazuki Kasuya, “Taking

Stock of the Postwar Era”, Japan Echo, (Winter, 1994), p. 66.

39 Yoshihisa Hara, Nichibeikankei no Kouzu, (Tokyo: Nihon Housou Shuppan Kyoukai,

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40 Kajima Institute of International Peace ed., Japan in Current World Affairs, (Tokyo: Edited, Japan Times, Ltd., 1971), p. 6. 41 Ibid, p. 8-9. 42 Ibid, p. 8-9. 43 Ibid, p. 8-9. 44 http://kantei.go.jp/foreign/96 abe/statement/ 45 Ibid. 46 http//www:mofa.go.jp/gaiko/bluebook/2013 47 http://www.eac,or.jp/#forum 48 Okinawa Times, 2013. 11-11 49 Okinawa Times. 2013, 11-12

50 Tomohiro Yara, Sajono Domei-Beigun Saihenga Akasu Uso(Okinawa: Okinawa Times, 2009) p. 239. 51 http://eumag.jp-EUの共通安全保障,防衛政策 52 http://www.mofago.jp-ASEAN 地 域 フ ォ ー ラ ム (ARF)外務省,第3回ASEAN地域フォーラム(A RF)平和維持専門会議の概要 References

Cropsey, S.(1991).Uncle Samurai: America's Military Alliance with Japan. Policy Review,(Fall). 外交青書2012(平成24年版)第55号-外務省

Hara, Y. (1991). Nichibeikankei no Kouzu. Tokyo: Nihon Housou Shuppan Kyoukai.

Isenberg, I. (1971).Japan: Asian Power. New York: H. W. Wilson.

Japan Echo, (Winter, 1990). Japan Echo, (Special Issue, 1995).

Japan in Current World Affairs. (1971). Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, Japan Times.

Kennan, G. F.(1967).Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston: Little Brown.

Kitaoka, S.(1996).“The Case for a Stronger Security Treaty”. (Japan Echo, Summer). 国際条約集(1998), 山本草二編,有斐閣.

Nakachi, K.(1989).Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations 1945-1972. Philippines: Hiyass Press.

Nishihara, M. & Tsuchiyama, T. (1998).Nichibeidomei Q & A 100. Tokyo: Aki Shobo.

Okamoto, Y. (1995).“Why We Still Need the Security Treaty”. (Japan Echo, Winter). Phillips, L. W.(1968).Constitution of Modern States.

New York: Frederick A. Praegar.

Sakaiya, T.(1997).“The 1993 Watershed and the Agenda for Reform”. Japan Echo, (Special Issue).

Toyoshita, N. (1996).Anpojoyaku no Seiritsu: Yoshida Gaiko to Tennou Gaikou. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho).

Yamazaki, M. & Kasuya, K. (1994).“Taking Stock of the Postwar Era”. Japan Echo, (Winter). Yara,Tomohiro.(2009) Sajyono Domei-Beigun

Saiehnga Akasu Uso (Okinawa; Okinawa Times) Internet (See the following web-site):

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ ref/1.html http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96-abe/statement http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/giko/bluebook/2013 http://www.eaci.or.jp/#forum http://www.mofago-jp-Asean

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戦後の日本の防衛政策: 歴史,課題そして新思考

Japan's Defense Policies in the Post-World War

Ⅱ:

History, Issues and New Ideas

仲地 清,伊禮 亮 

要旨  論文は1945年から今日までに日本の防衛政策の歴史的検証,課題の分析,新思考の提示である。安倍信三政権は憲 法9条の改正を含めた日本国憲法の改正へ向けて検討を始めた。しかしながら,冷戦時に社会主義国のソ連,中国に 対する防衛政策であった日米安全保障条約は今後も保持すると明言している。ソ連は崩壊し,代わったロシアも中国 も今では日米の敵ではなくなった。冷戦が終わったので,沖縄の人々が沖縄の米軍基地を撤去しほしいと要求しても 日米両政府は日米安全保障条約に基づいて,沖縄に駐留していると説明している。今,冷戦が終わり,グローバル時 代に見合う安全保障の新思考が必要である。 キーワード:日米安全保障条約,ヨーロッパ連合,アセアン,東アジア共同体

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