Prajñākaragupta s Theory of Sense-Perception
(indriyapratyakṣa):
With a Focus on the Criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School
Y
OKOYAMAAkito
0. Introduction
In Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (PVA) ad Dharmakīrti s (ca. 600–660) Pramāṇavārttika (PV)
3.194–207, Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), following Dharmakīrti who accepted the Sautrāntika theory of atomism, attempts to explain how sense-perception arises form ag-gregated atoms. This portion of PVA is important since it is regarded as being presupposed by Prajñākaragupta s famous citrādvaita theory (PVA ad PV 3.208–222. cf. Inami 2004). This paper aims to examine Prajñākaragupta s discussion in this portion, focusing on his criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
1. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Objections to the Buddhist View of Sense-Perception
In PV 3.194–207, Dharmakīrti criticized opponents in order to defend his own theory that the object of perception is multiple atoms. First, he presented an objection Even though atoms occur in the same perceptual field, those multiple atoms are not observed simultane-ously (PV 3.197ab. cf. Dunne 2004: 397, Tosaki 1979: 298). Prajñākaragupta explains this objection in detail. According to his explanation (PVA 280.16–19), objections can be clas-sified into two groups as follows: (A) a single perception cannot grasp multiple atoms multaneously because the manas acting on a certain object cannot act on other objects si-multaneously; or (B) the whole (avayavin) as the single substance should be accepted. This paper examines Prajñākaragupta s criticism of objection (A).
2. Prajñākaragupta s Criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Objection
2.1. The Criticism of the Objection that the Simultaneous Perception is an Illusion Due to Swiftness (lāghava)
According to opponents, it seems as if perception grasped multiple objects simultaneously due to the swiftness of perception, although perception can grasp them only successively. In PV 3.197 cd-199, Dharmakīrti rejected this view. According to Oki 1973: 973, this theory based on swiftness can be ascribed to Vasumitra (cf. MVi 64a18–20). However, Prajñākaragupta criticizes not only Vasumitra, but also another opponent who maintains the swiftness theory, as follows:
(Objection:) [The simultaneous perception is a false conception,] like [the cognition that the action of] piercing one hundred petals of lotus [by a needle occurs in a moment.] (cf. NV 105.6–7, TSP 830.7–9) (Reply:) This is not [correct] because things are not established on the basis of only examples. Indeed, [a thing] that is established in one case [is not always established] in the same manner in other cases. If [one] pierces one hundred petals from top to bottom one by one, it is proved that [the action of piercing] is successive by inference because simultaneous piercing is impossible. However, if [you] suppose that [the same example, piercing petals, can be applied to grasping multiple objects] in the same manner, the overextension (atiprasaṅga) of the example
cannot be prevented. Therefore, it is not established that [obtaining multiple objects simultaneously] is an illusion, since there are no defeaters (bādhaka). (PVA 281.2–5)
The underlined part corresponds to Uddyotakara s view as expressed in his Nyāyavārttika (NV). In this portion of NV, he uses the example of piercing petals in order to prove that we cannot perceive multiple objects like the moon and a branch of a tree simultaneously. Prajñākragupta rejects this view by indicating that nothing is proved on the basis of mere examples. Thus, Prajñākaragupta applies Dharmakīrti s criticism of Vasumitra s swiftness theory to his criticism of Uddyotakara.
2.2. The Criticism of the Prāpyakārin Theory
The reason that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proponents advocate the swiftness theory in order to re-ject simultaneous perception lies in their prāpyakārin theory. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, visual perception arises after a ray emitted from the eyes (nāyanaraśmi), affect-ed by the manas, has reachaffect-ed an object (prāpyakārin, cf. Akamatsu 1990). Therefore, the ray, insofar as the manas is single, cannot reach multiple objects simultaneously, but only one object at a time. If so, it is an illusion that the perception grasps multiple objects
simul-taneously. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains this illusion by the swiftness theory. In this way, the prāpyakārin theory is the basis of objection (A). Therefore, Prajñākaragupta must have rejected this theory in order to uphold his own position that perception grasps multiple at-oms simultaneously.
In PVA ad PV 3.205, Prajñākaragupta focuses on this prāpyakārin theory which Dharmakīrti did not deal with. First, Prajñākaragupta paraphrases the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ar-gument: the prāpyakārin theory can explain the fact that a perception does not arise when there are obstructions or a great distance between eyes and objects, while the Buddhist view, the aprāpyakārin theory, cannot. Prajñākaragupta criticizes this argument by saying that we can explain the occurrence of perception without the prāpyakārin theory because a sense-organ, like a magnet, affects an object that is within the range of its effect (PVA 284.21–25). The discussion sofar has already appeared in Nyāyasūtra and
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (cf. NS 3.1.45–48, AKBh 32.3–5). Prajñākaragupta further
suppos-es the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counter objection: A magnet which dosuppos-es not appear to be in contact with iron, actually is in contact with iron (PVA 284.30).
Then he rejects this counter objection as follows:
This is not [correct] because there is an overextension. For, since we see that a mantra can also attract something, it would result that what is attracted by that (=mantra) has contact [with a mantra.] If [the opponent says that] there would be [contact] in that case, this is wrong because sound (śabda) is a quality (guṇa) [, namely, of ether (ākāśa)]. (PVA 284.30–32)
Prajñākaragupta rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counter objection by indicating the example of the mantra that has no contact with objects. Further, he points out that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cannot regard a mantra as having contact because connection (saṃyoga)
belong-ing to the category of quality (guṇa) cannot inhere in the mantra, a kind of sound (śabda)
which is also a quality, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s system (cf. VS 1.1.15).
Prajñākaragupta further explains the reason we cannot perceive a distant object from an-other viewpoint, as follows:
In that case, it would result that an [object] that is very close (atinikaṭa) can be grasped, since a ray of a lamp can affect an [object] that is very close. Therefore, it should be accepted that eyes and so on have different properties from those of a lamp. (PVA 285.2–3)
I was not able to find criticisms based on the mantra and the atinikaṭa in other Buddhist treatises which criticize the prāpyakārin theory, like Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.
Conclusion
In the present paper, the following points have become clear. First, Prajñākaragupta classi-fies objections by opponents against perception s simultaneous grasping of multiple objects into two groups: (A) a single perception cannot grasp multiple objects simultaneously, and (B) a single whole substance is the object of sense-perception. He attempts to prove simul-taneous perception by criticizing both of these objections. Second, he criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory in more detail than Dharmakīrti. The latter criticizes only Vasumitra s swiftness theory in PV 3.197cd–199, whereas Prajñākaragupta criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view also as it is expressed in NV. Third, the Nyāya-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika objection (A) is based on their prāpyakārin theory. Prajñākaragupta s criticism of the prāpyakārin theory in PVA ad PV 3.205 can be regarded as aiming to reject objection (A) and to support his own position.
Abbreviations
AKBh Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Prahlad Pradhan, ed. Abhidharma Koṣabhāṣya. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
MVi Dapiposhalun 大毘婆沙論 (*Mahāvibhāṣa): Taisho, vol. 27, no. 1545.
NS Gautama, Nyāyasūtra: Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha, ed. Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara s
Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra s Tātpariyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha s Vṛtti. 2 vols. Calcutta: Metropolitan
Printing & Publishing House, 1936–1944. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book, 1982. NV Uddyotakara, Nyāyavārttika: See NS.
PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika: Miyasaka Yūshō, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). In Acta Indologica II, 2–41. Narita: Naritasan Shinshōji, 1971–1972.
PVA Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra: Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana, ed. Pramānavārtikabhāshyam
or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇavārtikam). Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
TSP Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā: Embar Krishnamacharya, ed. Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. 2 vols. Gaekwad s Oriental Series, nos. 30–
31. Baroda: Central Library, 1926.
VS Kanāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra: Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, ed. Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Com-mentary of Candrānanda. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1982.
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Key words Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, indriyapratyakṣa, prāpyakārin
(Graduate Student, University of Tsukuba)
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