CCihe
~ole ~tar j[Montblp
VoL. III-No. 5] }UNE 1, 1933 Price 3 sen Published by the Hokuseido Nishikicho, Kanda, Tokyo.
World Economic Parley Faces
Most Vital Issues Since War
such further deterioration the United States in general stands to lose as much as any other country, and if it occurs the actual monetary loss to the American treasury would far exceed the annuities which could be collected. On the other hand, no nation is in a position to say what policy it can pursue either in the monetary or the commercial field so long as the question remains unsettled.
By Sir Walter Layton, Editor of the London Economist None of the long and apparently in·
terminable series of international confer- ences that have met since the war--with the exception of the Peace Conference itself-has been charged with more vital importance or anticipated with more hopefulness, not unmixed with anxiety, than the World Economic Conference which is to meet in London this year.
This is due to the now almost universal recognition of the fact that the economic crisis cannot be solved, and can hardly even be palliated, by the action of in- dividual governments. It has now been abundantly proved that independent ac- tion, unless very wisely conceived and studied in its reaction upon other coun- tries, is likely to deepen the general de- pression, and that any benefits which accrue to an individual -nation are at best only relative. In short, there has rarely been a clearer case of a vicious circle, or one on a larger scale.
Restrictions on Imports Nearly every government in the world, for example, has tried to protect its national enonomy by a restriction of its imports. The more countries take such action, the stronger is the inducement for others to do so; and the more futile it becomes for all together, since every nation's imports are some other nation's exports. The process is obviously a suicidal one; yet none of the countries caught in the circle dares' singly to step outside it for fear of becoming a dump- ing ground for other countries' exports, without being able to expand its own.
For this reason, the progressive decline in the trade and production of the world can only be halted by cooperative agree- ment between. the nations. To achieve this not only in commercial matters, but in financial and monetary policy also, is the task of the Conference.
Before the Conference can meet with any prospect of a satisfactory outcome, W:o prerequisite conditions must be at- tamed. The first is a slackening of JlOlitical tension.
War Debt Problem
The other condition precedent is a final solution of the problem of the war deb_ts. Expert opinion, by no means futlrely European in its composition, has Th long been unanimous on this point.
y e Committee of Experts under the oung Plan, which met at Basel in December 1931, placed the question of
inter-governmental payments- including both reparations and war debts- in the forefront of their recommendations, and largely as a result of this report repara- tions were provisionally settled and the debts of the European nations to each other suspended at Lausanne last sum- mer. Since the end of the Lausanne Conference, the board of the Bank for International Settlements has recorded a similar opinion from the point of view of monetary reconstruction, while the Preparatory Commission of Experts for the World Economic Conference have stated in their report that "until there is such a settlement, or the definite prospect of such a settlement, these debts will remain an insuperable barrier to economic and financial reconstruction."
But let us not harbor any illusions.
Whatever view we may take of the role played by the attempt to collect these vast governmental debts in causing the original disequilibrium which brought on the slump, it is now quite obvious that the depression, once started, has develop- ed on a scale out of all proportion to the amounts involved in the debts. It is estimated, for example, that the annual national income of the United States must have shrunk by at least 30 billion dollars since 1929 - an amount three times as great as the whole capital value of the original debts and one hundred times the amount of one annuity. The value of the total foreign trade of the United States in 1932 was only a fraction over 30 percent of its 1929 value.
Customs receipts alone have fallen in three years by an amount roughly equal to the scheduled debt annuities for 1933.
As a result of declines of this order, re- produced in greater or less measure in every country of the world, the com- plexity and magnitude of the general problem facing the world are now im- mensely beyond those of the war debts alone. In these circumstances, even the complete cancellation of the debts would not set us again on the upward slope.
Effect on Exchanges
A similar argument applies to the sug- gestion that the debts should be remitted in return for tariff concessions which would enable the debtors to ·increase their purchases of American goods. The fact is that inability to make the pay- ments has not arisen because the debtor nations have been buying too little from America, but because America has been buying too little from the debtors. The only tariff barrier a lowering of which has any relevance to the problem of the war debts is that of the United States itself.
From European Angle There is, moreover, another aspect of the debt question which must be mention- ed because of its bearing on procedure and on the kind of discussions that may take place in the next few months. The debtor countries make no complaint if the United States insists on negotiating separately with each of them on debts, which are regarded at Washington as business transactions, juridically uncon- nected either with reparations or with war-loan obligations between the debtors themselves. But it is unreasonable to expect Europe to share this American viewpoint; and Britain, with her obliga- tions under the League Covenant and as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, must inevitably look at the matter from the angle of a European Power. Practi- cally and politically, reparations and war debts are inseparable factors in a single problem touching deeply international relationships and involving every Eu- ropean country- including Germany- which stands in the position either of debtor or debtor-creditor on war account.
The feeling is very widespread in Great Britain that it would be inequitable that a country which lent more to its associates for war purposes than it bor- rowed should be called upon in a final settlement not merely to collect from its own taxpayers, but to transfer abroad, a net sum out of its own resources. But, But a solution of the question is the if we do not do this and if we attempt first step; for if an attempt were now to collect from Europe whatever we may made to resume the payments, the psy- have to pay to America, we should in chological effect on the mentality of the I fact be fixing in our negotiations at whole world and the direct effect upon Washington the scale of the demands the foreign exchanges and money markets which we would subsequently have to would inevitably be such as to give the make on France and Italy. It would world a fresh push down hill. From any obviously be unreasonable for us to do
2
(第 三 種 郵 便 物 認可〉
this witho,,)t consultation with those countries
,
rarticuiarly having regard to the fact tha¥ their ability to meet their debt to us must to some extent depend on what they'themselves agree to pay to the United States. 1n other words, though negotiations may be conducted separate‑ ly,
there can be no final settlement until all the chief items in the account have been settl巴d.Unit告dBargaining Front
THE POLE STAR MONTHL Y VOL. III, NO. 5
How Germany Sees the
羽
Tor1d's Greatest, Problem ‑UnemploymentThis does not mean that the European debtors have created a united front" to be.rgain Vvith t
I 1
e United States. Indeed, the action taken last December shows the.t each of us r巴tains our liberty of inuependent aじtion. It is merely a re‑ cogni tion of thεfact that thes2 payments are inevitably linked together both eco・nOl111C
ヨ
llyand politically, ancl explains why the British Cabinet and Parliament wouid be uniikely 10 ratify any settle‑ITt.ent the g己nerallin巴sof which l;1ight be worked out in the Anglo‑American lle::ro; iations. until the final balance sheet
oI ~all these' intergovernmental debts has I ¥Ve rep:'o?uce here a s;‑ries of diag~ams I comes must be also deducled the money been drawn up and the way thus paved I of l1:elanc~lOly .~nt~rest :~.hich app̲E;ared r~: I ̲spent 011 the unem?Iloye? by meallS ';f Ior the larger ‑tasks of the' I'Vorld' Con‑I ~~ntly i~ the serliner .I!lustrir~e Zci~,:ng." I ~ire氾t ~n,:mployment benefit̲ of e,:ery kin ,d
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1 They relate to the pl'oblems of world UI1‑1 throllgh the organisation of work,
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~~~~bï~:"';c t;o;;'-o~"-th;'-~~-;;';~ic wsid~
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9 ;‑I as the Experts themselves point out, the I a ~r~~~_
push down l1ill. 此揚合、 新し
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haveωb('! macte on. a lIroad I 吾慢 務th;~--~ r~;-~r;~l -~f-th~ ~-hoï;"t~~~d--~f I front and progress will have to be made I A~~ican tre~sury.
米 図 大 蔵 省
tariff policy since the war. The magnトIi~ ea~ll seët~r-~f it isω~e made .at all.1 t~r!ff concess~~~.~.関 税 上の 諸 譲歩
tude and V'ital necesslty ui this task;o~-I 官 will not,
" they say,be possible ωI statu~ '}.uo;現 状
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Th;; t~(;sides of the Conference's work, I solve thisαisis."‑Fo阿 佐 四Afjairs. I( 部門)
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世界 経 済 合議Jの 註 │資本 の 移 動 の 再 開
ιand ‑the solution of one set of problems I a vicious circle. 循環 論 法 1 piecemeal measure.