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Vol.55 , No.3(2007)203松岡 寛子「『唯識三十頒』第一頒‘vijnanapariname’の第七格解釈について」

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On vijnanapariname in Trimsikakarika

MATSUOKA Hiroko

0. In the first verse of his Trimsikakarika (TrK) Vasubandhu states: atmadharmopacaro hi vividho yah pravartate/vijnanapariname 'sau parinamah sa ca tridha (TrKI [L13.3-4]). This verse is well known as expressing the core of the Yogacara doctrine accepted by Vasubandhu. Thus, a correct interpretation of the verse is crucial to a proper understanding of Vasubandhu's doctrine. This paper will examine two inter-pretations of the verse: one commonly adopted by modern scholars, such as Unebe and another put forth by the commentator Sthiramati. In fact, Sthiramati anticipates the interpretation of modern scholars and presents an argument to reject it. This ar-gument is also presented below.

1. To begin with, let us see what Unebe says.

Unebe[2004:137.6-13]: "According to him (Sthiramati), the verse (pada abc) means that various verbal expressions such as "atman" or "jiva" for human beings and "dharma" or "ayatana" for other constituents of this world are used among people (loka) as well as in the scientific system (sastra), but they refer to the transformations of consciousness (vijh -na pari-nama) in reality and, therefore, they are mere secondary applications (upacara)." The important point to note here is that Unebe takes vijnanaparinama as the refer-ent of a 'verbal expression' (upacara). According to Unebe [2004:137.3-5], the ex-pression upacarah pravartate vijnanapariname is a construction of the type sabdahpravartate arthe 'A certain word occurs in the domain of a certain meaning', so that it means 'A verbal expression refers to vijnanaparinama'.

It is debatable, however, whether the expression in question can be a construction of the type described above. I think that it is difficult to establish a signifier-signif-icand relation between upacara as a verbal expression and vijnanaparinama. 2.1. Sthiramati introduces the following arguments made on the assumption that the term upacara means a metaphorical expression.

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"It is not proper to have a metaphorical expression (upacara) when there do not exist at-man and dharmas as primary referents (mukhya). For, a metaphorical expression must meet three conditions: the primary referent of the word, the actual referent resembling the primary one, and a common quality existing between the two." (TrBh[L17.7-9]) The point made here is this: Suppose that the word atman refers to the self which really exists. If the same word is used to refer to a thing which is not atman and similar to it, this use of the word atman is called upacara or secondary. In this case it is also said that the word atman has two meanings: primary and secondary (gauna).

2.2. Sthiramati denies such a distinction:

"There is also no primary referent for a word since the essence of that [i.e., the primary thing] goes beyond the scope of thought(jnana) and language (abhidhana). For, it is only to grasp and to convey an [unreal] secondary aspect (gunarupa) that a cognition and a verbal expression occur, because they do not touch the essence of the primary thing. Oth-erwise [a cognition and a verbal expression, which are related only to] an [unreal] second-ary aspect, would become useless. Indeed, there is no means of determining the essence of the primary thing other than a cognition and a verbal expression. Thus it is to be understood that there cannot be any primary referent since there is no cognition or verbal expression to grasp or to convey it." (TrBh[L17.23-27])

Sthiramati argues that a cognition and a verbal expression do not touch the very es-sence of a primary thing but its unreal secondary aspect, which amounts to saying that they do not occur with reference to the ultimate reality but to the conventional reality. It is clear that he intends to imply here that the use of any word is second-ary (upacara), so that no essential distinction can be made between the use of a cer-tain word with reference to a cercer-tain thing and that of the same word with reference to another similar thing.

Thus we may say that to take the term upacara as meaning a metaphorical ex-pression as opposed to a primary exex-pression carries us too far away from the origi-nal intention of Vasubandhu.

3.1. We have to consider what Sthiramati states in his comments on the verse, to see how he understands Vasubandhu's statement atmadharmopacarah pravartate

vi-jnanapariname.

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(alayavij-(95)

nana) the conceptual cognition (vikalpa) in which [a thing such as] atman (the self) ap-pears (nirbhasa) and the one in which [dharmas (constituent factors of experience) such as] a material factor (rupa) appear, on the basis of the full development (pariposa) of the impression (vasana) left by the conceptualization of atman and the like and on the basis of the full development of the impression left by the conceptualization of a material factor and the like.

Although atman and dharmas do not exist externally, there occur the conceptual con-struction (upacara) of [such a thing as] atman and that of [such dharmas as] a material factor, which are beginningless, by means of thinking of the appearance of [a thing such as] atman and the appearance of [dharmas such as] a material factor as if they were enti-ties outside the conceptual cognition, and clinging to them." (TrBh[L16.2-6])

Here it is pointed out that in the vijnanaparinama there arise from dlayavijndna the conceptual cognitions in which atman and dharmas appear and that when such con-ceptual cognitions are produced, the concon-ceptual construction, which I think is meant by the term upacara here, of atman and dharmas occur. Thus Sthiramati shows that the expression upacdrah pravartate vijnanapariname does not admit of Unebe's interpretation.

3.2. Then we have to determine exactly what is meant by the locative ending in the word vijnanapariname. Sthiramati says:

"Moreover

, [it must be said that] when x does not exist in y then x is conceptually con-structed in y (yac ca yatra nasti tat tatropacaryate); for instance, [when the cause for the use of the word] go [does not exist in a Bahika then] it is conceptually constructed in the Bahika.

Similarly, because dtman and dharmas exist neither in the [transformation of] conscious-ness itself nor outside of it, atman and dharmas are just conceptual constructs (parikalpita) and do not exist from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth (paramarthatas). Therefore, the one-sided view should not be accepted that as a cognition (vijnana) exists as a real entity (dravyatas), so also does something to be cognized (vijneya).

Since no conceptual construction can take place without a locus (adhara), it should nec-essarily be accepted that the vijnanaparinama, in which occurs the conceptual construction of atman and dharmas, exists as a real entity (vastutas). Therefore, it is not reasonable to accept that as something to be cognized is simply conventionally real and not ultimately real (samvrtitas), so is also a cognition. For, the undesirable consequence would follow

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that the cognition does not exist even at the conventional level. Indeed it is not proper to say that a conventional reality has no basis (nirupadana)." (TrBh[L16.6-11))

The point to note here is that the vijnanaparinama is described as the locus in which the conceptual construction of atman and dharmas occurs. According to Sthiramati, atman and dharmas are simply conceptual constructs (parikalpita; TrBh [L15.20-21]: atma dharmas ca upacaryanta ity atmadharmopacarah), whereas the vijn-anaparinama exists as a real entity. It is patent that he takes the locative ending in vijnanapariname as signifying a locus. If the vijnanaparinama serves as locus in such a conceptual construction, it is properly to be said to be the cause of the con-ceptual construction.

Thus we may say that there obtains a causal relation between vijnanaparinama and upacara as a conceptual construction.

4. The following points have become clear:

(1) The term upacara in atmadharmopacara is to be understood as signifying con-ceptual construction or a concon-ceptual construct, leading to conventional discourse, rather than a metaphorical expression.

(2) The locative ending of the word vijnanapariname signifies the locus (adhara) in which occur the conceptual construction (upacara) of atman and that of dharmas. This shows that the vijnanaparinama is the cause for the occurrence of the concep-tual constructions.

Unebe cannot be justified in saying that various verbal expressions (upacara) refer to the transformation of consciousness. According to the Yogacara doctrine, the vij-nanaparinama exists as a real entity and hence cannot be referred to by any verbal expression. Rather, what can be the referent of a verbal expression is simply atman or dharmas, which are just conceptual constructs.

Thus the verse (padas a-c) is to be translated as follows:

"Indeed, the different kinds of conceptual construction (upacara) of atman and dharmas, which occur in everyday life (loka) and in theoretical discourse (sastra), occur in the trans-formation of consciousness."

〈References〉 TrBh[L]: Trimsikabhasya (Sthiramati). See TrK[L]. TrK[L]: Trimsikakarika (Vasubandhu). Sylvain Levi ed., Vijnaptimatratasiddhi: deux Traites de Vasubandhu:

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Vim-satika (la Vingtaine) accompagnee d'une Explication en Prose et Trimsika (la Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion Press, 1925. Unebe, Toshiya [2004]: "The "Grammarian's Objection" in Sthiramati's Trimsika-bhasya and Bhartrhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words," in Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Mo-tilal Banarsidass.

〈Key Words〉 Trimsikakarika, upacara, vijnanaparinama

(Graduate Student, Hiroshima University)

新刊紹介 四津 谷 孝 道 『ツ ォ ン カ パ の 中 観 思 想 ― こ とば に よ る こ とば の 否 定― 』 A5版 ・389頁 ・定 価9,975円 大 蔵 出版 ・2006年11月

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