Recent Developments in the Region

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population.²⁴⁴ Hence, the outcome of the two Egyptian uprisings was the restoration of the external balance of power in favor of the GCC.

Another country that was hit by Arab uprisings was Libya. Gaddafi’s regime had bad relations with the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, as it had tried to assassinate the previous King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime was a positive point for the GCC;²⁴⁵ two members of the GCC—the UAE and Qatar—played active roles in the military campaigns against Gaddafi’s forces.²⁴⁶

In Syria, the confrontation between the GCC and Iran is very obvious and public.²⁴⁷ The Syrian regime is considered one of the most important allies of Iran in the region, and there are military, intelligence, and logistical links between Iran and Hezbollah,²⁴⁸ a Lebanese organization under the control of the Iranian regime.²⁴⁹ After the Syrian uprisings, Iran tried extensively to support its ally, Assad’s regime, but the revolution was overwhelming. The GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, supported the moderate opposition to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) logistically, financially, and in the form of military aid. This became a proxy war between the GCC and Iran in Syria;²⁵⁰ Turkey also supported some groups of the Syrian opposition. The GCC and Turkey had different purposes for intervening in Syria: The Gulf was looking to counteract the Iranian influence in Syria, while Turkey, a neighbor of Syria, wished to increase its regional leverage in its own backyard.²⁵¹ On the other hand, Iran sent troops and even ordered Hezbollah to interfere in the Syrian War. Iran also recruited many Shia organizations and groups from Iraq and Afghanistan to fight with Assad’s

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regime,²⁵² inviting extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda to become involved in this conflict by releasing several leaders from Syrian jails. This may have led the extremist groups to weaken the moderate opposition parties.²⁵³ But the outcome so far has been in favor of the opposition;

Assad’s regime became weak, and Hezbollah suffered a large number of casualties.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, Assad’s regime now controls only about a sixth of Syrian land.²⁵⁵

In Iraq, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh, controls a large area of the country, as well as more than 30% of Syria.²⁵⁶ Daesh poses a threat to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Daesh has weakened the Iraqi government, which was a good ally to Iran. Surprisingly, Daesh has not waged any direct attack on Iran, but it has claimed many attacks on Saudi mosques.²⁵⁷ Hence, I consider Daesh negative for both the GCC and Iran.

In Yemen, which is considered the backyard of Saudi Arabia, the GCC interfered through its initiative to shape the transitional political process in Yemen to remove ex-President Saleh peacefully from his position and create a newly elected government. The intervention of Iran through the Houthis group with help from Saleh’s loyalists led to a military coup and the expulsion of the legitimate government. Then, the GCC interfered militarily (in OperationDecisive Storm), which I will discuss later in this chapter when I address the steps that were taken by the GCC to demonstrate a more assertive neorealist doctrine.²⁵⁸

In general, if we calculate the final outcomes of the Arab uprisings in terms of the balance of power in the Gulf region, we find that the uprising in Egypt was positive for the GCC; the uprising in Libya—although it did not affect the balance impressively—was

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positive for the GCC; and the uprising in Syria clearly benefitted the GCC by weakening Iran’s biggest ally in the region. In Iraq, the GCC has not benefited because Daesh is an enemy to both the Iraqi government and Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, the GCC has not benefited because the country is divided between the Houthis and the government in Aden, which is supported by the GCC. ²⁵⁹Therefore, the total result of the Arab uprisings is in favor of the GCC. But if we compare the balance of power before and after the Arab uprisings, we will notice that Egypt, for example, was an ally to the GCC, and so the Gulf simply restored its ally. Yemen was also an ally of the GCC, but the old regime and the Houthis became

enemies; therefore, we can’t jump to the conclusion that the GCC has benefited from the Arab uprisings in terms of the balance of power until we see the final results in Syria, Yemen.

Seeking objectivity to measure the balance of power and the value of each state in the balance of power, I selected military spending as the gauge. The average military spending for the sum of five Arab affected by uprisings states before the Arab Uprisings is 2126 million $; therefore, the weight of each state is their own military spending on $2,126. While in the era of post- Arab Uprisings, the average of yearly military spending increased to 2619 million $ in 2014.

Table 6.1 External balance and allies of Gulf powers Pre-Arab Uprisings

Country allies

Tunisia Egypt Libya Yemen Syria Total

Saudi Arabia 0.28+ 2.16+ 0.62- 0.81+ 1.11- 1.52+

Iran 0.28- 2.16- 0.62+ 0.81- 1.11+ 1.52-

Table 6.2 External balance and allies of Gulf powers Post-Arab Uprisings Country

Allies

Tunisia Egypt Libya Yemen Syria Total

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Saudi Arabia 0 1.89+ 1.44+ 0 0 3+

Iran 0 1.89- 1.44- 0 0 3-

Notice: (+) means an ally, (-) means non-ally and (0) means indeterminate.

Source: Alshammary, modified from military spending, According to the information of Sipri.

Another major development in the Gulf was the US withdrawal from the region. For decades, the United States was a major pillar of security in the Arabian Gulf, but US allies in the Gulf were uncomfortable with the ideas of some US politicians who said that the region did not hold as much importance to the US agenda as it had before. This gave Iran the chance to fill the United States’ void in the Middle East. As a result, the GCC tried to take a more active role in its own security efforts.²⁶⁰ Although some US officials deny military withdrawal from the region, the GCC viewed US disengagement in the region, mainly in the recent

military conflicts, as withdrawing. Additionally, the United States has rejected invitations to participate in Syria in order to remove Assad’s regime, and in Yemen, the United States only provided minimal logistical support for the Arab coalition.

In recent years, US oil production has increased significantly, which has reduced US dependence on the energy supply from the Middle East. The GCC found itself in a critical situation, as the power (i.e., the United States) that had been maintaining stability in the Gulf region for decades and acting as a counterbalance to Iran left after these changes in US priorities.²⁶¹

Furthermore, the concept of the pivot to Asia became popular among politicians and decision makers in the United States, and they, along with the United States’ tight military budget, did not allow the Pentagon to have large forces in both Asia and the

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Gulf.²⁶²Therefore, the Gulf states have to be more self-dependent and more involved in the security process, which has led to the self-help concept of neorealism. Before we consider the concept of anarchy in the eyes of the Gulf and Iran, I want to review two major events

mentioned earlier: the invasion of Iraq without UN authorization and the UN sanctions against Iran. As a result of these, the Iranian regime believes there is no higher formal authority that can fairly deal with Iran, while the Gulf States believe that, if the United States has no more interest in the region, nobody will care whether Iran attacks the sovereignty of the GCC.

Regarding self-help, both competitors (Saudi Arabia and Iran) have found themselves in the position of needing to be more dependent on self-power and their capabilities to protect their existence. Regarding internal balance, the military and economic capabilities of the GCC are much higher than those of Iran; for example, the UAE’s air forces could destroy Iran’s old air forces in several hours.²⁶³ Therefore, Iran tries to compensate for its weakness in conventional power through asymmetric warfare, which is considered one of the fundamentals of Iranian military doctrine.²⁶⁴

It is important to mention that security is responsible for drawing Iranian behavior toward other states more than ideology or economy; otherwise, there is no good explanation for Iran to cooperate with Al-Qaeda, which has a totally conflicting ideology, or for Iran to occupy UAE islands when Dubai is the most important trade partner in the region.²⁶⁵

Gulf rulers in the past used techniques to keep the balance of power or status quo in Iran, including chain ganging, which was the idea behind creating the GCC. They also used passing the buck effectively, either by supporting Saddam during the Iraq–Iran war or by letting the United States take the major role in Gulf security arrangements.²⁶⁶

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Recently, however, Saudi Arabia techniques to keep the balance of power with Iran have caused it to adopt an assertive (offensive) and a determinedly neorealist doctrine to maintain the status quo in the region.²⁶⁷ For example, it took steps to develop its military capabilities and hiked its military spending dramatically in recent years²⁶⁸ (the best single indicator of military power is one’s defense budget). It also tried to change the map of alliances in the Middle East by forming a pan-Arab force and creating a new coalition,

including the GCC plus Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan, which played a role in Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen (new chain ganging) in confronting Iranian expansion in the Arab world.²⁶⁹

Thus, the GCC, in order to ensure some kind of self-defense ability and independence from the United States, started to spend more on arms deals. For example, Gulf oil producers pumped nearly $130 billion into the military sector in 2012 as they pushed ahead with a drive to bolster their defense, according to Western data.²⁷⁰

In addition, the GCC will have a new force of 100,000 members. “There will be a unified command of around 100,000 members, God willing. I hope it will happen soon, and the National Guard is ready for anything that is asked of it,” Prince Miteb, the minister of the Saudi National Guard, was quoted as saying by the Saudi Press Agency.²⁷¹

The GCC has also planned to launch a joint military command.²⁷² In addition, the Gulf is planning to establish an advanced and strong antiballistic missile shield to protect the GCC from Iranian missiles.²⁷³ The Gulf has become more active in security and military issues in the region; a good example was Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to defuse the threat of

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the pro-Iranian group Houthis, as well as its active contribution and discussion in the formation of the new pan-Arab forces.²⁷⁴