Life, Moral Status and Biocentrism: An Operational Definition

In sections 3.3 and 3.4, it has been made clear that the concept of life cannot be defined in terms of intrinsic value and moral status. If we intend to endorse the term

“life” as a basic foundation of biocentrism, however, it is essential to show its relationship with intrinsic value as well as a necessitate component of moral status.

In responding to the problem, it is essential to spell out an answer to this question:

what is the criterion of moral status? Is it a capacity? Is it a moral agency? Or is it having right to life or livingness? Suppose, if we accept the view that only rational beings having moral status or having capacity is the criterion to determine moral status, it will be quite clear to us that living organisms do not have moral status. As such, biocentrism will be an impossible theory. But, our forthcoming analysis will show this assumption as trivial and pejorative.

For example, it is not difficult to show that most traditions of the eastern and the western thought have often been claimed that “life” is in everywhere. In the east, particularly in Indian traditions: Vedic, Jainist and Buddhist thoughts, it is said to believe in the notion of “all living organisms are full of life”. In a different manner western paganism, Greek pantheism, and some philosophical traditions believe on the same notion. Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor in the West assume that all living things ought to be treated equally as having their equal moral status. It reveals a normative ideal that livingness is the criteria of moral status. However, such an exposition has a counter-intuitive. Now, I will enter into the exposition of Marry Anne Warren’s view of moral status that I have discussed in the previous section.

If we consider the definition “[t]o have moral status ... is to be an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations.”¹⁸¹ In this definition, it is clear that Warren introduces the concept of moral status in terms of obligation and

179 Warren, 2007, p.239.

180 Henry Beston, cited by Warren on p. 239.

181Warren, Mary A.,1997, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.9.

duty. If it is so, obviously one may conclude that agents have direct duties towards other human beings, not to the objects. As such, she explicates the concept of moral status as something relational term. It is not difficult to show that duties have two aspects: (i) if anything have duty towards the objects; it implies that there is a bond between moral agents and objects. In a sense, moral agent is a “moral subjects” and the rest of the beings are “moral objects”. Therefore, Warren’s definition of “moral status” is convicted with the duality of subjects and objects. Whereas subject is with the moral status and the rest of the objects are undermine with it. A clear hierarchy can be found in this duality. This is enough to regret the Warren’s defence of moral status. So, the question is: how do we understand the term moral status?

In the section “Clarification of Key Concepts” of the first chapter, some notions of environmental ethics have been discussed, which indicates to extend morality.

Animal liberation is one of the strong notions that define moral status on the basis of

“sentience” and “subject-of-a-life”. At the first point, it is not illogical to raise a question whether sentience is the only criteria to define the term moral status. Recent biological researches have shown that “most strong motivating emotions” are in commonly present in the brain-stem of human beings and animals. Such emotions are essential for both human beings and non-human beings to find food, to get a strong partner of opposite sex, to take care of the offspring, and to strive to survive. Paul D MacLean¹⁸² finds out that we share these emotions with all reptiles, birds, fish, invertebrate animals, and mammals too. So, according to recent research of Maclean, Singer’s notion of sentience to draw a line between sentient and non-sentient beings has failed. On the other hand, subject-of-a-life as criterion of moral status is not as successful as moral status claim. If we consider that only subject-of-a-life is a criterion of moral status, a question may be opened here whether other living beings which do not have subject-of-a-life, having no moral status.

Therefore, both the criteria are unsuccessful in defining “moral status”. Because of that we may examine other criteria as the basic traits of moral status that is a

“life”. It is not surprising to think, as I have referred to scientific evidence done by McLean, that there is no difference between human beings and other non-human beings in terms of sensitivity and emotion. Therefore, finally, I approach to welcome

182 Maclean, Paul D., 1990. The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Pale-cerebral Functions, New York: Plenum Press.

Paul Taylor’s notion of life, which is supposed to be common to all living things. In supporting this conclusion, a strong defence has evolved from the story of evolution.

In the process of evolution all the living things share some basic similarities among all living things. In terms of “genetic ancestry”, condition of life sharing and the mutual interdependency are similarly present in all living things.

Life in living things appears in terms of “conation”. I have already argued that some scientific evidences support the view of “all living organisms have life” in terms of striving for survival, caring of the offspring, sharing emotions each other and self-preservation. In fact, conation as a representation of life introduced in the discussion of moral status of non-human beings was influenced by Aristotelian conception of autopoises which means self-production. Spinoza’s view of “natura naturata and natura naturans” and Leibniz’s view of causation also inherited the notion of self-production. In this connection, there are two traits: (i) self-production and (ii) self-organization. Both traits are existed in conativism.¹⁸³

“Conativism” reflected with its full-pledged meaning in Taylor’s notion of

“teleological notion of life”. In his definition of living things the notion “conativism”

characterizes: “the organism as a teleological centre of life, striving to preserve itself.”¹⁸⁴ He characterizes the living things as “… a unified system of organized activity, the constant tendency of which is to preserve its existence by protecting and promoting its well-being.”¹⁸⁵ In this characterization of living things, Taylor also attempts to define the concept “life” in terms of “conation”.

The discussion made above suggests that we cannot define the term life within a specific or definite sphere. Life is something extraordinary. This is why it does not depend on any criterion. But, life itself is the representative of moral status. And, something has got life means it has also intrinsic value. It reflects a view that moral status does not proclaim to show any other special trait or outstanding characteristic as human beings claim. So, taking into consideration the philosophical controversy

183Here, I have introduced J Baird Callicott’s view of “conativism” what he uses to characterize the biocentric understanding of Albert Schweitzer, Kenneth Goodpaster and Pul Taylor. See Callicott, 1989 (b).

184 Taylor, 1986, p.121.

185 Taylor, 1986, p.45.

regarding the issue of life, we need to explain it from environmental and biological perspectives.